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MIDDLE EAST
Human Rights
The Human Rights of Middle Eastern & Muslim Women: A Project for the 21st Century Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1, February 2004, pp. 106-125 Afary, Janet Abstracted by: Lucy Meliksetian [2010] Abstract: This article is divided into three categories. First, it looks at the different measures taken by various countries in North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East in upholding human rights for women. Second, it examines the different legal reforms that have been undertaken by women's rights activists, feminists, non-profit organizations, and grassroots networks. Lastly, it focuses on the various institutions and movements that are occurring in these regions to further promote and raise awareness of women and human rights. Currently, there are a number of countries within North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East that are still denying women their basic rights. Middle Eastern and Muslim women have suffered myriad types of human rights abuses since the 20th century. They have been constant victims of rape, sexual slavery, debt bondage, domestic violence, and had limited or no access to legal, political, or economic rights. In Kuwait for instance, although women are active in the education and employment sectors of society, they still have limited rights when it comes to marriage or divorce, they cannot pass their nationality on to their husband or their children, and they are still prohibited from voting. In Pakistan, domestic violence still abounds, with Human Rights Watch reporting very high levels of such abuse, including rape and so-called "honor killings". However, human rights and its effects on women have not been violated or suppressed in all countries of these regions. In Jordan in 2001, the government repealed Article 340 of the Personal Code which shielded men who participated in honor killings. In Turkey, thanks to women's rights advocates and public campaigns, the Civil Code was reformed which made men and women equal partners in marriage, gave women the right to divorce, raised the legal marriage age to 18, allowed single parents to adopt children, and gave inheritance rights to children born out of wedlock. Although there are still many human rights occuring against women, improvements are being made and public awareness of women and human rights are spreading throughout these regions.
Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on the Headscarf Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2005, pp. 35-61 Shadad, W., P.S. Van Koningsveld Abstracted by: Lucy Meliksetian [2010] See listing under "Religion"
Peacekeeping
Elusive Ingredient: Hamas and the Peace Process Journal of Palestine Studies, Summer 2004, Issue 132, no. 3. pp.39-52 Milton-Edwards, B. and Crooke, A. Abstracted by: Paula Broadwell Abstract: This essay argues that the significant shift in the political power balance in the Occupied Palestinian Territories towards Islamist movements like Hamas has major implications for the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and must be taken into account if there is any chance for a successful resolution. Indeed, all the plans put forward since the outbreak of the second intifada to end the violence and return to negotiations have failed. The authors, who have first-hand involvement with conflict resolution and negotiations with Hamas, survey the movement's evolution on the ground and its implications on Palestinian refugee human rights, its participation in cease-fire and intra-Palestinian talks to date, and its positions on power accommodation with the other Palestinian factions and on eventual participation in peace talks or governance. Many Palestinians have come to believe that the PLO/Palestinian Authority (PA) no longer has a credible national strategy capable of leading to a just solution of the conflict with Israel. Since 2000, political support for the PA had ebbed further under the impact of the general militarization of the Palestinian environment; persistent Israeli military incursions, curfews, and closures; and the withering of its own basic service provision as a result of the above. In the PA's stead, Hamas has filled a leadership void in these areas, for Palestinians in Israel and those in refugee camps in neighboring countries. Hamas is an historic movement whose leadership presides over a major social-welfare, political, and armed structure that rivals the PLO in terms of its presence and roots in the Palestinian arena. Its popularity has surged in recent years, making it a major political force. And while it is true that armed struggle appears to define Hamas's present relationship with Israel, it is also true that it has demonstrated considerable political pragmatism in the past and that, more recently, it has shown itself to be open to political maneuver as well as to armed resistance as a dual policy of maximizing its position in the local arena. At present, Hamas is the second largest armed faction in Israel, and unless it is brought into the political process there is little likelihood that it will disarm either before or after an Israeli evacuation. Yet despite its power, both as a political and as an armed force, Hamas remains marginalized from the political track of conflict resolution by Israel and key members of the international community. There has been some recognition of the shortsightedness of this policy, and efforts by the European Union did begin to yield results in terms of mediating a dialogue with Islamists. Such activities were politically foreshortened, however, by the intervention of stronger external actors (e.g. the US) that objected to dialogue with those they had come to consider in the same camp as the al-Qa`ida extremists. The role of external actors in rebuffing Hamas and equating it to al-Qa`ida ignores the stark reality and changed perception on the ground. The authors refute the view that Hamas is quintessentially committed to terrorism and incapable of the kind of journey from armed struggle to negotiated settlement. They conclude that current peace frameworks, by ignoring Hamas's weight and its indications of readiness for political incorporation into peacemaking, are ignoring what could be the "elusive ingredient" for peace.
Palestinian Refugees and the Politics of Peacemaking International Crisis Group, Middle East Report N22, February 3, 2004 , pp. 1-25. Abstracted by: Paula Broadwell Abstract: The plight of the refugees and the demand that their right of return be recognized has been central to the Palestinian struggle since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This report seeks to identify those actors and factors most likely to determine how Palestinian refugees will react to a negotiated agreement of the refugee question. After a statistical look at the dispersed Palestinian demographic and a detailed description of the status of the desolate refugee camps throughout the region, the author revisits the history behind and centrality of the refugee question in resolving the two-state solution. Recalling the initiatives of the Oslo Accords, the more recent Geneva Initiative, and the People's Voice movement, the authors infer that these proposals have precipitated a renewed campaign of activism on behalf of Palestinian refugees with which the leadership on both sides must contend. Palestinians warn that a dissatisfied, angry refugee community whose core demands remain unmet could undermine any peace agreement. The author claims that it is the sole issue around which political mobilization and political condemnation can most readily be achieved. This issue cuts across social, political, and geographical barriers. Israelis, who reject this return, suggest that the issue has been kept artificially alive by the Palestinian leadership and supportive Arab states. With this background, the report offers recommendations to the various key players that must be involved in any successful policy implementation. The PLO and other political organizations remain the dominant voice within the Palestinian political arena. If they do not represent true Palestinian beliefs and desires, organizations like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hamas or other radical Islamist groups will continue to capitalize on the refugee question as an effective instrument for discrediting not only Israeli leadership, but PLO/PA and Fatah as well. In light of this, the report recommends the following for the Palestinian Political Organizations: formalizing a forum with representatives from various Palestinian national institutions to seek an acceptable consensus on the resolution of refugees; working with refugee camp representatives to improve camp conditions; and discussing details for implementation of a permanent settlement of the refugee question based on the assumption of repatriation to a Palestinian state, normalization of status in host countries, relocation to third-countries and/or symbolic return to Israel, and compensation. In spite of the over four million refugees in the region, there is little question that Arab states have neglected the refugee camps, typically refusing to contribute to their improvement on the grounds that refugees are an international responsibility and seeking to exploit the humanitarian plight for their own political ends. With this in mind, the report recommends the following to the League of Arab States: willingness to resettle significant numbers of refugees, conducting a public campaign aimed at the Israeli public to explain Arab League initiatives; and engaging the PLO leadership regarding the status of Palestinian refugees remaining in Arab host countries. International players remain a key element to any peaceful resolution, both for the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and the greater Israeli-Arab conflict. To the United Nations and its member governments the report recommends: increase funding to the UNRWA programs to enable the organization to meet the basic needs of the refugee population, particularly those residing in camps; establishment of an international commission to examine repatriation, resettlement and compensation issues in detail. To the Quartet (US, EU, UN, Russia ), the report recommends the proposal of a comprehensive political settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including a just resolution of the refugee question.
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Refugees
War in Iraq: Environment of Insecurity and International Migration International Migration, 2005, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 197-214(18) Sirkeci, Ibrahim Abstracted by: Teresa Braun Abstract: This paper examines the clear relationship in Iraq between war and international migration. It focuses upon the concept of an "environment of insecurity" (EOI), which has been created in Iraq by decades of conflicts and ethnic tensions, as well as by the migration trends that have existed there between 1980 and 2003, and the role these trends will be playing in the wake of the U.S. invasion and war. The current instability in Iraq is not just a product of the recent war rather longstanding ethnic tensions are a root cause, largely due to the Sunni minority running the government for the last half century leading to problems with the Shiite majority and the Kurdish minority. The January, 2005 elections, however, indicated Shiites and Kurds were holding more than their population share, while Sunnis and Turkmen were not, leaving them without adequate representation and further adding to the societal instability. According to Sirkeci, international migration involves a variety of different types of migrants, including refugees, asylum seekers, families, illegal migrants, and migrant workers, most of whom have mixed and overlapping motivations. EOI offers one tool for understanding international migration behavior via "opportunity frameworks" of migration. His work uses the example of Turkish Kurds, who were not directly involved in ethnic conflict and already had a migration plan that was not related to the ethnic conflict, yet they used the EOI to bring these migration plans to bear. Thus, the EOI in Turkey, triggered by ethnic conflict, served as the opportunity (i.e., driver) for the Kurds to migrate. In this sense, actual conflict is not a necessary condition for migration, rather the potential for conflict can be enough to prompt international migration to take place, especially among those who are not in the greatest danger from conflict. Central to EOI in Iraq are the existing tensions among ethnic groups and the Arabization policies of Iraqi governments. Iraq has been in a state of continuous conflict that has included the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War, UN sanctions and an embargo that were marked by US and British attacks, all culminating with the war in 2003. These conflicts combined with widespread poverty, an uneven distribution of wealth, and ongoing human rights abuses. Killings and bombings occur daily in the wake of the 2003 war, adding to the probability that the reconstruction process will mean long-term instability, likely to encourage migration to more stable countries. These factors have led to large numbers of international migrants from Iraq (although very few formal studies of these have been completed). Most of these immigrants to industrialized countries, as well as neighboring Gulf states, were refugees and asylum seekers. Many, especially in the later periods of migration, flowed to countries in Western Europe, usually Sweden, Germany, the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands; however, geographical and cultural proximity of Turkey made it a prime destination in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War. Many of these countries have limited the flow of immigrants, tightening admission, making it harder for Iraqis to gain legal entry. These migration networks, which have been established throughout the decades of EOI in Iraq coupled with economic "pull factors" such as job opportunities, in concert with continued heightened ethnic tensions, point to the probability that Iraqis will follow in the footsteps of those who migrated before them. EOI offers an opportunity framework for those individuals who have a migration tendency, with refugees and asylum seekers from the immediate, intense, conflict area seeking the nearest safe haven while those utilizing the opportunity framework, who come from the periphery of the conflict seeking more favorable destinations, like western Europe. Those seeking security are likely to target countries that already have an existing Iraqi immigrant population. Sirkeci has identified EOI as a conceptual tool to study international migration in relation to ethnic conflict to further the understanding of this phenomenon, and in the Iraqi context should best incorporate ethnic conflict, international affairs, and socioeconomic underdevelopment.
Iraqi International Migration: Potentials for the Postwar Period Population Review, 2004, vol. 43, no. 1, pp. 37-49(12) Sirkeci, Ibrahim Abstracted by: Ellie Azoff Abstract: Written at a time when the future of the Iraq war and the potential for peace were unknown due to a premature declaration that the Iraq war was over, Sirkeci's article examines the all too current theme of Iraqi out-migration and its causes. In 2004, as well as present day 2007, little definitive information exists on Iraqi migration, the numbers coming only from the number of documented Iraqi immigrants seeking new homes in safe countries." Sirkeci's article not only aims to add to the small amount of existing documentation but also to provide an analysis of what will happen in Iraq once the U.S. led invasion is over through his theory of environments of insecurity and opportunity frameworks. Sirkeci begins by following the pattern of refugee and asylum seekers from Iraq in safe countries over the past twenty years. Although data are limited Sirkeci provides a thorough analysis of Iraqi immigration trends in the most preferred countries to which Iraqis flee. These countries include Germany, Turkey, Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark. By following these data Sirkeci proves that Iraqis were most likely to seek refugee and asylum status in times of conflict. He states that out-migration was highest during the gulf war, the economic embargo and currently with the US led invasion. Although it is not startling, nor even helpful, to state that people are most likely to flee in times of conflict, Sirkeci uses his simple findings to promote his theory of the "environment of insecurity" or EOI. Within the constructs of this theory Sirkeci explores major concepts within the field of migration. He states that within the EOI people are given two choices, to either exit or to maintain the status quo. Using his expertise with the migration of Kurds out of Turkey he explains that those wishing to leave Turkey were the exiters, those who stayed maintained the status quo and essentially adopted a Turkish identity. Sirkeci also supplements his theory of the EOI with the idea of opportunity frameworks. Sirkeci states that these opportunity frameworks are created through EOI. The EOI does not necessarily need to be caused by conflict but could be caused through socioeconomic pressures, political deprivation or ethnic tensions. When these aforementioned insecurities exist opportunity frameworks are created for those who flee. What is most interesting about Sirkeci's theory is that he goes so far as to say these frameworks allow people to leave when they have already been planning to do so. He also states that those who take advantage of these "opportunity frameworks" are usually enjoying a high standard of living in the country they wish to leave. By using the term "opportunity frameworks" and suggesting the majority who leave are the well-off, he is minimizing the idea of "forced migration," a term so commonly used by migration experts who study in the same field. By using this alternative syntax Sirkeci is suggesting that those fleeing Iraq are not primarily doing so out of desperation or fear but rather that they are taking advantage of this opportunity to leave Iraq because they have always wished to do so. Sirkeci closes his article by stating that as long as ethnic conflict, violence and poverty exist in Iraq, even after the war is over, Iraqis will leave the country. He predicts that after the U.S. pulls out tensions will worsen among the different ethnicities and safe countries will again see a rise in Iraqi refugee and asylum seekers, as they will continue to take advantage of the opportunity frameworks provided by the environment of insecurity. This leaves the reader with the question of whether Sirkeci sees the refugee as a victim or a profiteer.
Iraqis Denied Right to Asylum Forced Migration Review, June 2007 (Special Issue), pp. 24-26 (3) Frelick, Bill Abstracted by: Christine Danton Abstract: Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, more than 2.5 million Iraqis have left for neighboring countries, while another 2 million have been forcibly displaced within Iraq. The IDPs are trapped and are being denied the fundamental right to seek asylum. Iraq's neighbors have all but closed off borders, and the U.S. and the U.K. are not providing substantive support to the refugees or the countries hosting them. Saudi Arabia is building a $7 billion high-tech barrier on its border to keep Iraqis out, Kuwait is rejecting Iraqi refugees and Egyptian authorities are imposing highly restrictive procedures. Jordan, initially receptive to refugees, is now preventing the entry of single Iraqi men between the ages of 17 and 35, as well as severely restricting temporary residency permits. Iraqis who had legal residence in Jordan and valid travel documents who returned to Iraq have been prevented from returning to Jordan, a practice that is resulting in the separation of families. Jordan has no refugee law, is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and has no asylum procedures. Jordan needs international support to care for refugees on its territory, but must also play by the rules in protecting refugees in its territory. The countries that are bearing the brunt of the Iraqi refugee crisis are not the ones responsible for creating it. The U.S. and the U.K. have provided an inexcusable bare minimum of attention or support to the Iraqi refugee crisis. U.S. President George Bush has even yet to acknowledge the plight of the refugees, let alone direct any U.S. support to providing support or protection. In a recent article, Samantha Powers was highly critical of the Bush Administration's failure to acknowledge the Iraqi refugee crisis, stating that, "the U.S. debate about withdrawal from Iraq seems remarkably indifferent to those whose lives have been upended. The Bush Administration talks of staying the course without expending nearly enough political or financial capital to mitigate the humanitarian catastrophe that it pretends does not exist." 1 Frelick notes that in 2005 the U.S. allowed only 202 Iraqi refugees to enter the country. In 2007, the State Department announced that it was willing to resettle up to 7,000 Iraqi refugees during the year. As of June, with the 2007 fiscal year half over, fewer than 100 Iraqi refugees had been admitted to the U.S. The U.K. had not made any announcement as to whether it would admit Iraqi refugees who are under threat after having worked for British forces in Iraq, and has not provided any material support to meet the needs of refugees in the region. Frelick reminds us that with any refugee crisis, the international community has the responsibility to share the burden, which should not simply fall to the countries bordering the crisis area. Human Rights Watch, where Frelick is the Refugee Policy Director, has called on neighboring states to observe the fundamental principle of non-refoulement, to admit at least temporarily all Iraqi asylum seekers, to cooperate with the UNHCR in the registration of asylum seekers and refugees, to provide renewable residency permits for Iraqis registered with the UNHCR and to ensure the right of all children, regardless of residency status, to free and compulsory primary education. He believes Jordan, Kuwait and Syria should accede to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and all countries in the region should establish domestic refugee laws and build infrastructure for processing asylum claims and providing protection for refugees. The U.S. and the U.K. should acknowledge responsibilities for Iraqi refugees and IDPs by making contributions, including provision of substantial financial support for schools, shelter, health care in Jordan and Syria, by instituting significant refugee resettlement programs, by facilitating the evacuation of Palestinian refugees from Iraq, and by urging the governments of neighboring states to keep their borders open and to not deport refugees and asylees fleeing from violence and persecution.
1Samantha Power, "Access Denied," Time Magazine 179 (October 8, 2007): Commentary.
“The Road Home. The Faili Kurds. Expulsion. A Forced March. And the Loss of Nationality.” Refugees Magazine, United Nations High Commisioner for Refugees. Volume 1, Number 134, 2004, pp. 11-13 Marie-Helen Verney Abstracted by: Keesha Egebrecht Abstract: People all over the world have been persecuted for their beliefs, values, culture, identity, nationality and much more for eons. The problem persists to the present day, as evident in articles such as ones published in Refugees magazine. This article aims to bring awareness to the general public about refugees and their tragic stories. The Faili Kurds are a group of people that have a long history of persecution due to their nationality. The offenders are Saddam Hussain, the former dictator of Iraq, and his followers. Before discussing the article, it is important to familiarize the reader with the Faili Kurds. They are a group that has come to embrace Islam since the beginning of the Islamic conquest of Iraq and Iran. They originally lived in the area between Iraq and Iran , but many moved to Bagdad in the early 20 th century. Currently there are around 2.5 million in Iraq and around 3 million in Iran. Since their move to Bagdad , they have been actively involved in the economic and political arena. Because of this, Saddam felt his power threatened and decided to, unsurprisingly, confiscate their capital and property and banish them to Iran. He declared them to be Iranians and not genuine Iraqis, even though many generations of people were born in Iraq. The article discusses an account of one Faili Kurd who was exiled to Iraq 24 years ago. When this refugee was dispelled, there were thousands of other civilians of all nationalities who were also forced to flee. Not only were they forced out, but officially stripped of their nationality, having their documentation papers ripped up in front of their faces. This one particular man had evidence that his grandfather, father and he were all born in Iraq, but were still exiled. However, his brother, who was ordered to serve in the army, was excused from being a Faili Kurd, and was said to still be Iraqi. This man and his family have been in the Azna refugee camp for 24 years and have not gone one day without thinking about returning home, just as many of the world’s refugees. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) prefers voluntary repatriation, but it is often a true challenge because of the need to rebuild schools and clinics in destroyed areas, remove land mines covering their homeland, and try to integrate with the people who had stayed behind. The UNHCR says that overcoming the problem of nationality is challenging. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “Everyone has a right to a nationality” but there are as many as 9 million stateless persons worldwide. Despite these abundant obstacles, the UN refugee agency has recently been working with the 192 member countries to get the “big picture” and help governments solve the problem. For the Faili Kurds, the picture looks a little better as there was a meeting last year with the new Iraqi authorities to address their statelessness. The new government claimed that the Faili would indeed be allowed to return.
"Asylum Seekers," "Boat People" and "Illegal Immigrants:" Social Categorization in the Media Australian Journal of Psychology, 2007, vol. 59, no.1, pp.1-12. O'Doherty, K. and A. Lecouteur Abstracted by: Nirvana Bhatia [2010] Abstract: In this article, O"Doherty and Lecouteur analyze the media's ambiguous descriptions of asylum seekers, boat people, and illegal immigrants in Australia. Journalists portray the asylum situation either as incredibly positive, with Australia being at the forefront of refugee service, or as horrific, with local policies toward "illegal" people bordering on human rights abuse. These conflicting views are the result of the social connotations certain identifying labels carry, such as calling someone a "refugee" versus an "illegal migrant." Furthermore, the negative social undertones suggested by some of these terms may implicitly justify oppressive and discriminatory behavior towards "unexpected arrivals" from media audiences. The authors scoured over 2,000 print articles published between 1996 and 2001 by the mainstream media, including those written by the government and other interested groups like the UNHCR and refugee support organizations, in order to determine how "unexpected arrivals" are categorized; they also examine how the inconsistent language influences Australian attitudes towards this particular social group. Mass media traditionally possesses great power of influence, which is heightened in ethnic affairs articles; since much of the population has little access to cultural minorities, people rely on news stories to inform their opinions on related social issues. Therefore, when the media interchangeably uses terms that have a range of associations, such as "refugee," "asylum seeker," "detainee," "boat people," and "illegal immigrant," it sends mixed messages about the tolerance of an unexpected arrival. Considering that each individual has a different nationality, political status, legal status, and alleged intention for coming to Australia, it is unjust to refer to them by any haphazard synonym. For example, "refugee" denotes the legal status of someone fleeing to a safe haven under international conventions, while "illegal immigrant" indicates problematic individuals who should return home because they have not acquired proper legal status. Similarly, some articles contain multiple classifications of unexpected arrivals" without properly recognizing other identifying factors. One particular article mentions both "illegal boat people" and "visa overstayers;" the first category apparently refers to the large communities of Iraqi, Afghan, and Iranian refuges in Australia, but the second category is not clearly defined by nationality. According to Australian government statistics, the term "visa overstayer" is most frequently applied to citizens of the United Kingdom and the United States. Without proper context, it appeared that the journalist was only singling out the Middle Eastern refugees and not elaborating on a more familiar demographic. The lack of description consequently fuels a "them-versus-us" mentality among the Australian readers, who are less likely to identify with the Middle Eastern "foreigners." Accordingly, this misleading information helps justify a reader's personal intolerance as well as his support for broader government actions, such as mandatory detention for "illegal boat arrivals." Ensuring that these unexpected arrivals are not subject to harsh practices as a result of a vague term is integral to guaranteeing their human rights and to maintaining human dignity. Using a discursive approach to social categorization, the authors cite several examples illustrating the ignorant nature of news articles concerning unexpected arrivals. The media thus emerges as a powerful mechanism for transmitting negative sentiments about Australia's minority populations, which often serves to legitimize certain social actions (e.g., sending them home and mandatory detention) in the public eye. The authors note, however, that the problem lies with the social categories themselves and not with oppressive journalists attempting to share biased views. Although these broad generalizations may not be valid in every case, the article concludes that providing more appropriate context for social categorizations in media platforms will help safeguard the human rights of these unexpected arrivals by discouraging discrimination and other marginalization practices.
Racism
Zionism, Racism, and the Palestinian People: Fifty Years of Human Rights Violations in Israel and the Occupied Territories Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies, 1999, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 1-55 Imseis, A. Abstracted by: Paula Broadwell Abstract: The multitude of Israeli human rights violations against the Palestinian people has been well documented by independent scholars, and intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations for decades. Juxtaposingly, there has been little written concerning the role the official Israeli state ideology"including exclusivism-has played in implementing the Jewish state's policies vis-à-vis Palestinian rights. This article surveys Israel s prolonged violation of Palestinian human rights and argues that the Jewish state is a racist state guided by its overzealous commitment to Zionism. Analyzing the tenets of modern political Zionism, the author highlights the evolution of the movement from the days of political in-fighting and resistance from pro-assimilation Jews, for example, to the current trends and global movements that support such beliefs and actions. He claims that in order to understand Zionism, one must be cognizant of the following three prerequisites regarding Zionism's stated goal of establishing an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine: first, conquest of the land; second, the ingathering of Jewish immigrants; and third, the transfer or expulsion of the indigenous Arabs from Palestine. As history has shown, these tenets seem to have become the basis of numerous Israeli laws and policies that have engendered five decades of flagrant human rights violations against the Palestinian people. The author attempts to present a detailed examination of Israeli law and polices that contradict international standards for protecting civil and human rights. Israel's history of military engagements illustrates exceptionalism towards international law. Among other examples, the 1967 incursion where Israelis took the West Bank and Gaza Strip and subsequently imposed complete martial law on the 1.4 million Palestinian inhabitants without affording them citizenship status. Over the next thirty years, Israel then legislated hundreds of "occupier's laws' in flagrant violation of international humanitarian law. These laws made it legal to confiscate Arab lands, construct Jewish settlements on those lands, demolish homes, arrest, search and detain without explanation, exploit natural resources, deport local leaders, and impose curfews and collective punishment. The author describes in detail the obligation Israel has to Palestinian refugees under the multitude of international declarations and human rights documents"most of which are regarded with impunity. Although Israel claims to be a democratic state, the author purports that it is in fact a racist state whose existence is predicated on notions of exclusion and discrimination against those classified as "non-Jews' under Israeli law. This chronic persecution has led to violations in several key areas: the right of refugee return; the right to nationality; the right to ownership and protection of property; the right to work; the right to protection against arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; the right to protection against torture, cruel and inhuman punishment; the right to freedom of expression and opinion; and the right to education. The author summarizes with his concern for the moral and political implications of Israel's continued persecution of the Palestinian people. The roots of this protracted conflict are to be found in Zionism, an ideology that has conferred rights and privileges on Jews while simultaneously denying them to non-Jews. The author concludes that it is highly unlikely that as long as Israeli state policy remains wedded to Zionism's program of exclusivism and racism, it is unlikely that a just peace will ever be achieved.
Religion
Muslim Dress in Europe: Debates on the Headscarf Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2005, pp. 35-61 Shadad, W., P.S. Van Koningsveld Abstracted by: Lucy Meliksetian [2010] Abstract: Debates over the headscarf, whether it is a religious requirement of Islam or symbolizing a form of oppression for women, have raged throughout Europe since the mid-1980s. Currently, three different views are held when discussing appropriate dress for women. The first viewpoint, favored by most scholars, holds that the entire female body, with the exception of the face and hands, should be covered at all times when in public. A second viewpoint, held by a small group of conservative scholars, believes that the entire body, including the face and hands, should be covered with the exception of the eyes or one eye. Lastly is a viewpoint, held by many liberals and feminists, rejecting the headscarf altogether, questioning the legitimacy of such a covering in today's society. Since there are a number of opinions on what constitutes "proper" female attire or whether such attire has any relevance in present times, many countries within the European Union (EU) have had a difficult time reconciling their laws on the role of the state with the basic human right of freedom of religion. In addition to the varied opinions regarding the headscarf, stereotypes propagated by the media have given the headscarf a negative connotation, which sees the headscarf as: an expression of fundamentalism, an act of religious propaganda, an act of women's oppression, and/or a sign of the unwillingness to integrate. Because of these debates and assumptions, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and independent judges in a number of EU countries have needed to step-in to help balance the fine line between state neutrality and religious freedom. For instance, in a 2001 ruling by the Court of Strasbourg, members of the judiciary ruled against a teacher of Turkish origin to be able to wear her headscarf during class because it might infringe upon her students and their parent's feelings about their own religion, or lack thereof, in addition to it violating Switzerland's policy of state neutrality. In The Netherlands, the local courts have ruled that, in terms of Muslim students being able to wear their headscarf in school, students are allowed to do so if attending a public school but religious private schools can determine their own policy on whether to allow it. Additionally, in Belgium, there is no central rule with respect to students and the wearing of the headscarf. The local courts have given schools the authority to decide on the matter. Because of the debates on what role religion should play in the public sphere, the European Union has allowed for sovereign states to handle the issue and has no central policy with regards to wearing of the headscarf.
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