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Aiding whom? Competing explanations of middle-power foreign aid decisions

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Aiding Whom? Competing Explanations of Middle-Power Foreign Aid Decisions

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When do states take human rights into account in their foreign policies? This paper examines the relative role of human rights and economic self-interest in shaping aid policy during the era of globalization.

I develop an argument that human rights abuses in the recipient state will prompt aid reduction or cessation by donors only when the recipient is neither economically nor strategically valuable to the donor. In the case of middle-power states, however, the donor will additionally refuse to punish states that are of strategic importance to major-power allies, such as the US.

I then assess the hypotheses I have derived through quantitative analyses of the foreign policies of Britain, Canada, and the US in the years 1980-1996. In doing so, I extend my past research on the interaction of trade and human rights concerns in donors' aid decisions. I trace overall patterns in the relationships between aid, trade, and domestic politics, as well as changes occurring as the boundary-centered world of the Iron Curtain dissolved into the interconnected politico-economic world of the mid-to-late 1990s.

This research is designed to shed light on a question often raised in debate about the role of human rights in the foreign policies of democracies. Are these rights, ostensibly at the heart of the democratic form of governance something for which states are willing to sacrifice gains in other arenas or are they only pursued when it is not costly (either economically or strategically) to do so? This research takes at its starting point the often-observed inconsistencies in the foreign policies of aid-giving states towards countries that have dubious human rights records (for instance, the stark contrast between the US's engagement with China and ostracism of Cuba). Inconsistencies are observed both in the treatment of different states with similar problems as well as between official rhetoric and action.

Determining under what conditions human rights actually have an effect vis a vis other potential explanations of foreign policy decisions is important for at least three reasons. First, if states with the ability to set the international agenda fail to do so, a clear signal will be sent to leaders of other states that human rights can be costlessly sacrificed. Second, in countries where respect for democratic values is supposed to be the basis of governmental legitimacy, a failure to respect and protect these rights internationally (let alone at home) represents an apparent contradiction of core principles. Finally, if certain states are able to multiply the impact of their foreign policy tools by affecting foreign policies of other states, treatment of states as unitary rational actors in the international system needs to be reconceptualized.

The Questions

What aims does foreign aid serve, and, moreover, whose aims? There has long been evidence, and it continues to mount (see, for instance, Lumsdaine 1993, Stokke 1995, Scharfe 1996), that foreign aid is far from purely altruistic and is often based on a panoply of considerations apart from the actual neediness of (and other conditions in) the recipient state. And yet it is commonly, and sensibly, assumed, that the aims that are pursued – be they strategic, economic, political, or otherwise-- are based on some overall sense of benefit to the donor country, even if that be only through creating the greater global stability that comes with succoring areas of the world which suffer the greatest need.

And yet, is this a reasonable assumption about foreign policy in general? Hegemonic stability theory (for instance, Keohane's (1996) discussion) and recent world events suggest that the system leader can, in a variety of ways, create an incentive structure whereby allies act in ways more clearly in line with the system leader's interests than what appear to be vital interests of the allies themselves. Two US allies about which this claim is most often made are Canada, as the US's closest developed neighbor, and Britain, with whom the US has always shared a "special relationship" and has been through most of the twentieth century one of its most notable and reliable military allies. And yet, foreign aid patterns present a particularly rigorous test of US influence on its allies. Foreign assistance should be an area of foreign policy in which we would expect to see less influence by the system leader on its allies, because, for Britain and Canada, aid has evolved largely as a vestige of a colonial empire that the US did not share. Therefore, in the following paper, I investigate a number of competing explanations about the most common – and most important – aims of foreign aid, with two foci. One is the extent to which a system leader – currently the US – influences the aid decisions of middle –power states. This is a question with particular current relevance, not only given the US's leadership role in the war on Iraq, but the

fact that Bush has sent clear signals that he wants to demonstrate new American leadership in development policy (for instance at the 2003 G8 Summit in Evian, France). Though the US has been a traditionally stingy aid donor (proportional to the size of its GDP) Bush's administration has been the first in decades to propose major foreign aid increases. And though there have been questions about whether his administration's aid proposals represent the most efficient use of funds, there have already been signs that the administration's tactics may be working to encourage other donors to increase their aid – and possibly change their aid priorities—as well.

While the process through which one state may take into account the interests of another may be exercised can be extremely complex and multifaceted, I adopt a very limited, but therefore straightforward measure of the *effects* of these calculations in the context of the present study of foreign aid. A donor takes into account the interests of its allies if

The second also question also arises in part from recent competing claims about the aims of foreign policy in general. Are human rights, ostensibly at the heart of the democratic form of government, something for which states are willing to sacrifice gains in other arenas, or are they are only pursued when it is not costly to do so? This question is often posed about the role of human rights in foreign policy but rarely addressed systematically. It is an especially critical question in a post-Cold War world, where policy-makers and academics alike celebrate the spread of democracy -- because when terms like 'human rights' become hollow, so does one of the organizing principles that defines democracy. More importantly, aid generally serves to prop up whatever regime is in power in recipient states. It tends to not go to the poorest members of society, and therefore ultimately exacerbates societal inequalities. It is therefore important to understand who, and what, we are aiding.

I do not pretend that these two questions need necessarily to go together – that taking cues from the US's foreign policy stances, for instance, is likely to encourage our allies to take human

rights into account in their foreign affairs to a greater extent than would otherwise be the case.

But in both donor states that are the subject of this study, both human rights and the preferences of the US are factors that, on the one hand, have long appeared to have a role at least at a rhetorical level, and, on the other, have in the last two years regained a rather high profile in the array of possible foreign policy goals. Systematically examining them in the context of recent history seems a good place to begin looking for answers about their true role.

At least three other caveats are in order along the lines of what the design of this research does and does not allow us to test. If we see that apparent US policy preferences are related to British and Canadian aid patterns, we can only infer many of the specific characteristics of the process that produces that statistical association. These include 1) whether US policy makers consciously attempt to influence the aid policies of their allies, 2) whether policy makers in middle-power donor states *intend* to take US policy preferences into account (the possibility that the associations are spurious due to policy congruence between the US and each of the other donors is, however, controlled for), and 3) whether the relative extent to which US interests are reflected in ally aid policies is affected by changes in who staffs ministerial posts at various levels in the bureaucracy (the party in control of government overall is, however, taken into account). Fuller elucidation of these questions awaits far more extensive archival research than has to date been possible (and than has, in the case of Britain at least, apparently ever been done).

Some Extant Answers

Democracies have a long record of committing blood and treasure to the cause of political and civil rights. While realists argue that ethical concerns never matter in foreign policy, still democratic states and multilateral organizations provide billions of dollars in aid to non-strategic countries.

Britain and Canada are particularly interesting cases in that they provide unique tests of the roles of both human rights and the extent to which each takes into account the interests of the US in aid policy. First, British and (less dramatically) Canadian policy makers are often accused of slavishly following US policy cues in terms of putting strategic interests at the top of policy agendas (particularly during the lead-up to Gulf War II). Second, Britain's history as a colonial power, and Canada's membership in the Commonwealth could be expected to make former colonial ties more important than some current economic and strategic concerns. Third, both Britain and Canada have been among the first signatories to a number of international human rights instruments and Canada has instituted a great number of explicit and far reaching human rights instruments domestically. A great number of general philosophical proposals about the propriety of including human rights in foreign policy, as well as specific linkage strategies for doing so, have circulated around the highest levels of government, to a much greater extent in the Canadian case than the British (Scharfe 1996). The relative role of competing goals in foreign assistance policy are addressed by at least three broad theoretical approaches to the study of international relations: realism, idealism, and neoliberalism.

Realism. Certainly acting to further one's own strategic interests through the assistance of valuable allies is well within the prescriptions of successful realist statecraft. Twentieth century realists since Waltz (1954) and before have argued that an ally's goals may be valuable ones to help pursue if they also benefit oneself and one can in turn send a signal of reliability to the ally.

But seldom, from a realist perspective, is the status of individual rights in another country important unless it affects state power. And realism has often given short shrift to the importance of domestic considerations to foreign policy makers. The results of this research, therefore, have interesting implications for testing the realist assumption that the imperative to survive in an anarchic international arena subsumes all other concerns. If realist assumptions are valid, internal

characteristics of states can only have the most minor impact. The British case may prove an especially interesting test, as political discourse in Britain in the 1980s took a distinct realist turn. Says Larsen: 'Power politics was seen as the true nature of international relations....' (1997: 93-4). In fact, the realist view would still be confirmed if rhetoric acknowledges human rights but is not backed up by policy commitments.

Scholars of Canadian foreign policy have generally proffered two kinds of arguments about the import of strategic considerations. The first is a structural Marxist strain that emphasizes Canada's tendency to act in concert with other capitalist western states to maintain the international politico-economic status quo. The second, a strategic studies variant, focuses (or focused) on the East-West conflict, Canada's interest in access to sea lanes, and its concern for key trade intersections, considerations which are measured (but receive little support) in the analyses below. Since the latter perspective was driven by Cold War concerns, it would be evidence in its favor if trade intersections and like measures had a greater effect on trade disbursements before the dissolution of the Soviet Union than was the case in the 1990s.

Nossal, for instance, believes strategic interests generally receive greater priority by foreign policy-makers, and concedes that there indeed appears to be an inverse link between Canada's perceived strategic stake in a state and the likelihood that it will take action to alleviate human rights violations in that state:

In the major cases of violations in the past decade, where "strategic concerns" have largely been absent, as in Uganda, Kampuchea, or Sri Lanka, Ottawa has taken a stiff stand against violations; where clearly identifiable strategic interests exist, it tended to play down violations. Canada's considerable ambivalence on South Africa, or its relatively muted concerns about Indonesia's political prisoners or its invasion of East Timor, or its quiet diplomacy on human rights violations in Central America, or its indifference to violations in Iran in the 1970s, can be linked to the strategic importance of the states involved.(3)

Similarly, Canada's criticisms of Eastern Bloc human rights violations during the Cold War were much more vociferous than they were for comparable problems in Western donors,

much as was the case with the US and Britain (Skilling 1988). As Nossal argues, “the Canadian government’s interest in human rights is considerably diluted by other interests.”

Idealism and legal protections of human rights. Respect for civil and political human rights is at the heart of democratic governance. International legal incentives to take human rights into account are supplemented in Britain by official Government rhetoric entailing a commitment to using human rights as criteria for aid disbursement. For example, in 1990, John Major, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, advocated making aid conditional on democratic reforms in recipients (Burnell, 1991). That same year, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd claimed that promotion of good government and political pluralism was Britain’s official development assistance goal (Stokke, 1995:22). And the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has declared that foreign aid should be used to foster the ‘observance of human rights’ as well as democratic government (Burnell, 1997:156).

The serious consideration of human rights in Canadian foreign policy, as in British, begins in the 1970s, when increased global attention to human rights was spearheaded by Carter’s inclusion of rights as an administration priority in the US (Matthews and Pratt: 13, Nossal:46). In fact, however, the first formally elucidated commitment to human rights by the government dates to 1970, in the form of a white paper in which Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s Liberal administration committed to a “positive and vigorous” approach to human rights (Nossal:47).

Several other national and international trends combined in the 1970s to raise the profile of human rights discussions on policy agendas. Nationally, every Canadian province passed local anti-discrimination laws. Several members of parliament sought to make overseas development assistance dependent on improvement in human rights conditions for the worst-violating recipients. Canada signed on to the UN Convention on Racial Discrimination and Covenants on Economic and Social Rights and Civil and Political Rights, and the discussion before and after

these drew additional public attention to the issue of basic needs and basic rights, and whether there could be international standards thereof. The passage of the Helsinki Final Act by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe drew enhanced the new status of human rights in the public eye. In addition, during debates over the UN Conventions and Covenants, the government established federal-provincial committees to identify and capitalize on links between domestic and international human rights issues. By 1988, Victoria Berry and Allan McChesney could note with optimism that “for over two decades the Canadian public has expressed rising interest in the place of human rights in foreign policy” (Berry and McChesney 1988:60). And throughout the 1970s and 1980s there was increasing verbal support for human rights among high-ranking cabinet officials.

However, as human rights gained more attention internationally, activists and representatives from other governments regularly criticized Canada for its lukewarm commitment to human rights abroad, and especially its failure to put to use the development assistance tools at the government’s disposal (Nossal: 47).¹

Neoliberalism/ globalization perspectives. If trade and economic cooperation for mutual benefit between nations is a paramount concern of policy makers (Keohane 1993, Lipson 1993, Axelrod and Keohane 1993), some relations may be so valuable that the donor would rather continue to generate good will through aid than jeopardize access to the recipient by cutting it off. These are countries that offer significant trade potential to the donor, provide fertile export markets, and have large or expanding economies. These countries are less likely to be punished, and if they are, punished less severely, than are other states for commensurate human rights

¹ Prior to the below-mentioned reports, discussion of the motives behind Canada’s foreign aid did not even touch on human rights as a consideration. Dobell (1972) notes the following motives behind Canada’s aid program to francophone Africa: finding an outlet for francophone Canadians, the desire to preempt a Quebecois aid program in Africa, and the desire to outflank Quebec in its attempts to heighten its international presence. He bemoans the failure of Canada to join Europe and the US in involvement with “far east”ern development efforts and the economic

abuses (Gillies, 1989; Scharfe, 1996). Currently, some observers note that when there is significant potential for trade with a country (in general more quickly developing states or NICs), human rights appear not to matter at all (Gillies 1989). Gillies contends this discriminatory treatment of countries is a result of the extent to which an incumbent government's quest for political survival is predicated on economic growth. "This imperative is the foundation of the privileged position that business develops in the policy arena" (1989:455). And several examples suggest this is a pattern that has been borne out in Canada's bilateral relations with several recipients.. As the trade-driven model presented earlier suggests, Canada "seems to fashion human rights policies with an eye fixed firmly on commercial interests" (Nossal 1988:49).

(And in fact, currently a good deal of the US's aid policy clearly has trade interests in mind - for instance Bush has criticised European donors for their opposition to genetically modified food crops and for their continued support of export subsidies . And the Europeans often characterise America's food-aid program itself as in fact a kind of export subsidy (Economist 5/31/2003: 67.)

The General Context of British and Canadian Foreign Policy Making

The International Context.

Britain's connection to the US arguably shapes its foreign policy outlook more than does any other bilateral relationship (Smith 1988). The relationship has been, sometimes simultaneously, both a very close and a very contested one over the course of the 20th century. Even in WWII, when the two states were each other's closest allies (and when Britain would very likely not have survived Hitler's onslaughts were it not for the US's assistance and eventual declaration of war on the Axis powers), British strategists worried about the potential US predominance in the Pacific (supplanting Britain's own) that might result from US intervention

benefits they could render (103). Even at the point, however, Dobell documents calls from, at the very least, the academy, for greater altruism in Canada's foreign policy (97).

(French, 1993). But on the other hand, some observers have argued, its relationship with the US has been one which has allowed Britain to extend its otherwise declining influence on world affairs, and therefore it might be argued that any reflection of US interests that we observe in British aid patterns are in fact strategically served.

In aid policy particularly, many would currently question whether the present US administration can claim leadership in aid policy with much legitimacy (see for instance the kind of commentary reflected in 'Bush: Hero or Hypocrite', *Economist* 5/31/2003: 67). But British foreign policy has often been dismissed in recent months as simply rubber stamping American strategic preferences. Whether or not this is strictly true, there do appear to be signs that British policy makers and activists are paying attention to the Bush administration's most recent, very vocal machinations in aid policy. For instance, after Bush announced new aid initiatives at the May G8 summit, Bob Geldof (in a *Guardian* interview) dubbed the Bush administration's commitment to African economic assistance the most significant since that of the Kennedy administration (*Economist*; 5/31/2003: 67).

Conventional wisdom often dismisses Canadian foreign policy, including aid policy, as largely taking cues from its Southern neighbor. But in fact, Canada has provided foreign assistance to a number of states with whom the US has had serious policy differences. Canada has a multifaceted economic relationship with Cuba, for instance, consisting of not only foreign aid, but also private investment of Canadian firms in joint ventures with Cuban state-run corporations (Lane 1997).

Formal Policy Making Institutions and Structure. Several characteristics of British foreign policy have particular relevance for the aid allocation process. Institutional inertia exists in every decision-making apparatus, but may exert a particularly strong effect in the British civil service. According to Wallace (1975:8), 'the high morale and prestige of the British civil service, and its

successful resistance of the bypassing of its regular procedures by political channels, make the problem of organizational inertia particularly acute for policy makers in Britain.' Additionally, the decision-making process about aid is one of the most difficult to trace in terms of its official institutional channels; looking at long-term overall factors in the aid decision can help one induce what one could not derive from official institutional arrangements. . In spite of the fact that Canadian foreign policy has directed more rhetorical attention at human rights issues than has the British foreign policy making community, the incorporation of human rights concerns into policy practice has been impeded by the fact that human rights issues are the nominal purview of numerous different governmental departments. No unit perceives the need to make human rights a top priority, because each knows human rights is in part the responsibility of some other department(s). This lack of ownership by any one unit results in human rights issues becoming isolated and marginalized (Berry and McChesney 1988: 60), and means that there is an endogenous source of devaluation of human rights concerns and likely lesser degree of salience than is the case in analogous situations in other donors. And because human rights are not and have not been included in any formalized Canadian foreign policy framework, the extent to which human rights considerations are represented on policy agendas (let alone become implemented), is dependent primarily on individual officials and politicians.

Canadian institutions devoted specifically to human rights issues also are and have been temporary and ad hoc, as was the case with Parliament's appointment of a special joint committee to consider the conditions under which Canada should concern itself with human rights violations in other countries. Similarly, when there was first discussion about Canada becoming a signatory to UN Conventions on various rights in the 1970s, the Department of the Secretary of State was the point of contact at the federal level -- but the Department of External Affairs gradually took over responsibility for the role of human rights in foreign policy. Another example of the ad-hoc

nature of the development of rights policy is the formative role that individual, informal speeches have come to play in the policy process.

Characteristics of the Aid Decision and Considerations Therein

Since the end of WWII, the major donors' *aims* for aid have been contested. Generally, however, there have been four major goals.

- Assisting strategic allies. (This often includes former colonies or members of the Commonwealth, whose 'strategic' value might be debatable, but who are allies due to historical cultural, political, and economic ties, and who the donor wants to maintain as allies.)
- Securing trade benefits for domestic businesses. (This is pursued largely as a result of the efforts of large, well-organized, and well-funded business lobbies in the donor. Such trade advantages are usually pursued through strategies like 'tied aid' and special aid-for-trade deals or legislation such as the Aid and Trade Provision in Britain².)
- Pursuing general global stability through development and economic growth; though there is often a failure to distinguish between the two in practice
- Achieving democratization and increased respect for human rights. (Development goals that do not have concurrent benefits to some sector of the donor's economy are generally given far less attention than are strategic and economic goals. Where they are taken into account, they are largely justified with reference to their utility as a means, rather than as an end.)

Most authors argue that the first two of these are much higher on donors' agendas than is the last. *History of Human Rights in British and Canadian Foreign Policy*. Scholars of the role of human rights in British foreign policy often trace the roots of an explicit role for human rights in British foreign policy to the mid-1970s (Vincent 1986). But the late 1970s and 1980s saw little evidence

that such rhetoric was incorporated into policy practice. In 1989, Cunliffe (1989: 115) could conclude that ‘analysis of the flow of economic aid from London to the less developed world over the past fifteen years does not reveal any enduring, concerted effects by successive British Governments to utilize the flow of concessional finance for the promotion of international human rights.’ In fact, as of the late 1970s, the UK had only cut off aid completely to two countries in response to human rights abuses. Moreover, when human rights had any effect at all, it was highly conditional:

London’s relations with the Third World ...have been dominated by ...political, historical, and economic constraints which have drastically limited the extent to which ...concern for...human rights has led to changes in...aid relations...[human rights] concerns are subservient to other political and economic ambitions in determining the quantity and direction of the aid programme (Cunliffe, 1985:112, 116).

There is evidence of some improvement over the past decade, at least rhetorically. The Blair government has argued that human rights should have a more significant role in British foreign policy. Many of Blair’s initiatives reflect programmes begun under the preceding Conservative government, suggesting some linkage between aid policy and rights performance during the years of this study.

Canada’s perceived lack of commitment to alleviating human rights abuses abroad stands in stark contrast, as is the case with other donor nations, to apparent governmental concerns over rights violations – one of the apparent discrepancies this research attempts to explain. In what Margaret Doxey (cited in Nossal: 48) has called the “rhetoric gap”, there is “marked discrepancy between expression of concern and actual government behavior”. In fact “in their public statements, political leaders and departmental officials stress that they are shocked and disturbed by evidence of human rights violations by other governments, that they believe such behavior is morally wrong”, and that Canada bears a responsibility to answer these violations in its foreign

² An important side effect of this characteristic is that it is biased towards helping richer developing countries, something found in several of my analyses.

policy (Nossal:47). Senior policy makers have for years adopted the stance of former Secretary of State Don Jamieson, who declared that “Canada will continue to uphold internationally the course of human rights, in the legitimate hope that we can eventually ameliorate the conditions of our fellow man” (Nossal:47). Furthermore, the commitment has been at least ostensibly bipartisan, as the Conservative governments of the late 1970s and mid 1980s (Clark and Mulroney) made public announcements to this effect as well. In addition, “senior cabinet members, most notably a number of secretaries of state for external affairs, have supported a significant role for human rights in foreign policy” (Nossal:47). Such pronouncements have even been formalized, especially in the area of overseas development assistance and other aid. Successive governments’ commitment to linking aid to human rights is laid out in several major documents, two of which (the 1986 Hockin-Simard Report and the 1988 Winegard Report, *For Whose Benefit?*) were reports to special committees in Parliament. A report by the Canadian International Development Agency (*Sharing Our Future*, 1988) claimed that these new frameworks would “help make it more feasible to take human rights under serious consideration in the formulation of our aid policy” (quoted in Scharfe 1996:15). Whether or not these kinds of commitments have been kept is examined below.³

Public Opinion/Interest Groups. Three categories of interest groups have been particularly well-organized around aid issues.

Human Rights NGOs. Policy results often turn on how the national interest is defined in a given situation. Therefore, one of the primary goals of human rights interest groups is to make human rights aspects of a particular aid decision appear to be of higher salience than other kinds of considerations. Issue definition also establishes which components of the British policy-making machinery will assume responsibility for an issue. In Canada, according to Berry and

³ Whether or not there is an actual change after 1988 is not currently examined, but certainly could be in future extensions of this research

McChesney, human rights first became a major topic of public discussion in the 1970s during the debates about Canada signing the various UN conventions on human rights and racial discrimination. At that time, the first human rights NGOs gained popular notice and support (both symbolic and financial). The presence of these organized interests required that greater government attention be devoted to issues of rights both at home and abroad.

Business Interests. Wallace claims that ‘promotional groups and economic interests are as active in foreign policy issues as they are [in] questions of transport or educational policy’ (Wallace 1975:3). Some trace the influence of business interests in foreign policy to Britain’s status as a middle-power state.

By 1970... British policy makers and observers had alike accepted that Britain could no longer aspire to world status, but was rather a ‘major power of the second order.’ Their perception of the national interest which foreign policy should pursue reflected the more commercial orientation appropriate to a middle power (Wallace:4)⁴.

Viewing the role of business interests in Canadian foreign policy, Matthews and Pratt (1985), Nossal, and Gillies all share the assumption that commercial interests will likely mitigate a donor country’s interest in pursuing human rights policy abroad. In Nossal’s judgement, Canada “...seems to fashion human rights policies with an eye firmly fixed on commercial interests.” For instance, in examinations of Canadian foreign policy towards regimes which systematically violated human rights in Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Uganda by Keenlyside and Taylor (1984) and Scharfe (1996), there were found a “general reluctance to engage in economic sanctions against violators with which Canada has substantial and growing commercial interests” (Keenlyside and Taylor 1984).. Gillies contends that discriminatory treatment of countries (on the basis of their human rights records) is a result of the extent to which an incumbent government’s quest for political survival is predicated on economic growth. “This

imperative is the foundation of the privileged position that business develops in the policy arena” (1989:455).

Immigrant Populations and Other Relevant Domestic Constituencies. Immigrant populations, while generally comprising a very small percentage of total population, can make a real impact if they are well organized and concentrated, as in the UK around the urban centers of, most notably, London and Birmingham, the largest current countries of origin being Pakistan, India, and Nigeria, in descending order. As Matthews and Pratt (1988:9) note about Canada’s immigrant communities, “where there is severe denial of civil and political rights in their countries of origin, immigrants and descendants are bound to be particularly concerned”. Therefore, these kinds of practical domestic politics concerns often reinforce any philosophical commitment the Canadian government might make to securing human rights within the borders of other countries. While there are no reasons a priori to expect Canadian immigrant groups to have a greater impact on the policy process in Canada than in Great Britain, the analyses below test for their impact on the aid granting process.

Hypotheses

From the foregoing considerations, I derive the following hypotheses:

1. Economic and strategic considerations are likely to be at least as strong an influence on aid decisions as are human rights considerations and neediness of the recipient.
2. System leader policy preferences are likely to help explain ally aid choices.

Methods

I assess the goodness of fit of these hypotheses using four different analyses for each of the two donors. The first assesses the relative impact of a number of characteristics of both the recipient itself, and of the donor’s relationship with it, on the probability that a given recipient is

granted aid. The second assesses the extent to which knowing US policy preferences gives us added information about these decisions, and the third weighs the relative importance of US vs. donor policy preferences. Finally, I assess the extent to which US policy preferences appear to drive ally aid based on a less comprehensive, but more costly, signal by the US of the strategic significance of a potential recipient: its own assistance to that state.

Time Period to Be Covered. The unit of analysis is the recipient-year. My analyses include the years 1980-1996, the years for which quantitative data on human rights is available. This is a particularly useful time period to examine, for a number of reasons. It gives us over 1000 cases in the decade before the Cold War ended, and over 700 in the six years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Finally, this time period includes aid responses of the West to genocide in both Africa and in the backyard of Europe.

A model of the determinants of whether or not a potential recipient receives aid is estimated using pooled cross-sectional time series logit analysis, appropriate to dichotomous dependent variables for which the distribution of the error-terms is roughly log-linear, where one is interested in a large number of cases at several temporal points. A variable is included for aid at year t minus one to control for past aid and serial autocorrelation.

Dependent Variable. Annual aid data was obtained from the OECD (various years).

If a state was a non-creditor country in a given year, it was included as a potential aid recipient. It is more unusual to *not* to be granted aid from Britain than to be granted it. In a sample year, 1996, 119 of the 180 potential recipients received aid (Table 1). Of the 69 states that did *not* receive aid (Table 2), eight of these were oil exporters and relatively wealthy; it is not surprising that they would not be aid priorities. Many others were island nations who receive large amounts of aid from geographically proximate states.

A look at Table 3 demonstrates that it is also more unusual not to be granted aid by Canada than to be granted it. In 1996, 128 of the 180 potential recipients receive aid (in comparison to 104, for instance, which received aid from Britain). A look at the 60 states that did not receive aid (in Table 4) reveals that seven (Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) are oil exporters and relatively wealthy, and as was the case with Britain, others are island nations who receive a great deal of aid from geographically proximate donors.

Few clear patterns emerge in an examination of the human rights records of the potential recipients left off the lists. The numbers in parentheses indicate the human rights scores of these states (as discussed below, higher numbers indicate worse violation levels). Forty (two-thirds) of these potential recipients were not evaluated by the State Department in 1996. Seven had the best possible human rights score at 1, and ten others had scores of 2. Only one, Burma, has a relatively poor score of 4, and none fall into the worst category, level 5. Clearly, human rights in itself does not explain which potential recipients are left off the aid list.

Independent Variables.

1) *Human Rights Abuses in Recipient Country.* Human rights abuses are measured using the Purdue Political Terror Index, originally compiled by Michael Stohl and including two ratings derived, respectively, from the US State Department's annual country reports and those of Amnesty International. This is a five-point scale ranging from one ('Countries... under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their views, and torture is rare or exceptional... Political murders are extraordinarily rare') to five ('The violence of Level [Four] has been extended to the whole population...The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals') (Stohl 1983). The State Department measure was chosen, though not without trepidation. Key differences between the two scales are discussed in earlier (2002) versions of this research.

Many studies of human rights treat ‘democracy’ and ‘respect for human rights’ as nearly synonymous (Beitz, 1979: 179; Franck, 1992: 46-47; Ray 1998:442-3). However, one might also expect that democratic recipients might be less able to reciprocate aid with preferential trade agreements than are autocratic ones. This variable is included to test whether democracy is indeed a proxy for respect for human rights, and is measured as the recipient’s polity score on Jagers and Gurr’s (1996) Polity III index. However, I expect democracy to be of lesser significance in predicting aid amounts than are economic and strategic measures. Additionally, many donors are reluctant to sink aid funds into unstable regions, which are often either undemocratic or transitional.

2) Potential and actual economic value of the recipient state.

Potential economic value of the recipient to the donor, which I expect to be positively associated with recipient aid, is measured in two ways: size of the economy of the recipient (GDP), and annual growth rate of GDP. Together, these two figures should give us some idea of how promising a trade partner the recipient looks to be. The recipient state’s population is also taken into account (CIA, various years).

In addition, measurements of economic value are constructed that more specifically measure the recipient country’s *trade* potential. Volume and percentage of imports and exports between Britain and each recipient are drawn from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics (various years) data. Since not all trade is created equal, I also take into account whether a recipient is an oil-exporting state.

3a) Strategic value of the recipient state. Realists would predict that strategic interests trump human rights concerns. A recipient with which the donor has had recent conflict or sees possibility of future conflict should be less likely to receive aid, because that conflict would

disrupt any benefit the donor would derive from its investment. However, such conflicts, at least militarized ones, are relatively rare.

The strategic value of the recipient is measured in several other ways. These measures include the geographic location of the recipient, proximity to trade intersections, location in areas of instability (CIA, various years) and whether the recipient possesses nuclear capabilities (*Historical Statistics of the United States 1997*). If a state is listed as a participant in an interstate dispute, as a site of substantial civil unrest, or if it borders on such a state, it is coded as a site of instability. A state is coded as located at a key trade intersection if it contains major pipelines, key ports, or is on a major shipping route.

I also take into account military commitments, measured as shared alliance membership taken from the alliance subset of the Correlates of War data set.

In addition, donors that are geographically proximate to a recipient have a greater stake in that recipient's fate. Geographical proximity is measured as distance in kilometers between London or Ottawa and the capital of each recipient.

Finally, one of the most comprehensive measures of strategic interests are captured by similarity of UN voting records, measured using Signorino and Ritter's (1999) S statistic in the Similarity of UN Policy Positions dataset created by Erik Gartzke, Dong-Joon Jo, and Richard Tucker. I expect a priori for this to be a powerful predictor of whether a potential recipient receives aid, as it should capture a significant amount of the 'shared policy outlook' that would make a state an important strategic ally. (And personal correspondence with members of the aid policy bureaucracy strongly suggests this.)

3b) Strategic value of the recipient state to the US. As is the case with the donors themselves, there are both qualities of the recipient itself that might make it valuable, and then also those characteristics of the relationship between the recipient and various donors that could

function independently in determining that recipient's aid fate. Therefore, to test whether knowing US(system leader) interests helps us predict recipient aid status above and beyond what we can predict by knowing the recipient's relationship with the donor, I take into account two measures of the relationship between the US and the recipient: its Similarity of UN Policy Positions score, and then, to take into account a more costly signal, US aid to the recipient. I take into account only military assistance, as it is the subcategory most likely to be targeted at recipients whose value is primarily strategic (rather than say recipients that were getting aid based primarily on neediness). In models where I include this measure, I also control for similarity of UN policy stances with those of the donor state in question.

Additional control variables – both gatekeeping and allocation decisions. Five other categories of variables are included as controls.

4) *Mass mediated humanitarian crises.* Determining whether a recipient suffered a humanitarian crisis (that was widely publicized in the mass media) allows one to measure economically based altruism⁵ as well as public awareness. This variable is a count of headlines in print news as compiled under the coding scheme used for the Kansas Events Data Set (KEDS) and its Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) subset (<http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/panda.htm>). If states are taking into account the needs of recipients, the presence of a humanitarian crisis should be positively associated with a recipient's aid status.

5) *Domestic Politics.* Convincing policy makers that human rights is the most important lens through which to examine a particular decision is often the goal of human rights NGOs, and I therefore include a count of all reported demonstrations in Britain and Canada in a given year regarding the human rights record of the recipient

⁵ This control is also included in the interest of replicability (it is included in many studies of US aid (Cingranelli and Pasquarello, 1985; Poe, 1990, 1991)).

(<http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/panda.htm>).⁶ In addition, the presence of a large immigrant diaspora in the UK or Canada may be successful in lobbying for aid for its country of origin; therefore I also include the number of immigrants in the past ten years to the UK from the recipient country.

6) *Former colonial status of recipient.* I control for whether a recipient is a former British colony (*Flags of the World*, 2003); colonial ties promote a tradition of financial support and account for a good deal of variation in aid amounts between recipients (Lumsdaine, 1997; Maizels and Nissanke, 1984).

7) *End of the Cold War.* British and Canadian policy makers might see themselves as less constrained by strategic concerns and freer to allocate aid according to either economic or human rights criteria. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, British policymakers have aspired to restore its role as a major player in world politics, using aid as one instrument. Finally, with shrinking security budgets, aid becomes a more versatile (and available) policy tool than was heretofore the case. Whether the aid year occurs during the Cold War is measured as a dummy variable – coded one before and including 1991 (when the Soviet Union finally broke apart), zero after. I expect more states to get aid, but less of it, after the Cold War ends (and have demonstrated this in related research (Barratt, forthcoming)).

Because it is probable that in the less rigid strategic atmosphere of the post-cold war world, human rights would have a better chance of being a criteria in aid decisions, I include an interaction term to determine whether the effect of human rights considerations is greater after the cold war.

⁶ Ideally, I would have obtained measures of the amount and intensity of campaigning done on behalf of particular human rights crises from the major human rights interest groups themselves. However, both Amnesty and Human Rights Watch claim not to keep records of this kind or any other that would lend itself to systematic analysis – not even a financial audit that would contain country-specific line items.

8) *Past aid*. Past aid is a key determinant of present aid, because appropriations are often left unchanged as a result of institutional inertia (personal correspondence). In the gatekeeping model, whether a state received aid in the previous year is measured as a dichotomous dummy. In the allocation model, past aid is measured as the overall aid amount to that state in the previous year. Despite the fact that I use several measures of economic importance of the recipient and strategic importance of the recipient, and two measures of some other characteristics of recipient or of the donor-recipient relationship, there is little collinearity between the independent variables. In fact, out of 220 pairs, there are only seven sets of variables that correlate at over 0.4⁷, and none that correlate at under -0.4.

Results

Britain. Scholars have expressed much of the same skepticism about humanitarian rhetoric in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe) as they have in the case of the US, arguing that ‘calls for the protection of others’ rights have not led to serious commitments’ (Brewin 1986:189). In addition, scholars of British foreign policy have clearly perceived that allocation of foreign policy resources almost always necessitates tradeoffs (Vincent 1986).

Hypothesis 1 stated that economic and strategic considerations are likely to be at least as strong an influence on aid decisions as are human rights considerations and neediness of the recipient.

The results of a logit analysis designed to test the relative relationships to aid of donor strategic concerns, economic interests, and human rights is presented in the first column of Table

5. Human rights record of the recipient has no effect, though recipient democracy score has a

⁷ Recipient’s nuclear capabilities and location at a trade intersection, recipient’s location in an area of instability and at a trade intersection, size of immigrant population in the UK and the recipient’s location at a trade intersection, UK exports to the recipient and imports from it, UK exports to the recipient and whether the recipient was a location of humanitarian crisis, UK imports to the recipient and whether the recipient was a location of humanitarian crisis, the recipient’s population and whether it possesses nuclear capabilities, the recipient’s population and its immigrant presence in the UK, and the interaction variable with one of its components (the Cold War period).

marginally positive effect on the probability of receiving aid. (While it may seem surprising that the democracy level would be significant while the human rights score would not, it should be recalled that they do measure quite different things; with the human rights score often reflecting social and economic rights violations not captured in Polity's political and civil measures of democracy, for instance). While few economic measures come into play, either of the recipient itself or of the relationship between the recipient and the donor, strategic measures certainly do. Potential recipients that are closer to the UK are much more likely to receive aid than those that are not. Policy similarity (as measured through UN votes) also has a positive and significant impact on the probability a state receives aid. More states receive aid after the Cold War, which may be a sign of policy influence in itself, as donors feel free to disburse their aid more widely (or may wish to do so to hedge their bets). No measures of domestic politics are significant, save for the highly significant impact of having received aid in the past, indicating a substantial level of inertia. Clearly strategic concerns, at least for Britain in this time period, trump both humanitarian ones (despite the claims of official rhetoric) and more crass commercial ones (despite the fears of anti-globalization activists) in making aid decisions.

In the second column of Table 5, we can examine the value added of knowing US policy positions. And in fact, at first blush, there appears to be little. Once again, recipient democracy score has a positive impact on the likelihood it will receive aid, and we do see a significant change in that, once we control for US policy similarities with the recipient, recipient need is significantly associated with the probability of receiving aid (the negative association between recipient economic growth and aid). Potential recipients that are closer to the donor are still more likely to receive aid. But not only does the policy similarity score for the US not achieve significance, but now the measure of UK policy preferences does not either. Moreover, the

percent of cases our model predicts correctly is essentially the same as it was before we took into account US policy preferences.

What does this tell us? Should we reject Hypothesis 2 - that system leader policy preferences are likely to help explain ally aid choices -in toto? Are no policy cues provided by the supposed system leader, the US? On the contrary – the third column in Table 5 demonstrates that, substituted in for UK policy preferences, US policy preferences are actually a slightly better predictor of UK aid choices! So the reason that neither was significant in the prior analysis is likely that they cancelled each other out due to collinearity, and in fact the two measures do correlate at .77. Nonetheless, it is a striking result that US interests could be a better predictor of a donor's aid decisions than that donor's own preferences.

Finally, keeping the basic model, I examined the value added of taking into account US strategic interests as indicated by a costlier signal: where the US actually spends its military assistance dollars. While the PPC measure of explanatory power of the model changed little, as did the significance level and direction of most of the independent variables, the new measure was marginally significant, even accounting for UK policy preferences (remember that the earlier measure of US interests was not). Clearly, evidence exists of allies (consciously or not) taking into account US policy interests– even in the area of foreign aid.

For a more intuitive interpretation of the coefficients for significant variables in these 4 analyses, please see Table 6, which presents marginal effects on the probability of a state receiving aid of a one-unit change in each independent variable. The two variables with the most substantial effects, once again, are those of policy similarity and aid inertia. A one-unit change in each of these variables increases the probability of a state getting aid by close to or more than one standard deviation.

Canada. What of the US's closest geographical ally? While Canada's foreign aid calculus appears to be less exclusively strategic than is Britain's, there still appears to be some association between US interests and Canadian policy outcomes. The first column in Table 7 presents, as was the case with Britain, the results of a logit analysis designed to test the relative relationships to aid of donor country strategic concerns, economic interests, and human rights. Again, the latter appears to have little effect (though in fact, given the apparent policy influence the US is able to exercise, and the content of US foreign policy rhetoric, we might expect it even if the two donors examined here did not regularly invoke such rhetoric themselves). The potential recipient's level of democracy again is positively associated with the probability it gets aid, but a number of other factors are associated with Canadian aid patterns that were absent in the UK case. The recipient's presence at a trade intersection (which could be read as both an economic and strategic boon), is in fact negatively associated with the probability it receives aid, a result that seems rather surprising. Some light may be shed on this by the fact that several other measures of trade value of a state (being an oil exporter, or the volume of one's total exports to Canada) are also negatively associated with the likelihood that one gets aid. If one considers what kind of states are likely to have these characteristics, however, they are likely to be states that are, while still developing, not among the poorest of the poor. Therefore, this pattern indicates a Canadian favoring of those states most in need, rather than those most likely to be commercially valuable. The fact that states with larger populations are also more likely to receive aid suggests this possibility as well.

Strategic considerations do also appear to be strongly associated with Canadian aid patterns; similarity of UN policy positions is highly significant predictor, and any given state is more likely to receive aid after the Cold War – a similar diffusion process to that observable in

British aid patterns. Once again, whether a state received aid in the previous year is the single best predictor of whether it will receive aid in the current year.

The second column in Table 7 presents the results of an analysis designed to test Hypothesis 2. At first, as was the case with Britain, taking into account US policy preferences appears to make little difference to the explanatory value of the model. And yet, remarkably, the significance, size, and direction of the Canada policy preferences measure is very robust to inclusion of the US policy positions variable, which almost completely obscured the impact of the Britain policy positions variable in the last set of analyses. The US policy positions measure, meanwhile, appears to have no impact at all. Canada's foreign aid policy seems to be quite independent of the preferences of its larger southern neighbor. (And in fact, the correlation between the two is much lower than was that of the US-UK pair, though still not negligible at .57).

To test this, we can observe the results (in the third column of table 7) of the analysis of Canadian aid decisions when US policy preferences are substituted in for Canadian ones. The US measure still fails to achieve statistical significance, and there is little other effect on the predictive power of the model, other than the PPC being slightly lower. Finally, even the more "costly" (and thus, one might imagine, meaningful) measure of US interests (US military assistance), included in the final analysis in Table 7, fails to either achieve significance or boost the PPC by much. The only real effect on the analysis is that the two measures I interpreted as demonstrating the impact of need now fail to achieve significance, perhaps demonstrating the impact of need in the American program as well.

Once again, more intuitive interpretations of the impact of the independent variables are presented in Table 8. Again, this presents marginal effects on the probability of a state receiving aid of a one-unit change in each independent variable. The two variables with the most substantial

effects, once again, are those of policy similarity and aid inertia. A one unit change in each of these variables increases the probability of a state getting aid by close to or more than one standard deviation.

Conclusion and Implications

So, in a world where the current US administration appears to favor unilateralism, and yet an increasing number of problems (world poverty, environmental degradation, and human rights abuses, for instance) appear to require multilateral cooperation, what role do the policy preferences of the US appear to play in the aid patterns of two of the US's closest allies? And to what extent do those patterns appear to rest on the extent to which recipients appear to perform to basic human rights standards, as required in the aid rhetoric of both Canada and Britain? The answer to the latter appears to be a bit more straightforward than the answer to the first.

Britain. Scholars have expressed much of the same skepticism about humanitarian rhetoric in the UK (and elsewhere in Europe) as they have in the case of the US, arguing that allocation of foreign policy resources almost always necessitates tradeoffs (Vincent 1986). Hypothesis 1, therefore, stated that economic and strategic considerations are likely to be at least as strong an influence on aid decisions as are human rights considerations and neediness of the recipient.

The results of a logit analysis designed to test the relative relationships to aid of donor country strategic concerns, economic interests, and human rights were presented in the first column of Table 5. Human rights had no effect, though recipient democracy did have a marginally positive effect. While few economic measures come into play, strategic measures such as distance, the end of the Cold War, and policy position similarity certainly do. No measures of domestic politics matter, save for the highly significant impact of having received aid in the past. Strategic concerns, at least for Britain in this time period, trump both humanitarian concerns and more commercial ones in making aid decisions.

The second column of Table 5 presented the value added of knowing the similarity between US policy positions and that of the recipient. And in fact, at first blush, there appeared to be little. But not only did the policy similarity score for the US not achieve significance, the measure of UK policy preferences did not either. Moreover, the percent of cases our model predicts correctly is essentially the same as it was before we took into account US policy preferences.

But, rather than indicating that we should reject H2 altogether, the third column in Table 5 actually demonstrated that, substituted in for UK policy preferences, US policy preferences were a slightly better predictor of UK aid choices at this stage than were UK policy preferences themselves! This is a remarkable result that bears further investigation with a wider variety of measures, but at least in the current context, it can not be dismissed as simply the result of a spurious result stemming from a similarity of US and British policy portfolios, because such congruence is controlled for.

Finally, keeping the basic model, I examined the value added of taking into account US strategic interests as indicated by a costlier signal – where the US actually spends its military assistance dollars. The new measure was marginally significant, even accounting for UK policy preferences. Clearly, evidence exists for there being a strong and persistent relationship between US policy preferences and UK foreign assistance patterns.

Canada. While Canada's foreign aid calculus appeared to be less exclusively strategic than is Britain's, there still appeared to be some association between US interests and Canadian aid policy outcomes. The first column in Table 7 presented the results of a logit analysis designed to test the relative relationships to aid of donor country strategic concerns, economic interests, and human rights. Again, the latter appeared to have little effect. The potential recipient's level of democracy again was positively associated with the probability it received aid, and a number of

apparently beneficial trade-related characteristics were negatively associated with the probability a potential recipient received aid. This pattern could be interpreted as indicating that Canadian aid patterns favored those states most in need, rather than those most commercially valuable.

Strategic considerations also appear to be strongly associated with Canadian aid patterns, including most significantly similarity of UN policy positions and past aid history.

The second column in Table 7 presented the results of an analysis designed to test Hypothesis 2. In stark contrast to the British analyses, the significance, size, and direction of the Canadian policy congruence measure was very robust to inclusion of the US policy congruence variable.. When US policy congruence was substituted in for Canadian, the US measure still demonstrated no statistically significant association with which recipients were granted aid by Canada. Finally, even the more “costly” measure of US interests (US military assistance), included in the final analysis in Table 7, failed to either achieve significance or boost the PPC by much.

This study aimed to begin to answer two questions: that of the relative role of altruism and various forms of self-interest in foreign aid patterns, and the role of dominant powers in the system in shaping the aid decision patterns of others.

In doing so, I build on earlier work distinguishing the different aid calculi that exist for different categories of recipients, and I add a more specific measure of the strategic value a recipient may have for a donor. Human rights abuses continue apace despite the fact that policymakers and activists in democratic states profess a firm commitment to civil and political rights. Determining when and why states take action in defense of those goals helps us understand why so many continue to be denied basic political and civil liberties, and what can be done about it by states that possess the resources to encourage change.

In addition, I begin to try to more systematically interrogate the conventional wisdom around US dominance of the international system. While the analyses I have conducted reveal a connections between US policy congruence with a recipient and the likelihood that recipient is granted aid by Britain, another close ally's (Canada) aid patterns do not, though they might be expected to. In addition, these patterns are just that—patterns—and the processes that generated them need to be investigated more thoroughly and disentangled with greater nuance than has been possible in the context of this paper. For instance, it is unclear whether the apparent association of US policy preferences with British aid outcomes is due in part to spurious correlation between the US's and UK's sets of policy preferences, or whether there is a true cueing process occurring. While anecdotal evidence seems to suggest there is, archival research to date does not substantiate such a claim. One possible reason for this might be if British interests have come to be so closely aligned with US ones that they appear to be one and the same. However, given how much British assistance is focused on former colonies, this seems unlikely.

The results of this investigation beg other questions which, as noted at the outset of this investigation, must remain unanswered in the context of the current research. Though we saw that apparent US policy preferences were related to at least British aid patterns, we can only infer 1) whether US policy makers consciously attempt to influence the aid policies of their allies, 2) whether policy makers in middle-power donor states *intend* to take US policy preferences into account (the possibility that the associations are spurious due to policy congruence between the US and each of the other donors was, however, controlled for), and 3) whether the relative extent to which US interests are reflected in ally aid policies is affected by changes in who staffs ministerial posts at various levels in the bureaucracy (the party in control of government overall is, however, taken into account). Fuller elucidation of these questions awaits far more extensive archival research.

What this paper presents, then, are the beginnings of some answers, and a good deal many more questions. The one thing that may be beyond question is that the task of improving the economic, social, civil, and political lot of people in all states must be a multilateral endeavor, and must be one in which all wealthy nations perceive an interest. Discerning how such decisions are now made is therefore essential.

Table 1
States that Received Aid from Britain, 1996

Afghanistan	Latvia	Turks and Caicos
Albania	Lebanon	Uganda
Angola	Lesotho	Ukraine
Anguilla	Liberia	Uruguay
Antigua and Barbuda	Macedonia	Uzbekistan
Armenia	Madagascar	Vanuatu
Azerbaijan	Malawi	Viet Nam
Bangladesh	Malaysia	Virgin Islands
Belarus	Mali	Zaire
Belize	Mauritania	Zambia
Bolivia	Mauritius	Zimbabwe
Bosnia	Mexico	
Botswana	Moldova	
Brazil	Mongolia	
Bulgaria	Montserrat	
Burundi	Morocco	
Cambodia	Mozambique	
Cameroon	Myanmar	
Central African Republic	Namibia	
Chad	Nepal	
Chile	Nicaragua	
China	Niger	
Colombia	Nigeria	
Congo	North Yemen	
Costa Rica	Pakistan	
Croatia	Palestine	
Cuba	Paraguay	
Cyprus	Peru	
Czech Republic	Philippines	
Dominica	Poland	
Ecuador	Romania	
Egypt	Russia	
Eritrea	Rwanda	
Ethiopia	Sao Tome	
Gambia	Senegal	
Georgia	Serbia	
Ghana	Seychelles	
Grenada	Sierra Leone	
Guatemala	Slovakia	
Guinea	Slovenia	
Guyana	Solomon Islands	
Honduras	Somalia	
Hungary	Sri Lanka	
India	St. Exupery	
Indonesia	St. Helena	
Iran	St. Kitts	
Iraq	St. Lucia	
Ivory Coast	Sudan	
Jamaica	Swaziland	
Jordan	South Yemen	
Kazakhstan	Tajikistan	
Kenya	Tanzania	
Korea, Dem Rep.	Thailand	
Kyrgystan	Togo	
Laos	Turkmenistan	

Table 2
States That Did Not Receive Aid From Britain, 1996

Algeria (5)	Macau (na)
Argentina (2)	Malta (na)
Aruba (na)	Marshall Islands (na)
Bahamas (na)	Maldives (na)
Bahrain (2)*	Mayotte (na)
Barbados (na)	Micronesia (na)
Benin (1)	Nauru (na)
Bermuda (na)	New Caledonia (na)
Bhutan (2)	Niue (na)
Brunei (na)*	Northern Marianas (na)
Burkina Faso (na)	Oman (2)*
Burma (4)	Palau (na)
Cape Verde (na)	Panama (2)
Comoros (1)	Papua New Guinea (3)
Cook Islands (na)	Qatar (na)*
Djibouti (2)	South Africa (4)
Dominican Republic (3)	Saudi Arabia(2)*
El Salvador (2)	Singapore (1)
EquatorialGuinea (3)	St. Vincent (na)
Estonia (2)	Suriname (2)
Falkland Islands (na)	Syria (3)
Fiji (na)	Taiwan (1)
French Polynesia (na)	Timor (na)
Gabon (na)	Tokelau (na)
Gibraltar (na)	Tonga (na)
Greece (1)	Trinidad (2)
Guinea-Bissau (2)	Tunisia (2)
Haiti (3)	Turkey (4)
Hong Kong (na)	Tuvalu (na)
Israel (3)	United Arab Emirates (1)*
Kiribati (na)	Venezuela (5)
Korea, Republic of (na)	Wallis and Fortuna (na)
Kuwait (2)*	Windward Islands (na)
Libya (3)*	Western Samoa (na)
Lithuania (2)	(#)= State's Human Rights Score (US State Department)

Table 3
States that Received Aid from Canada, 1996

Afghanistan	India	Singapore
Albania	Indonesia	Slovakia
Algeria	Iraq	Somalia
Angola	Ivory Coast	Sri Lanka
Argentina	Jamaica	St. Exupery
Armenia	Jordan	Sudan
Bangladesh	Kazakhstan	Suriname
Barbados	Kenya	Swaziland
Belize	Korea, North	South Yemen
Benin	Kyrgyzstan	Syria
Bhutan	Laos	Tajikistan
Bolivia	Lebanon	Tanzania
Bosnia	Lesotho	Thailand
Botswana	Liberia	Togo
Brazil	Lithuania	Trinidad
Burkina Faso	Madagascar	Tunisia
Burundi	Malawi	Turkey
Cambodia	Malaysia	Uganda
Cameroon	Maldives	Ukraine
Cape Verde	Mali	Uruguay
Central African Rep.	Mauritania	Venezuela
Chad	Mauritius	Viet Nam
Chile	Mexico	Windward Islands
China	Mongolia	Zaire
Colombia	Morocco	Zambia
Comoros	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
Congo	Myanmar	
Costa Rica	Namibia	
Croatia	Nepal	
Cuba	Nicaragua	
Czech Republic	Niger	
Djibouti	Nigeria	
Dominica	Northern Marianas	
Dominican Republic	North Yemen	
Ecuador	Pakistan	
Egypt	Palestine	
El Salvador	Panama	
Equatorial Guinea	Papua New Guinea	
Eritrea	Paraguay	
Ethiopia	Peru	
Gabon	Philippines	
Gambia	Poland	
Ghana	Romania	
Grenada	Russia	
Guatemala	Rwanda	
Guinea	South Africa	
Guinea-Bissau	Sao Tome and Principe	
Guyana	Senegal	
Haiti	Serbia	
Honduras	Seychelles	
Hungary	Sierra Leone	

Table 4
States That Did Not Receive Aid From Canada, 1996

Anguilla (na)	Israel (3)	Saudi Arabia(2)*
Antigua and Barbuda (na)	Kiribati (na)	Slovenia (na)
Aruba (na)	Korea, Democratic Republic of (na)	Solomon Islands (na)
Azerbaijan (3)	Korea, Republic of (na)	St. Helena (na)
Bahamas (na)	Kuwait (2)*	St. Kitts (na)
Bahrain (2)*	Latvia (1)	St. Lucia (na)
Belarus (2)	Libya (3)*	St. Vincent (na)
Benin (1)	Macau (na)	Taiwan (1)
Bermuda (na)	Macedonia (1)	Timor (na)
Bulgaria (2)	Micronesia (na)	Tokelau (na)
Burma (4)	Malta (na)	Tonga (na)
Cook Islands (na)	Marshall Islands (na)	Turkmenistan (2)
Cyprus (1)	Mayotte (na)	Turks and Caicos (na)
Estonia (2)	Moldova(2)	Tuvalu (na)
Falkland Islands (na)	Montserrat(na)	United Arab Emirates (1)*
Fiji (na)	Nauru (na)	Uzbekistan (2)
French Polynesia (na)	New Caledonia (na)	Vanuatu (na)
Georgia (3)	Niue (na)	Virgin Islands (na)
Gibraltar (na)	Oman (2)*	Wallis and Fortuna (na)
Greece (1)	Palau (na)	Western Samoa (na)
Hong Kong (na)	Qatar (na)*	(#)= State's Human Rights Score (US State Department)
Iran (3)		

Table 5: Pooled Cross Sectional Probit Analysis of Whether a State Received Aid – Britain

Variable	Coefficient (Robust Standard Error in Parentheses)			
	Basic Model Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. & Britain	Including Similarity of Recip.'s UN Votes with Both US & Britain	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. & US	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. & Britain, & US Mil. Assistance
Human Rights	-.104 (.106)	-.091 (.107)	-.091 (.107)	-.187 (.133)
Recipient Polity Score	.012 (marg) (.006)	.014* (.007)	.014* (.007)	.013 (.006)
Trade Intersection	-.112 (.542)	-.073 (.554)	-.063 (.551)	-.151 (.592)
UK Exports to Recipe.	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
UK Imports from Recip.	-.000 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	.000 (.000)
Oil Exporter	.481 (.340)	.493 (.368)	.487 (.367)	.412 (.316)
Recipient GDP	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Recipient GDP Growth	-.030 (.017)	-.034(marg) (.018)	-.034* (.018)	-.044** (.017)
Population	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Nuclear Capabilities	-11.727 (1990000)	-10.928 (4469324)	-10.554 (1620722)	-11.741 (3600784)
Distance	-.000*** (.000)	-.000*** (.000)	-.000*** (.000)	-.000*** (.000)
Dispute	-7.830 (21400000)	-6.910 (4792967)	-6.588 (1740000)	-7.422 (3832127)
Alliance	.958 (.837)	.929 (.862)	.922 (.861)	.673 (.832)
UN Policy Similarity - Recip. and Britain	.956* (.489)	.141 (.736)		.287* (.004)
UN Policy Similarity - Recip. and US		.900 (.602)	.986* (.401)	
UN Policy Similarity – US and Britain		.567 (.453)	.509 (.534)	.544 (.608)
Cold War	-.400(marg) (.210)	.319 (.221)	.301 (.200)	.251 (.193)
Mass Mediated Humanitarian Crises	-.011 (.013)	-.009 (.013)	-.010 (.013)	-.020 (.014)
Human Rights Activism	-8.745 (7550000)	-7.967 (2520000)	-7.720 (9359749)	-7.962 (16670000)
Immigrant Populations	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Commonwealth	.469 (.493)	.481 (.541)	.474 (.548)	-.025 (.525)
Any Aid Previous Year	1.302*** (.193)	1.2890*** (.192)	1.295*** (.189)	1.274*** (.190)
US Military Assistance to Recip.				.000 (marg) (.000)
Model Significance	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
N	1402	1402	1402	1402
Percent Predicted Correctly	.56	.55	.57	.56

***=significant at $p < .001$; **= $p < .01$; *= $p < .05$; marg= $p < .060$ (one-tailed).

Table 6: Marginal Effects for Significant Variables - Britain

Variable	Marginal Effects On Change in Probability of Receiving Aid of A One-Unit Change in Independent Variable			
	Basic Model Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. & Britain	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. & US	Including Similarity of Recip.'s UN Votes with Both US & Britain	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. and Britain, & US Military Assistance
Recipient Polity Score	.012	.014	.014	.013
Recipient GDP Growth		-.035	-.034	-.004
Distance	-.000	-.000	-.000	-.000
UN Policy Similarity - Recip. and Britain	.956			.956
UN Policy Similarity - Recip. and US		.986		
Cold War	.400			
Any Aid Previous Year	1.302	1.295	1.288	1.270
US Military Assistance to Recip.				.000

Table 7: Pooled Cross Sectional Probit Analysis of Whether a State Received Aid – Canada

Variable	Coefficient (Robust Standard Error in Parentheses)			
	Basic Model Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. & Canada	Including Similarity of Recip.'s UN Votes with Both US & Canada	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. & US	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. and Canada, & US Military Assistance
Human Rights	.142 (.083)	.141 (.086)	.110 (.068)	.086 (.067)
Recipient Polity Score	.009** (.003)	.009** (.003)	.011 *** (.003)	.010*** (.003)
Trade Intersection	-.662* (.277)	-.658* (.284)	-.584* (.295)	-.770* (.342)
Canada Exports to Recip.	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)	-.000** (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Canada Imports from Recip.	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Oil Exporter	-.566* (.253)	-.572* (.279)	-.603* (.272)	-.450 (.285)
Recipient GDP	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Recipient GDP Growth	-.007 (.011)	-.007 (.011)	-.011 (.011)	-.012 (.011)
Population	.000** (.000)	.000** (.000)	.000** (.000)	.000 (.000)
Nuclear Capabilities	.543 (.449)	.559 (.485)	.772 (.483)	.428 (.582)
UN Policy Similarity - Recip. and Canada	1.521** (.520)	1.529** (.526)		1.520** (.520)
UN Policy Similarity - Recip. and US		-.033 (.375)	.465 (.340)	
UN Policy Similarity – US and Canada		.325 (.333)	.306 (.208)	.264 (.420)
Cold War	-.356* (.150)	-.360* (.161)	-.516*** (.144)	-.548*** .129
Instability	Dropped-collinearity	Dropped-collinearity	Dropped-collinearity	Dropped-collinearity
Mass Mediated Humanitarian Crises...	.001 (.005)	.001 (.005)	.005 (.005)	.004 (.005)
Alliance	Dropped-collinearity	Dropped-collinearity	Dropped-collinearity	Dropped-collinearity
Dispute	Dropped-collinearity	Dropped-collinearity	.000 (.000)	Dropped-collinearity
Human Rights Activism	-.199 (.391)	-.200 (.392)	-.148 (.383)	-.219 (.389)
Immigrant Populations	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Distance	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Commonwealth	.695 (.506)	.709 (.573)	.755 (.349)	.383 (.304)
Any Aid Previous Year	.923*** (.126)	.922*** (.127)	1.012 *** (.125)	.944*** (.127)
US Military Assistance to Recip.				.000 (.000)
Model Significance	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
N	1407	1407	1407	1407
PPC	.57	.58	.54	.58

***=significant at $p < .001$; **= $p < .01$; *= $p < .05$; marg= $p < .060$ (one-tailed).

Table 8: Marginal Effects for Significant Variables - Canada

Variable	Marginal Effects On Change in Probability of Receiving Aid of A One-Unit Change in Independent Variable			
	Basic Model Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. &Canada	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. &US	Including Similarity of Recip.'s UN Votes with Both US & Canada	Including Similarity of UN Votes – Recip. and Canada, & US Military Assistance
Recipient Polity Score	.009	.011	.009	.010
Trade Intersection	-.662	-.584	-.658	-.769
Canada Exports to Recip.	-.000	-.0005	-.000	
Oil Exporter	-.566	-.603	-.572	
Population	.000	.000	.000	.000
UN Policy Similarity - Recip. and Canada	1.521		1.529	
Cold War	-.356	-.516	-.360	-.548
Any Aid Previous Year	.923	1.012	.922	.944

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