Identity and Immigrant Integration in Western Europe’s “New” Migration Cities

THE CASES OF DUBLIN AND MADRID

ELITSA DANEVA MOLLES
Boston College
Ph.D. Candidate, Comparative Politics

As Ireland and Spain transformed into immigration countries in the early 2000s, they attracted comparatively large immigrant populations, especially to their largest cities. Nonetheless, the immigrant communities in Dublin and Madrid differ significantly in their composition, the reaction they have elicited from the host society, and their ability to incorporate in their new environment. This paper explores the factors that influence immigrant reception and integration in new immigration spaces like Dublin and Madrid. While acknowledging the significance of social networks, economic interest, and party politics, it instead focuses on the identity characteristics, both those of the newcomers and their host societies, in determining the exclusion and inclusion that different ethnic communities face. Further, the article examines how the host society’s inclusion-exclusion dynamics interact with the immigrants’ own perceptions of belonging or isolation to produce certain political, economic, and social integration outcomes. The argument is explored for Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Bulgarians and Ecuadorians in Madrid.¹

Following a boom that moved them from the European economic periphery to its forefront in the early 2000s, Ireland and Spain transformed from exporters of labor to immigration countries receiving foreign workers themselves. Various ethnic groups are now interacting among each other and with their hosts, especially in these new immigration countries’ largest cities – Madrid and Dublin. Nonetheless, the foreign population in Dublin remains white, Catholic, and European, with non-European immigrants largely marginalized. The immigrant community in Madrid, alternatively, is ethnically diverse, with workers from Eastern Europe, Latin America and North Africa competing for economic and social resources.

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With economic downturn, Ireland and Spain are struggling to define the contours of exclusion and inclusion and successfully accommodate the new European and non-European immigrant communities in their midst with varying degrees of success. While Nigerians have generally settled in Ireland, they experience rejection in the social sphere and are often displaced by the Polish from Dublin’s lower-skilled labor market (Central Statistical Office, 2006-2011; Fanning 2011; Immigrants Council of Ireland, 2008; henceforth ICI). While the Polish were welcomed with open arms in the mid-2000s, they are still exploited in the economic sphere and do not fully belong in Ireland (The Independent 2006; Krings 2010). Bulgarians travelled to Madrid due to common sentiments with the Spanish, yet were received with suspicion by their hosts and remain relatively isolated. Moroccan immigrants are marginalized in all spheres regardless of a lengthy residence and shared history with Spaniards. While somewhat isolated economically, Ecuadorian immigrants are generally accepted in their new home in Madrid.²

The objective of this article is to disentangle variations in reception and assimilation by surveying the experience of the immigrant worker in new Western European immigration cities like Dublin and Madrid. Consequently, it poses the question: What determines integration outcomes in new Western European immigration spaces? To respond to this question, the paper considers: 1) How can immigrant integration be defined and gauged in the Western European context?; 2) On what basis are inclusion and exclusion of the immigrant “Other” constructed in Western European receiving societies?; 3) How do inclusion-exclusion dynamics affect integration outcomes?

The article addresses these questions using the cases of Poles and Nigerians in Dublin and Bulgarians and Ecuadorians in Madrid. In particular, it focuses on how identity characteristics,
both those of the newcomers and their host societies, produce certain political, economic, and social integration outcomes.

**The Migration Literature**

The migration literature has provided answers to the three research questions this paper poses. First, what is integration? Integration has been interpreted as assimilation, where integration is successful if immigrants become “similar and equal to us” (Papadapoulos 2011). The emphasis is on national identity, values, and social cohesion (Etzinger 2005; Joppke and Morwaska 2003). On the other hand, a multicultural model follows a “different-but-equal-to-us” logic. Cultural pluralism and the emancipation of ethnic minorities are institutionalized, where integration occurs “with retention of identity” (Papadapoulos 2011; Scholten 2011). A final paradigm emphasizes immigrants’ participation in the host society’s distinct spheres, like education, the labor market, or the welfare state (Boswell and Geddes 2011). In one example, Etzinger (2000) identifies three domains of integration - the legal-political, the cultural, and the socioeconomic, while in another Freeman (2004) discusses incorporation in the domains of state, market, culture, and welfare. This analysis roughly mirrors Freeman’s approach and considers integration in the receiving community’s separate spheres.

Second, how are inclusion and exclusion constructed in the Western European context? Current scholarship attributes exclusion and inclusion dynamics to an economic-rational, a social network, or a political-institutional logic. According to the economic approach, immigrants are accepted when they provide Western European countries with cheap labor in economic sectors undesirable to native workers (Piore 1979) and serve the economic interests of the receiving state or its concentrated interests groups (Freeman 1995; Messina 2007). Foreign laborers are
excluded when they compete with nationals for scarce resources like jobs, wages, or welfare benefits (Von Tubergen, Maas and Flap 2004).

Alternatively, the social network approach suggests that labor mobility occurs when “webs of connectivity” between sending and receiving countries, as well as migrant-supporting institutions in the receiving state, facilitate migration (Faist 2000; Massey et al. 1987). Longer-established immigrant groups in possession of high levels of “ethnic capital” are better received by their host societies (Zhou and Logan 1989).

According to the political-institutional approach, exclusion and inclusion reflect the national institutional context of the receiving state (Ireland 2000). They are further shaped by the opportunities resulting from national interest group politics and the efforts of national administrators (Guiraudon 1998), courts (Joppke 1999), or employers (Freeman 1995). Migrants are rejected with the break-up of traditional state structures and the rise of anti-immigrant parties (Betz 1991; Messina 1989) and are generally included in states with left-wing governments (Lenski 1966).

While all three approaches raise significant points, they tend to omit non-material variables and the issues of cultural distance and identity politics which define immigration discourse today (Hainmüeller and Hiscox 2007; Hayes and Dowds 2006). The preferred level of analysis is the national (Brubaker 1992) or the supranational (Lavenex 2007), with less attention to the local level, where exclusion and inclusion patterns are most prominent (Money 1999). While exclusion-inclusion dynamics and immigration policy are significant predictors of immigrant incorporation, the connection is rarely established.

Thirdly, how do exclusion and inclusion factors figure in immigrant integration? The literature is dedicated mostly to the relationship between immigration and the erosion or
continued significance of the national state rather than the connection between immigration and integration policy. Consequently, immigrant integration is most commonly attributed to the institutional conditions, actors, and practices of the state (Castles and Miller 2003; Hammar 1985).

Assimilation policy depends on “cultural idioms of nationhood,” or citizenship models and discourses (Brubaker 1992). Civic and ethnic citizenship regimes interact with distinct integration models to produce certain political opportunity structures for immigrant incorporation (Koopmans et al. 2005; Statham 1999). Incorporation also stems from the structures of key state institutions, like the welfare or educational systems, and the points of access they offer to the immigrant (Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Dörr and Faist 1997; Faist 1994). Institutions could be path-dependent, where historical ideas and past experiences define state structures and determine integration models today (Favell 1998; Hansen 2002).

Alternatively, the state is considered to be constrained in its ability to exclude, include or integrate the immigrant “Other” by the forces of globalization and supranationalism. Thickening economic interdependence forces liberal states to grant rights to all of their residents regardless of nationality (Hollifield 1992). Increasingly porous national borders and the rise of “postnational” membership have undermined the state’s ability to dictate the conditions under which immigrant communities are incorporated (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994). European Union integration imposes communal immigration and integration prerogatives on individual European states, thus precluding them from defining belonging, citizenship or assimilation unilaterally (Bauböck 2006; Geddes 1998; Guiraudon 1998).

Some authors find that the characteristics of the immigrant rather than the state affect integration outcomes. Immigrants’ language, education, or work experience determine
occupational and socioeconomic mobility and dictate the sector of the receiving society to which migrants are assimilated (Portes 2007; Portes and Zhou 1993). Culturally distant immigrants are disadvantaged in their chances for economic assimilation due to their lack of country-specific resources (Rosholm et al. 2006). Alternatively, integration is a process that spans generations, where the immigrant gradually becomes indistinguishable from, while transforming, the receiving society (Alba and Nee 2003; Morawska 1994).

Immigrant agency is downplayed in all three of these approaches. While the last approach focuses on the immigrant as determining in integration outcomes, the emphasis remains on characteristics rather than the immigrant as a conscious actor (Berger et al. 2004; Fennema and Tillie 1999). Furthermore, few authors emphasize the intersection between migrants’ strategies and perceptions and the institutional and discourse landscape of the receiving society (Diehl and Schnell 2006; Freeman 2004). The interaction between immigrant claims-making and the host state’s political opportunity structures eclipses the significance of “cultural” opportunity structures (Guigni and Passy 2004). As Carmel and Cerami (2011) put it, surprisingly little attention is given to “emotions” and how they drive preference formation or limit policy.

Argument and Significance

This paper strives to address the gaps left by the migration literature. Consequently, a political science literature concerned with the national state is combined with sociological and anthropological references emphasizing perceptions and identity. The interaction between immigration policy, and how we decide who to admit, and integration policy, or how we accommodate the ones admitted, is considered. While not discounting the insights in the migration literature, the article concentrates on its least developed aspects by stressing identity
and “emotion” as drivers of immigrant inclusion and exclusion and by focusing on the immigrants’ agency as essential to integration outcomes. Finally, the analysis here moves to the local level, where exclusion, inclusion and integration policies actually shape up.

It is undeniable that immigrants are included in the receiving society if they are economically utile, are embedded in thick ethnic networks, or reside in a left-leaning state with open institutions. However, differences in reception in times of economic downturn and among equally flexible and exploitable foreign groups are harder to explain by the economic rationale. Ethnic capital matters, yet it is less significant in new countries of migration or if established migrant groups are more severely marginalized than new ones. Institutional structure is less relevant when migrant populations are treated differently regardless of equal policy rules and party politics matter less when right-wing movements are yet to form in the host country.

Therefore, this paper turns to identity politics as the primary driver behind immigrant reception and immigration policy. In the tradition of Tajfel’s (1982) work, the article argues that impulses of social and cultural anxiety and perceptions of difference and familiarity prevail over purely material motives in selecting among foreign workers (Kunz and Leinonen 2007). The immigrant as an economic commodity is often obscured by the immigrant as a socio-cultural entity in determining labor market outcomes. Inclusion and exclusion are grounded in identity politics, where local identity variations determine what migrant identity characteristics are considered “similar” and welcomed and which ones are deemed “different” and undesirable (Triandafyllidou 2001). Even if economic utility matters, inclusion is framed through categories fundamental to Smith’s (1991) definition of the nation, namely race, religion, shared past, and common culture. Commonality is also established through the category of “work ethic” – a non-
material and fluid characteristic that could be re-ascribed to any immigrant group. Connections are invented to institutionalize the most desirable attributes of the receiving context.

Further, exclusion and inclusion dynamics have a part to play in integration outcomes, where both the host state’s institutions and its identity characteristics and socio-cultural discourses matter. However, immigrants’ agency is equally significant, where foreign workers’ own perceptions of belonging/similarity or isolation/difference significantly affect incorporation. Ultimately, integration success is rooted in the interaction between the immigrant’s agency and the prevailing discourses in the receiving society.

There are four possible outcomes based on this argument. Incorporation results are optimal when the immigrant group perceives itself to be similar and belong and when the receiving society shares in this discourse of inclusion. Integration outcomes are least favorable when the immigrant group considers itself isolated or “different” and the receiving community reproduces this discourse of exclusion. The other two outcomes are intermediary, with acceptance from the host society combined with lack of belonging accounting for the third best outcome (Table 1).

Table 1: Integration Outcomes

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<th>Immigrant Group</th>
<th>Belong</th>
<th>Don’t Belong</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Host Society Actors</td>
<td>Reject</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third best outcome</td>
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Belonging is defined through the subjective feelings of being different or similar, as well as integrated or isolated in one’s diasporic community; future migration plans; satisfaction and primary identification; and comparative levels of interaction with the host society and one’s own ethnic group.

Integration outcomes are operationalized roughly through Freeman’s model (2004), with an emphasis on immigrants’ participation in four spheres of the receiving society. Participation in the “state” is measured through legal status and pertinent legislature and policy; running and voting in elections; membership in trade unions and political parties; voluntary activism; and naturalization rates. Participation in the “market” is surveyed through recruitment; occupation and occupational mobility as compared to education and employment history; employment rates; and conditions and exploitation at work. Participation in “welfare” is operationalized through access to welfare benefits, housing, education, and other state institutions. Finally, participation in “culture” is measured through rates of intermarriage; experiences of racism; as well as dominant religion and language.

**Background and Methods**

The above analytical framework is applied to a “small-n” comparison between two receiving localities each hosting two distinct immigrant populations (one European and one non-European). In particular, the paper compares Ireland and Spain, and more specifically Dublin and Madrid. Polish and Nigerian immigrants are the focus in Dublin and Bulgarian and Ecuadorian workers are surveyed in Madrid. This design yields four case studies, one roughly fitting each possible integration outcome identified in the argument above.

Spain and Ireland provide for a fruitful comparison. Former emigration countries, both became immigration countries in the mid-1990s, as they moved from the European periphery to
the forefront of economic growth with booms in the service and construction sectors (Brücker 2007). Both are coming to terms with the immigrant workers in their midst for the first time in the context of European integration, sweeping economic change, and fragmented national identity. Both states are experiencing severe economic contraction since the late 2000s, yet struggle with continued immigration and pressure to integrate their foreign populations. Neither, however, is subject to overt racialization of politics or the influence of right-wing political parties.

Despite similarities, Ireland remains the only EU country where European immigrants are more numerous than third country nationals and relatively large groups of Nigerians and Chinese are nonetheless much less prominent than white Christian workers (European Commission 2008; CSO 2012). In contrast, Spain’s foreign labor force is multicultural, with Ecuadorians, Moroccans, Romanians and Bulgarians as some of the largest groups (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2010; henceforth INE; Papademetriou et al. 2010).

Further, the focus is on Polish and Nigerian immigrants in Ireland and Bulgarians and Ecuadorians in Spain. These nationalities represent a “new” European and a non-European immigrant group for each location, as to reflect differences in legal-political status. They highlight the connection between immigration and European integration on the one hand and the nexus between integration and cultural, historical, and quasi-colonial relationships on the other. These four populations also reflect a variation of identity and ethnic characteristics with some defined as profoundly “different” and others described as presumably “similar” to their hosts.

These national groups are also among the most prominent in the receiving localities. The first non-Irish immigrants to arrive to Ireland, mostly as asylum seekers, Nigerians grew from

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3 This researcher also collected data on Moroccan immigrants in Madrid, who remain the largest third-country national group in Spain. This immigrant population was omitted from the main analysis, however, as Moroccans are
only 10 in 1996 to 19,780 in 2011 and represent the largest third-country national group in the receiving context (CSO 2012; Komolafe 2008). However, Nigerians are relatively few compared to Polish workers who account for 8% of the Irish labor force (Barrett 2009). Attracted to a rapidly growing and liberal economy, the spoken English language, and the ease of migration with EU enlargement, Polish nationals inundated the Irish labor market and are the most numerous foreign group in Ireland in 2011 with 122,585 persons (CSO 2012).

Ecuadorian and Bulgarian workers are similarly prominent in Madrid as their Polish and Nigerian counterparts are in Dublin. With a number of bilateral labor market agreements between the two countries, booming services and construction sectors, as well as cultural connections between the receiving and sending contexts, Ecuadorian labor mobility to Spain rose sharply in the early 2000s, rivaling traditional migration from Africa (Perez 2003). Ecuadorians are the third largest national group in Spain with 440,304 persons residing in the receiving state as of 2009 (INE 2010). Spain is also the home of the largest Bulgarian diaspora in Europe. Attracted to the opening of borders with EU enlargement, a familiar and flexible market structure, a favorable climate, and their hosts’ similar Southern European disposition, together with Romanians, Bulgarians have been the fastest growing European immigrant group in Spain in the late 2000s (INE 2009; 2010).

the only “traditional” immigrant group in the receiving state, migrating to Spain in the 1980s due to economic reasons and historical and economic bonds between Morocco and Spain. The focus here instead is on relatively new migration in receiving contexts with less experience with accommodating foreign workers instead. Further, Moroccans are employed in the agricultural sector rather than manufacturing or low-skilled services. They reside primarily in Cataluña and Andalucía rather than Madrid (INE 2010; Papademetriou et al. 2010).

4 All Bulgarians interviewed by this researcher considered themselves to be quite similar to their Spanish hosts on the basis of their belonging to Southern rather than Northern Europe. As Southerners, Bulgarians reported being warmer, friendlier and more receptive to others than Northern and Western European nationalities, much like their hosts (for instance, Dietrich*, personal communication, March 7, 2011, Madrid; Iris*, personal communication, April 17, 2011, Madrid). (*Names have been changed to maintain the respondents’ confidentiality).

5 The Bulgarian population in Spain grew by 112% between 2006 and 2007, from 60,174 to 127,058 persons. This is the largest relative migration growth for any national group excluding Romania with 185% (INE 2010). It also represents a shift in European migration to Spain from retirement-based migration from Western European older EU
Bulgarians were selected rather than the dominant Romanian group, since Bulgarians are still among the most prominent foreign populations in Spain and are rising in numbers during the economic downturn. Bulgarians also have similar legal-political status and motivations for migration to those of Romanians. However, they are not racialized through the stereotype of the “Roma” as their Romanian counterparts, a significant issue in a project dealing with identity.

Regardless of the reasons for their migration, representatives of all four national groups are currently economic migrants concentrated in the same market segments of the host states. Apart from some medical personnel, Nigerian nationals in Ireland are employed in lower skilled services, such as social work, security, retail, manufacturing, and the taxi industry (CSO 2008). It is in these sectors that they compete with Polish workers who arrived to Ireland to fill labor shortages in construction, yet are currently employed in manufacturing, retail, hotels, and restaurants (CSO 2006-2011; Quinn 2010). Similarly, Bulgarian and Ecuadorian men vie for employment in construction and, with the bust of the construction sector, in low-skilled services and manufacturing, while women from both populations have concentrated primarily into domestic work and tourism (INE 2007; Papademetriou et al. 2010).

The paper focuses on these lower skilled or skilled occupations, and namely construction, retail, hotels, restaurants, and domestic care. These economic sectors have the highest concentrations of the immigrants of interest here. They are home to the most severe competition among the relevant foreign groups with economic contraction. They also tend to fall within the informal economy and provide fewer protections to the persons employed there.

However, the analysis moves beyond the national level to focus on the urban spaces of Dublin and Madrid (Money 1999; Sassen 1998). Dublin and Madrid both attract about one-fifth member states to economic migration for low-skilled and informal employment from among the new Eastern European EU members (Papademetriou et al. 2010).
of all immigrants in their respective countries (CSO 2008; INE 2010). Dublin is the home of forty percent of all Nigerians residing in Ireland and about one third of all the Polish workers in Ireland in 2011 (CSO 2011; Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych 2009; henceforth MSZ). Madrid hosts the largest Ecuadorian community in Spain (30% of the total) and the most Bulgarians in the receiving state (18% of the total) (INE 2010). The economic sectors in which the immigrant groups of interest focus are mostly located in the two cities (CSO 2006-2011; INE 2007; 2009).

Madrid and Dublin have been profoundly transformed by Bulgarian, Ecuadorian, Polish, and Nigerian immigrants whose churches, restaurants, shops, and associations have enhanced the cities’ identities. On the one hand, the cities are representative of the four populations’ experiences in the host countries more broadly, as they contain a cross section of these communities in terms of socioeconomic profiles and cultural backgrounds. On the other hand, they are unique spaces for the study of immigrant integration, as it is there that immigration and integration policies are implemented in reality and the immigrant groups interact among each other and with local labor market and socio-political actors.

The comparison is established through mostly qualitative methods. Data collection was based primarily on the ethnographic approach. A year-long fieldwork in the two cities was dedicated in large part to participant observation of the relevant migrant groups in their social, economic, and organizational environments. This researcher took residence in heavily immigrant localities of the cities, visited the communities’ associations, and participated in the cultural, social, and political events they organized. One-hundred short surveys with randomly selected native consumers of foreign labor were collected in each city.

Semi-structured interviews with three types of relevant actors serve as the most significant source of data for each location. Interviews were conducted with anywhere between
ten and forty representatives of each of the foreign populations of interest. Surveys of the less numerous Nigerian and Ecuadorian respondents by other researchers supplement the data for these two national groups.\(^6\) Questions roughly followed the same script, but were open-ended as to allow for insight into what the immigrants themselves considered most significant about their integration. Further, interviews with the immigrants’ representatives in ethnic organizations were conducted in order to confirm trends identified by the foreign workers and render the analysis more representative. Finally, this researcher conducted interviews with thirty local labor and political actors in each context. These included local elected politicians and administrators, representatives of the relevant ministries and trade unions, members of the police and the media, as well as employers of foreign labor. Questions were comparable, yet autonomy was given to the participants to identify the issues in local integration policy of most importance to them and to outline their organization’s specific role in reception and incorporation.

Sampling differs across actor type. The snowball approach was employed to identify immigrant participants. However, the approach was modified where subsequent interviewees were selected on the basis of their difference in terms of demographic characteristics from the previous “seed” (Hammersley and Atkinson 2004). Respondents were also picked at random from immigrant-heavy areas and ethnic events, such as religious services in the case of the Polish or language classes in the case of Bulgarians.

Sampling for immigrant representatives and local labor market actors was purposive. The local organizations that take part in shaping exclusion, inclusion and integration policy were identified in advance and one representative was selected from each relevant institution. In the

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case of elected councilors and the media, multiple representatives were interviewed as to account for the left-right political spectrum.

Variations in reception and belonging across immigrant groups and localities are established based on the interview and survey data. Discourse analysis is used in processing the interviews and any observations recorded during field work, whereas statistical analysis is employed in the case of the survey data. All responses pertaining to a certain question are tabulated to identify repeating trends. When determining integration outcomes and how they relate to reception and belonging levels, interview data by the expert respondents and reports by governmental and non-governmental organizations are employed.

**Analysis**

Three main conclusions emerge from careful evaluation of the case studies. *First, even though the four immigrant groups of interest are a permanent presence in their new host cities, they have been received very differently by local political and labor market actors and the general public.* Polish workers were warmly welcomed and perceived with “novelty and curiosity” rather than fears of inundation. They are “accepted” by actors in the host society. Despite historical and cultural connections with the host country, Nigerians are considered different and unable to “settle” in Dublin. Therefore, they are “rejected” by host society actors. Regardless of perceptions of common European destiny and similar mentality, Bulgarians remain isolated in Madrid and thus are “rejected” by the host society. Ecuadorians are “accepted” and welcomed in the receiving city.

While the flexibility and cost of the immigrants’ labor or the economic and social burden they place on the receiving context has something to do with these patterns, exclusion and
inclusion are defined in non-material terms. Welcome or rejection stem from a subjective sense of “perceived familiarly” or alternatively “distance,” understood in terms of racial, cultural, and historical characteristics, and grounded in the host city’s own ideal self-identification. Commonalities and differences are exaggerated and even invented to institutionalize the receiving society’s own desirable attributes and downplay the undesirable traits of local identity.

Consequently, perceived ethnic and racial commonalities matter, where white European Polish workers are considered to easily fit in and contribute to a limited and comfortable sense of multiculturalism in Dublin that Nigerians “of different color of skin” would disrupt. In their turn, Balkan Bulgarians are perceived as second-hand citizens of the Continent. These darker-skinned Southeast Europeans are viewed as not truly European and thus they remind their hosts of a recent past in which the swarthy Southern Spaniards were themselves considered “ethnic” in the Northwest of the European Union. Ecuadorians evoke a common Hispanic ethnicity instead.

Further, the religion shared between Polish workers and their Irish hosts and Ecuadorians and Spaniards is another marker of similarity. On the other hand, Nigerians are considered suspect and likely “not Christian” even though 25% are Catholic and another 52% are of another Christian denomination (CSO 2012). Bulgarians’ Orthodox faith and atheism set them apart from the local population in Madrid.

A third marker of inclusion is shared history. Polish history of emigration and fighting against oppressive neighbors is invoked to stress Dublin’s own spirit of independence, autonomy, and entrepreneurship, while the influence of Irish missionaries, faith, and ideas in Nigeria is downplayed. Historical connections with Bulgarian immigrants, who were oppressed under a dictatorial communist regime for decades, are deemphasized to avoid painful memories
of Madrid’s own authoritarian past under Franco. Connections with Ecuador are invented to return to a more glorious past of a powerful Spain with influence in South America.

Further, common language between Spaniards and Ecuadorians is stressed, as is the unwillingness of Bulgarians to learn Spanish. While Nigerians speak English, their different intonation is emphasized, as is the Polish’ eagerness to learn English as the ultimate sign of commitment to settling in Dublin.

Moreover, cultural connections between Dubliners and Polish immigrants allowing for a deeper level of communication are discussed as compared to Nigerians’ “loud and annoying voices” and different socio-cultural interaction patterns isolating them from their hosts. Bulgarians’ sternness and tendency to socialize in the home sets them apart from Madrid’s population, whose cultural and social rituals and open disposition are found common to that of Ecuadorians.

Finally, the category of hard work is employed to summarize all other desirable characteristics of the “similar” immigrant populations and the host society. It invokes not just economic utility but also reliability, flexibility, honesty and pride in one’s work.

Second, regardless of the inclusion and exclusion dynamics and discourses they encounter, the immigrants in question have their own perceptions of belonging or lack thereof in their new cities of residence. Their agency is essential for their strategies, aspirations and future plans, and ultimately their own efforts to settle and integrate in the receiving context. While they consider themselves relatively welcome in the city, Polish workers in Dublin find themselves profoundly different from their hosts, deem their stay in Dublin temporary, communicate mostly with their compatriots, and plan to return to their true home – Poland. Nigerian immigrants came to Ireland in view of historical, linguistic, and cultural connections with the intention to settle.
However, they do not consider their larger community in Dublin welcome or integrated and feel “stuck” in a hostile city in which they have nothing in common with the local population. Bulgarians arrived in Spain in view of their common temperament and future with the Spaniards. They consider Madrid their second home. Ecuadorians came to Madrid due to the ease of the socio-cultural transition with migration and the similar economic structure in Spain and plan a better future for their family in the host city.

Table 2: Integration Outcomes and Cases

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<tr>
<th>Immigrant Group</th>
<th>Host Society Actors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Belong</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Third best</td>
<td>Optimal</td>
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<td>outcome</td>
<td>outcome</td>
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<td>(Bulgarian in</td>
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<td>Madrid)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t Belong</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Worst outcome</td>
<td>Second best</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Nigerian in</td>
<td>outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dublin)</td>
<td>(Polish in</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dublin)</td>
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Third, the interaction between the local actors’ discourses of inclusion and exclusion and the immigrant groups’ perceptions of belonging or difference produce distinct integration outcomes for the four populations. Ecuadorians in Madrid both belong and are accepted in their new home. They exhibit the optimal outcome in terms of integration and thus fall in the upper right quadrant of Table 2. Ecuadorians participate in political activities, trade unions and voluntary associations, and naturalize in large numbers. This group experiences upward occupational mobility upon migration and a match between skills and jobs, high employment rates and ease of recruitment, as well as less exploitation in the work place and high satisfaction.
with their employment. Finally, they live in integrated neighborhoods, have access to education or social welfare, and do not experience racism.

Polish immigrants fall within the lower right quadrant of Table 2. They are hypothesized to represent the second best outcome in terms of integration as they are accepted by their hosts yet do not belong in Dublin. Indeed, they have relatively plentiful political, social, and economic rights, but their incorporation remains incomplete. Polish workers in Dublin vote and run for election in relatively low but rising numbers, have not naturalized in large numbers, and are only recently joining trade unions in Ireland. They have created numerous organizations in Ireland, but those mostly focus on the cultural enhancement of the Polish diaspora. Still, recent policy and legal measures are positive and give this group significant advantages and enhanced entitlements in Dublin. Polish workers have some of the highest economic activity rates regardless of the downturn, suffer less exploitation in recruitment or the work place than other immigrant populations in Ireland, and are very satisfied with their work. However, they experience deskilling and downward occupational mobility upon migration. Finally, Polish immigrants are rarely subject to overt racism or discrimination and generally have access to integrated housing, education, or other local institutions and ministries. However, they tend not to own their homes and experience discrimination when claiming social welfare.

Bulgarians in Madrid exemplify the third best outcome in terms of incorporation as they belong yet are rejected by their hosts. They fall in the upper left quadrant of Table 2. Bulgarians have relatively low levels of political participation regardless of political entitlements. They are generally apathetic to trade union, voluntary, or local political activity and rarely naturalize in Spain. Their legal-political status is privileged, as Bulgaria is part of the European Union, yet local policies and provisions are aimed to limit their political rights. Bulgarians have high
employment levels, yet those have significantly declined with economic downturn. They experience downward occupational mobility and at least some exploitation in the workplace. Bulgarians tend to live in segregated housing, mostly with their compatriots. While they have access to healthcare, language barriers and institutional discrimination limit their participation in the Spanish educational system. Bulgarians are the victims of racism in some instances and have limited access to social benefits.

Finally, Nigerians fall in the lower left quadrant of Table 2 as they feel they neither belong nor are accepted in Ireland. While they sometimes vote and run in elections and have set up ethnic associations in Dublin, they do not hold public positions of power. Political activity rates are low and recent policy and legal developments have stripped this group of political entitlements. Nigerian immigrants exhibit the lowest employment rates and highest unemployment rates among the four populations discussed here. They also experience the most extreme mismatch between education and current employment. They are the victims of discrimination in recruitment, the worst working conditions, exploitation and racism at work, and low levels of job satisfaction. Nigerian immigrants might own their residences in Dublin, yet live mostly with other Nigerians in less desirable neighborhoods. They experience institutional and subjective barriers to education, healthcare, social welfare, as well as other governmental institutions like the police. Nigerians are subject to overt racism in the receiving context. Therefore, they are the worst positioned to integrate among the four groups discussed in this paper.

**Conclusion**

Public officials and the larger community in new immigration cities include their immigrant populations on the basis of perceived familiarity, expressed in terms of shared
ethnicity, religion, history, language, culture, and work ethic. Exclusion is constructed on the basis of perceived distance and grounded in the same non-material characteristics, where actual historical or cultural affinities are downplayed.

While these dynamics of inclusion and exclusion affect the integration of foreign workers in new West European migration spaces, the immigrants’ agency matters too. Immigrants’ own perceptions of belonging or isolation intersect with local discourses of welcome or rejection to affect the success of incorporation. When a discourse of acceptance interacts with perceptions of belonging, integration in the political, social, and economic sphere is most likely.

These conclusions enhance current migration scholarship by crossing disciplines, bridging the immigration policy and immigrant integration literatures, directing attention towards the local level of analysis and the agency of immigrant workers, and stressing the overlooked subjective and identity aspects of immigrant inclusion and exclusion dynamics. The findings have practical implications about the best routes to the incorporation of foreign communities in localities that are only now coming to terms with their changing demographics.

References


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