

VOLUME III, SECTION II.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND SUMMARY: METROPOLITAN PLANNING
ORGANIZATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), particularly since the advent of the *Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991* (ISTEA).¹ This review only includes literature dating from 1991 to the present because, although many MPOs had been operating effectively for decades, it was only after the passage of this landmark legislation that MPOs truly acquired policy and planning authority over certain transportation decisions within their boundaries. Following the trends of the literature in this field, a number of issues are considered in this section, including the relationship between MPOs, state departments of transportation (state DOTs) and other stakeholders, public participation, representation, parochialism, open process, technical expertise, funding flexibility, and comprehensive planning.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MPOS, STATE DEPARTMENTS OF
TRANSPORTATION, AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

Cooperative relationships are vital in effectuating a regional planning process in which stakeholders are both well served and satisfied.² This is particularly true in the case of MPOs and state DOTs.³ It is unfortunate, therefore, that the vast majority of MPOs do not highly rate their existing MPO/state relationships.⁴ Despite this oftentimes poor working relationship between the two entities, the MPO and the state DOT are required to cooperate in spending state-controlled ISTEA funds within the MPO region.⁵

¹ 49 U.S.C. § 101.

² Dilger, Robert Jay, "ISTEA: A New Direction for Transportation Policy," *Publius*, Summer 1992, pp. 67-78, 77.

³ Prendergast, John, "MPOs Become VIPs," *Civil Engineering*, April 1994, pp. 40-44, 41; Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., "ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment," *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 148; Lewis, Paul G., and Sprague, Mary, "Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California," *Public Policy Institute of California*, April 1997, p. 67.

⁴ (This is especially true of MPOs in nonattainment areas as defined by the Clean Air Act.) On the other hand, ISTEA is viewed as having a positive effect on intergovernmental relations because it is forcing more contact among a larger number of governments, agencies, and stakeholders, and these contacts frequently have the effect of breaking down barriers of communication and cooperation. Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., "ISTEA and the role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment," *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 148-49.

⁵ Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., "ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment," *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 140; while ISTEA mandates cooperation between state governments and MPOs, it also blurs the lines of authority and responsibility between them. Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, "Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning," *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 2. The MPO's existence and structure, in fact, are established by agreement between the state and the represented local governments. Most MPOs control only one fifth of the transportation funding given to a state, so the state DOTs have much more power than the MPOs. Successful partnering, then, will require a paradigm shift that allows a more even distribution of decision-making capacity among all planning agencies.

There are some notable exceptions to this estrangement in which states have actually embraced regional councils. These states include Florida, Texas and Vermont. More and more councils are becoming involved with their state governments, in part because an increasing number of state programs involve the councils. For example, many states are focusing on growth management, which directly involves transportation planning,⁶ as is the case with the Puget Sound Regional Council and the Washington State government. The increased contact has improved the working relationship between the two entities.⁷

As discussed in Volume II of this study, ISTEA fundamentally changed the relationship between state departments of transportation (state DOTs) and MPOs.⁸ State DOTs no longer had exclusive decisional authority over allocation, because MPOs were given allocation power over two federal funding categories.⁹ Further, while the focus of state DOTs has traditionally been on construction and maintenance of highways,¹⁰ with the advent of ISTEA, their planning must now include a variety of multimodal transportation solutions. Both of these changes have produced at least some level of conflict between state DOTs and MPOs, and at times, conflict has escalated to outright animosity and a breakdown in communication and coordination between the two entities.

Where the two processes do not mesh, a conflict is likely. For example, state DOT processes are typically more rapid because they are not encumbered by the many requirements, processes, data collection and analysis, public involvement, and the necessity for consensus that the MPOs face. Therefore, when a DOT desires a rapid response from an MPO, it may either become frustrated with what is perceived as a lack of efficacy or efficiency on the part of the MPO, or it may circumvent the MPO process

Prendergast, John, "MPOs Become VIPs," *Civil Engineering*, April 1994, pp. 40-44, 43; Younger, Kristina, and O'Neill, Christopher, "Making the Connection: The Transportation Improvement Program and the Long-Range Plan," *Transportation Research Record 1617*, Paper No. 98-1129, 1998, pp. 118-121, 120; the role of MPOs varies from state to state because in some states, localities possess only those powers that are either expressly granted by the state, implied by the state, or are essential to the locality. This makes MPOs subject to the direction of the state. In other states, MPOs are given more discretion in managing their affairs. Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, "Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning," *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 6.

⁶ Gage, Robert W., "Sector alignments of regional councils: implications for intergovernmental relations in the 1990s," *American Review of Public Administration*, September 1992, v. 22, n. 3, pp. 207-226.

⁷ The incentive to states appears to be their stake in implemented, needed growth management programs at the sub-state regional level. The genesis of an intergovernmental partnership between sub-state regional organizations and their state governments could be one of the significant developments in the U.S. intergovernmental system of the late 1990s. Gage, Robert W., "Sector alignments of regional councils: implications for intergovernmental relations in the 1990s," *American Review of Public Administration*, September 1992, v. 22, n. 3, pp. 207-226.

⁸ Howe, Linda, "Winging It with ISTEA," *Planning*, January 1994, pp. 11-14, 13.

⁹ Since the advent of ISTEA, MPOs have gained political clout, and greater influence over implementation of funds and greater bargaining power with the state, making MPOs true political decision-makers. Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., "ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment," *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 136.

¹⁰ Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., "ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment," *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 148.

entirely by blocking the MPO out of the decisional process. Where power relationships are in flux, as they currently are in many states, the situation is ripe for conflict.¹¹

Two primary issues are to blame for friction between a state DOT and an MPO. The first is a power struggle concerning the apportionment of authority over the different funding categories. The second involves the accuracy and timing of the flow of information from the state to the MPO.¹²

In an attempt to avoid such friction, several entities have undertaken friction-reduction steps. For example, the East West Gateway Coordinating Council and the Missouri Department of Transportation agree that common planning principles and coordination of project planning and programming create better transportation solutions. In order to effectuate the coordination, the two agencies executed a memorandum of understanding, hoping to ensure maintenance of a superior level of planning coordination.¹³

Another approach to promoting partnerships¹⁴ was taken by the Minnesota DOT, which radically altered funding distributions to its MPOs. All federal funding for the state is channeled through “area transportation partnerships.” The effect is an elimination

¹¹ Howe, Linda, “Winging It with ISTEA,” *Planning*, January 1994, pp. 11-14, 13; Additionally, eligibility for highway funds was extended to all non-local streets approved by the state and metropolitan planning process. This increased the number of miles of roadway for which MPOs would be responsible by 670,000 nationwide. Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., “ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment,” *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 140, 148; Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, “Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning,” *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 2. The MPO cannot meet the requirement of creating a fiscally constrained, regionally cohesive TIP if it does not receive accurate figures and data from the state DOT.

¹² State DOTs are expected to provide MPOs with estimates of federal and state funds available. This requires both financial forecasting skills and intergovernmental cooperation. Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., “ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment,” *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 143; Lewis, Paul G., and Sprague, Mary, “Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California,” *Public Policy Institute of California*, April 1997, p. 67; Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, “Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning,” *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 17. The MPO cannot meet the requirement of creating a fiscally constrained, regionally cohesive TIP if it does not receive accurate figures and data from the state DOT. Andrews, James H., “Metro Power,” *Planning*, Vol. 62, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 8-12; Many of the Florida MPOs in this study expressed difficulty in obtaining timely and reliable information from the state, which impeded the MPOs’ planning efforts. Mierzejewski, Edward A., and Marshall, Margaret A., “Review of Long-Range Transportation Plans of Florida’s Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, paper No. 98-1305, 1998, pp. 122-129, 125.

¹³ Andrews, James H., “Metro Power,” *Planning*, Vol. 62, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 8-12.

¹⁴ The term “partnership” is used to describe a working relationship that reflects a long-term commitment, a sense of mutual cooperation, shared risks and benefits, and other qualities consistent with concepts and theories of participatory decision-making. The partnership concept rests on the notion that performance can be significantly improved through joint, mutually dependent action. Helton, Jack D., “Intermodal Partnerships Under ISTEA,” *Transportation Research Board – National Research Council*, special report 240, December 1992, pp. 138-148, 139.

of funding categories, thus reducing rigidity in an MPO planning process, and instead emphasizing decision-making based upon project types.¹⁵

A review of the literature in this regard also seems to indicate that the councils with high visibility, which aggressively engage in decision making on key regional issues, give higher priority to relationships with their state governments and the private sector. Further, these councils are likely to be more influential, more innovative and more responsive to new partnerships, and, thus, better able to find creative solutions, particularly to funding problems.¹⁶

In recognition of the fact that many of the intermodal transportation links are controlled by the private sector (truck terminals, port drayage facilities, rail transfer facilities, and the like) coordination of private intermodal resources became a requirement imposed by federal legislation for developing and implementing transportation plans. Congress was wise in creating this new requirement the goal of which is to create partnerships with the private sector that promote region-wide efforts in economic development and coordination.¹⁷

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

In addition to creating a better working relationship with the Missouri DOT, the EastWest Gateway Coordinating Council recognized the need to broaden relationships with the general public. In response to that perceived need, the MPO has greatly expanded public participation through various techniques, such as visioning sessions,¹⁸ surveys, open house workshops, and guidebooks.¹⁹

While there are obvious practical reasons for including the public in transportation planning,²⁰ ISTEA actually mandates public participation at multiple points in an MPO's

¹⁵ Prendergast, John, "MPOs Become VIPs," *Civil Engineering*, April 1994, pp. 40-44, 43.

¹⁶ Gage, Robert W., "Sector alignments of regional councils: implications for intergovernmental relations in the 1990s," *American Review of Public Administration*, September 1992, v. 22, n. 3, pp. 207-226.

¹⁷ Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, "Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning," *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 25.

¹⁸ The goal of public participation programs should be early involvement by all groups. One strategy identified by a group of workshop participants was visioning because it focuses on developing a common future vision for the metropolitan area through early involvement by all groups. Baker, Horsley, and Lake, "Institutional Aspects of Metropolitan Transportation Planning," *Transportation Research Circular*, no. 450, December 1995, pp. 40-44, 41.

¹⁹ Andrews, James H., "Metro Power," *Planning*, Vol. 62, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 8-12. The Puget Sound Regional Council in Washington has taken similar measures. The PSRC has produced a video, conducted telephone and written surveys, and places announcements and articles in print media in an effort to keep the public well informed. Prendergast, John, "MPOs Become VIPs," *Civil Engineering*, April 1994, pp. 40-44, 43; Public hearings are almost always insufficient means of public participation. Successful participation has the following characteristics: inclusiveness, early involvement, and clear, accurate information. Carlson, Wormser, and Ulberb, *At Road's End: Transportation and Land Use Choices for Communities*, Island Press, 1995, p. 118.

²⁰ Public involvement is useful for (1) articulating goals; (2) developing a full range of alternatives that collectively address all goals; (3) choosing among alternatives in which trade-offs must be made. Reinke,

planning process.²¹ One writer goes so far as to say that “public involvement in transportation investment decision-making is central to accomplishing the vision of [ISTEA].”²² Yet large MPOs in Clean Air Act attainment areas are likely to view the public involvement requirements as “perfunctory and unproductive.”²³ Still, public involvement is the most frequently cited change in MPOs since the passage of ISTEA.²⁴ Perhaps the large MPOs in attainment areas feel confident to handle the planning issues and do not want to complicate the process by pulling in more information.

Some MPOs specifically include business groups, developers, and civic groups in the process, and even try to get a consensus among these varied citizen groups about the transportation planning and policy visions for the region.²⁵ MPOs should now include citizen groups which have traditionally been locked-out of the transportation planning process, including neighborhood preservation groups; users of all modes of transportation; conservation and environmental groups; religious and community development groups; disenfranchised minorities; the disabled and elderly; and the like.²⁶ Including these diversified groups serves to identify all relevant issues and goals of the region, relate them to local situations, set priorities, and may even help in establishing project selection criteria.²⁷ The key is not only giving the public an opportunity to give input, but also providing a sense that their input will have a meaningful impact on the outcome of decisions.²⁸

A major complaint universally among MPOs is that there are inadequate resources to achieve the mandates set forth in ISTEA and TEA-21. One reason for funding shortfalls, however, may be a lack of public understanding and support. Often, the “sticker shock” overcomes a desire for transportation alternatives, such as light rail. If the public does not understand true transportation costs, the vision of the transportation plan for the

David, and Malarkey, Daniel, “Implementing Integrated Transportation Planning in Metropolitan Planning Organization: Procedural and Analytical Issues,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 71-78, 72.

²¹ 23 C.F.R. § 450.316(b); See also Contemporary Federal Legislative: Regulatory Requirements, Volume II of this Study; Dittmar, Hank, “A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself,” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 12; Public participation should begin prior to key decision points. Baker, Horsley, and Lake, “Institutional Aspects of Metropolitan Transportation Planning,” *Transportation Research Circular*, no. 450, December 1995, pp. 40-44, 41.

²² Khisty, C. Jotin, “Education and Training of Transportation Engineers and Planners Vis-à-Vis Public Involvement,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 171-176, 171.

²³ Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., “ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment,” *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 143.

²⁴ Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., “ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment,” *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 143.

²⁵ Andrews, James H., “Metro Power,” *Planning*, Vol. 62, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 8-12.

²⁶ Dittmar, Hank, “A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself,” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 12.

²⁷ Dittmar, Hank, “A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself,” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 12.

²⁸ Cunningham, Christensen, Dunn, Gonzales, and Hirsch, “Recommendations for Developing Customer Focus in Statewide Transportation Planning Process,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 19-26, 21.

region, and how transportation affects all of our lives, its members will be reluctant to support measures designed to increase revenue.²⁹ Examples of such measures include toll roads, increased gas and vehicle registration taxes, and the like.

In summary, as was the case with the relationships among the MPO, the state DOT and other stakeholders, partnerships should be formed with various citizen groups. The first step in establishing partnerships and relationships is to identify the key partners in the MPO planning and project selection process. The next step is to determine what role these partners will play and to ensure participation and communication. Minimum standards and expectations should be developed for each group so that progress can be mapped and to ensure that all stakeholders know what duties they are expected to fulfill in the process. Access to MPO technical staff must be maintained and promoted, and MPO staff must be educated about the roles of all players in an effort to increase participation and meaningful feedback. Finally, communications regarding information about meetings and agendas must be open and dissemination must be timely to allow for full participation.³⁰

Khisty identifies several barriers, past and persisting, which inhibit public involvement.³¹

- ◆ Planners lack the knowledge, skills, and attitudes conducive to building support for public involvement.
- ◆ Only a small percentage of planners consider themselves equipped with the necessary expertise to deal with political issues.
- ◆ A large majority of planners, who depend on their technical expertise and their rationality (efficiency, economy, control, and belief in the means-end relationship), consider themselves to be technically qualified.
- ◆ There is a tendency among planners to look down on the average citizen . . . believing that citizen participation is a waste of agency time and a distraction from their busy schedules.
- ◆ Recent engineering and planning graduates report . . . [being] well grounded in analytical and process skills but weak and deficient in negotiating and influencing citizen groups.

The problem is that transportation decisions are political in nature, and it seems that most planners are ill prepared in that regard.³² For that reason, public agencies, such as

²⁹ Andrews, James H., "Metro Power," *Planning*, Vol. 62, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 8-12. The Capital District Transportation Committee (CDTC) of the Albany, NY MPO recognizes the need for public buy-in, and solicits public input at every opportunity. Younger, Kristina, and O'Neill, Christopher, "Making the Connection: The Transportation Improvement Program and the Long-Range Plan," *Transportation Research Record 1617*, Paper No. 98-1129, 1998, pp. 118-121, 119.

³⁰ Hynes-Cherin, Brigid, "Institutional Aspects of Metropolitan Transportation Planning," *Transportation Research Circular*, no. 450, December 1995, pp. 37-8.

³¹ Khisty, C. Jotin, "Education and Training of Transportation Engineers and Planners Vis-à-Vis Public Involvement," *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 171-176, 172.

³² Khisty, C. Jotin, "Education and Training of Transportation Engineers and Planners Vis-à-Vis Public Involvement," *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 171-176, 171-72.

MPOs, have gradually lost legitimacy in the community. On the other hand, citizens are becoming increasingly aware of the highly complex nature of transportation planning and are beginning to realize that solutions will not be quickly or easily found.³³

REPRESENTATION

Representation at the policy and decisional levels on MPO boards varies widely. Sometimes the board is comprised of a small, non-representative collection of local government executives. Other boards allow seats for representatives not only from all the local jurisdictions, but also from transit, aviation, expressway, environmental, and other agencies.³⁴ It seems that local jurisdictions “buy into” the process to a greater extent where there is broad, representative participation. Such a process creates a perception of equity and the ability of stakeholders to influence policy and decision-making in a meaningful way.³⁵

One problem, however, is that the majority of MPO boards operate on a one-seat, one-vote basis. There is no true representation in this type of a structure. An explanation often cited in defense of such non-weighted voting is that this type of voting structure promotes regional dialogue and consensus.³⁶

Numerous studies have found that central cities on MPO boards are usually underrepresented,³⁷ and so do not hold the voting power and influence in the decisional processes to which they probably ought to be entitled.³⁸ The American Public Transit Association (APTA) has complained that “when a minority can outvote the majority, there is a federal interest in ensuring that the structure is changed.” The APTA, then, would have a true representative structure mandated for MPO boards by the federal government.³⁹

A study by Benjamin, Kincaid, and McDowell measured the “Index of Central City Voting Power.” (the Central City Voting Study”.) The MPOs listed in the Central City Voting Study include the cities investigated in the current study by the University of

³³ Khisty, C. Jotin, “Education and Training of Transportation Engineers and Planners Vis-à-Vis Public Involvement,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 171-176, 172.

³⁴ Andrews, James H., “Metro Power,” *Planning*, Vol. 62, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 8-12; Howe, Linda, “Winging It with ISTEA,” *Planning*, January 1994, pp. 11-14, at 14.

³⁵ Andrews, James H., “Metro Power,” *Planning*, Vol. 62, No. 6, June 1996, pp. 8-12.

³⁶ Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 841.

³⁷ In this study, of 86 responding MPOs, 79% of central cities were under-represented, and 6% were over-represented. The study identifies states in which weighted voting is allowed: Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Washington. Benjamin, Seth B., Kincaid, John, and McDowell, Bruce D., “MPOs and Weighted Voting,” *Intergovernmental Perspective*, Spring 1994, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 31-35.

³⁸ Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 843; Benjamin, Seth B., Kincaid, John, and McDowell, Bruce D., “MPOs and Weighted Voting,” *Intergovernmental Perspective*, Spring 1994, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 31-35.

³⁹ Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 843.

Denver Intermodal Transportation Institute (DUITI): Denver, Dallas, Seattle, and Phoenix (the “DUITI Study”). The data is interesting because it mirrors some of the findings contained in DUITI Study.⁴⁰ Phoenix and Denver demonstrated very low central city representation levels as a result of their respective voting practices. Not surprisingly, DUITI found a higher level of satisfaction among MPO participants in Dallas and Seattle, relative to Denver and Phoenix.⁴¹

A mandate regarding an MPO’s representational scheme has not yet been handed down by the U.S. Congress, particularly in light of the fact that it had ample opportunity to do so with the recent passage of TEA-21, because federal policy makers do not want to tread on politically volatile ground.⁴² Yet some MPOs recognize this problem within their organizations, and have actively taken steps to “even the playing field.”

One way to achieve true representation is to weight the votes according to the size of population represented. Another is to have a one-seat, one-vote structure, but with the option to invoke weighted voting.⁴³ A third is to apportion seats on the board in a way that better reflects population differences. A fourth unique, inventive, and effective way was devised by the Council of Fresno County Governments in California. There, two steps are required for the passage of any measure: the proposal must be approved by board members representing at least 40% of the population, and also by a majority of all 16 board members. This would allow a jurisdiction with a population of 40% or higher to have veto power. On the other hand, such a jurisdiction would not be able to muscle proposals through the process because a majority of representatives would still have to approve. Where the board has a number of very small jurisdictions, it is conceivable that a small town, representing a small fraction of the population, could have the deciding vote, essentially vetoing a measure proposed by a very large city.⁴⁴

It should be noted that a highly skewed representational scheme within an MPO may be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, thus making such a structure unconstitutional.⁴⁵ In a 1974 federal appeals case, *Education/ Instruccioun, Inc. et al v. Moore*, the Court examined this issue, but found that there was not an equal

⁴⁰ Phoenix and Denver have a very low index, 0.08 and 0.16 respectively, while Seattle and Dallas have relatively high indexes, 0.67 and 0.58 respectively. The Index of Central City Voting Power is derived by dividing the percentage of the representation of central city on the MPO board by the percentage of central city population in the MPO area. Benjamin, Seth B., Kincaid, John, and McDowell, Bruce D., “MPOs and Weighted Voting,” *Intergovernmental Perspective*, Spring 1994, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 31-35.

⁴¹ This literature review does not attempt to draw conclusions about why that is the case, only to point out that there are much different structural schemes in terms of representation, and that those differences may be a factor in both the MPOs’ efficacy and in satisfaction within the MPO’s membership.

⁴² Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 843.

⁴³ As illustrated in the section relating to MPO Effectiveness contained in Volume II of this study, optional weighted MPO voting is rarely, if ever, invoked.

⁴⁴ Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 845; Lewis, Paul G., and Sprague, Mary, “Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California,” *Public Policy Institute of California*, April 1997, pp. 38-9

⁴⁵ Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 849.

protection problem because the Council of Governments (COG) did not “exercise general governmental powers” or “functions.”⁴⁶ The MPO involved did not meet the Court’s definition of having general governmental powers, meaning true decisional or policy-making capacity, because it functioned merely in an advisory capacity.⁴⁷

The 1974 appeals case pre-dates ISTEA, however, which does, in fact, grant decisional and policy-making authority to MPOs. Therefore, if decided today, the outcome could be quite different, and a federal court decision could radically alter the structure of MPO boards in an effort to ensure that the jurisdictions represented by the MPO have equal protection under the law.⁴⁸

Many researchers, MPOs, state DOTs, and other agencies have already concluded that MPO boards must change their representational structure. Short of congressional legislation or a federal court decision, this may be accomplished in one of three ways: (1) individual MPOs may revise their voting rules, so long as the new rules do not violate their enabling legislation; (2) state legislatures may pass legislation requiring weighted voting; or (3) other remedies may be sought, such as appointing or electing members of MPOs board on a county-wide or sub-regional basis.⁴⁹

PAROCHIALISM

MPOs are charged with developing transportation plans that balance local and regional priorities, while ensuring that state and federal mandates are attained. The greater the number of stakeholders, the more difficult a consensus on a plan will be. The dynamics of the MPO are driven in large part by the priority-setting process.⁵⁰

Due to the daunting political pitfalls, one of the most difficult tasks an MPO faces is prioritizing projects.⁵¹ Delegates sent to represent local jurisdictions have divided loyalties, because they are not elected directly to the regional planning agency and must remain loyal to their constituents.⁵² Where a “regionally-minded” measure would hurt

⁴⁶ Education/ Instruccion, Inc., et al v. Moore, 503 F3d 1187 (1994), 1189.

⁴⁷Id.

⁴⁸ Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 849.

⁴⁹ Benjamin, Seth B., Kincaid, John, and McDowell, Bruce D., “MPOs and Weighted Voting,” *Intergovernmental Perspective*, Spring 1994, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 31-35, 31. As of spring 1994, only 44% of MPOs were staffed by regional councils. The others were staffed by individual cities, counties, or city-county planning commissions, or were freestanding entities having only the responsibilities given to them by federal transportation planning laws and regulations. McDowell, Bruce D., “Reinventing Planning Under ISTEA,” *Transportation Research News* 175 feature 1b, pp.9-11, 10.

⁵⁰ Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, “Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area wide Intermodal Planning,” *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 7.

⁵¹ Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., “ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment,” *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 147.

⁵² Lewis, Paul G., “Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 841; Lewis, Paul G., and Sprague, Mary, “Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California,” *Public Policy Institute of California*, April 1997, p. 37.

the representative's jurisdiction, it is difficult to expect most politicians to weigh in with an affirmative vote.⁵³

Yet there is a body of literature that recognizes the significance of metropolitan regions and the need to create power bases and organizational structures on a regional basis in order to overcome the problems facing Society. These include transportation issues, crime prevention, land use planning, and the like. Anthony Downs argues that nearly all major problems in urban areas are region-wide in scope, and so cannot be solved by local independent governments.⁵⁴ Geographers, economists, and sociologists are in near unanimous agreement that metropolitan regions, not states or localities, have become the most important units affecting a society's economic productivity and efficiency.⁵⁵

The key is getting various stakeholders regionally focused, yet satisfied with the outcome for their respective jurisdictions. One article identifies three necessary ingredients. The first is a notion that was commonly referred to by stakeholders in Dallas: if participants are confident that they will get something they want from the process, they will be willing to compromise on other projects. The second is perceived fairness in project selection, which may be accomplished by allowing all stakeholders to collaboratively determine selection criteria that reflect the regional vision. The third is some level of sub-regional or local control over allocation. One MPO accomplished this by splitting funding among congestion management areas, and allowing those areas to shift funds when necessary or desirable, without MPO approval.⁵⁶

The question of why some metropolitan areas share a common regional vision and act collectively, while others behave in a highly parochial manner, was addressed by Baldassare in a 1991 survey.⁵⁷ Baldassare collected 600 surveys in eight distinct regions of California.⁵⁸ His findings evidenced an increasing support for regional government. Three unique attributes accounted for strong support: (1) a common and distinct geographical location; (2) some level of past, positive experience with regional

⁵³ Lewis, Paul G., "Regionalism and Representation: Measuring and Assessing Representation in Metropolitan Planning Organizations," *Urban Affairs Review*, Vol. 33, No. 6, 1998, pp. 839-853, 841.

⁵⁴ Downs, Anthony, "The Devolution Revolution: Why Congress Is Shifting a Lot of Power to the Wrong Levels," <http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb003/pb3.htm>, July 1996.

⁵⁵ Downs, Anthony, "The Devolution Revolution: Why Congress Is Shifting a Lot of Power to the Wrong Levels," <http://www.brook.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb003/pb3.htm>, July 1996; Lewis and Sprague conclude that metropolitan-level decision-making generates a distinctly different set of priorities than is found at either the state or local level. Lewis, Paul G., and Sprague, Mary, "Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of the Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California," *Public Policy Institute of California*, April 1997, at iii; Gage, Robert W., "Sector alignments of regional councils: implications for intergovernmental relations in the 1990s," *American Review of Public Administration*, September 1992, v. 22, n. 3, pp. 207-226.

⁵⁶ Howe, Linda, "Winging It with ISTEA," *Planning*, January 1994, pp. 11-14, 14.

⁵⁷ Baldassare, Mark, "Regional Variations in Support for Regional Governance," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No.2, December 1994, pp. 275-284.

⁵⁸ Baldassare, Mark, "Regional Variations in Support for Regional Governance," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No.2, December 1994, pp. 275-284, 276.

governmental agencies; and (3) special features of the central city that draw regional communities throughout the region.⁵⁹

The problem of parochialism and attaining area-wide intermodal planning objectives is compounded in regions with multiple MPOs. The exception would be where local administrative structures consolidate planning. The reason for the increased fragmentation is that there is little incentive for integrating plans.⁶⁰ Also, it appears that partnerships have a tendency to create dialogue that encourages regional thinking, analysis of alternatives, and better regional planning and coordination.⁶¹ Where there are multiple MPOs, the region becomes more fragmented, and the advantages of partnerships are diminished.

In order for partnerships to work, however, there must be willingness for flexibility and compromise by all of the stakeholders from the beginning of the process. An effort must be made to see all sides of an issue and to understand the needs and concerns of all participants.⁶² That necessarily implies open communication and an atmosphere conducive to partnerships.⁶³ Case studies show that in order to maintain successful partnering, there must be strong neutral leadership, and stakeholders must see the benefits.⁶⁴ Decisions in partnerships should move toward “buy-in” or consensus by the stakeholders and each member must have a sense of ownership in the process for the process to be completely successful.⁶⁵

Research indicates that stakeholders in a partnership “buy-into” a process when they feel empowered to make decisions and to speak with authority for their organizations. The partnership can still be effective where working groups do not have such authority, however, if a higher-level executive or steering committee is actively involved in the planning of the partnership.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ Baldassare, Mark, “Regional Variations in Support for Regional Governance,” *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No.2, December 1994, pp. 275-284, 282-83.

⁶⁰ Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, “Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning,” *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 24.

⁶¹ Hauser, Edd, and Breese, Amy R, “Partnerships for Multimodal Transportation Planning,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 57-65, 63.

⁶² Meyer, Michael D., “ISTEA and Intermodal Planning: Conference Findings,” *Transportation Research Board – National Research Council*, special report 240, December 1992, pp. 4-15, 7.

⁶³ “ISTEA and Intermodal Planning: Workshop report on Intermodal Partnerships,” *Transportation Research Board – National Research Council*, special report 240, December 1992, pp. 19-22, 20.

⁶⁴ Meyer, Michael D., “ISTEA and Intermodal Planning: Conference Findings,” *Transportation Research Board – National Research Council*, special report 240, December 1992, pp. 4-15, 7; Carlson, Daniel, and Billen, Don, “Transportation Corridor Management: Are We Linking Transportation and Land Use Yet?,” *Institute for Public Policy and Management, University of Washington Graduate School of Public Affairs*, October 1996, p. 49.

⁶⁵ Hauser, Edd, and Breese, Amy R, “Partnerships for Multimodal Transportation Planning,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 57-65, 64.

⁶⁶ Hauser, Edd, and Breese, Amy R, “Partnerships for Multimodal Transportation Planning,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 57-65, 65.

Promotion of “buy-in” may be increased by accommodating into the process the organizational culture of each stakeholder. This becomes increasingly difficult as the number of stakeholders increase. Still, this is important in maintaining compromise and flexibility in the process, because there is a tendency to use established policies and procedures. Joint training among stakeholders may help to increase acceptance and create a good partnering environment.⁶⁷

Also central to the issue of parochialism is the treatment of the central city during the planning process. A common trend in America today is the demise of the inner city, while the suburbs continue to grow. A misconception, however, is that the suburbs may prosper while the inner city continues in its economic free fall. In actuality, suburbs and central cities are highly interdependent.

It has been shown that metropolitan regions (including the inner city and its suburbs) can best prosper when localities harness common resources and unite their populations. The sum of the efforts within a metropolitan region results in a synergy that cannot be achieved by the individual parts.⁶⁸ Over time, interdependence, resource synergy, and the ability to interact will become increasingly important for a metropolitan area’s success.⁶⁹

ISTEA has had a positive influence on bringing disparate agencies together to improve the transportation planning process.⁷⁰ Yet many MPOs still struggle with coordinating the different needs of diverse local jurisdictions.⁷¹ These challenges must be overcome, however, to maintain continuity of the transportation network beyond the physical boundaries of individual jurisdictions and to ensure that plans meet regional transportation needs.⁷²

⁶⁷ Hauser, Edd, and Breese, Amy R, “Partnerships for Multimodal Transportation Planning,” *Transportation Research Record*, no. 1552, 1996, pp. 57-65, 65.

⁶⁸ Savitch, Collins, Sanders, and Markham, “Ties That Bind: Central Cities, Suburbs, and the New Metropolitan Region,” *Economic Development Quarterly*, Vol. 7 No.4, November 1993, pp. 341-357, 341-42.

⁶⁹In the early 1980’s, 47% of suburban income could be attributed to the density and income of the central city. By the early 1990’s, that number had climbed to 61%, meaning that for every \$1,000 difference in city per capita income, suburbs stand to lose or gain \$610. Inclusion was shown by these researchers to be important to success, and, in fact, is an accurate predictor for how well a city does relative to its suburbs. Savitch, Collins, Sanders, and Markham, “Ties That Bind: Central Cities, Suburbs, and the New Metropolitan Region,” *Economic Development Quarterly*, Vol. 7 No.4, November 1993, pp. 341-357

⁷⁰ Mierzejewski, Edward A., and Marshall, Margaret A., “Review of Long-Range Transportation Plans of Florida’s Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, paper No. 98-1305, 1998, pp. 122-129, 124.

⁷¹ Mierzejewski, Edward A., and Marshall, Margaret A., “Review of Long-Range Transportation Plans of Florida’s Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, paper No. 98-1305, 1998, pp. 122-129, 124.

⁷² Mierzejewski, Edward A., and Marshall, Margaret A., “Review of Long-Range Transportation Plans of Florida’s Metropolitan Planning Organizations,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, paper No. 98-1305, 1998, pp. 122-129, 124.

OPEN PROCESS

Project selection used to be determined “behind closed doors” by both state DOTs and many MPOs. ISTEA now requires an open, cooperative approach among the MPO, the state, regional transit operators, and other interest groups in developing transportation plans. The MPO must conduct an open, competitive process in its own project selection.⁷³ Yet there is still no requirement that state DOTs conduct an open, competitive process, so many participants do not have adequate access or understanding of state DOT transportation allocation procedures and policies.

While an MPO cannot control the state process, many MPOs have taken steps to ensure an open process by disseminating all relevant information to stakeholders, and allowing for discussion of issues in a public forum.⁷⁴ As relationships among all stakeholders improve, it can be expected that the state DOT processes will follow suit.

TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

MPOs coordinate and participate in transportation planning for their region. Staff competence and expertise is, therefore, important for high performance and satisfaction. In fact, staff leadership is often viewed as essential in focusing the stakeholders on regional processes and criteria of project selection, rather than on individual needs.⁷⁵

The staff of an MPO must be capable of considering a wide range of multimodal transportation issues, land use, and economic development issues; seek innovative solutions; perform technical analysis and research; recognize regional needs; and facilitate cooperative planning among divergent governmental agencies, the public, and special interest groups.⁷⁶ The stakeholders must trust that information and data disseminated from the MPO staff is accurate and timely.

Yet it is becoming increasingly important for the “technical” staff to use holistic approaches in producing transportation solutions. More and more writers stress the importance of changing the traditional engineering training curriculum so that it includes understanding of human behavior. That would be accomplished through the addition of courses in social psychology, anthropology, history, economics, and the arts.⁷⁷

⁷³ Prendergast, John, “MPOs Become VIPs,” *Civil Engineering*, April 1994, pp. 40-44, 42; Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., “ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment,” *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 143.

⁷⁴ Younger, Kristina, and O’Neill, Christopher, “Making the Connection: The Transportation Improvement Program and the Long-Range Plan,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, Paper No. 98-1129, 1998, pp. 118-121, 119.

⁷⁵ Lewis, Paul G., and Sprague, Mary, “Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California,” *Public Policy Institute of California*, April 1997, p. 108.

⁷⁶ Younger, Kristina, and O’Neill, Christopher, “Making the Connection: The Transportation Improvement Program and the Long-Range Plan,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, Paper No. 98-1129, 1998, pp. 118-121, 118.

⁷⁷ Carlson, Wormser, and Ulberg, *At Roads End: Transportation and Land Use Choices for Communities*, Island Press, 1995, p. 85.

So the task for the planning professionals is becoming progressively more complex. The engineer/ planner must now possess more than technical expertise, because all sorts of socioeconomic elements have been added to the mix. Decisions are no longer based strictly on the technical merits because transportation decisions have become increasingly political in terms of both the process and implementation.

FUNDING FLEXIBILITY

ISTEA allowed states and MPOs unprecedented flexibility in the use of federal funds to undertake a wide array of projects, but the flexibility has yet to be fully utilized.⁷⁸ When funding categories are turned into a means of rigid fund sub-allocation, this potentially valuable tool can become a hindrance to effective decision-making.⁷⁹ The MPO is not the project sponsor or builder, but, rather, a planning coordinator. As such, flexibility is required to respond to those aspects of the plans that the implementing agencies are capable of delivering.⁸⁰

By placing all funding sources into a “balanced program,” rather than individual project types, the playing field is somewhat leveled. An additional benefit is that a focus on customer needs is maintained, whereby the policies focus on facility function rather than ownership.⁸¹

Funding flexibility is most likely to occur in programs designed to address air quality issues, due to the structure of the federal funding. States can take actions to hamper flexibility, however, by passing laws, for example, which restrict the use of tax revenues or limit growth.⁸²

The fiscal relationship between states and MPOs is oftentimes an impediment to region-wide planning. On the one hand, most MPOs support dedicating a percentage of the state gas tax revenues for transportation planning within their region, while the vast majority of states disfavor the idea. On the other hand, most MPOs would not provide a percentage of their planning funds for statewide planning.⁸³ So it seems that the focus is

⁷⁸ Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, “Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning,” *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 19.

⁷⁹ Younger, Kristina, and O’Neill, Christopher, “Making the Connection: The Transportation Improvement Program and the Long-Range Plan,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, Paper No. 98-1129, 1998, pp. 118-121, 120.

⁸⁰ Younger, Kristina, and O’Neill, Christopher, “Making the Connection: The Transportation Improvement Program and the Long-Range Plan,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, Paper No. 98-1129, 1998, pp. 118-121, 120.

⁸¹ Younger, Kristina, and O’Neill, Christopher, “Making the Connection: The Transportation Improvement Program and the Long-Range Plan,” *Transportation Research Record 1617*, Paper No. 98-1129, 1998, pp. 118-121, 121.

⁸² Gage, Robert W., and McDowell, Bruce D., “ISTEA and the Role of MPOs in the New Transportation Environment: A Midterm Assessment,” *Publius*, Summer 1995, pp. 133-154, 138.

⁸³ Zoller, Ted D, and Capizzano, Jeffrey A, “Evolution and Devolution: A National Perspective on the Changing Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in Area-wide Intermodal Planning,” *Virginia Transportation Research Council* report No. VTRC 97-R19, June 1997, p. 24.

on controlling funds rather than on how to most appropriately allocate them or on building partnerships that will accomplish meeting complex transportation goals.

INTEGRATED PLANNING

Integrating transportation planning is a complex and difficult task. Transportation Research Board conference participants identified a number of essential elements and issues:⁸⁴

(1). Altering the planning process will take several years. (2) A great deal of effort will be needed to re-invigorate relationships between federal, state, and regional planning efforts. (3) Multimodal planning must reflect community values and quality of life criteria, as well as providing mobility. (4) Benefits and costs must be properly assessed and land use issues require a high priority. (5) Effective multimodal planning demands that traditional “adversaries” establish new relationships. Planning interest cannot be limited to transportation. Private business and environmental advocates must be included. The new planning environment will affect the way the private sector provides facilities and services. New kinds of collaborative efforts will need to serve a broader range of goals than in the past. In addition, freight and commodity planning must be evaluated to integrate land use, congestion, and other planning programs.

Metropolitan regions are increasingly recognizing the need to integrate decisions about transportation and land use at both the project and regional levels.⁸⁵ Many states, including Florida, Georgia, Oregon, and Washington, have passed legislation that requires balancing zoning decisions against transport capacity.⁸⁶ In the broader context, however, integrating a system means integrating its management by bringing together disparate institutions responsible for transportation to plan in a coordinated manner.⁸⁷

Growth management legislation allows a greater level of coordination between local and regional planning entities. Where there is no such legislation, difficulties arise among adjoining counties, particularly when some have no zoning or comprehensive plan, while others have a general plan calling for more stringent development requirements.⁸⁸ This type of legislation forces state DOTs and MPOs to coordinate planning and also opens lines of communication and trust between the two organizations.

Another important issue, is the problem of urban sprawl and a bias toward single-occupancy vehicle use. Dittmar believes that the problem is spawned by the signals sent

⁸⁴ Birch, Stephen C., and Hoel, Lester A., “Multimodal Transportation Planning in Virginia: Past Practices and New Opportunities,” <http://www.ntl.bts.gov/ntl/DOCS/vtrc.html>, p. viii.

⁸⁵ Dittmar, Hank, “A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself,” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 10.

⁸⁶ Dittmar, Hank, “A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself,” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 10.

⁸⁷ Dittmar, Hank, “A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself,” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 11.

⁸⁸ Carlson, Daniel, and Billen, Don, “Transportation Corridor Management: Are We Linking Transportation and Land Use Yet?,” *Institute for Public Policy and Management, University of Washington Graduate School of Public Affairs*, October 1996, p. 18.

by building roads and beltways, subsidizing free parking and suburban development through utility infrastructure, and providing tax incentives favoring vehicle use and suburban home ownership.⁸⁹ Dittmar's solution is to restore travel choices, encourage transportation decisions that consider design and context, and focus on accessibility rather than mobility. Each transportation solution must be viewed in the broader social context.⁹⁰

An MPO may have success in this regard by involving the stakeholders and encouraging transportation decisions that meet regional goals. One way to do this is to first have the MPO and stakeholders cooperatively develop a set of project selection criteria that reflect broad regional goals. The individual stakeholders may then score their own projects. This will have the effect of focusing the stakeholders on the goals of the region, while at the same time it will have the effect of inclusion.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Dittmar, Hank, "A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself," *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 13.

⁹⁰ Dittmar, Hank, "A Broader Context for Transportation Planning – Not Just An End In Itself," *Journal of the American Planning Association*, Vol. 61, No. 1, Winter 1995, pp. 7-13, 13.

⁹¹ Lewis, Paul G., and Sprague, Mary, "Federal Transportation Policy and the Role of Metropolitan Planning Organizations in California," *Public Policy Institute of California*, April 1997, p. 114.