Fatigue in Transportation

Fastigue Countermeasures in the Railroad Industry:
Past and Current Developments

Chapter 1: Introduction

The study of the role of fatigue and transportation has a long history. Congress enacted the Hours of Service Act in 1907 to enhance railroad safety by limiting the number of hours that railroad engineers and other railroad employees can work. Locomot ive engineers and other transportation employees can work a maximum of 12 consecutive hours followed by at least 8 hours off duty. Hugo Munsterberg (1913), the father of industrial psychology, noted that, "We have in the literature concerned with ac cidents in transportation numerous popular discussions about the destructive influence of loss of sleep on the attention of the locomotive engineer." In 1917 a task force of scientists gathered to study the effects of fatigue on vehicular accidents. The earliest published study of the effects of fatigue on locomotive engineers was in 1971 (Grant, 1971). In 1937 Congress passed hourspassed hours of service regulations for commercial drivers to address these concerns. However, due to the ever-chang ing complexity of the demands faced by drivers and operators in all modes of transportationof transportation, this topic continues to be the focus of intense study (Sherry, Bart, & Atwater, 1997). Over the past few years there have been increased efforts to address the problems of fatigue in the railroad industry. A USDOT/FRA report in 1991 (Pollard, 1991) identified causes of fatigue. These are: uncertainty about the time of oneís next assignment, excessive working ho urs, long commutes and waiting times before beginning work, unsatisfactory conditions for sleeping at some terminals, and the decision not to rest during the day even when subject to call the next night. Suggestions for remedying the situation included: a minimum of eight hours notice before being called to work, greater predictability in scheduling trains, division of assignments according to blocks of time.

Traditionally, locomotive and train crews work a a 9.5-hour day. The work period can begin at any time during the day or night. The assignment begins with a phone call announcing the a sassignment, typically one-and-half to two hours in advance. Cre ws are expected to report for duty in that time. Upon reaching at the railroad facility, the crews go on duty and may immediately depart, wait for the train to arrive, or may travel by vehicle to another location to reach their train. Once on the engine , crews usually remain on duty for a continuous period until the end of the duty period. However, upon completion of the run crews may have to wait for transport to arto arrive at the terminal or lodging facility. This too may take an hour or more. After completing their paperwork, the crews are considered off-duty and have at least eight hours before they can be required to be on duty again. During this time they must eat, sleep, take care of family business and otherwise rest. The typical engineer or conductor has around 20 duty starts over a 30-day period.

A decade and a half ago, the NTSB pointed out, in its 1985 report on collisions in Wiggins, Colorado, and Newcastle, Wyoming that railroad crews are subjected to the most unpredictable work/rest cycles in the transportation industry. Soon thereafter, the 1988 Thompsontown, PA accident, in which four crewmembers were killed due to one engineer's having fallen asleep, also stimulated Congressional concern. FRA responded with several projects thatprojects that explored various aspects of crew performanc e and hours of service including a study of crew scheduling issues and locomotive diaries. In the first phase of the work, interviews were conducted with crew-management and crew-scheduling personnel at seven Class I roads. Focus groups with engineers were also conducted at three locations. The information gathered was used to prepare a report titled Issues in Crew Scheduling which was published in 1991.

A later report by the GAO (GAO, 1992) found that railroads were essentially complying with the Hours of Service Act. In fact, it was found that 99.4 % of the time engineers were given at least 10 hours off duty following a work period of 12 or more ho urs. Further, the investigators found no instances in which an engineer received less than 8 hours off duty in any 24-hour period. It was also found that engineers rarely worked more than two consecutive shifts with fewer than 9 hours off duty between s hifts. The report indicated that reducing the maximum number of hours allowed per shift from 12 to 10 would have little effect on the number of accidents that occur. It was found that only 4.5% of all human factors caused accidents occurred after 10 hou rs in an engineerís shift. The report cautioned that reducing the "maximum allowable work/off-duty periods from the current 12 hours on, 10 hours off cycle to a 10-on, 10-off cycle could increase the variability - the change in work period start tim es from day to day - of engineers work cycles." The report cited research that suggested that variability in work cycle start times disrupt natural human sleep-wake cycles, which in turn can lead to fatigue.

The GAO study found that more human factor caused rail accidents occurred from 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. than in any other 4-hour segment. Incidentally, the overall accident rate (which includes all causes) between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. was higher than at other ti mes. "The start time variability of engineers work cycles was quite pronounced during the 2 a.m. to 6 a.m. time period." The report authors speculated that, " Higher levels of start time variability increase the likelihood that engineers will experience fatigue." (GAO, 1992, p. 3)

A 1992 study (Kuehn, 1992) observed four engineers under two simulated schedule regimens, a normal schedule and a fatigue work schedule. The study concluded that a deterioration in engineer performance, regardless of schedule, coupled with the irregul ar sleep/work patterns of the subjects suggest the need for continued research which focuses on sleep work patterns and performance. While as a group the study participants did not differ in overall performance in the simulator, they weresimulator, they were observed to incur speed limit infractions, failures to blow the horn for crossings, rapid throttle changes, and application of excessive train forces. Thus, specific instances of performance decrements were observed.

In the early part of 1990, the railroad industry recognized the importance of the fatigue issue and began to study as well as to educate its employees. The railroads also began to distribute booklets and videos describing health habits and bean to loo k at the levels of fatigue within its workforce.

In 1992 railroads began a study of work/rest and fatigue issues in the railroad industry. The industry initiated the formation of a Work Rest Task Force with a number of participants from the Association of American Railroads, major railroads, and rep resentatives from the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and the United Transportation Union. The Task Force investigated a number of questions concerning crew scheduling, shift length, start frequency, start variability, and work times, and the occurre nce of accidents and injuries. This committee continues its work today with periodic visits from a Scientific Advisory Panel made up of recognized leaders in fatigue research matters. The members are Col. Greg Belenky, U.S. Army, Walter Reed Institute of Research, Dr. Carlos Comperatore, US Coast Guard Marine Safety Laboratory, and Dr. Ronald Heslegrave, Chairman of the Research Ethics Board, University Health Network, Toronto. These experts provide information on the latest scientific research and fa tigue developments and their relationship to the railroad industry.

In November of 1995, The Department of Transportation published a report titled "Focus on Fatigue" (DOT, 1995). The report documents the activities and projects supported by the DOT in the area of fatigue. According to the document "FR Aís fatigue research is concentrated on those jobs most directly responsive for the safe operation of trains, i.e. locomotive engineers and dispatchers." Two research projects were identified in the report as being directly related to railroad activ ity. These included "Enginemen Stress and Fatigue: Phase II" a study designed to determine whether work schedules that comply with hours of service requirements resulted in stress and fatigue of such magnitude to cause safety concerns. Prelimi nary results suggested that performance deteriorated over the course of testing. The FRA also sponsored the development of a device designed to measure fatigue affected neurobehavioral functioning thought to be related to fitness for duty of employees re porting for work.

In 1995 the NTSB and NASA in cooperation with the Department of Transportation sponsored a symposium on fatigue. The conference was thought to be a first step in educating diverse groups in the transportation industry to address the fatigue issue. Dr . Mark Rosekind, a presenter at the conference, summed up the intent of the proceedings in his address: "An important theme expressed throughout the entire symposium was that there is no magic bullet to eliminate human fatigue in transportatio n operationsÖ. Every participant is encouraged to take some action to educate, address a scheduling issue, use a countermeasure or apply some piece of knowledge.... to improve transportation safety." (NTSB, 1995).

In 1995 the FRA simulation of railroad work schedules study was followed up by a more recent study of 55 engineers monitored while operating on two different railroad work schedules (Thomas, Raslear, and Kuehn, 1997). The first schedule was designed t o run "faster" than another group running "slower" in terms of frequency of train operations. Engineers operated trains in a simulator for a ten-hour shift. Participants had at least an average of 9.3 hours off duty for the "fas t" group and 12 hours off duty for the "slow" group. Results showed that the "slow" group got about 6.1 hours of sleep per night compared to 4.6 hours for the "fast". Performance measures in this simulation included n umber of missed horns sounded at crossings and cumulative pounds of fuel used. Results showed that the "fast" group missed about one third more horns at crossings than did the "slow" group. Furthermore, the "fast" group use d about 200 pounds more fuel per trip segment than did the "slow" group.

Following several serious accidents in 1996 and 1997 Congress again expressed concern and scheduled hearings on railroad safety. In September of 1998 hearings were held by the Senate Committee on Surface Transportation. Statements were submitted by m embers of the unions, the Federal Railroad Administration, the Association of American Railroads, and various scientific authorities on the subject of fatigue. The President of the Brotherhood of Locomotive engineers noted "Through a cooperative app roach, rail labor and the railroad industry can ensure fatigue countermeasures are a part of railroad culture. Through the AAR Work/Rest Task Force, NARAP, and a Canadian project called CANALERT, this industry has moved further and faster to address the problem of fatigue than any other mode of transportation." (Monin, 1998) The Executive Vice President of the Association of American Railroads suggested that "While fatigue in the workplace has been studied for many years, there is still much to be learned about how to apply the acquired scientific knowledge to operational settings. Great strides have been made by the cooperative efforts of rail labor and management to explore a variety of fatigue countermeasures." (Dettmann, 1998)

In late 1997, the Federal Railroad Administration invited labor and management to form the North American Rail Alertness Partnership or NARAP. This group was formed with the intention to collaboratively apply resources that address fatigue as a human factor cause of accidents, incidents, and injuries in the railroad industry. Many of the speakers at the 1998 Congressional hearings commented that NARAP was an important part of the current effort to address fatigue in the railroad industry.

The formation of this partnership has created a forum for the discussion and dissemination of current scientific information, a discussion of the results of pilot projects, and a venue for the exchange of views around important policy issues. This par tnership is significant for the simple fact that it is unique in the transportation industry. NARAP also serves the industry by assisting in the education of key labor and management personnel as well as driving the understanding of fatigue issues through out various organizations. All member organizations have a voice in the activities of the group. As a result of this process NARAP members have agreed on several key points that should be included in fatigue management plans in various organizations. No other coalition has been formed in other modes of transportation to address the issues of fatigue on neutral ground. This partnership is one of the key reasons why the railroad industry is the leader in fatigue countermeasures in the transportation indust ry.

As can be seen from this brief review, the issue of fatigue in the railroad industry has been has been recognized for almost 100 years. Only recently, however, has there been a serious effort to address these issues with scientific studies and actual field tests of attempts to manage fatigue. These efforts have been identified by other transportation modes as remarkable. Most feel that the railroad industry, while still having a long way to go, is the industry leader in attempting to manage fatigue.

Railroad labor and management and regulatory agencies, with the assistance of the scientific community, in the 1990ís have investigated scheduling changes, time windows, napping policies, technological measures for counteracting fatigue, educational se minars, instructional videos, and fatigue hygiene reading and self-study materials. In addition, thousands of hours of meetings and discussions have taken place to work through the issues, brainstorm, and plan projects programs and policies that would le ad to more effective management of fatigue.

Given the previous work in this area and the current legislative climate it was decided that a detailed study of the current status of fatigue countermeasures was needed. The purpose of this monograph is to document and detail the nature of these inte rventions and to comment on their credibility from a scientific point of view. The present document first sets out to summarize much of what is known in about fatigue in the transportation industry. This is followed by a section examining early pilot pro jects attempted by the industry and their present status today. This section consists of a review of previously published material plus anew section on current pilot projects included in a separate chapter. Finally, an assessment and summary of current status is offered.

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