

## Colombia

by Travis Ning

The events of September 11 continued of the pattern of redefinition in the conflict in Colombia. The complex war of today actually began decades ago as a small political struggle, which has gradually developed into a large-scale civil war. The continuation and growth of civil strife in Colombia witnessed the emergence of several organized anti-government guerrilla movements. Some of these groups have since been defeated or have integrated themselves into the recognized political system. Others have continued to violently challenge Colombian government authority. Currently, the two most significant anti-government insurgency groups are the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN). These guerrilla groups seek profound economic and political revolution that threatens the Colombian government as well as the existing social structure of the country. To address the specific concerns of the economic elite paramilitary forces have formed with the purpose of combating the guerrilla groups. The coalition of paramilitary forces is known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The government of Colombia mobilized a large military effort to quell the insurgency, and has frequently been accused of collaborating with the AUC in the fight against the guerrillas.

The introduction of the illicit drug trade has added immense financial support to many different sides of the conflict, and altered external perceptions of the war. The civil war eventually came to be known as a “War on Drugs,” and was characterized by both domestic and international efforts to deal with Colombia’s role in the flourishing trade of narcotics. Meanwhile, the FARC, ELN, and AUC stand accused of making substantial profits from the production and sale of illicit drugs.

The consequences of September 11 have profoundly altered the context of the conflict in Colombia. This is most pronounced in the rhetoric of the Colombian government when it seeks assistance in asserting state authority. Colombian President Uribe recently declared that any armed opposition to a democratic state is considered a terrorist threat. By this definition, the Colombian state is under siege by many terrorist organizations. The United States, a significant actor in Colombia, has largely endorsed Uribe’s interpretation of the post-September 11 language of terrorism. Thus, anti-drug funding is increasingly identified as anti-terror support. Both the Colombian and U.S. governments have changed the nature of war by redefining the previous “War on Drugs” as a “War on Terror.” The U.S. and Colombian emphasis has shifted from narcotics control to regional stabilization, security, and anti-terrorism. All three of the major non-state military movements in Colombia (AUC, ELN, FARC) are on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations.

Regardless of labels and official designations, the human rights situation in Colombia is severe: all of the different armed actors struggling to assert authority over the territory and population of the country have been complicit in grave offenses. Decades of war have produced a range of human rights violations, most notably internal displacement and the wide usage of child soldiers. This bibliography seeks to orient the reader to these problems by paying specific attention to the changes in the human rights situation after September 11.

## General Background

The Colombian civil conflict once popularly known as a key component in the “War on Drugs” and has recently begun to be identified as a part of the global War on Terror. However, well before the emergence of narco-trafficking and official listings of terrorists a war against the state was underway. The conflict arose from a small and politically disenfranchised population into today’s 40-year old conflagration. These resources examine the initial causes of the uprising and how it evolved into its current form.

2000. “Chronology, 1509-2000”. *International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society*. 14(1): 5-14.

*ABSTRACT: The article presents a chronology of events that occurred between 1509-2000 in Colombia. During the period 1509 to 1830 the following events took place. Early Spanish exploration and colonization of present-day Colombia took place. Santa Fe de Bogota was established in 1538. Comunero uprising against Crown officials in north-central Colombia took place. The Republic of New Granada was established. In the year 1958 the Frente Nacional was formed. The two parties agree to share power, splitting all elected and appointed offices and public employment and alternating the presidency for 16 years. Elements of this bipartisan arrangement would persist even after the formal end of the Frente in 1974. In 1972, the M-19 guerrilla movement was established by ex-members of ANAPO and of the FARC. Urban in origin, it eventually began to operate in the countryside. Its leadership cadres also largely come from among young intellectuals. In the year 1987 Medellin Cartel affiliated drug lord Carlos Lehder was captured and extradited to the U.S., where he was sentenced to a 135 year prison term and committed to a maximum-security federal prison in Illinois.*

*Details the origins of many of the factors in the current Colombian civil crisis such as political and military movements, the development of the illegal drug industry, human rights, and failed peace initiatives. Features more specific chronologies of the previous three presidential administrations.*

Catherine C. Legrand. 2003. “The Colombian Crisis in Historical Perspective”. *Canadian Journal of Latin American & Caribbean Studies*.

*ABSTRACT: This article explores the nineteenth- and twentieth-century roots of the present violence in Colombia. Focusing on the civilian government, the Colombian military, the FARC and ELN guerrillas, and the paramilitaries, it emphasizes the chronic weakness of the state, the privatization and regionalization of conflict, the impact of the cocaine export economy, and the difficulties of coming to a peace agreement.*

Gabriel Marcella, and Donald E. Schulz. 1999. “War and Peace in Colombia.” *Washington Quarterly*. 22(3): 213.

*ABSTRACT: Highlights the different conflicts that plague Colombia. United States’ policy on Colombia; Communist insurgency; Expansion of paramilitary networks; Drug traffickers and government corruption; Threat posed by continued Colombian disintegration to the inter-American community; Approaches to U.S. involvement in the peace process; Lessons from El Salvador’s civil wars.*

Frank and Palacios Safford, Marco. 2002. Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society.

A detailed history of Colombia spanning from Pre-Columbus times to the end of the 20th century. Special emphasis on the fragmentation of Colombia into regions and the development of

distinct economic and cultural characteristics. Explains the delayed economic development, and the weakness of the state and the state's authority.

Julia E. Sweig. 2002. "What Kind of War for Colombia". 81(5): 122.

*ABSTRACT: Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, inaugurated in August 2002, promised democratic security--meaning a frontal assault on the country's two leftist guerrilla groups and, perhaps, its right-wing paramilitaries as well. But stopping these rebels will not be easy. Between drugs, paramilitaries, guerrillas, and a collapsing state, Colombia's condition is steadily worsening. There is a widespread consensus that drug eradication in Colombia has failed. The United States has tried to balance the overriding U.S. interest in drug eradication against local efforts to combat domestic insurgencies in Latin America. If clear and tough demands are not put on the Colombian military and political elite to double tax revenues, double the defense budget, cut ties to the paramilitaries, send their sons to fight, return the internally displaced to their homes, and to enact other reforms, Colombia's precipitous decline will only continue.*

*Presents the numerous and complex problems facing President Uribe and makes a critical review of U.S. policy towards Colombia. Includes a description of the effects of the war in Colombia on the Andean and Amazonian neighbors. The author asserts that the U.S. retains a delicate role in the conflict, and must further consult European and Latin American governments in addressing the problem.*

Juan Gabriel Tokatlian. 2000. "Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace Diplomacy". *International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society*. 14(2): 333.

*ABSTRACT: This essay analyzes Colombian foreign policy over the last three decades with specific emphasis on Bogota's peace diplomacy from 1978 up to 2000 in the context of an ongoing and degrading internal war. Initially, it assumes a modified realist perspective that links international relations with domestic structures. Then, the text defines three models of Colombian peaceful diplomacy according to the purposes, the means, and the rationales employed by the administrations that covered the above-mentioned period. After empirically evaluating the governments of Presidents Turbay, Betancur, Barco, Gaviria, and Samper and the first two years of the presidency of Pastrana, the article concludes with an assessment of the country's peace diplomacy and its impact on internal violence and instability. The foreign policies of the six different mandates show that Colombia never developed an overall, consensual state strategy towards peace, that the multiple peaceful diplomacies were partially successful in terms of sustaining the political regime and that, notwithstanding the latter, the successive governments failed to achieve a genuine resolution to domestic war. Finally, the article calls for a serious, active, and simultaneous state foreign policy and citizen's diplomacy in favor of peace.*

*This essay analyzes Colombian foreign policy over the last three decades with specific emphasis on Bogota's peace diplomacy from 1978 up to 2000 in the context of ongoing internal war. Evaluates the foreign policies of the last six presidential administrations to show that Colombia never developed an overall, consensual state strategy towards peace. Recommends a two-pointed approach involving a renewed state diplomacy and a peace-focused citizen's diplomacy.*

## **Human Rights Issues in Colombia**

*The lethal combination of narcotics trade, guerrilla insurgency, paramilitary retaliation, and government security measures impart Colombia with the distinction of leading the Western Hemisphere in reported human rights and international law violations. With several armed forces struggling for dominance over*

*territory and population, the consequences on the civilian populace are wide-ranging and severe (Human Rights Watch).*

Human rights abuses in Colombia long pre-date the iteration of political violence. Internal displacement, child soldiers, and the hampering of civil liberties have long been commonplace in Colombia. Armed with the new language of terror, the Colombian government now benefits from an increased flexibility in combating guerrilla movements. With insurgency efforts being funded by the narcotics trade, actions once considered to be anti-drug measures are now classified as anti-terror tactics. Crop fumigation is an effort to cut terror funding. The “the anti-democracy terrorists” label redefines the guerrilla fighters who are often children under fifteen years of age. Uribe’s “Informants Network” initiative incorporates civilians into the military “anti-terror” efforts. This list of resources provides a look at some of the central human rights violations still occurring in Colombia.

Human Rights Bureau of Democracy, and Labor. 2003. “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices”. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18325.htm>.

This U.S. State Department report presents an overview of the Colombian conflict with respect to human rights in year 2002. The article gives a brief description of the principle actors in the civil war and evaluates each group’s human rights record. The report categorically reviews human rights violations in Colombia by listing basic human rights principles, then applying these standards to the violations in Colombia.

Nora Segura Escobar. 2000. “Colombia: A New Century, an Old War, and More Internal Displacement”. Human Sciences Press. 14(1): 107.

*ABSTRACT: The article focuses on internal displacement in Colombia. The violence, which Colombia has endured for over fifty years, has had as its main stage the rural areas of the country and has made the peasantry and the colonizers of the agrarian frontier its principal, though not exclusive, victims. Today, migratory currents in multiple directions witness to the shifting nature and extensive geography of the social conflicts and to the unprecedented proliferation of armed groups. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the magnitude and degradation of the armed confrontation has made displacement the only option for security for many of the inhabitants of the territories in conflict. The problem of the displaced, does not, however, correspond solely to confrontations between insurgent forces, paramilitary squads, and the state. Offshoots of these hostilities as well as other forms of the violent exercise of power expel populations from those areas that are involved in mega-development projects that have become zones whose control is of strategic economic and military importance, and those that have become arenas for the defense of landed interests or the consolidation of regional power.*

*The article focuses on internal displacement in Colombia. The violence has had as its main stage the rural areas of the country and has made the peasantry and the colonizers of the agrarian frontier its principal, though not exclusive, victims. Article cites specific gender-related consequences of internal displacement, and evaluates the behavior of these marginalized groups in relation to public sentiments.*

The Latin America Working Group. 2003. “The Wrong Road, Colombia’s National Security Policy”. <http://www.lawg.org/docs/WrongRoad0707C.pdf>.

*ABSTRACT: The Wrong Road outlines Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's controversial security policies. These include permitting police and army to search homes and offices, tap phones and detain people without warrants, suspending basic civil liberties in war zones, and employing armed civilians as soldiers and informants. These measures "set the stage for an increase in human rights violations, while providing none of the safeguards--respect for the rule of law, civilian oversight, ensuring that military forces understand and embrace their duty to protect all citizens rather than a privileged few--that are the foundation of real security." July 2003*

*Details President Uribe's security initiatives that focus on the expansion of military force and powers of the Colombian military institutions. The "Informants Network" and "Peasant Soldiers Program" are attempts to integrate armed civilians into the armed forces for intelligence and military operations. Questions the constitutionality of these acts and criticizes President's role in the deteriorating human rights situation in Colombia.*

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human and Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia. 2004. "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia\*". [http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/Informe2003\\_eng.doc](http://www.hchr.org.co/documentoseinformes/informes/altocomisionado/Informe2003_eng.doc).

This report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights covers the year 2003. Contents include chapters on the dynamics of internal armed conflict, state policies and international recommendations, breaches international law by armed actors, an evaluation of the current human rights situation, and a description of the status of vulnerable groups.

Human Rights Watch. 2001. Colombia: Beyond Negotiation: International Humanitarian Law and Its Application to the Conduct of the FARC-EP. New York: Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/farc/colmfarc0801.pdf>.

*ABSTRACT: Whether they live in Bogotá or in remote rural areas, Colombian civilians bear the brunt of the country's violent armed conflict. Thousands have been killed in recent years, and thousands more have been kidnapped for ransom. Their children, some as young as thirteen or fourteen, have been recruited into the irregular forces - guerrillas and paramilitaries - that play a primary role in the conflict. Fleeing their homes to protect themselves and their families, some two million Colombians have become internally displaced or have left their country as refugees. Human Rights Watch abhors the conflict's heavy civilian toll and supports ongoing efforts to achieve peace. Yet we insist on the protection of civilians even in the absence of peace. The international humanitarian law norms applicable to the conflict were designed to shield civilians from war, and to protect sick and wounded combatants as well as those who have surrendered. In Colombia, to the great discredit of the warring parties, these norms are largely ignored. This report, which is based on first-hand research in Colombia, including a visit in May-June 2000 to the Zone, describes the range of international humanitarian law violations committed by FARC-EP. Both in format and substance, it closely follows a July 2001 letter to Commander Marulanda addressing these issues.*

*This comprehensive report criticizes the human rights situation in Colombia, specifically condemning the behavior of the FARC group. The report specifically cites incidents of extrajudicial killings, the use of child combatants, hostage taking, forced displacement, and attacks on medical workers. Includes applicable international laws and recommendations to the FARC General Secretariat and the countries facilitating negotiations between FARC and the state.*

Amnesty International. 2003. "Amnesty International's Briefing to the Un Committee against Torture on the Republic of Colombia". <http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/colombia/document.do?id=3D53C24D8C7374C980256DB800529336>.

This document focuses on the failure of the Colombian government to ensure that Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the Covenant Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Punishment (CAT) are upheld. Focuses criticism on the government's participation in torture via the Colombian Military and the government-linked paramilitaries. Specific violations, including rape and torture, are reviewed. Lists recommendations to Colombian Government.

Amnesty International. 2004. "Colombia Annual Report 2004". <http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/colombia/document.do?id=7226D17FCB39404980256E9E005A9548>.

Annual report detailing the activity in the areas of paramilitaries, guerrillas, and armed forces in reference to human rights abuses in 2003. Evaluates the behavior and violations of each group for the 2003 period. Also details attacks on human rights monitors, violence towards women, kidnapping, and abuses against civilians.

Amnesty International. 2004. "Colombia, a Laboratory of War: Repression and Violence in Arauca". <http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/colombia/document.do?id=93581D5105D8C49C80256D2400379147>.

Briefly outlines the failed peace negotiations initiated in 1999 and the subsequent intensification of the conflict. Describes President Uribe's efforts to curb civil liberties during the "state of emergency" in 2002. Detailed examples of human rights violations such as kidnappings and persecution of human rights defenders.

Betsy Marsh. 2004. "Going to Extremes: The Aerial Spraying Program in Colombia". <http://www.lawg.org/Misc/Publications.htm>.

*ABSTRACT: Report critically analyzes the US-funded aerial spraying program to eradicate coca production in Colombia. States that the controversial strategy has harsh human and environmental costs and does little to curb narcotics production or usage. Urges that resources be redirected towards alternative crop production and drug treatment.*

Colombia Human Rights Network. 2004. <http://colhrnet.igc.org/>.

This website focuses on the human rights situation in Colombia, paying particular attention to the U.S. military aid to the Colombian government. Features links to U.S. and Colombian organizations with similar aims, legislative updates, and archives.

Center for International Policy. 2004. <http://ciponline.org/colombia/background.htm>

Extensive list of websites on human rights and Colombia. Links to resources on general human rights, refugees, media protection, and labor. Includes non-governmental, UN, US, and Colombian government links. Materials in both Spanish and English.

Defensoria Del Pueblo. 2004. <http://www.defensoria.org.co>

A Spanish language Colombian website dedicated to the issue of human rights within the armed conflict. Features Colombia-related urgent action petitions, a virtual classroom regarding human rights, and reports. Links to Colombian government, International agency, and NGO websites.

Adriana Herrera Tellez. 2002. "Children of War". *Hemisphere: A Magazine of the Americas*. 11(16).

Focuses on the effect of the civil war on children in Colombia. Practice of using child combatants by guerrilla forces; Statistics of minor deaths in the civil conflict; Reason for children joining guerrilla groups in Colombia; Long-term psychological effect of violence on children; Absence of social provisions for former child combatants in Colombian Law.

Defensoria Del Pueblo Y Unicef. 2002. "La Ninez En El Conflicto Armado Colombiano". [http://www.defensoria.org.co/investigacion/informes\\_a.php?i=9](http://www.defensoria.org.co/investigacion/informes_a.php?i=9).

Spanish language report detailing the results of interviews with 86 former child-soldiers with the intent of discerning the context in which a child becomes a soldier in the Colombian conflict. Explores motives for joining, the children's role in the conflict, and the demobilization and recovery. Includes various tables and graphs detailing the various dimensions of the problem of child combatants: its origins, membership, and drug use.

Human Rights Watch. 2004. "Colombia: Child Soldier Use 2003". [http://hrw.org/doc/?t=americas\\_pub&c=colomb](http://hrw.org/doc/?t=americas_pub&c=colomb).

Briefing details both governmental and non-state participation in the use of children in the civil conflict. Cites that all major actors in the war in Colombia utilize children in various capacities. Briefly summarizes abuses and demobilization and child protection programs.

Human Rights Watch. 2002. "A Wrong Turn: The Record of the Colombian Attorney General's Office". [http://hrw.org/doc/?t=americas&c=colomb&document\\_limit=40,20](http://hrw.org/doc/?t=americas&c=colomb&document_limit=40,20).

*ABSTRACT: Colombia's Attorney General has seriously undermined the investigation and prosecution of major human rights cases. The 14-page report "A Wrong Turn: The Record of the Colombian Attorney General's Office," documents how the attorney general's office has failed to make progress on critical human rights investigations. Upon taking office in July 2001, Attorney General Luis Camilo Osorio made it clear that he was deeply suspicious of ongoing efforts to prosecute human rights cases, particularly those involving allegations against members of the Colombian military. Publicly, he promised to correct what he described as excessive attention to these allegations by prosecutors. Within seventy-two hours of his arrival, Osorio had demanded the resignations of two high-ranking officials who had handled some of the institution's most important human rights cases. A third official felt compelled to resign in response to the attorney general's actions.*

*Documents how Attorney General Luis Camilo Osorio's office has failed to make progress on critical human rights investigations. Specifically cites the lack of support of prosecutors in human rights trials, a failure to protect justice officials, and the forced resignation of prosecutors and officials. Makes several recommendations to the U.S. and Colombia.*

Human Rights Watch. 2003. "You'll Learn Not to Cry: Child Combatants in Colombia". <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/colombia0903/colombia0903.pdf>.

*ABSTRACT: More than 11,000 children fight in Colombia's armed conflict, one of the highest totals in the world. Both guerrilla and paramilitary forces rely on child combatants, who have committed atrocities and are even*



*made to execute other children who try to desert. The first comprehensive report published on this issue, "You'll Learn Not to Cry" documents how Colombia's illegal armies have recruited increasing numbers of children in recent years. Only Burma (Myanmar) and the Democratic Republic of Congo are believed to have significantly larger numbers of child combatants than Colombia. The 150-page book, based on interviews with 112 former child combatants, documents how both guerrillas and paramilitaries exploit the desperation of poor children in rural combat zones. Many join up for food or physical protection, to escape domestic violence, or because of promises of money. Some are coerced to join at gunpoint, or join out of fear. Others are street children with nowhere to go. Children as young as thirteen are trained to use assault rifles, grenades and mortars. Human Rights Watch urged guerrilla and paramilitary forces to end all recruitment of children under the age of eighteen and to demobilize the children in their ranks. Pending complete demobilization, the group urged the following immediate and unconditional steps: firmly prohibit forcible recruitment; allow those who wish to leave without reprisals; cease executions of children; and provide proper medical care for the sick or wounded.*

*One in four combatants in Colombia are under 18 years of age. Both paramilitary and guerrilla forces utilize child soldiers. Report covers recruitment, training, life in ranks, role in combat and treatment after capture, desertion or rescue. Estimates 11,000 child combatants currently participating in the Colombian conflict. Makes recommendations to principle participating actors such as the paramilitary and guerrilla groups, the Colombian Military, the US, and the United Nations.*

## **Non-State Actors**

The internal conflict of Colombia is unique in the relatively high number of state and non-state actors asserting varying degrees of military and political influence and independence. In addition to the state army, Colombia features at least three paramilitary forces currently waging a war within the country's borders. Each actor's distinct motivations create a complex and morphing web of interests.

The U.S. State Department has classified the three organized non-state armed groups as terrorist organizations. The AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional) each feature different founding ideals, thousands of soldiers, and a history of human rights abuses. Another critical dimension to the definition of these groups is the very lucrative drug trade. This section also features material general to non-state actors and guerillas.

### *General*

Jeff Browitt. 2001. "Capital Punishment: The Fragmentation of Colombia and the Crisis of the Nation-State". *Third World Quarterly*. 22(6): 1063.

*ABSTRACT: The Colombian nation-state is in its worst period of crisis since the infamous Violencia of the late 1940s and 1950s. State power is being contested by a number of groups: paramilitaries, the revolutionary Left, drug cartels and corrupt high-level officials. But these latest challenges must be set in a wider historical context: a 200-year history of failed attempts by the oligarchy to forge a stable modern nation-state without undermining their dominant position in the Colombian polity. The writing of a new constitution in 1991, the first since 1886,*



*was an attempt to address many of the above problems, including the granting of special powers to the executive to deal with civil unrest, the need for a decentralised and pluralised political landscape and constitutional guarantees for minority and indigenous representation and rights. However, constitutional change has also taken place in the context of the consolidation of the globalisation project and the practical effects of the new constitution have been its provision of legal and administrative measures to facilitate the neoliberal restructuring of the economy, a process which, over the past 10 years, has been a devastating form of 'capital punishment' for the Colombian underclasses and has contributed to the further fragmentation of the nation.*

Details the crisis of the nation-state in Colombia as multiple armed groups contest state authority. The negative consequences of globalization and neoliberal policies on the underclass have undermined the 1991 constitution that sought to increase government power

Center for International Policy - Colombia. 2004. <http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm>

This expansive website presents several papers opposing large increases in U.S. military aid. It includes several Colombia-related sub-sections including: U.S. military and police aid, U.S. government information, peace initiatives, and links to governmental and non-governmental sites.

Dr. Max G. Manwaring. 2002. "Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threat and Response". Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/pubResult.cfm/hurl/PubID=16/>.

*ABSTRACT: Colombia's deeply rooted and ambiguous warfare has reached crisis proportions in that Colombia's "Hobbesian Trinity" of illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary organizations are creating a situation in which life is indeed "nasty, brutish, and short." The first step in developing a macro-level vision, policy, and strategy to deal with the Colombian crisis in a global context is to be clear on what the Colombian crisis is, and what the fundamental threats implicit (and explicit) in it are. Political and military leaders can start thinking about the gravity of the terrorist strategy employed by Colombia's stateless adversaries from this point. It is also the point from which leaders can begin developing responses designed to secure Colombian, Hemispheric, and global stability. The author seeks to explain the Colombian crisis in terms of nonstate threats to the state and to the region--and appropriate strategic-level responses.*

*The author seeks to explain the Colombian crisis in terms of non-state threats to the state and to the region, and appropriate strategic-level responses. The principle non-state actors are drug traffickers, insurgents and paramilitaries. Author asserts that the threat of these non-state actors, which he considers to be terrorists, can be addressed via education and organizational solutions.*

Max G. Manwaring. 2002. "Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and to the Hemisphere". *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. 13(2): 68.

*ABSTRACT: Explains the Colombian crisis in terms of non-state threats to the state and to the region. Political and economic problems of Colombia; Emergence of the illegal drug industry and various insurgent organizations/paramilitary groups in the country; Development of a macro-level vision, policy and strategy by U.S. political and military leaders to deal with the Colombian crisis.*

*The author explains the Colombian crisis in Hobbesian terms of non-state threats to the state and region. The Colombian state is threatened by three non-state actors: paramilitaries, guerrillas, and the illegal drug industry. The strength of these forces is leading to the partial collapse of the state of Colombia, as evidenced by the diminishing state authority over large portions of the country and the non-physical erosion of democracy via widespread corruption.*

Center for International Policy. 2004. <http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm>.

This website, which was last updated August 27, 2002 at the time of this writing, features information on the four dominant actors in the Colombian conflict: the FARC, AUC, and ELN and the State Armed Forces of Colombia. Areas covered include: maps of controlled territory, current leadership of each organization, and links to the status of negotiation for each group.

Cynthia Watson. 1992. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia: Reconstituting the Political Process". *Terrorism & Political Violence*. 4(2): 84.

*ABSTRACT: Examines the hypotheses on the guerrillas and generalizations related to the advent of an altered political party arrangement in Colombia. Constitutional political system in the country; Refusal to participate in the electoral process by Guerrilla groups; Factors contributing to the reintegration of guerrillas into the political arena.*

*This article provides a description of the origins of the anti-government guerrilla forces in Colombia, paying particular attention to the decades of the 70's and 80's until the writing of a new constitution in 1991. During this time period, some guerrilla movements attempted to legitimize their movements via direct political participation. It also details the impact of narcotics on the insurgent efforts.*

### *Guerrillas*

Max G. Manwaring. 2002. "Non-State Actors in Colombia: Threats to the State and to the Hemisphere". *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. 13(2): 68.

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Mauricio Romero. 2000. "Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia". *International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society*. 14(1): 51.

*ABSTRACT: The article focuses on regional elites and the paramilitaries in Colombia. The armed confrontation in Colombia is an important case of violence in the Americas. Escalating progressively since the mid-1970s, it has reached such an intensity that it now threatens to divide the country into three different territories: the northwest, dominated by counterinsurgent paramilitary groups, the Andean and central area, controlled by the constitutional armed forces, and the southeast, where leftist guerrillas prevail. Until recently, such intranational or civil wars tended to be regarded as reflections of Cold War hostilities. Scholars focused on interstate or systemic dynamics, and paid little attention to domestic conflicts, violent nonstate entrepreneurs, or the implications of intranational struggle for longer-term patterns of political change and state transformation in so-called Third World societies. By bringing real social actors back in, this study of armed conflict in contemporary Colombia shows that the state's*

*monopoly of the means of violence-an attribute that is often considered as given, permanent, and even natural-is actually social and practical. Authority over the means of violence is contested and changing, and is, in fact, a variable quality of the state.*

The article examines thirty years of political polarization in Colombia via a study of the state of Cordoba. Cordoba is headquarters of Colombia's strongest paramilitary organization, and the author explores how the increase in guerrilla presence in the 1980's encouraged the local elites and state forces to consolidate a paramilitary and eventual political force.

Philippe Serres. 2000. "The Farc and Democracy in Colombia in the 1990s". *Democratization*. 7(4): 191.

*ABSTRACT: Addresses issues regarding the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) through the concept of the partial breakdown of the state. Discussion of the strengthening of FARC and the involvement of FARC with drug trafficking. Details the factors that led to the guerrilla group's incapacity to defeat the Colombian state.*

Alfredo Rangel Suarez. 2000. "Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia". *Journal of International Affairs*. 53(2): 577.

*ABSTRACT: Discusses the economic prosperity of Colombia's guerrilla groups as of year 2000. Evolution and current situation of the guerrilla phenomenon in Colombia; Analysis of the guerrilla economy as a function of its expansion and territorial control.*

*Explores how economic prosperity of the guerrilla groups impacts the larger Colombian economy. The broad-based guerrilla economy has never relied heavily on any international support, and is fueled by extortion, kidnapping, taxes, robbery, and drug trafficking. A failure to negotiate a peace with these forces is a major detriment to the economic welfare of Colombia.*

Cynthia Watson. 1992. "Guerrilla Groups in Colombia: Reconstituting the Political Process". *Terrorism & Political Violence*. 4(2): 84.

*ABSTRACT: Examines the hypotheses on the guerrillas and generalizations related to the advent of an altered political party arrangement in Colombia. Constitutional political system in the country; Refusal to participate in the electoral process by Guerrilla groups; Factors contributing to the reintegration of guerrillas into the political arena.*

*This article provides a description of the origins of the anti-government guerrilla forces in Colombia, paying particular attention to the decades of the 70's and 80's until the writing of a new constitution in 1991. During this time period, some guerrilla movements attempted to legitimize their movements via direct political participation. It also details the impact of narcotics on the insurgent efforts.*

*ELN (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional)*

Ejercito De Liberacion Nacional (ELN). 2004. <http://www.eln-voces.com/>

This basic Spanish language ELN homepage expresses the self-defined characteristics of the group. In the site, the ELN details its historical foundations, why the group has taken up armed

struggle, and the goals it intends to achieve via militaristic and political efforts. Includes ELN-authored essays.

Center for International Policy. 2004. <http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm>.

This website, which was last updated August 27, 2002 at the time of this writing, features information on the four dominant actors in the Colombian conflict: the FARC, AUC, and ELN and the State Armed Forces of Colombia. Areas covered include: maps of controlled territory, current leadership of each organization, and links to the status of negotiation for each group.

*FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)*

Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias De Colombia (FARC). 2004. [http://www.farcep.org/pagina\\_ingles/](http://www.farcep.org/pagina_ingles/)

The basic, 2002, English-version FARC homepage includes a variety of information including the group's history, letters, and interviews. It links with the more comprehensive and current Spanish version.

Roman D. Ortiz. 2002. "Insurgent Strategies in the Post-Cold War: The Case of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia". *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*. 25(2): 127.

*ABSTRACT: This article analyzes the adaptation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the post-Cold War strategic scene. In this process of change the Colombian guerrilla organization has broken away from the traditional behavior patterns of Latin American armed groups in four key ways. First, the FARC has reduced the rigidity of its ideology in order to make its political message more attractive. Second, it has made a great effort to boost its military potential. Third, it has established independent channels of funding and arms supply. Finally, the Colombian rebels have developed a very decentralized organic structure that nevertheless maintains a sufficient degree of cohesion. These innovations have made the FARC a new model of insurgency that has managed to corner the Bogota government and destabilize a significant part of the Andean region.*

*The author observes the fundamental ways that the FARC has changed in since the end of the Cold War. The article details the four key ways that the FARC has also broken away from traditional behavior patterns of armed groups in Latin America: reduction in rigidity of ideology, boosting military potential, the establishment of independent funding, and a decentralized organizational structure. These innovations have made the FARC a new model of insurgency that has managed to corner the Bogota government and destabilize a significant part of the Andean region.*

Center for International Policy. 2004. <http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm>.

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Philippe Serres. 2000. "The Farc and Democracy in Colombia in the 1990s". *Democratization*. 7(4): 191.

Addresses issues regarding the Colombian guerrilla group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) through the concept of the partial breakdown of the state. Discussion of the strengthening of FARC and the involvement of FARC with drug trafficking. Details the factors that led to the guerrilla group's incapacity to defeat the Colombian state.

### *Paramilitaries*

Autodefensas Unidas De Colombia (AUC). 2004. <http://www.colombialibre.org/>

This well-organized and current Spanish language homepage of the AUC positively portrays the group's activities in the Colombian conflict. The site details the group's current efforts in peace negotiations, human rights protection, and anti-terror measures. Features current press AUC-leaning releases, videos, and interviews.

Staffan Löfving. 2004. "Paramilitaries of the Empire". *Social Analysis*. 48(1): 156.

*ABSTRACT: Comments on the construed paramilitary violence in terms of excessive responses to insurgencies by means of conventional warfare. Paramilitary function of state power in countries that survived the Cold War to find their fate; Prevalence of paramilitary violence in countries where it is the military that monopolizes the use of violence and where the police and the judicial system operates; Details of information on the paramilitary violence in Guatemala, Colombia and Israel.*

*Discusses the evolving role of the paramilitary forces in Colombia, specifically their evolution from small, state sanctioned militia to groups building political platforms claiming the right to participate in peace negotiations. The emergence of paramilitaries resulted from a weak central state authority. Observes the AUC's attempts to foster legitimization. Author compares the paramilitaries of Colombia, Guatemala and Israel.*

Mauricio Romero. 2000. "Changing Identities and Contested Settings: Regional Elites and the Paramilitaries in Colombia". *International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society*. 14(1): 51.

*ABSTRACT: The article focuses on regional elites and the paramilitaries in Colombia. The armed confrontation in Colombia is an important case of violence in the Americas. Escalating progressively since the mid-1970s, it has reached such an intensity that it now threatens to divide the country into three different territories: the northwest, dominated by counterinsurgent paramilitary groups, the Andean and central area, controlled by the constitutional armed forces, and the southeast, where leftist guerrillas prevail. Until recently, such intranational or civil wars tended to be regarded as reflections of Cold War hostilities. Scholars focused on interstate or systemic dynamics, and paid little attention to domestic conflicts, violent nonstate entrepreneurs, or the implications of intranational struggle for longer-term patterns of political change and state transformation in so-called Third World societies. By bringing real social actors back in, this study of armed conflict in contemporary Colombia shows that the state's monopoly of the means of violence—an attribute that is often considered as given, permanent, and even natural—is actually social and practical. Authority over the means of violence is contested and changing, and is, in fact, a variable quality of the state.*

*The article examines thirty years of political polarization in Colombia via a study of the state of Cordoba. Cordoba is headquarters of Colombia's strongest paramilitary organization, and the author explores how the increase in guerrilla presence in the 1980's encouraged the local elites and state forces to consolidate a paramilitary and eventual political force.*

Victoria Sanford. 2003. "Learning to Kill by Proxy: Colombian Paramilitaries and the Legacy of Central American Death Squads, Contras, and Civil Patrols". *Social Justice*. 30(3): 63.

*ABSTRACT: The article traces the founding of Colombian paramilitaries to the cold war era when the U.S. helped the Colombian and Central American governments establish proxy paramilitary forces in its fight against international communism. The author summarizes the devastating effects this paramilitarism had on Colombian and Central American society during the 1960s to the late 20th century. A concluding section provides an update on the impact of paramilitarism on human rights in contemporary Colombia, and on the implications for peace in the region.*

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Human Rights Watch. 2003. *Colombia's Checkbook Impunity: A Briefing Paper*.

In 2003, the AUC paramilitary forces signed an agreement with the Colombian government to demobilize by 2005. This article protests the Colombian government's agreement to introduce legislation that would allow paramilitaries convicted of serious human rights crimes to make cash payments in lieu of serving prison sentences. According to the legislation, the President would determine which individuals qualify for a suspended sentence. Report cites examples of AUC abuses.

Human Rights Watch. 2001. *The "Sixth Division": Military-Paramilitary Ties and U.S. Policy in Colombia*. Human Rights Watch.

Asserts that there is compelling evidence that certain Colombian Army brigades and political detachments continue to promote, work with, support, and profit from paramilitary groups. Specific focus on 3 brigades. Strong condemnation of Pastrana administration. Includes recommendations to Colombian and U.S. governments.

Scott Wilson. 2002. *Cocaine Trade Causes Rifts in Colombian War*. *The Washington Post*. Date. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A22043-2002Sep15&notFound=true>.

The AUC paramilitary group is in danger of fracturing as a result of the drug trade, and this impacts significantly on the anti-drug Plan Colombia strategy. The once-united force of 15,000 members has split over the a disagreement over whether the financial benefit of protecting the country's cocaine trade outweighs the political costs and internal corruption it has brought the group. The split further threatens the stability of Colombia by creating a collection of regional groups that do not support the government's anti-drug initiatives.

## State Actors

To combat this increase in drug production, the [United States](#) introduced Plan Colombia. This program provides substantial financial and military assistance to the [Colombian government](#). This plan intricately added the United States' financial and military support into the crowded puzzle of principle actors. In light of the events of September 11, the language and purpose of the Plan Colombia has shifted to reflect the transition from a "War on Drugs" to a "War on Terror."

### *United States*

Washington Office on Latin America. 2003. "Plan Colombia 3 Year Report Card". [http://www.wola.org/Colombia/plan\\_col\\_report\\_card03.pdf](http://www.wola.org/Colombia/plan_col_report_card03.pdf).

A negative evaluation of the U.S. Plan Colombia. Specifically assesses Plan Colombia's impact on the eradication of illegal drugs, the use of a balanced approach, the institution of judicial reform, the protection of human rights, and the fostering of peace.

Washington Office on Latin America. 2003. "Protecting the Pipeline: The Us Military Mission Expands". Colombia Monitor. <http://wola.org/Colombia/colombia.htm>.

Analyzes the role of oil in Colombia's conflict and the dangers of the United States' growing military mission in Colombia.

Max G. Manwaring. 2001. "U. S. Security Policy in the Western Hemishphere: Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is to Be Done?" Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/pubResult.cfm/hurl/PubID=22/>.

*ABSTRACT: This is one in the Special Series of monographs stemming from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and The Dante B. Fascell North-South Center of the University of Miami. In substantive U.S. national security terms, the author addresses the questions, Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done? He explains the importance of that troubled country to the United States. He points out that the fragile democracy of Colombia is at risk, and that the violent spillover effects of three simultaneous wars pose a threat to the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the interdependent global community. Then he makes a case against continued tactical and operational approaches to the Colombian crisis and outlines what must be done. In that connection, he recommends an actionable political-military strategy to attain security, stability, democratic governance, and a sustainable peace. The proposed strategy would not be costly in monetary or military terms. It would, however, require deliberate planning, cooperation, time, and will.*

*A monograph stemming from the February 2001 conference on Plan Colombia. The author asserts the need for U.S. leadership and the strategic importance of Colombia to U.S. interests. The author cites sets of requirements necessary to restore Colombian state legitimacy: the need for Colombian leadership to optimize capabilities, and the need for U.S. -Colombia partnership to achieve a national and international unity of effort.*

Peter McLaren and Gregory Martin. 2004. "The Legend of the Bush Gang: Imperialism, War, and Propaganda". Cultural Studies/Critical Methodologies. 4(3): 281.

*ABSTRACT: This article explores the dialectical relationship between the Bush administration's domestic policies and its deranged "war on terrorism," which is being waged on a number of different fronts, for example,*



*Iraq, Afghanistan, Colombia, and the United States. The authors argue that the Bush gang is using the external “international crisis” to override the remnants of U.S. bourgeois democracy in order to reestablish conditions of profitability. Perhaps not surprisingly, at least from a Marxist perspective, the supporting repressive (e. g., the Department of Homeland Security’s secret police) and ideological state apparatuses (e. g., schools and the corporate media) have played a profound role in building support for the Bush gang’s totalizing ambitions.*

*This article explores the dialectical relationship between the Bush administration’s domestic policies and its War on Terrorism, which is being waged on a number of different fronts, including Colombia. The authors argue that the Bush administration is using an external “international crisis” to override democracy in order to reestablish conditions of more narrow profitability.*

### *Colombia*

Dr. Geoffrey Demarest. 2003. “Mapping Colombia: The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy”. Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm/hurl/PubID=12/>.

The author asserts that government efforts to counter narcotics and lawlessness in Colombia will worsen unless the it firmly enforces property rights. For instance, many parts of Colombia are not yet mapped, so rule of law cannot exist until there is a knowledge of the location of different properties. The current U.S. and Colombian efforts to assert state authority will require complete mapping to define boundaries of lawlessness and civilization.

Julia E. Sweig. 2002. “What Kind of War for Colombia”. *Foreign Affairs*. 81(5).

This broad overview illustrates the difficulties facing the current presidential administration of Colombia, and examines the country’s status as a functioning democracy. Contrasts the Pastrana Presidency to that of the current Uribe regime and their distinct efforts to establish stability in the lawless regions of the country. Describes the evolution of the Plan Colombia, and the significant influence that the U.S. exerts over the situation.

### **War on Terror**

*In the weeks and months following September 11, it was not uncommon to see images of Osama Bin Ladin edited into the news reports about FARC actions in Colombian television news broadcasts. Conservative politicians, church leaders, and members of the Colombian armed forces creatively developed new adjectives to describe Colombian rebels as “Talibanes” or “Bin Ladenes.” This approach rendered any efforts at negotiating a political solution to the decades-long conflict as illegitimate, if not morally repugnant (Mario Murillo, Colombia and the United States: War, Unrest and Destabilization).*

The traditional view of the Colombian conflict is of an internal war of political ideology that had been spun to include the effects of the narcotics trade on the escalation of violence. The events of September 11th 2001 spawned yet another redefinition of the civil war in Colombia. As I argued in the introduction, the “War on Drugs” has been enveloped by the “War on Terror.” This

bibliography features several resources that detail this transformation and specify the altered roles some of the principal actors.

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 2004. "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report". <http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/vol1/html/29832.htm>.

*ABSTRACT: Despite dramatic progress against the narcotics trade, Colombia remains a major producing country. Proceeds finance the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), and, to a lesser extent, the National Liberation Army (ELN). They control areas within Colombia with concentrations of coca and heroin poppy cultivation and their involvement in narcotics is a major source of violence in Colombia. In 2003 the Government of Colombia (GOC) eradicated illicit crops at a record-setting pace. The U.S. -supported Colombian National Police Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN) sprayed over 127,000 hectares of coca and 2,821 hectares of opium poppy. Subsequent field verification demonstrated that this spraying effectively eradicated 116,000 hectares of coca. In addition to spray operations, the GOC manually eradicated 8,441 hectares of coca and 1,009 hectares of opium poppy. Plan Colombia has reduced narcotics production and seizures of illicit commodities are up; the scope and delivery of key government services have been extended; the effectiveness and availability of institutions of justice have been increased; and, the GOC is in negotiations with the AUC toward demobilization. Colombia is party to the 1988 U.N. Drug convention.*

*This 2004 U.S. State Department website notes the progress being made against narcotics production and trade in Colombia for the year 2003. Attributes narcotics production and trade to the non-state actors in Colombia (FARC, AUC, ELN), and details the Colombian Government's actions to curtail production via fumigation. Site includes categories such as accomplishments, law enforcement efforts, corruption, treaties, transit, cultivation, and U.S. participation in anti-drug measures.*

Patricia Bibes. 2001. "Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Colombia, a Case Study". *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice*. 17(3): 243.

*ABSTRACT: Discusses the complex relationships that exist among drug traffickers, insurgent guerrilla groups, paramilitary forces and the Colombian government's military and police agencies. Use of violence and terrorism to achieve disparate ends; Colombia's importance as a key source country for coca leaf and as an incubator for organized crime; Institutional initiatives to combat drug production, trafficking and terrorism.*

*Discusses the complex relationships that exist among drug traffickers, insurgent guerrilla groups, paramilitary forces and the Colombian government's military and police agencies. Details use of violence and terrorism to achieve disparate ends. Colombia's importance as a key source country for coca leaf and as an incubator for organized crime. Institutional initiatives to combat drug production, trafficking and terrorism.*

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin W. Buckley. USAWAC Strategy Research Project. U.S. Army War College. <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/search/search.asp>.

This report, written as an SRP from a lieutenant colonel, evaluates the effectiveness of U.S. participation in Plan Colombia. The article cites drug-related statistics that reflect the successes of the aerial spraying program, increased government interception of narcotics, and increased police presence. Includes the viewpoints of some Plan Colombia critics, but considers the program to be effective. Makes several conclusionary recommendations such as the need to

decrease drug demand, restriction of drug movement to neighboring countries, and to restrict U.S. forces from combat roles.

Justin Delacour. 2000. "Plan Colombia: Rhetoric, Reality, and the Press". *Social Justice*. 27(4): 63.

*ABSTRACT: Discusses the anti-narcotics drug aid package of the United States to Colombia, known as Plan Colombia, and the objections of human rights groups to the package. Describes opposition of the U.S. government to human rights conditions. Support of drug-connected paramilitaries to U.S. policy; Paramilitary massacres and violations; Political issue behind press coverage of Colombia; Rhetorics behind Plan Colombia's objectives.*

*Discusses the anti-narcotics drug aid package of the United States to Colombia, known as Plan Colombia. Asserts that the \$1.3 billion aid package is actually a counterinsurgency measure more than an anti-narcotics program. This idea stems from the proven links between the Colombian Military and the drug-producing AUC paramilitaries with a history of human rights abuses. States that U.S. aid heightens human rights concerns and internal conflict.*

Stokes Doug. 2003. "Why the End of the Cold War Doesn't Matter: The Us War of Terror in Colombia". *Review of International Studies*. 29(4): 569.

*ABSTRACT: Orthodox narratives of U.S. foreign policy have been employed as uncontested modes of historical interpretation with U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy in the Third World characterised by discontinuity from its earlier Cold War objectives. Chomsky's work adopts an alternative revisionist historiography that views U.S. post-Cold War foreign policy as characterised by continuity with its earlier Cold War objectives. This article examines the continuities of U.S. post-Cold War policy in Colombia, and explains this in terms of the maintenance of U.S. access to South American oil, the preservation of regional (in)stability and the continued need to destroy challenges to US-led neoliberalism.*

*Utilizing Colombia as a case study, the author evaluates Noam Chomsky's theory of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy. Examines the continuities of U.S. post-Cold War policy in Colombia, and explains this in terms of the maintenance of U.S. access to South American oil, the preservation of regional stability and the continued need to destroy challenges to US-led neoliberalism.*

Adam Isacson. 2004. "Optimism, Pessimism, and Terrorism: The United States and Colombia in 2003". *The Brown Journal of World Affairs*. 10(2): 245.

*ABSTRACT: Discusses the relationship between the U.S. and Colombia in 2003. Financial contributions of the U.S. to Colombia's war on drugs; Criticisms of Plan Colombia, the law governing the war on terrorism funding; Effects of increased U.S. engagement through Plan Colombia.*

*Discusses the transformation of the U.S. "War on Drugs" into a "War on Terror" in Colombia in light of the events of 9/11. Profoundly details how U.S. financial aid has increased via Plan Colombia. Critically evaluates the successes of Plan Colombia, argued by Colombian and U.S. military officials, with the contrasting opinions of human rights reports. Asserts that the current, military-focused involvement of the U.S. is counterproductive and needs revision.*

Robin Kirk. 2004. "Colombia and the War on Terror: Rhetoric and Reality". *The World Today*.  
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/04/colomb7932.htm>.

How the contemporary "War on Terror" post 9-11 has been applied to the decades-old civil war in Colombia. The Colombian government has utilized the new vocabulary to declare insurgents

as “terrorists” and captured guerillas have been deemed “illegal combatants.” Also details how the U.S. military links illicit drugs to the funding of Islamic terrorist groups, and narcotics are “weapons of mass destruction.” These new classifications facilitate U.S. anti-terror funding. Takes a critical view of this new policy, as Colombia’s new “War on Terror” is focusing on the anti-government guerrillas and leaving the paramilitary forces to maintain and increase their power.

John Marulanda Marin. 2002. “The Urban Battlefield”. *Hemisphere: A Magazine of the Americas*. 11(20).

*ABSTRACT: Focuses on the spread of the Colombian civil war to cities. Impact of the displacement of people from the countryside on the urban population; Activity of guerrilla organizations in the countryside; Increase in strikes, protests and popular mobilizations in cities; Reasons for efforts by guerrilla groups to establish urban presence; Factors working against generalized urban violence.*

*Post 9/11 article focuses on the threat of terrorism the spread of Colombian civil war to the urban areas. Details the history and impacts of the displacement of rural people on the urban populations. Provides motivations for guerrilla groups to establish an urban presence. Details the factors inhibiting the urbanization of the conflict: media, popular sentiment, armed forces and a modernized state.*

Thomas A. Marks. 2002. *Colombian Army Adaptation to Farc Insurgency*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College. <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB13.pdf>.

The author analyzes Colombia’s problems and makes recommendations regarding what it will take to achieve stated U.S. and Colombian objectives in that crisis situation. Critical analysis of Plan Colombia, corruption, the armed forces, and leadership. Explores implications of September 11 on the U.S. relations with Colombia and the regional repercussions.

Mario Murillo. 2004. *Colombia and the United States. War, Unrest and Destabilization*. New York: Seven Stories Press.

This informative book features a keen description of how the “War on Terror” has allowed an increased militaristic approach by Colombian government. The post-9/11 context has reduced the original social political sources of the Colombia conflict to a mere extension of the global war on terror.

United States. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. 2002. [International Global Terrorism: Its Links with Illicit Drugs as Illustrated by the Ira and Other Groups in Colombia: Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Seventh Congress, Second Session, April 24, 2002](http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42862). Washington: U.S. G. P. O. : For sale by the Supt. of Docs. U.S. G. P. O. [Congressional Sales Office]. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS42862>.

Report by the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations details the “Globalization of Terror” with a focus on the Colombian civil war and the hemispheric concerns of the United States. Portrays narco-funded FARC as a “multinational terrorist network” similar to Al Qaeda, and explores the links between FARC and the IRA. Includes DEA reports.