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by Tom J. Farer

Graduate School of International Studies
University of Denver
2201 South Gaylord Street
Denver, CO 80208
tfarer@du.edu

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Human Rights and the Neo-Conservative Project: What's Not to Like?

by

Tom Farer¹

The Neo-conservative Project

Hegemony, as neo-cons argued in the 1990s, is not the mere possession of dominating power but also the will to use it on behalf of a coherent project. In the Clinton years, hegemony was only latent. The catastrophe of September 2001 created the circumstances in which it could be made real. To what end? There is not yet a single comprehensive statement of the neo-conservative project and its premises. Still, out of the particular policies advocated by its high priests and house organs and the thicket of argument surrounding them, project and premises materialize.¹

Having won the Third World War, conventionally called the “Cold War,” we are now by dint of circumstance launched into a fourth. Like the second and third ones, it stems from a conflict of values and not of mere interests. It is a war between democratic capitalism and its enemies. The former is expanding, not at the end of a bayonet but in response to the desire of people everywhere to receive it or at least its blessings. And that expansion is coterminous with the expansion of individual freedom.

¹ Professor and Dean, Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver. All rights reserved. Reproduction requires the express written consent of the author.

The expansion coincidentally threatens where it does not immediately demolish the practices, beliefs, and institutions that thrive only where freedom is alien and can be made to remain so. As the financial and cultural base of the expansion that is sometimes labeled “globalization”, the U.S. is the inevitable target for all those who, being threatened, resist. And since globalization is not a public policy but the summation of millions of private initiatives responding to the yearnings and passions of billions of people, the U.S. government cannot erase the bull’s eye from the nation’s flank by any policy other than attempting to remake the nation in the image of its enemies, a closed society.

So war is our fate. A conventional war would be a minor affair for a country with America’s power. But in the epoch of globalization, we must contend with asymmetrical war. Since the enemies of the open society cannot stand up to our armies, they turn to such soft targets as civilians and the infrastructure that supports them. Here our enemies find vast vulnerabilities springing from the very nature of our open society and the delicate systems of communication and movement and energy generation that sustain quotidian life. The destruction of the World Trade Center illustrated the lethal potential of asymmetrical war even when waged without benefit of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Add them to the mix, and images of unspeakable catastrophe are summoned.

As America is the center of expanding liberal capitalist democracy, the Islamic world, particularly its Arab sector, is the center of violent opposition precisely because the dynamism and pluralism and instrumental rationalism of liberal capitalism challenge deeply rooted social arrangements and identities. And this challenge occurs against a backdrop of nearly a millennium of armed conflict between the West and the various Islamic polities on the southern side of the Mediterranean and, in recent centuries, a succession of devastating military defeats

and political humiliations for the latter. Added to this dangerous mix is a strain of sacrificial violence in contemporary if not original Islamic thought which leads to the suicide bomber.

What, then, is to be done according to the Neo-Cons? A first step is to seek out and destroy immediate threats and demonstrate that American power is now driven by an implacable will and a universal capacity to revenge every injury by inflicting greater ones. Being hated is not good; being hated without being at the same time feared is far worse. In destroying the Taliban regime and killing or incarcerating various Al Qaeda members, the first step was taken. Going after Saddam also has had demonstrative value. For the Taliban were barely a regime, virtually unrecognized and not fully in control of the country they misruled. Destroying its regime and doing so largely through reinforcing and bribing indigenous actors was at best a veiled warning to established governments with histories of support or tolerance for terrorist groups. Destroying the long-established regime in Iraq, one not credibly connected to September 11, was a dramatic expansion of the anti-terrorist project, calculated to be a qualitatively more potent demonstration of American will and power.

If one is to take neo-conservatives at their word, however, “encouraging others” was only one of the reasons to overthrow Saddam Hussein. A second was to create the condition for installing a capitalist democracy in the once most formidable and technologically advanced country in the Arab world.² This too would be done in part for its hopefully contagious effects on the surrounding Arab states, a hope flowing from a key, if not always clearly declared, premise of neo-conservative grand strategy: Given the opportunity, ordinary people will prove to be rational maximizers of their material well being. To serve its interests and theirs, the United States should provide the opportunity, as it provides the quintessential model: strict limits on state power; the rule of law including transparency of the public realm; an independent judiciary;

extensive rights to private property associated with constitutional limits on the confiscatory power of the state; and free elections to sustain the rest. The individual, being protected from depredations by the state is thereby liberated to pursue material well being. And pursue it he or she will, for that is the natural impulse of men and women, if not in all ages, then certainly in ours.

The ethic of consumption will trump all other ends. An electorate of economic strivers will disown projects that conscript their wealth on behalf of utopian ends. For they will find dignity and meaning in the struggle to produce and sufficient pleasure in the satisfaction of their appetites. That is why liberal democracies do not war with each other. To be sure, fanatics immune to the ethic of material consumption will not altogether disappear. But they will no longer be able to multiply themselves so easily. And liberal democratic governments, driven by the coercive power of elections to mirror the interests of their electors, will cooperate with the U.S. to extirpate fanatics.

Neo-cons do not rely exclusively on a contagion of democracy springing from the demonstration in Iraq of the possibility and the benefits of democratic government. While the visible freedom, peace and affluence in Iraq will weaken from within the stagnant autocracies of surrounding Arab states like Syria and Saudi Arabia, the U.S will encourage them with positive and negative incentives to manage a transition to open societies for the benefit of the Arab people in general and for ours. And for Israel's too because citizens of open societies will no longer have grounds to rage at their fate—rage which today's Arab governments deflect to Israel first and then to the United States.³

After September 11's demonstration of American vulnerability to asymmetrical warfare, this vision, to the extent it is credible, could draw support from traditional conservatives

concerned primarily with maximizing the security and the wealth of the nation, as well as those who *a priori* equate U.S. and Israeli security interests. Should it not appeal as well to human rights activists and to the wider universe of liberals and social democrats? Can one believe in the universality of human rights and not embrace a strategy that purports to merge realism and idealism in the cause of freedom? Apparently so, since most of the established organs and prominent advocates of liberalism and social democracy and most of the leading figures and institutions in the international human rights world have reacted along a spectrum ranging from intense skepticism through selective criticism to comprehensive hostility toward the Bush administration's grand strategy.⁴

Grounds for Doubt: A Human Rights Perspective

What's not to like here? Is the skepticism a merely visceral response to the conservative messenger? Or are there reasoned grounds, rooted in liberal values and the deep essence of human rights, for not embracing this program? Actually, taking the messengers' identity into account is entirely reasonable, part of the seasoned wisdom of everyday life. For in our quotidian existence, we do not entrust things we value except to persons who over the years have created grounds for trust. And there are essentially two reasons why we trust people. One is that they have a record of fulfilling their commitments and the other is that we have common values, a conviction also rooted in experience, which is particularly important where the mission we are called upon to entrust to the messenger has as its very purpose the advancement of our values, in short the case before us.

If our end is the broader realization of human rights, there are substantial reasons to distrust the right-wing executors of contemporary American foreign policy. As noted above,

when George W. Bush sought the presidency, he disowned use of the coercive power of the U.S. where the only potential gain in a given case would be protection of human rights. This was also the position of his national security advisor.⁵ But the case for skepticism does not rely simply on the place of human rights in the President's initially declared hierarchy of concerns. In addition, his Secretary of Defense had served as a special envoy to Saddam Hussein during the Reagan administration, when it was assisting the dictator whose aggression against Iran had backfired to the point where, without extensive external support, he faced utter defeat.⁶ It was during this period that Saddam employed lethal chemical weapons against both the Iranians and the Kurdish population of Iraq without in any way compromising American support for his regime.

Donald Rumsfeld is simply a "for instance." Many senior members of the current administration served in the earlier Bush administration when it stood idly by as Yugoslavia disintegrated and Serbia initiated mayhem in Croatia and Bosnia. To be fair, they do not have more to answer for morally than the Clinton administration that also wrung its palsied hands as Slobodan Milosevic and his colleagues murdered their way around the Balkans and actually discouraged action during Rwanda's slow-motion genocide.⁷ But Clinton never promised us a no-holds-barred crusade for liberal democracy and did not ask the American people to entrust him with wartime power to spread the American Way.⁸

One could, moreover, argue that, if we are going to ground skepticism on past words and performance, we need to disaggregate realist conservatives like Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice from neo-conservative officials like Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz or the National Security Council's Elliott Abrams, or pundits like Charles Krauthammer.⁹ Even if it is hard to credit the traditionalists with a Pauline epiphany in September 2001, have the neo-cons not been at least rhetorically consistent? Indeed, is not a declared commitment to Wilsonianism with fixed

bayonets a defining feature of neo-conservatism?¹⁰ Thus, the problem seems less that of the messenger's sincerity than it is of the humanitarian implications of the message itself.

A crusade for democracy, even full-blown liberal democracy, overlaps but is not synonymous with a crusade for human rights. Moral criteria for evaluating the exercise of power stretch into the remote past.¹¹ At least the first generation of civil and political rights, rights that have evoked the widest consensus about their imperative quality, is focused on the individual, not the wider community. More than that, they are claims that the community cannot trump or subordinate to some presumed general good which, while causing injury to a few, enhances the welfare of the many.

It is conceivable that a good faith effort to implant liberal democracy throughout the Middle East and in other areas where it is largely absent, an effort carried out in part by war, armed subversion, assassination, and other instruments of coercive statecraft, might in the long course of history enhance human well being beyond anything that could be achieved through such non-violent means as education, economic incentives, financial and technical assistance to democratic movements, and improving the welfare consequences of democracy so as to increase its attractions. But even if, by means of divine revelation, we could be certain that human welfare would in the long term be better served by a violent statecraft, if one were committed to the view that human rights are trumps, then one might still oppose a crusade for democracy. Why? Because the taking of innocent lives is an inevitable consequence of a violent crusade for whatever end. One particularly awful instance occurred during the invasion of Iraq, when a missile flying off course struck an apartment complex wiping out a child's immediate family, ripping off his arms, and cringing his body.¹² Since civilians were not targeted—on the contrary it appears that the U.S. military made an unusual effort to minimize civilian casualties¹³—this lad's horror is entirely consistent with the humanitarian laws of war.¹⁴ At the same time, however, it is in a state of considerable tension with

the deep values that anchor the idea of human rights

Pain and death inflicted predictably albeit unintentionally on the innocent rubs across the grain of human rights in any war of choice rather than self defense. And that would be the case whether the choice is made for the purpose of preserving American freedom of action or extending the incidence of democracy. Consistent with their stated faith, neo-cons are prepared to make war not simply for the immediate purpose of installing elected governments, but also for the more general one of maintaining American hegemony indefinitely as is now enshrined in the National Security Strategy of September 2002.¹⁵ They would do so, not for or at least not only for narrow chauvinistic purposes, to be sure, but because, as the neo-conservatives see it, a hegemonic America will assure or is at least the best means of assuring the long-term triumph of liberal democracy and hence the greater good of humanity.¹⁶ Of course for traditional conservatives, hegemony needs no justification beyond the influence and wealth and presumably security it brings one's own nation in a world of nations; for them the tribal good does not have to be wrapped in the politically correct colors of the general good.

Is there any tension between the traditional realist and the neo-conservative world views? And if there is, should those who define the good in terms of the more effective defense and promotion of human rights prefer the triumph of the traditionalists or of the crusaders? Prominent traditionalists like Henry Kissinger¹⁷ and Brent Scowcroft¹⁸ either supported without enthusiasm or opposed the Iraq war. So did their ideological brethren in academia.¹⁹

In a state that for good reason feels the tide of history running against it, a state that feels geo-politically insecure, as Germany did when it ignited the First and Second World Wars,²⁰ realists may be risk takers. And few risks are consistently greater than the risk of war. But in a country like the United States—wealthy, cohesive, and without any rival in sight—realism will generally operate as a restraint on military adventures.

The one thing certain about armed intervention is the death and mutilation of the innocent—like the inhabitants of the asylum for the mentally ill in Grenada inadvertently pulverized by invading U.S. forces²¹ or the several hundred or more humble people of Panama killed by chance when President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. forces to serve an arrest warrant on General Manuel Noriega and to restore “democracy” there.²² Because the core human rights are imperative claims by individuals not open to trumping by some supposed long-term general good, a crusade to defend them has built-in restraints that a crusade for the general expansion of democracy does not. For in the former case, we are constrained at least to balance the lives hopefully saved against those we will take in order to save them. But if democracy alone is the end, then as long as we are confident that some will survive to hold free and fair elections, what matters the cost in human life other of course than the lives of our own troops? This may seem like an unfair *reductio ad absurdum*, carrying the logic of the neo-conservatives’ position beyond the point most of them would probably follow it. Yet, in fact, it is grounded in experience.

In the deadly Central American conflicts of the 1980s, neo-cons personified by Elliott Abrams passionately defended, indeed helped to organized and sustain, the U.S.-organized insurgency against Nicaragua’s Sandinista government.²³ While this use of American power had a thin Cold War rationale, publicly its most ardent defenders invoked the virtue of struggling for democracy.²⁴ A settlement based in large measure on an internationally-supervised election ultimately occurred, but only after the death of forty thousand people in a population of less than three million and this on top of the roughly forty thousand killed in the revolt against the Somoza family regime that had survived for 47 years, thanks in part to U.S. patronage.²⁵

Peace came to Central America when President George H.W Bush and his top foreign

policy associates, all traditional conservatives, decided that after the Cold War a conflict in Central America was a distraction.²⁶ Elections under international supervision in both Nicaragua and El Salvador were a means to the end of liquidating this distraction, not an end in itself. And there seems little doubt that even if the Sandinistas had won their election, as many including them expected, Bush senior would have regarded the matter as settled. Neo-cons, on the other hand, believing that the Sandinistas, as a leftist regime, were by their nature undemocratic, might well have continued the conflict if they had then controlled American foreign policy.

Conclusion

Looking forward, the greatest humanitarian risk from the neo-cons' tendency to discount the particulars of collateral damage in favor of the general goal of promoting democracy may lie in Asia rather than the Middle East. There China, with its authoritarian government and 1.25 billion people, is a natural target for their zeal. Anyone who cares at all for human rights hopes to see China evolve into a state where rotation in office achieved through fair elections at all levels of government helps to discipline elites and to widen the scope of personal freedom. Meanwhile, the progressive dismantling of the Maoist economy since 1979 and the corresponding growth of a market economy open to foreign investment and, concurrently, to transnational cultural forces, have already effected both a measure of personal liberation inconceivable during the long decades of Mao Tse Tung's dictatorship and a remarkable reduction in poverty.²⁷

Imagining a greater calamity for human rights and welfare than a renewed Cold War between the United States and China is difficult. Among its predictable byproducts would be reduced freedom for the Chinese people to express opinions, to move within the country, to travel abroad, to complain about and publicize corruption, to have access to foreign ideas and to

shape their careers. Moreover, by deflecting additional resources into an arms buildup and reducing foreign involvement in China's economy, a cold war would reverse the trend toward the reduction of poverty in that huge country.

Does it then follow that human rights advocates should look to the conservative realists as allies albeit of convenience? Probably not. In the first place, realists come in two forms, the prudent and the adventurous or, in academic discourse, the defensive and the offensive, the latter believing that states generally do and in all cases should seek to maximize their power, that the idea of a mere "sufficiency" of power is absurd.²⁸ The first type of realist, epitomized today by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and the former National Security Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, are sensitive to the risks of trying to reshape the international system's norms and actors. They are seemingly alive to the danger, among others, of provoking a hostile coalition of states who, were it not for their shared opposition to domination by an ambitious hegemon apparently unrestrained by long-accepted rules of the game, would have relatively little in common. And in a world of potentially catastrophic terrorism, they are cautious about swelling the pool of recruits for the terrorist project and making the United States its favored target.

That, at least, is how I construe the former's grudging support for the war in Iraq and the latter's open opposition. But what centrally characterizes them is their intellectual eclecticism. Their realism is not rigorous. Both are supporters of constructive engagement with China through trade and other exchanges. Yet trade and foreign investment help drive, arguably are the critical ingredients of China's rapid economic growth which in turn helps sustain political stability. If rapid growth continues for another twenty years, China will be the only state capable of challenging American hegemony in Asia. For that very reason the leading offensive realist in

the academic world, John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, urges adoption of economic measures that would slow China's growth, although even he stops short of celebrating preemptive war.²⁹ Kissinger's advocacy of engagement, both bi-lateral and multilateral, implies belief that a more developed China and the United States are not inevitable enemies, that they share or through their interactions could come to share the view that they have far greater common interests than differences in an international system much like the present one which works well for the United States. In short, Kissinger's China policy is more easily reconciled with non-realist theories that attribute causal value to institutional arrangements and subscribe to the idea that national interests are not given but rather constructed through the interaction of state elites.

But there is another species of realist, personified by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice-President Richard Cheney, who apparently join the neo-conservatives in discounting the danger of flouting long-established practices and norms and magnifying the decisive effect of military power. Today, when their focus is on terrorism, they are seemingly happy to accept China as a cooperative state. But given the centrality of military power in their world view, if and when the present sense of immediate danger passes, they could be as susceptible as the neo-conservatives to a policy of confrontation with China.

If constraining American power were the optimal strategy for promoting humanitarian ends, human rights advocates might reasonably seek an alliance with resurgent realists in the Kissinger-Powell mode. But surely it is not. For realists of all stripes would have tolerated butchery in Bosnia, genocide in Rwanda and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The Congo's agony and the bloody convulsions of Liberia have little purchase on their moral imagination because they have no place in their grand strategy, any more than does a renewed Afghanistan as opposed

to one where sufficiently accommodating commercially-minded war lords regulate the rubble. The neo-cons are certainly right about one thing: American leadership is indispensable for any project to mitigate the present and looming humanitarian horrors of the Twenty-First Century.

In that they are in accord on that point, would it not be useful as well as pretty for liberal humanitarians to reconcile with neo-con militants? Alas, the past generally being prologue, the prospect for accord must be judged dim. For what does the past tell us about the nature of these militants? It was said of Charles de Gaulle that he loved the idea of France but not the French. So in their behavior during the 1980s and in their contemporary stances, neo-conservatives betray love of the idea of liberty but something all too much like indifference to the fate of the liberated.

By our lesser sins are we often revealed. Neo-cons invoked Saddam Hussein's savagery as one justification for invading Iraq. In doing so, they struck a sympathetic chord in liberal hawks, people like the author who have favored intervention in cases of gross inhumanity where the predictable collateral damage seemed small in comparison to the human costs of inaction. But what credibility can claims of humanity summon when those who make them fail to protect the purported beneficiaries of their concern? To invade Iraq without preparing to deploy immediately and instruct properly the forces necessary to establish order, to protect the inhabitants' rich cultural legacy and to safeguard the material infrastructure of government and the health system is hardly to evince concern for real people as distinguished from abstract ideas. Nor is a determination not to tally at least the civilian Iraqi dead and maimed, the collateral damage, as it were, of liberation. But it is quite consistent with a cynical power-sharing compromise between neo-cons and offensive realists. And it is consistent as well with a sentiment that Administration realists and neo-cons appear to possess jointly, which is contempt for what liberal humanitarians deem essential: Due regard for the opinion of our old democratic

allies and of other peoples with whom we share this Earth.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Winter 1990/1991): 23-33; Mark Helprin, “What Israel Must Do to Survive,” *Commentary* 112 (November 2001), pp. 25-28; Daniel Pipes, “Who is the Enemy?” *Commentary* 113 (January 2002), pp. 21-27; Norman Podhoretz, “How to Win World War IV,” *Commentary* 113 (February 2002), pp. 19-29. For a critical eye, see for example Nicholas Lemann, “The Next World Order,” *The New Yorker*, April 1, 2002, pp. 42-48.

² Alan Murray, “Bush Officials Scramble to Push Democracy in Iraq,” *Wall Street Journal* (April 8, 2003), p. A4; Lawrence Kaplan, “Regime Change,” *The New Republic* 228 (March 3, 2003), pp. 21-23.

³ See generally, Thomas Carothers, “Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror,” *Foreign Affairs* 82 (January/February 2003): 84-97.

⁴ The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in particular published “A Year of Loss: Examining Civil Liberties Since September 11” (September 2002), and its update, “Imbalance of Powers: How Changes to U.S. Law and Policy Since 9/11 Erode Civil Liberties (April 2003). These reports are available online at http://www.lchr.org/us_law/loss/loss_main.htm.

⁵ See, for example, Condoleezza Rice, “Promoting the National Interest” *Foreign Affairs* 79 (January/February 2000), pp. 45-62.

⁶ Christopher Dickey and Evan Thomas, with Mark Hosenball, Roy Gutman and John Barry, “How Saddam Happened” *Newsweek* (September 3, 2002), pp. 34-40.

⁷ See Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell, America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), chapters 9 and 10.

⁸ This was due mostly to Clinton’s emphasis on domestic—especially economic—policy. See David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals* (New York: Scribner, 2001), pp. 158, 167-168.

⁹ See, e.g. Ramesh Ponnuru, “Getting to the bottom of this ‘neo’ nonsense,” *National Review* (June 16, 2003), pp. 29-32; and “The Shadow Men,” *The Economist* (April 26, 2003), pp. 21-23.

¹⁰ Or even, “Wilsonianism in boots.” See Stanley Hoffman, “The High and the Mighty: Bush’s national security strategy and the new American hubris,” *The American Prospect* 13 (January 13, 2003), online at <http://www.prospect.org/print/V13/24/hoffmann-s.html>.

¹¹ See Micheline Ishay, *Human Rights Reader: Major Speeches, Essays and Documents from the Bible to the Present* (London: Routledge, 1997).

¹² Samia Nakhoul, “Boy Bomb Victim Struggles Against Despair” *Daily Mirror*, April 8, 2003.

¹³ See George F. Will, “Measured Audacity,” *Newsweek* 141 (April 14, 2003) p. 66.

¹⁴ The primary treaties of humanitarian law governing international armed conflict are the 1907 Hague Convention, the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions. Taken in concert, the provisions of these treaties require that military attacks must be directed at military targets and that the rules of necessity and proportionality be followed, but it does not mean that there cannot be civilian casualties. See Michael

Bothe, et. al., *New Rules for Armed Conflicts* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Law International, 1982), pp. 304-305.

¹⁵ The National Security Strategy is available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>.

¹⁶ See, for example, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (July/August 1996), pp. 18-32.

¹⁷ Henry Kissinger, "Phase II and Iraq," *Washington Post* (January 13, 2002), p. B7.

¹⁸ Brent Scowcroft, "Don't Attack Saddam", *Wall Street Journal* (August 15, 2002), p. A12.

¹⁹ See, for example, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "An Unnecessary War," *Foreign Policy* (January/February 2003), pp. 51-60.

²⁰ See generally Gordon A. Craig, *The Germans* (New York: Meridian Books, 1991); William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960).

²¹ Stuart Taylor Jr., "In Wake of Invasion, Much Official Misinformation by U.S. Comes to Light," *New York Times* (November 6, 1983), p. A20.

²² The invasion of Panama resulted in the deaths of 300 Panamanians. Adam Isaac Hasson, "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on Trial: Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic--Trends in Political Accountability and Transnational Criminal Law," 25 *B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.* 125 (Winter 2002), pp. 125-158.

²³ See Mark Danner, *The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

²⁴ David K. Shipler, "Senators Challenge Officials on Contras," *New York Times* (February 6, 1987), p. A3.

²⁵ See Marlene Dixon, *On Trial: Reagan's War Against Nicaragua* (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1985).

²⁶ See, for example, Howard J. Wiarda, "Europe's Ambiguous Relations with Latin America: Blowing Hot and Cold in the Western Hemisphere," *Washington Quarterly* 13 (Spring 1990), pp. 153-167.

²⁷ Albert Park, "Growth and Poverty Reduction in China," World Bank Presentation at the University of Michigan, June 17, 2002. Available online at http://poverty.worldbank.org/files/12398_APark-Presentation.pdf.

²⁸ See generally John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) and Glen H. Snyder's review of the book in *International Security* 27, no. 1 (summer 2002), pp. 149-73.

²⁹ John Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 5 (September/October 2001), pp. 46-61.