Assessing the threat
Current responses, U.S. and world
North Korea’s leadership
Human rights
Solutions, including unification

INCLUDING THOUGHT LEADERSHIP FROM

Representative Ed Royce
Ambassador Samantha Power
Ambassador Christopher Hill
Jenny Town
Bruce Klingner
North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: Assessment, Global Responses And Solutions

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Only united allies can compel North Korea to keep its promises

By Ambassador Christopher Hill

The North Korean nuclear issue continues to be probably the major security challenge of the Asia Pacific region. After all, it was some 10 years ago that the North Koreans agreed they would abandon all their nuclear programs. And since that time there were efforts to get them to implement that agreement, but today they have essentially said they are no longer interested in denuclearization.

We have, therefore, a special challenge of what to do with a country that has gone back on its word regarding nuclear weapons, and that has a new leadership that can be described as not very trustworthy and a leadership that really is not very steady.

The North Korean issue is not just a problem for the Republic of Korea to deal with, or the U.S. or China. What North Korea is trying to do with a combination of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles goes beyond the region, and threatens the peace and order of the world.

Even alongside the greatest issues facing the United States, including concerns about the Middle East, ISIS and the Iranian nuclear problem, it is clear the problem of North Korea is a first-echelon issue in which the United States must be engaged.

There is discussion, of course, of whether the Six Party process, which involves the Republic of Korea, United States, Russian Federation, Japan, China and North Korea, should be widened to a global participation of, say, six countries, or eight or 88.

The problem is not the number of countries involved. Six parties is a good platform. The real question is how these countries, and the international community as a whole, can work together to convince North Korea that it is not acceptable to pursue these kinds of dangerous weapons.

I think it is very important that the six parties — especially the five parties that consider this to be a problem — work on the issues in ways that reinforce each other's efforts. It is very important that we not, for example, just say that China is the problem. It's very clear that China has to do things, but so do we all have to do things.

We need to resurrect the concept of a unified front — that we all are going to work on this problem together.

The fact that North Korea tested a nuclear device a few weeks ago, and then tested an intercontinental missile right after that, speaks to the fact that North Korea is not interested in what the rest of us are concerned about.

As a result the situation has shifted to a moment where we have to do a better job of getting North Korea's attention. The Republic of Korea took a very important step after the ICBM test with the decision to discontinue the Kaesong Industrial Complex. To keep Kaesong going or not has always been in the hands of the people of the Republic of Korea, led by their government, and I think it's important for the rest of us to be supportive of whatever the Korean people decide.

The reason we need to be supportive is that we need to be respectful of the fact that this is a peninsula on which live Koreans — not Americans, not Russians, not Chinese. This is their homeland and we need to be respectful of the actions, the political deliberations, that the Korean people need to take in order to deal with this threat.

The Republic of Korea has taken a very important step with the closing of Kaesong, and what they are essentially saying to the rest of the world is, we understand that decisions we need to make are ones that can affect our interests, our own economic interests, but we are going to take those decisions because it's the right thing to do. And so it's my hope that the rest of us can look to see what is the right thing for us to do.

Sanctions are never an easy process. The United Nations knows that, and there continue to be disagreements on that topic. I hope we can all come together and understand that, even though sanctions may not be everyone's favorite option, they are probably at this point one of the only options that can be employed to deal with this.

And finally, the third element, which I think is also a very difficult decision to make, and that is of course the strengthening of the anti-ballistic missile defense. This is a direct effort by the United States, working with the Republic of Korea, to do the best the United States can do to help protect the Republic of Korea. If the Republic of Korea wants our very best anti-missile systems, they deserve our very best anti-missile systems because we are allies, and this alliance is strongly embedded in our law, just as it is embedded in our thinking about how to deal with this problem.

Everyone hopes that all these measures will begin to get the North Koreans' attention, but there is one other thing that we also need to do, and that is to keep the door open to negotiations. We don't want to give the impression to North Korea that we are desperate to negotiate because, after all, North Korea seems to be forgetting what they already agreed to. It is very difficult to negotiate with someone who cannot remember what he did the day before. Try it sometime.

However, we need to keep the door open in the event that North Korea says, yes, we would like to go back to the table on the basis of things that we have already agreed to, and see if we can continue to make progress.

We have come to a very important stage, a time of history where it is very important for us all to be together in this, to support one another, and to make sure that everyone understands that nuclear weapons are a threat to all of us. If we can come together at this historic moment, perhaps we can arrive at a situation where Northeast Asia, this critical and beautiful corner of our planet, can be an area that exports all the good things we want to see exported, and will not export the instability that is produced by North Korea.

 Ambassador Christopher Hill is dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at Denver University. He was U.S. Ambassador to Korea (2004-2005) and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2009-10). These remarks are excerpts from his speech to the International Leadership Conference, held in Seoul, Feb. 12-16, which was sponsored by the Universal Peace Federation, The Washington Times and Segye Ilbo newspaper.
Writing a great tomorrow with you

As a global leader
SK writes a great tomorrow
to make into a new reality for you

SK innovates ceaselessly, challenging all limits
in the energy-chemical, telecommunications, semiconductor,
and bio industries
to take our global partners and you into a great tomorrow

Developing innovative new technologies
to build Korea into an IT Powerhouse

Making a long patient effort for new drug
development to achieve healthy future

Achieving energy-rich nation status
through worldwide oil field exploration and development

Number 2 in world semiconductor
memory market share
North Korea recently conducted a test of its new KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile, further enhancing its nuclear delivery options amid heightening tensions on the Korean Peninsula and with the larger international community. The SLBM test was quickly followed by the firing of five short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan.

These were the first major tests of advanced weaponry since the recent round of tougher sanctions imposed on Pyongyang by the United Nations, the U.S. and Japan.

Escalating threats from North Korea's communist regime are indicators of a future military attack or another nuclear test in the coming days, according to a recent U.S. intelligence assessment.

Intelligence agencies issued the assessment in mid-March warning that threatening rhetoric from Pyongyang in response to large-scale U.S.-South Korean military exercises and new sanctions had reached the highest level in years.

The unclassified assessment circulated within government states that the intense language suggests North Korea is preparing for a surprise military strike or a demonstration of strategic capability, such as a SLBM firing or another underground nuclear blast, according to U.S. officials familiar with the report.

On March 15 North Korean state news media warned its missiles could destroy New York City in a thermonuclear attack.

“Our hydrogen bomb is much bigger than the one developed by the Soviet Union,” the outlet DPRK Today stated.

“If this H-bomb were to be mounted on an intercontinental ballistic missile and fall on Manhattan in New York City, all the people there would be killed immediately and the city would burn down to ashes,” the report said.

Such threatening rhetoric from Pyongyang is typical of the communist regime’s propaganda. However, in the past several weeks the tone and level of threats have been unusually harsh, according to the officials, and that is increasing fears among intelligence analysts that the stepped-up threats are a prelude to military action or nuclear and long-range missile tests.

The SLBM test appears to violate a recent U.N. Security Council Resolution, No. 2277, which on March 5 tightened economic sanctions on North Korea in an effort to block development of nuclear arms and nuclear missiles.

The new resolution states that a 2015 SLBM missile ejection test violated earlier U.N. resolutions aimed at curbing both nuclear and missile programs sponsored by the Pyongyang regime.

“All such ballistic missile activities contribute to [North Korea's] development of nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension in the region and beyond,” the resolution says.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye also warned March 21 that Pyongyang could carry out additional military provocations and urged the country to remain vigilant. “Now is a very crucial time for the future of the Korean Peninsula,” she said during a meeting with aides at the presidential office in Seoul.

North Korea's dictator Kim Jong-un vowed in recent days that his country would soon conduct a nuclear warhead test blast and fire several kinds of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

U.S. military and civilian intelligence agencies have stepped up monitoring of North Korea in anticipation of further provocations.

Disclosure of the SLBM test came as North Korea on March 21 fired five short-range ballistic missiles and has threatened to conduct further nuclear and long-range missile tests in defiance of international pressure. Two days after the SLBM test, North Korea fired two medium-range Nodong ballistic missiles. The road-mobile Nodongs were fired from the country's east coast, and one traveled about 500 miles before falling into the sea. The second missile blew up in flight.

Bill Gertz is the national security columnist for The Washington Times and senior editor of The Washington Free Beacon.
By Peter Vincent Pry

Aft er a month of U.S. pleading, China and Russia reluctantly agreed to more United Nations sanctions, punishing North Korea for illegal nuclear and missile tests on Jan. 6 and Feb. 7 — performed despite already being under U.N. sanctions for a decade, since 2006.

It’s time for a paradigm shift in thinking about the threat from nuclear missile proliferation. Sanctions will not work because Russia and China are helping North Korea’s nuclear missile program, accelerating capabilities to threaten the United States, a process that might be termed “hyperproliferation”:

- Supposedly, North Korea has evolved crude Scud missiles into much more sophisticated medium-range Nodong missiles, intercontinental missiles and the Unha-3 space rocket that orbits satellites. This mainstream view sounds increasingly preposterous.
- Reportedly, according to U.S. Strategic Command, North Korea’s Unha-3, which orbited their first satellite in 2012, is much more sophisticated than expected: “First-stage debris fish ed out of the Yellow Sea after the December 2012 launch came as a surprise as it showed that the Unha vehicle was more advanced than previously believed, employing modern aluminum alloys and showing much thinner tank walls than expected. Also, the first stage was outfitted with four vernier engines with a ... gimbal, contrary to previous reports that showed the first stage to be stabilized through the use of simpler jet vanes.”

North Korea tries concealing the design of its missiles by launching out of schedule and, during the February 2016 launch of Unha-3, rigging the spent first stage to self-destruct, according to U.S. Strategic Command. This highly sophisticated denial operation should be prohibitively risky for the supposedly primitive North Koreans.

Russia sold to North Korea, supposedly for scrap, a dozen Golf-class missile submarines and a nuclear capable SS-N-6 missile. Unthinkable a few years ago, North Korea is now developing a fleet of nuclear missile submarines.

Russian generals told the Congressional EMP Commission in 2004 that the design for Russia’s Super-EMP weapon “accidentally” leaked to North Korea, that there had been “brain drain” of Russian scientists to North Korea, and that the North could probably test a super-EMP warhead “in a few years,” a prediction that apparently came true in 2006. A single super-EMP warhead could blackout North America for months or years, and kill millions.

North Korea’s two satellites orbit on a trajectory identical to that planned for Soviet-era secret weapon called the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System. North Korea’s KSM-3 and KSM-4 satellites, like the Russian FOBS, orbit on the optimum trajectory to make a surprise attack, and at the optimum altitude to generate an EMP field over the 48 contiguous United States.

North Korea’s transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) for mobile Nodong medium-range missiles is the TEL from Russia’s SS-20 missile, banned by the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

According to “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea” (2015) a recent Defense Department report, North Korea’s TEL for its KN-08 mobile intercontinental ballistic missile is from China. The only nations in the world with mobile ICBMs are Russia, China and North Korea — not even the United States has mobile ICBMs.

Mainstream thinking is that North Korea, and other nuclear-missile-aspirant nations, rely on home-grown capabilities to develop missiles and nuclear weapons. Consequently, the mainstream consistently low-balls nuclear missile threats.

For example, most analysts estimate North Korea has 10 to 20 crude A-bombs, based on the Yongbyon nuclear reactor’s plutonium production, and assuming that backward North Korea must have conservative bomb designs, using 5 to 8 kilograms of plutonium in each weapon. This ignores that North Korea is known to have a clandestine nuclear weapons program, probably mostly underground, using uranium centrifuges and perhaps other technologies unknown to us.

The mainstream view also ignores that North Korea is obviously getting help from Russia and China. If North Korea has more sophisticated bomb designs, using smaller amounts of plutonium for example, some analysts estimate North Korea could have over 100 nuclear weapons. This estimate is consistent with North Korea’s nuclear test program, which has conducted four overt nuclear tests with reportedly a fifth test planned.

It is really plausible — if North Korea has only 10 to 20 A-bombs — that they would expend on testing up to half their scarce weapons?

The mainstream underestimated the nuclear sophistication of North Korea as recently as Jan. 6 when, with few exceptions, experts claimed North Korea could not have tested an H-bomb. Only a few reported on Jan. 28 that the Department of Defense changed its mind — that new evidence indicated, as headlined by CNN “North Korea Might Have Tested Components Of A Hydrogen Bomb.”

The mainstream doesn’t like to talk about the fact that no plutonium or uranium (A-bomb fuels) have been detected from North Korean tests, but traces of tritium (H-bomb fuel) have been found.

Some of the implications of hyperproliferation are that Russia and China are part of the problem, not part of the solution: the hyperproliferation by these actors is a weapon in the New Cold War; and that we should reassess the nuclear missile threat from other nations of concern — including Pakistan and Iran.

STRONG

From page C6

organizations that focus on preventing nuclear terrorism throughout the globe are gathering March 31 and April 1 for the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit at the Walter E. Washington Convention Center in the District of Columbia.

North Korea is likely to be mentioned frequently in absentia, especially as conference take up discussions on the “evolving threat.”

This year’s Nuclear Security Summit will be missing Russia’s voice, however. Even though Russia owns nearly half of the world’s known and presumed 16,300 nuclear weapons, its leadership indicated soon after the 2014 summit that it would not participate in this year’s event. Russia has since voiced skepticism about the effectiveness of the Nuclear Security Summit as a governing body and raised concerns about its interference in the work of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Mr. Obama has said he wants to “finish strong in 2016,” and the legacy of the summits will be addressed as the process is coming to an end, barring an extension.

Its achievements include reducing the amount of unsecured nuclear material — a goal that will need to be continued under the auspices of the IAEA, which has been a key player in all the summits.

Also, at The Hague in 2014, 35 countries signed a joint statement, “Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation,” also called the “Triennial Initiative,” which is the primary agreement for implementing security of nuclear and radiological materials. Notably, the nuclear-owning nations Russia, China, India and Pakistan have not signed that accord, but it is hoped that the IAEA will bring them on board.

Separately, the Nuclear Industry Summit and a nongovernmental organization event called Solutions for a Secure Nuclear Future are also held this week in Washington.

Larry Moffitt is vice president of The Washington Times Foundation. He is former vice president for editorial at Tempos del Mundo newspapers in Latin America.

‘Hyperproliferation’ in North Korea
More U.S. defensive measures a wise response to DPRK’s threats

By Rebeccah L. Heinrichs

Does the brutal, provocative and nuclear-armed North Korean regime actually pose a threat to the United States? In recent weeks, Pyongyang has increased the seriousness of its threats to include preemptively attacking with nuclear weapons both the United States and South Korea during the allies’ annual joint military exercises.

This comes on the heels of North Korea’s fourth underground nuclear explosion and yet another long-range missile test in the form of a satellite launch. Perhaps its most concerning missile is the mobile KN-08, which Admiral William Gortney, the commander of Northern Command, recently testified before Congress could deliver a nuclear weapon to much of the continental United States.

Although the regime leader is in the habit of making empty threats, the United States cannot afford to bank on the hope Kim Jong-un is crying wolf.

Analysts who view international relations with a rosier, more idealist outlook remain skeptical. They try to tamp down such ominous threat analyses like that of Admiral Gortney’s, and are quick to point out that the regime has yet to actually prove it has mastered the ability to deliver a long-range missile.

It is true North Korea has yet to demonstrate a technically challenging part of itsğını: delivering a warhead into the entry vehicle reenters the atmosphere as it descends upon the desired target — or that it can accomplish this feat with a weighty nuclear payload atop. But it has demonstrated enough technical prowess to give the Pentagon confidence that it likely could do it, however imprecise its targeting may be.

Of course, precision is less demanding when the intended target is a landmass the size of the United States. Even with poor accuracy, a long-range missile, especially one armed with a nuclear weapon, enables the North Koreans to credibly threaten and blackmail the United States.

But the skeptics insist, even if North Korea were to achieve the ability to attack the United States with a nuclear weapon, it simply would not, because doing so would be irrational and counter to its national goals, chief among them “regime survival.”

However, the reality of a regime like North Korea — one of the most repressive countries in the world, in which its people face murder, torture, enslavement, rape, labor camps, and forced abortions at the hands of their own government — must cause analysts to admit their own limitations in predicting with certainty what the regime leader is or is not willing to do.

Therefore, the United States must urgently deploy increased defensive measures.

• It must fully resource and bolster defense of the U.S. homeland from ballistic missiles. The Obama administration has requested $400 million more than the current year’s enacted amount for the homeland defense component of the ballistic missile defense system (BMDS), the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system. Congress should re-store funding to last year’s level, and fully support additional sensors to improve discrimination capabilities. It must continually upgrade this system, as well as invest in promising technologies that would give the United States the ability to intercept missiles while they are still in their boost phase, before they can release decoys and counter-measures meant to evade U.S. defenses.

• Second, the United States must show a commitment to the protection of South Korea. It should, in cooperation with South Korea, move forward with the deployment to Seoul of the defensive Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. China is protesting the deployment, saying it would degrade China’s highly formidable offensive missile force. Although THAAD could not diminish China’s offensive force, the United States should refuse to give credence to the immoral and debunked theory that stability is maintained and that Americans are safer if the United States intentionally remains vulnerable to Chinese missiles; therefore, the United States should ignore China’s protestsation, except perhaps to remind China that it is its failure to pressure North Korea that has abetted the missile program. — The next U.S. president must take a new tack towards North Korea altogether. Among other things, the United States must persuade China and Russia to implement current sanctions, and cannot ignore the evidence that Chinese “entities” have assisted Pyongyang’s missile program. Related, the United States must initiate new efforts with allies to disrupt North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation and cooperation with other nations. Until the regime is made to understand that threatening the United States and U.S. allies with nuclear missiles is not worth the cost, we should expect the regime’s verbal threats and its technological advances to make good on those threats to continue apace.

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The hidden North Korea-Iran strategic relationship

By Larry Niksch

Amid the official attention and publicity given to the Iran Nuclear Agreement and North Korea’s new nuclear and missile tests, an important element of these stories has been largely missing: North Korea’s strategic collaboration with Iran.

The silence on this issue is not new. Since 2007, the Bush and Obama administrations have revealed little about the North Korea-Iran relationship: infrequent disclosures about collaboration in missile development; no disclosures of North Korea’s aid to Iran’s clients, Hezbollah and Hamas, an exception being an acknowledgment by then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates in August 2010; and Obama administration denials that North Korea and Iran have engaged in nuclear weapons cooperation.

The obscurity of this issue in Washington contrasts with coverage given to it overseas. Reputable newspapers in Great Britain, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Israel and Australia have issued numerous reports since the late 1990s on North Korea-Iran collaboration in developing missiles and nuclear warheads. They cite non-U.S. intelligence sources and reports; defense and diplomatic officials from these countries; high-level North Korean and Iranian defectors and exile groups; and sources within the Iranian regime.

U.S. reporting has been far less, although there have been key reports in several leading U.S. newspapers, and some members of Congress have voiced their concerns.

All the while, collaboration between Pyongyang and Tehran has expanded. In September 2012, North Korea and Iran signed an agreement for technology and scientific cooperation. The Ayatollah Khamenei attended the signing ceremony and declared that Iran and North Korea have “common enemies” and had established an “anti-hegemonic front.” The Washington correspondent of Japan’s Kyodo News Service reported in July 2012 that North Korea and Iran signed a secret agreement in April 2012 to deepen collaboration on “strategic projects.”

Reports soon emerged, based in part on South Korean government sources, that Iran sent missile experts to North Korea to be stationed there indefinitely.

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North Korea’s ‘lens’ sees 150 years of conflict

This summer North Korea will mark the 150th anniversary of a seminal event in the introverted nation’s history, namely, the beginning of today’s ongoing struggle against U.S. aggression.

This might seem odd, given that North Korea is not even 70 years old. But from Pyongyang’s perspective, today’s standoff over nuclear weapons development and missile technology actually began in August 1866.

In that year, a private U.S. merchant vessel, the General Sherman, sailed up the Taedong River to encourage (some might say force) the Koreans to open up to trade with the West. Living up to their epithet “Hermit Kingdom,” the Koreans strongly encouraged the ship to turn around. When it did not, the Koreans burned it and killed its crew on the banks of the river near Pyongyang.

North Korean historians have since claimed that the grandfather of North Korea’s founder, Kim Il-sung, played a role in the incident, making him the first in a dynasty of opponents of U.S. imperialism.

In North Korea this story is remembered annually. In the United States it is rarely noted. Even the U.S. Marines’ invasion of Korea a few years later, in 1871, near Incheon in modern-day South Korea, is hardly noted, if at all, despite the 15 Congressional Medals of Honor earned by U.S. forces. Yet in South Korea (an American ally), there are memorials and rebuilt forts to highlight Korea’s ability to resist foreign intervention. There is a long and complicated history between the United States and Korea, something that shapes Pyongyang’s views of Washington.

The effect of differing historic lenses is often overlooked, but can be profound. Historical lenses also impact policy. The U.S. sees its policy toward North Korea through a counterproliferation lens: Washington wants to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program and prevent it from proliferating its nuclear technology. But North Korea sees the relationship very differently. It sees actions that fit into a bitter history of U.S. occupation and encroachment, a small nation squeezed between much larger powers, and resistance and overarching desire for independence. It is not that North Korea is right or wrong, just that its leaders view the world from a very different perspective — one heavily shaped by history and geography — just as U.S. leaders’ worldview is shaped by U.S. history and geography.

Understanding the North’s perspective will not solve the differences between the United States and North Korea, nor does it require pandering to Pyongyang. But it can provide additional insights into the likely North Korean reaction to U.S. policy initiatives.

Sanctions on North Korea reinforce its sense of embattlement, reinvigorating its desire to resist. U.S. military demonstrations remind Pyongyang that if it wants to preserve a modicum of independence, it must create a deterrent disproportionate to its size. And diplomatically isolating North Korea may also fail to engender the desired response — after all, intentional isolation has long been North Korea’s policy.

In building a new North Korean policy, one must understand Pyongyang’s fears, not necessarily to exploit them, but to mitigate them. Some would point to South Korea’s now-defunct “Sunshine Policy” of the late 1990s and early 2000s, which included investment and limited family reunions, to argue that “appeasing” the North does little to ease tensions or dissuade its nuclear and missile development. But one could just as easily cite past policies of sanctions and threats to argue the same point.

The challenge in shaping an effective North Korea policy is that it must be comprehensive, and so must include Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. But each of these countries has its own interests, priorities and domestic constituencies to deal with, and North Korea is adept at playing off of the differences between these powers.

An effective policy must also be consistent, not only between administrations, but within the span of a single administration. North Korea leadership serves far longer than individual U.S. presidents, whom they are skilled at waiting out.

Finally, an effective North Korean policy must have small, definable goals. Barring direct military intervention, a future policy could best be served through engagement, a stepped approach and a clear set of definable end goals — all while reminding the North that even its best attempts at a viable nuclear deterrent are ultimately ineffective. In this, the counsel of China’s Mao regarding his Korea strategy is worth recalling: “Eat sticky candy in small bites.”
The technology of Lotte Chemical
enriching the life of mankind

Taking on a new challenge, Lotte Chemical has invested in the construction of a 3 billion dollar petrochemical plant in Louisiana, with the hopes to usher in a promising future filled with greater possibilities.
Nuke tally could double by 2020

By Jenny Town

On March 9, North Korea's state media released photos of Kim Jong-un inspecting a miniaturized nuclear weapon and modern re-entry body. While experts have believed for some time that the North had miniaturization capabilities, the photos put to rest any doubts from skeptics that such capabilities existed, and signaled to the world, once again, that the North's ambitions for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are both real and a serious, growing threat.

In 2015, the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies conducted a year-long study of North Korea's growing nuclear threat. This study, the North Korea Nuclear Future project, assessed the North's WMD-related capabilities today, and projected low-, mid- and high-level scenarios of where the program may be by 2050. The projections, even under the harshest conditions for Pyongyang to maneuver within, estimated that the North could double the size of their nuclear arsenal in five years. Under more optimal conditions (for Pyongyang), that projection increased rapidly — up to 50 nuclear weapons in a midrange scenario and up to 100 in a high-end scenario — along with development projections for the North's delivery systems.

Despite international and unilateral efforts to bolster sanctions against North Korea, the lack of serious diplomatic efforts by the United States or other stakeholders to address Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions have tacitly given Pyongyang the green light to keep developing its WMD. While these ambitions are far from new, the pace of development under Kim Jong-un seems to have accelerated. In just the past few years, we have seen major upgrades to the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, including the building of a taller gantry tower able to handle larger space launch vehicles; construction of more sophisticated assembly systems; and implementation of better concealment facilities, such as covers over the end of the rail spurs, and new structures on both the launch pad and engine test stands to provide more cover for launch and test preparations. At North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site, there has been continued excavation of tunnels at the North Portal, where the 2009, 2013 and 2016 tests took place; the beginning of tunnel excavation at a new West Portal; and consistent activity at the main support area, separating the North and South Portals. In addition, North Korea has built a new class of ballistic missile submarine, the GORAE-class, berthed at the Sinpo South Shipyard, and has started testing sea-launched ballistic missiles.

North Korea has also stepped up its fissile material production capacity. In 2013, North Korea restarted its 5 MW reactor for plutonium production, which, if running at full capacity, can produce up to six kilograms of plutonium per year (roughly one bomb's worth); and also doubled the size of its uranium enrichment facility's centrifuge halls.

This year already, the North Koreans have resumed nuclear testing, now claiming to have hydrogen bomb capabilities, and warned of more tests to come. They restarted satellite launches, revealed a miniaturized nuclear weapon design, started wind-tunnel testing of a re-entry vehicle, and have tested solid-fuel rocket engines.

These developments, while sparking great concern, are not so surprising, given the trajectory North Korea has been on. As its WMD capabilities grow, Pyongyang's nuclear strategy will also evolve. Even in a low-end scenario, doubling its nuclear arsenal and showing some improvement of its delivery systems will still bolster its deterrence capabilities, and continue assured retaliation in response to a nuclear attack by the United States. With larger arsenals, it moves past assured retaliation, and could become emboldened to explore other nuclear options, including tactical nuclear weapons, or could even start to threaten early or first use of nuclear weapons. And here we are today.

The stronger North Korea's WMD capabilities become, the harder it will be to find diplomatic solutions to slow or halt these programs. However, leaving the situation to resolve itself has proven ineffective, time and time again, even with increased pressure through sanctions. As difficult as pursuing a serious, sustained diplomatic process with North Korea may seem, the threat Pyongyang poses will continue to grow in the meantime.

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HIDDEN

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These experts reportedly helped the North Koreans prepare for the successful test launch of a long-range missile in December 2012. Reports from Kyodo and the London Sunday Times described arrangements for a high-level Iranian delegation to observe the February 2013 North Korean nuclear test. These and other reports indicated a growing Iranian investment (including monetary investment) in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.

The collaboration presents two dangers. Former Michigan Rep. Mike Rogers, as chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said in November 2013 that Iran and North Korea were testing engines for an intercontinental ballistic missile. This Iranian support may be encouraging Kim Jong-un in his intention to accelerate the program to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile — and a nuclear warhead for that missile that could strike U.S. territory. This is the intent of the 2016 tests. Success appears possible by 2018.

A second danger lies in North Korea's major nuclear weapons achievement to date: The development of a nuclear warhead for the Nodong intermediate-range missile. The Obama administration has not disclosed this publicly, despite authoritative reports since early 2013 from sources such as NBC's chief national security correspondent Richard Engel; the Nelson Report (read by most Korea watchers); and from top South Korean diplomat, WI Sung-iac. Chinese nuclear experts told U.S. nuclear experts in February 2015 that North Korea likely would have 40 nuclear warheads by early 2016.

Iran's Shahab-3 missile is a twin of the Nodong, developed with North Korean input. A Nodong nuclear warhead would fit the Shahab-3. The Shahab-3 could hit targets in Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East. North Korea's output of Nodong warheads could be sufficient for Iran to acquire a number of these warheads. North Korea has been largely successful in using clandestine sea and air transportation networks to ship missiles to Iran and Syria. Interdictions have been few. An attempt to ship Nodong warheads to Iran would be a realistic option for Pyongyang and Tehran. This would give Iran a secret stockpile of nuclear weapons that could unveil at any time and present the United States with a fait accompli.

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WELCOME GLOBAL DELEGATES TO NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT 2016

On behalf of the Korean American community in the Washington area, NUAC and Global Hanin welcomes Her Excellency Park Geun-hye, President of Korea, and all 56 heads-of-state, delegations and organizations for the 4th Nuclear Security Summit hosted by the President of the United States, Barack Obama. We respectfully urge all global leaders to work together for the common good of humanity, our global environment and most of all, for future generations. Our greatest concern is to eliminate nuclear weapons in North Korea.

It is our profound hope that the bonds of friendship, understanding and shared values between all Nuclear Security Summit 2016 participating nations will greatly enhance global partnerships and reduce the threats of nuclear proliferation, accidents and provocations.

We envision a unified Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons, in which Korean people in the North and the South will be equally protected under the rule of law, enjoy the fruits of lasting peace and love in one nation dedicated to human rights and human flourishing.

A new United Korea will become a dynamic growth engine in Northeast and Central Asia, contributing substantially toward world peace and prosperity.

Korean Americans have always cherished the Korea-U.S. friendship and cooperation. We will always defend our common values and prosperity for the sake of future generations.

Linda Han, President
The National Unification Advisory Council Washington Chapter
William Won Kyun Hwang, President
U.S. applying ‘sustained pressure’ on North Korea

By The Washington Times

On March 16, President Barack Obama signed an order imposing U.N.-backed “robust new sanctions” on North Korea. The move comes amid a series of reprisals from Pyongyang, including the jailing of a 21-year-old American student.

The sanctions were passed at the United Nations in response to a nuclear test in January and ballistic missile launch in February. “These actions are consistent with our longstanding commitment to apply sustained pressure on the North Korean regime,” the White House said. “The U.S. and the global community will not tolerate North Korea’s illicit nuclear and ballistic missile activities, and we will continue to impose costs on North Korea until it comes into compliance with its international obligations.”

The White House announced that Mr. Obama’s executive order for the sanctions primarily targeted North Korea’s mining, financial and shipping assets, as well as the “Propaganda and Agitation Department” of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The U.S. Treasury Department estimates that mining alone generates more than $1 billion (890 million euros) a year for the regime, providing the regime with much-needed revenue.

Previously, when South Korean President Park Geun-hye visited Washington in October, Mr. Obama spoke about the special relationship between the U.S. and South Korea:

In recent years, President Park and I have worked together to strengthen our alliance for the future, and today I want to reaffirm that the commitment of the United States to the defense and security of the Republic of Korea will never waver. Our alliance remains a linchpin of peace and security — not just on the Korean Peninsula, but across the region. And so South Korea plays a central role in America’s rebalance to the Asia Pacific. And we continued that work today.

As we agreed in Seoul last year, our militaries are investing in shared capabilities, including the technologies and missile defenses that allow our forces to operate together effectively. We want to ensure that our Korean allies have the capabilities that are needed to take on greater responsibility for the defense of the peninsula and the eventual transfer of operational control of the alliance. And we’re determined to maintain our readiness against any threat.

Madam President, I want to commend you and the people of South Korea for the resolve that you displayed this summer following North Korea’s reckless actions in the DMZ that wounded two of your soldiers. North Korea was reminded that any provocation or aggression will be met by a strong, united response by South Korea and the United States.

Likewise, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs have achieved nothing except to deepen North Korea’s isolation. Today, President Park and I are reaffirming that our nations will never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. We will continue to insist that Pyongyang must abide by its obligations on the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the peninsula in a peaceful manner.

And given the horrific treatment of the North Korean people by their government, our two nations will continue to expose abuses and call for accountability for human rights violations.

At the same time, we do support President Park’s efforts to improve relations between South and North Korea. As my administration has shown with Iran and with Cuba, we are also prepared to engage nations with which we’ve had troubled histories. But Pyongyang needs to understand that it will not achieve the economic development it seeks so long as it clings to nuclear weapons. In contrast, President Park has articulated a better vision — a unified Korea free from the fear of war and nuclear weapons — and that’s a vision that we very much support.

Getting DPRK to Six Party Talks

On Feb. 23, Secretary of State John Kerry gave these remarks at the State Department, with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi:

The United States and China share one of the most consequential relationships in the world. ... We discussed North Korea's increasingly provocative actions. The nuclear test that the DPRK conducted last month and its subsequent ballistic missile launches are provocative; they are threatening; they are a violation of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. And China and the United States agree completely that this — these actions merit an appropriate response through the United Nations Security Council, which was promised if they violated a resolution, and it was promised in the last resolution.

There now have been several flagrant violations of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, and those violations threaten not only the peninsula, but they also are a threat to international peace and security. We, therefore, need to respond accordingly. And we agreed today to continue our efforts to make certain that response is forthcoming rapidly.

Today, Foreign Minister Wang and I also discussed ways that we, along with our partners in the U.N. and the Six Party Talks framework, can deepen our cooperation not only to respond to the actions that DPRK took, but equally importantly because those reactions have a purpose and that purpose is to bring the DPRK back to the table for the purpose of the Six Party Talks and particularly discussions about denuclearization.

We also discussed other issues, where our nations’ views differ as well, such as cybersecurity, human rights, the issues of nonproliferation, the importance of the nuclear summit that President Obama will host here in Washington at the end of March. I raised our concerns about the challenges on issues such as human trafficking and human rights, and we agreed to continue our discussion with specificity with respect to those issues.
New U.N. sanctions to severely curtail DPRK weapons programs

On March 2, Ambassador Samantha Power, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, gave an explanation about the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2270 regarding sanctions on North Korea. These are excerpts of those remarks.

..., with each nuclear test and launch using ballistic missile technology, the DPRK improves its capability to carry out a nuclear missile attack, not only in the region but also a continent away ... the only country in the entire world that has conducted a nuclear test in the 21st century. In fact, it has conducted not one nuclear test, but four — in 2006, 2009, 2013 and now, 2016. It is also the only U.N. Member State that routinely threatens other countries with nuclear annihilation, including multiple members of this Council on different occasions.

... The DPRK has been able to exploit gaps and evade measures aimed at impeding its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs, and we’ve put in place new measures to fill those gaps, one by one. Let me give just a few of many examples of how the resolution adopted today does this.

North Korea generates a significant share of the money it uses to fuel its nuclear and ballistic missile programs by mining natural resources — often exploiting the workers under desperate conditions — and selling those resources abroad. For example, it is estimated that the DPRK brings in approximately $1 billion a year in coal exports, roughly a third of the revenue it earns from exports, and it brings in at least $200 million a year in iron and steel exports. That is why the resolution we have adopted today limits, and in some instances bans outright, North Korea’s exports of specific natural resources, making it tougher for the government to fund its activities.

Until today, in many countries around the world, inspectors required information providing reasonable grounds to inspect cargo coming into and going out of North Korea. So the DPRK and its suppliers took the ballistic missile parts, nuclear technology, and other illicit items they needed to build or weaponize mass destruction, and they buried them deep in otherwise suspicious loads on airplanes, ships, and trucks coming into the country. The DPRK used similar tactics to hide illicit items it was exporting — such as weapons, drugs, and counterfeit goods — which it used to generate a significant amount of additional income. That is why, under this resolution, cargo going into and coming out of North Korea will be treated as suspicious, and countries will be required to inspect it, whether it goes by air, land, or sea. This is hugely significant.

North Korea used to be able to import aviation fuel, which included rocket fuel used to launch proscribed ballistic missiles. Not anymore. The resolution adopted today bans all imports of aviation fuel, including rocket fuel.

For years, the DPRK deployed arms dealers, smugglers, financiers and other enablers of its illicit weapons programs and claimed that they were diplomats and government representatives around the world. Abuse of diplomatic protections, these individuals cut illicit deals, set up shell companies, and procured banned items to aid North Korea’s weapons programs. The resolution adopted today obligates countries to expel any North Korean who carries out these acts, including DPRK diplomats.

Despite previous financial sanctions that constrained North Korea’s access to the international financial system, North Korean banks were still able to do business on foreign territory, allowing the government to fund its illicit programs. Under the resolution adopted today, states around the world will have to shut down DPRK financial institutions in their territory.

North Korean scientists have used specialized trainings at academic institutions and international research centers to obtain technical expertise that they can put to use to advance the DPRK government’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. The resolution adopted today prohibits specialized training of any DPRK officials in fields that could be used to advance these programs, including nuclear and space-related technical exchanges.

Now, as these measures make abundantly clear, the purpose of this resolution is not to inflict greater hardship on the people of North Korea, who endure immeasurable suffering under one of the most repressive governments the modern world has ever seen....

It is deeply important that today’s resolution, and all the tough measures it includes, has been adopted with the support of all 15 members of the Security Council. In particular, the United States would like to recognize the leadership of China, which has worked closely with us in negotiating this extremely rigorous resolution. Beyond the Council, it is worth noting the unanimity among, and leadership by, the countries in the region — China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea — who understand so clearly the threat to our shared security posed by the DPRK’s actions. The fact that this resolution has been co-sponsored by 50 Member States drawn from every region in the world, demonstrates both the recognition of the global threat posed by North Korea, and the international community’s commitment to working together to address that threat.

Ban on DPRK nuclear test: ‘I condemn it unequivocally’

On Jan. 6, 2016, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement on North Korea’s hydrogen bomb test:

The underground nuclear test announced by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on January 6 is deeply troubling.

U.N. sanctions deserve swift implementation

On March 2, Rep. Matt Salmon, Arizona Republican and chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, made this statement in support of the United Nations’ sanctions resolution against North Korea:

The U.N. Security Council adopted a strong new resolution against North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, recognizing the persistent threat this rogue regime presents to the world. These additional sanctions and restrictions imposed on the Kim Jong-un regime align international sanctions more closely with those that Congress imposed through the North Korea Sanctions Enforcement Act of 2016 — a bill I was proud to co-sponsor. I am pleased to see the international community recognize that more significant pressure must be applied for North Korea to give up its proscribed nuclear and missile programs.

This resolution follows not only our action in Congress, but also strong measures by our allies in the region. The government of Japan imposed tough new unilateral sanctions, and South Korean President Park Geun-hye took the bold step of closing the joint Kaesong Industrial Complex, cutting off a major source of revenue for the Kim regime. I call on all U.N. member states to swiftly implement and enforce all international sanctions and restrictions on North Korea.
Congress united on North Korea sanctions

The North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (H.R. 757), authored by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Ed Royce and co-sponsored by the Committee's Ranking Member, Eliot L. Engel, passed smoothly through the House and Senate in February 2016, and was immediately signed into law by President Obama. On Feb. 12, the day the bill cleared the Senate and was sent to the president’s desk, Chairman Royce spoke about the bill, praising the bipartisan teamwork of the Republicans and Democrats.

By Rep. Ed Royce

For three years the Foreign Affairs Committee I chair has worked with great determination to build support for this North Korea sanctions legislation. I want to thank my Democratic colleagues, especially Ranking Member Engel, for their support. I also thank Senators Corker, Cardin and Gardner for their leadership in the Senate, and for their strong additions, particularly on human rights and cyberattacks by the brutal and hostile North Korean regime.

Today Congress — Democrats and Republicans, House and Senate — unite to put this North Korea sanctions legislation on the President’s desk. Last month this bill passed the House with 418 votes. And this week it passed the Senate 96-0. Mr. Speaker, these overwhelming votes reflect bipartisan frustration that the US’s North Korea policy — a policy of so-called “strategic patience” — isn’t working. Today, Congress unites to say it is time for a new approach.

Mr. Speaker, last month North Korea conducted its fourth known nuclear test. Last weekend it conducted a long-range missile test. And on Tuesday our director of national intelligence, James Clapper, testified that North Korea has restarted a plutonium reactor and expanded production of weapons-grade nuclear fuel.

The threat to the United States and our allies is real. The tyrannical Kim regime has developed increasingly destructive weapons: miniaturized nuclear warheads that fit onto its most reliable missiles. We cannot stand by any longer.

The legislation we consider today, H.R. 757, is the most comprehensive North Korea sanctions legislation to come before this body. Importantly, H.R. 757 uses targeted financial and economic pressure to isolate Kim Jong-un and his top officials from the assets they maintain in foreign banks, and from the hard currency that sustains their rule.

These assets are gained in part from illicit activities — like counterfeiting U.S. currency and selling weapons around the world — and are used to advance Pyongyang’s nuclear program. They also pay for the luxurious lifestyle of the ruling elites and the continued repression of the North Korean people.

In 2005 the Treasury Department blacklisted a small bank in Macau called Banco Delta Asia, which not only froze North Korean money in the bank but scared away other financial institutions from dealing with Pyongyang for fear they too would also be blacklisted. Unfortunately, this effective policy was shelved for ill-fated negotiations. But this bill can get us back on a winning strategy.

Equally important to the strong sanctions in this bill are its critical human rights provisions. North Korea operates a brutal system of gulags that hold as many as 120,000 men, women and children. If a North Korean is suspected of any kind of dissenting opinion from the Kim regime, his entire family — for three generations — is punished. North Korea is a human rights house of horrors.

Two years ago, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry released the most comprehensive report on North Korea to date, finding that the Kim regime “has for decades pursued policies involving crimes that shock the conscience of humanity.” This amended version requires the Obama administration to develop a strategy to promote North Korean human rights, including a list of countries that use North Korean slave labor.

The implementation of H.R. 757 will help sever a key subsidy for North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program. For only when the North Korean leadership realizes that its criminal activities are untenable will the prospects for peace and security in Northeast Asia improve.

By Sen. Cory Gardner

For decades the United States and its allies like Japan and South Korea have faced a complex threat in North Korea.

While the Obama administration has rightfully focused attention on developments in the Middle East, for too long it has turned a blind eye to the North Korean threat. A rogue regime headed by a leader with no respect for human dignity, Kim Jong-un — North Korea’s forgotten maniac — has been met with indifference instead of resolve.

It’s time to reverse this administration’s failed policy of “strategic patience.” Recent headlines confirm this.

North Korea has conducted four nuclear tests, three of which occurred in the last seven years. Earlier this month North Korea launched an ICBM with a range sufficient to strike anywhere in the United States.

We know the regime is expanding its nuclear stockpile, and its capabilities are growing. North Korea may already possess as many as 20 nuclear warheads, with the potential to gain as many as 100 within the next five years.

Furthermore, our military experts have warned that the situation on the Korean Peninsula may be at its most unstable point in more than 60 years. They believe North Korea has the ability to miniaturize an atomic weapon and place it on a rocket that has the ability to reach targets thousands of miles away.

North Korea’s illicit behavior doesn’t stop with its nuclear-proliferation activities. The regime has intensified its cyberwarfare capabilities, as evidenced by its attacks on South Korea’s financial systems and the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures here in the United States.

North Korea also has a long history of horrific human rights abuses and continues to maintain a vast network of prison camps.

We can no longer stand idly by as North Korea builds an arsenal of mass destruction, grows its cybercapabilities and tortures as many as 200,000 of its own men, women and children. We must apply the pressure required to change the forgotten maniac’s pattern of belligerent behavior that endangers the globe.

That’s why Congress, in overwhelming bipartisan votes, passed the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act this year, which President Obama signed into law on Feb. 18.

The law is a tough rebuke of Kim Jong-un and a dramatic change in U.S. policy toward North Korea: The law imposes mandatory sanctions on individuals who contribute to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program, its malicious cyberattacks, its censorship activities, and the regime’s continued human rights abuses.

It also mandates that the White House develop a comprehensive strategy to address the regime’s human rights abuses and cybercriminal activities.

The goal of this law is simple: to quell North Korea’s aggression and peacefully disarm the regime and restore human rights.

During his final State of the Union address, President Obama acknowledged that “our foreign policy must be focused on the threat from ISIL and al Qaeda, but it can’t stop there.” I couldn’t agree more with that statement.

It’s time for the United States to lead. We must set an example and send a message to the rest of the world that America will not tolerate patterns of belligerence — a message that America will lead.

Sen. Cory Gardner (R-CO) is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific and international cybersecurity policy. He introduced the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act in the Senate.

Turning attention to the ‘forgotten maniac’
Peace in Korea would be ‘starting point’ for a nuclear-free world

On March 1, South Korean President Park Geun-hye gave an address on the 97th March First Independence Movement Day. The following are excerpts from that speech.

The spirit of the March First Independence Movement led to the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, and we eventually realized long-yearned-for independence. Then, we rose out of the ashes of war and accomplished industrialization and democratization, building a proud Republic of Korea standing tall in the world.

After achieving the liberation of our homeland that was so desperately longed for 97 years ago, we live in a free and prosperous country. Now it is our solemn debt to our forefathers, who have built this country with their blood, to pass on to posterity a peacefully unified Korea.

Fellow Koreans, I believe that the realization of the spirit of the March First Independence Movement in this age would be none other than to achieve peaceful unification and make it possible for our children and grandchildren to live peacefully in a wealthy and powerful Korean Peninsula.

While the Government has firmly responded to North Korean provocations, it has sought to promote inter-Korean dialogue and nongovernmental exchanges and cooperation, and provided much assistance and made concessions to the North in order to build trust and lay the foundation for peaceful unification.

Nonetheless, after conducting its third nuclear test right before the inauguration of the current Administration, North Korea has yet again seriously threatened our safety with more extreme provocation — the fourth nuclear test and long-range missile launch. Even now, the North is openly declaring that it will continue to carry out nuclear and missile provocations.

If we were to allow North Korea to keep on making such reckless provocations, fifth and sixth nuclear tests will ensue, and its nuclear program will pose a substantial threat not only to the survival of the Korean people, but also to the stability of Northeast Asia and peace around the globe. This will pose a challenge and threat to the peace that the Republic of Korea and the entire world are determined to achieve.

It has now become unmistakably clear that the current approach will not be able to curb the North’s determination to develop nuclear weapons. We must make North Korea clearly realize that efforts to sustain its regime by exploiting its people and concentrating resources on nuclear development are futile and meaningless.

More forcefully than ever before, the international community is demonstrating its united determination not to countenance North Korea’s nuclear program. More than 100 countries have joined in strongly condemning Pyongyang’s nuclear test, and the toughest and most effective sanction resolution ever on the North is expected to be adopted soon by the United Nations Security Council. This resolution is the crystallization of the uncompromising determination of the international community that North Korea must be made to pay a grave price for committing a nuclear test and long-range missile launch with total disregard for Security Council resolutions and the international community.

Moreover, the United States has passed a North Korea Sanctions Bill, and other friendly countries, including Japan and the European Union, are joining in taking measures to impose crippling sanctions.

The Government will always keep the door to dialogue open, but if North Korea shows no intention to denuclearize and refuses to change, Korea and the international community will keep up the pressure. On the basis of stronger security readiness and international cooperation, the Government will use every means to make sure that the North has no choice but to give up its nuclear ambitions. Now, the choice is North Korea’s to make.

I believe that countries neighboring the Korean Peninsula will redouble their efforts to achieve peace on the Korean Peninsula and in the world...

We long for unification because we hope that the Korean Peninsula will become the starting point of a nuclear-free world and that our North Korean brethren may share the freedom, human rights and prosperity we enjoy today. The Government will strive to make a new Korean Peninsula permeated with peace, affluence and freedom. I firmly believe this is the culmination of the spirit of the March First Independence Movement.

North Korea should ‘top the agenda’ at no-nukes talks

On March 2, South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se addressed the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. These are excerpts from his remarks.

...We all know the [Conference on Disarmament] can play a catalytic role in furthering disarmament and fostering nuclear non-proliferation, and a rapidly rising international security landscape. Unfortunately however, since 1998, the CD has lost steam... In particular, the paralysis in the CD is sending out the wrong message on the global non-proliferation regime centered on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT).

In 2011, at the CD, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned that — “the continued deadlock has ominous implications for international security. The longer it persists, the graver the nuclear threat — from existing arsenals, from the proliferation of such weapons, and from their possible acquisition by terrorists.”

And unfortunately, we are witnessing that his warnings on the nuclear threat are materializing... because of the lack of a member of this Conference. Indeed, North Korea has an unmatched notorious track record:

It is the first country which has conducted nuclear tests in this century; it has conducted four nuclear tests and launched six long-range missiles in the last 10 years, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and international law.

It is the first country which has conducted nuclear weapons programs within the NPT regime and announced its withdrawal from both the International Atomic Energy Agency and the NPT.

It is the first country which has officially declared itself as a “nuclear-armed state” in its constitution; and it is also the first CD member state which declared itself as “the youngest nuclear weapons state,” at this very Conference last year and threatened the “final destruction” of another CD member state, the Republic of Korea, here in this August chamber right after its third nuclear test in February 2013.

...Pyongyang is like a serial offender. It is no wonder that the Security Council will very soon adopt a landmark resolution with the strongest ever non-military sanction measures in seven decades of U.N. history. This is a clear manifestation of the resolve of the international community to punish North Korea’s provocations once and for all.

It is also no wonder that some member states raised the issue of the DPRK’s qualifications as a peace-loving member states in view of its non-compliance with its international obligations. North Korea has defied, and is even now defying, U.N. sanctions and international condemnations by declaring it will continue long-range missile launches. Last week, Pyongyang even stated in public that it will strike the Republic of Korea, as well as the U.S., to take revenge in stunning and unimaginable ways.

First, for the sake of the integrity and credibility of the NPT regime, we should make urgent efforts to stop and roll back North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities in accordance with existing and new U.N. Security Council resolutions. As one defense minister of a CD member state in the southern hemisphere recently remarked, no country in the world is as free from North Korea’s nuclear and missile blackmail. Indeed, we are living under Pyongyang’s nuclear sword of Damocles, dangling right above our heads.

Second, we must strengthen the rule of law in the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime, particularly through ensuring universality and compliance. In this regard, North Korea’s nuclear tests are a direct challenge... So, I hope that later in June, at the ministerial meeting to be held in the 20th anniversary of the Treaty’s adoption, North Korea will be on the top of the agenda....

Third, individual countries should be encouraged... to work towards our common vision of Global Zero, a world free of nuclear weapons. During the previous Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, my President spelled out the vision of a nuclear-weapons free Korean Peninsula. Since that time, my government has been active in regional and global forums to turn the dreams of a nuclear-weapons free world into a reality... Kazakhstan is a good model of non-proliferation, and a rapidly rising economy.... This success story is in stark contrast to what is happening in North Korea.
Japan implementing new restrictions on North Koreans

By Larry Moffitt

Japan will host the G-7 Summit in Ise-Shima in May as a nation facing the most complex issues in balancing regional and global powers to keep the peace, while also maintaining strong forward motion with their economy.

Speaking to the 190th Session of the Japanese Diet in January, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe acknowledged the difficulty of creating economic growth in an aging society with a falling birthrate, and an increasingly perilous security environment in the region.

In foreign affairs, as difficult as it is to live with China, that nation remains the most important neighbor for Japan in the region. Relations with South Korea appear to be easing somewhat due to the adoption of this resolution, which encompasses the principles of “dialogue and pressure” and “action for action,” in close coordination with the international community.

The Government of Japan has taken several measures against North Korea. The Japan Foreign Ministry released these remarks from Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on March 3.

Japan highly appreciates that the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270 regarding North Korea's nuclear test in January and ballistic missile in February. With the adoption of this resolution, which encompasses the position to assist the above-mentioned North Korean authority officials residing in Japan with an aim to go to North Korea.

First, the Government of Japan implements restrictions on movement of persons. The details are as follows:

- Ban on the entry of North Korean citizens.
- Ban on the re-entry of North Korean authority officials residing in Japan with an aim to go to North Korea.
- Request to all residents not to visit North Korea.
- Suspension of Japanese government officials’ visits to North Korea.
- Ban on the landing of North Korean flag vessels’ crew members.
- Ban on the landing of foreign crew members, sentenced for the violation of the trade and financial measures against North Korea; ban on the re-entry of those foreign citizens residing in Japan, sentenced for the violation of the above-mentioned measures, with an aim to go to North Korea.

Second, the Government of Japan reduces the lowest amount that requires notification from equivalent to 1 million yen to 100,000 yen concerning the carrying of currency etc., to North Korea, and bans the payment to North Korea, except for the case in which the amount is less than 100,000 yen with humanitarian purposes.

Third, the Government of Japan bans the entry of all North Korean flag vessels including those for humanitarian purposes, and bans the entry of third-country flag vessels which have previously called at ports in North Korea.

Fourth, the Government of Japan adds to entities and individuals designated for asset-freezing measures.

Japan forges ahead in a sea of complexity

Japan will host the G-7 Summit in Ise-Shima in May as a nation facing the most complex issues in balancing regional and global powers to keep the peace, while also maintaining strong forward motion with their economy.

Speaking to the 190th Session of the Japanese Diet in January, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe acknowledged the difficulty of creating economic growth in an aging society with a falling birthrate, and an increasingly perilous security environment in the region.

In foreign affairs, as difficult as it is to live with China, that nation remains the most important neighbor for Japan in the region. Relations with South Korea appear to be easing somewhat due to the adoption of this resolution, which encompasses the principles of “dialogue and pressure” and “action for action,” in close coordination with the international community.

The Government of Japan has taken several measures against North Korea. The Japan Foreign Ministry released these remarks from Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on March 3.

Japan highly appreciates that the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2270 regarding North Korea's nuclear test in January and ballistic missile in February. With the adoption of this resolution, which encompasses the position to assist the above-mentioned North Korean authority officials residing in Japan with an aim to go to North Korea.

First, the Government of Japan implements restrictions on movement of persons. The details are as follows:

- Ban on the entry of North Korean citizens.
- Ban on the re-entry of North Korean authority officials residing in Japan with an aim to go to North Korea.
- Request to all residents not to visit North Korea.
- Suspension of Japanese government officials’ visits to North Korea.
- Ban on the landing of North Korean flag vessels’ crew members.
- Ban on the landing of foreign crew members, sentenced for the violation of the trade and financial measures against North Korea; ban on the re-entry of those foreign citizens residing in Japan, sentenced for the violation of the above-mentioned measures, with an aim to go to North Korea.

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Awakening U.S. moral self-confidence: ‘When did America forget that it is America?’

By Paul Coyer

Amid the plethora of security threats the world is facing today, North Korea, with its fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6, long-range missile test on Feb. 7 and firing of short range missiles in late March, has been doing all it can in order to ensure that it gets its share of attention. Its ICBM program has made significant strides, and it is making progress towards a miniaturized nuclear warhead and operationalizing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capability, which would give Pyongyang a survivable nuclear deterrent. And the regime's proliferation activities, particularly with Syria and Iran, have posed an even broader threat.

Little that Washington has attempted over the past 20-plus years has halted North Korean progress, including the Obama administration’s policy of “strategic patience.” Pyongyang believes that its legitimacy as an independent state depends upon its nuclear weapons capability, and has thus proven impervious to inducements to give up such a capability. It has become increasingly emboldened due to the belief that its nuclear weapons will deter any muscular action against it, and in the (to date correct) assumption that China, by its largest trade partner, has an interest in its continued survival and will therefore not allow sanctions to destabilize it.

China does not want to see a unified Korean peninsula under Seoul's governance and aligned with the United States on its border. (And for the same reason, Russia does not want to see such an eventuality.) Beijing also seeks to maintain an independent and unpredictable North Korea as a source of leverage over Washington, particularly since China's neighborhood is filled with American partners.

South Korea, for its part, has come to the conclusion that its engagement policy with the North has failed, as made clear by President Park Geun-hye’s February speech to the South Korean National Assembly, which marked a fundamental shift of South Korean policy towards the North. Ms. Park's speech has taken Pyongyang out of the driver's seat by signaling that the ground rules have changed, and Ms. Park has moved to cut off all sources of cash to Pyongyang over which Seoul has any control. The U.S. needs to follow suit — the status quo will no longer suffice.

While it is a positive sign that China worked with the United States in drafting the sanctions recently put into place by the UN, (which are the harshest set of sanctions the UN has placed on Pyongyang to date), past history (as well as current levels of activity at the Chinese-North Korean border, which appear fairly normal) indicate that the chances that the Chinese will aggressively implement those sanctions are extremely low unless China is forced to change its strategic calculus. Washington and its allies need to convince China that North Korea is far more of a liability than a strategic asset.

The evidence that this is the case is not difficult to find. The North’s actions have spurred closer cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea, and are a major reason why Washington was able to press Tokyo and Seoul to finally reach an agreement on the “comfort women” issue — part of the bitter historical legacy that has bedeviled past attempts at cooperation. They have also impelled Seoul to finally agree to deploy the THAAD missile defense system, which China has long strenuously opposed out of the belief that it would reduce China's nuclear deterrent. Further, they increase the risk that Japan will at some point choose to acquire nuclear weapons.

Washington can help to further bring home the message that Pyongyang is a strategic liability by ensuring that future joint American-South Korean military exercises occur in the Yellow Sea not far from China's coast.

Cutting off the cash

Harsh and rigorously enforced sanctions that target all who do business with North Korea need to not only cut off the North Korean regime from as much hard cash as possible, but to demonstrate the risk to China's already-strained banking system if it allows Chinese banks, businesses and middlemen to do business as usual with Pyongyang. Recently enacted congressional legislation has prodded the White House to begin the process of cutting off the Kim regime's access to extensive role played by Chinese banks and middlemen in enabling North Korea's illicit trade in a large number of areas, and notes that the U.S. Treasury Department has substantial coercive powers to shape the behavior of Chinese banks and financial institutions.

The other study, by the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, maps out the chain of command, structures and mechanisms of the Kim regime, and thus sheds light on how targeted sanctions can be most effective in limiting both the North's ability to threaten the outside world and its ability to continue to systematically brutalize its own people. North Korea is a clear case in which security and humanitarian concerns are interrelated, and the Kim regime’s human rights record should be placed front and center in American diplomatic activity.

Washington needs to demonstrate a commitment to maintain support for sustained, effective, cooperative action on the part of the international community, in the face of Chinese (and Russian) bailiwick, North Korean threats and provocations, etc. This will require an enormous amount of effort, but absent a clear display of resolve and leadership on the part of Washington, China has little reason to seriously cooperate with sanctions. The alternative is to continue down the same path we have been on, with potentially disastrous results.

Perhaps most importantly, American moral leadership has historically played a powerful role in facing down totalitarian threats in the past, from fascism to communism. In order to do so again, Washington needs to display a greater moral self-confidence than has been the case under the current White House administration.

Natan Sharansky, the former Soviet dissident who was so inspired by Ronald Reagan's unabashed moral defense of human freedom in the face of Soviet totalitarianism, has lamented what he sees as America’s “tragic loss of moral self-confidence,” asking “When did America forget that it is America?” We need to regain such a sense of national purpose, a sense, in Reagan's words, of “spiritual commitment, . . . belief and resolve [grounded in] humanity before God,” which he saw as “ultimately the source of America's strength as a nation.” Without it, we cripple our ability to meet the very great challenges that face us in the international arena, of which North Korea is but one.

Paul Coyer is a research professor at the Institute for World Politics. He is a contributor on foreign policy, with a focus on Eurasia, for Forbes, and is a contributing editor for Providence: A Journal of Christianity and American Foreign Policy, published by the Institute on Religion and Democracy and The Philos Project.
China also seeks
denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

By Stratfor Global Intelligence

Leaders from across the globe will gather in Washington from March 31 to April 1 for the fourth and final Nuclear Security Summit.

They will discuss multilateral efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism and the smuggling and proliferation of nuclear materials.

There are a number of things that all can agree on. Among them, that nuclear weapons in the hands of sub-state actors is a bad thing, and that safeguards should be taken to ensure the security of nuclear arsenals in states where political stability cannot be taken for granted. But, as with most summits of this nature, this gathering will not bring about enforceable measures on a multilateral level. The real substance to be found at the summit will emerge from the meetings taking place on the sidelines.

One event to watch will be Chinese President Xi Jinping's meeting at the White House with President Obama. This will be the two leaders' first meeting in 2016, and is likely to be Mr. Xi's final visit to Washington before Mr. Obama leaves office.

Much of the discussion will revolve around the recent advances in North Korea's nuclear program. North Korea is working to build up the credibility of both its developing nuclear deterrent and the leadership of Kim Jong-un in the lead-up to this year's Congress of the Workers' Party in Pyongyang.

Beijing's inability to influence North Korea is increasingly obvious.

Winning economic diplomacy is having to impose punitive measures on North Korea that might cause instability along the countries' shared border. Pyongyang's nuclear advances have invigorated bilateral defense ties between the United States and South Korea, as well as multilateral defense ties between the United States, South Korea and Japan.

Notably, Mr. Obama will hold a joint meeting with South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the same day he meets with Mr. Xi.

For evidence that China is worried that growing military connections between the United States, South Korea and Japan will undermine its security imperatives in the region, one need only look at Beijing's repeated objections to talks that began in 2013 to negotiate a peace agreement, as well as multilateral tracking of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense battery in South Korea. Mr. Xi will also use the opportunity to discuss with Mr. Obama rising tensions in the South China Sea, particularly regarding U.S. freedom of navigation operations, which have become routine.

Washington uses these operations to challenge Beijing's growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. If the United States adheres to its plan of two freedom of navigation operations per quarter, the second operation of the first quarter will take place soon, adding to the already tense dialogue surrounding the South China Sea.

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In Putin’s chess game with the West, North Korea is a pawn

By L. Todd Wood

Make no mistake, the Stalinist North Korean regime is no close ally of the Kremlin but simply a pawn in Russia’s great geopolitical game with the United States and the West.

Vladimir Putin sees Kim Jong-un as a useful idiot, although an idiot that has been causing a lot of trouble lately. After all, the Soviet Union birthed North Korea, and today’s Russia continues to see the North inside its sphere of influence. A glaring example of this usefulness was North Korea’s support of Russia in its Ukrainian adventures.

The problem with North Korea’s latest temper tantrum is that it will cost Russia a lot of money, something it doesn’t have very much of at the moment. The sanctions against North Korea, pushed by the Obama administration through the United Nations after the latest round of North Korean nuclear tests, are substantially unfavorable to Russia in economic terms and a setback to Mr. Putin’s long-term plan of literally mining the North for minerals and other commodities.

But within Mr. Putin’s view of the world, economic issues are secondary to influence and realpolitik. The fact that ordinary Russians are suffering due to Western sanctions is subservient to the Kremlin’s goal to re-establish Russian influence and power projection capability on the world stage. The Kremlin’s view of its relationship with North Korea is no different and fits within this mindset.

In Moscow’s eyes, North Korea is the perfect thorn in the Americans’ side. What better way to cause Washington problems than to have North Korea routinely rattle its sabers and threaten the West and South Korea, a country seen as a puppet to the Americans? Russia sees no threat from a nuclear North Korea. In fact, Russia is the North’s lifeline, providing fuel, food, weapons technology, and military support. Russia will accept a nuclear North as it knows it has nothing to fear from the regime. However, Moscow does fear a united Korean Peninsula under Western influence. This outcome is completely unacceptable to Mr. Putin.

Russia would much rather have a state that is starving its people and beholden to Moscow for trade and other largesse than an economic powerhouse that a united Korea would most surely become. The prospect of an industrial giant putting the Russian economy and its industry to shame is certainly not a scenario the Kremlin will allow to develop. Russia has failed to diversify its economy away from hydrocarbons. In fact, the Russian economy is less diversified than under Soviet control. Moscow cannot afford to have this reality highlighted by an overly successful, united Korea.

To understand the Russian viewpoint, one must understand Russian history.

Mr. Putin is no longer a communist. He is a czar. He values money, power and influence. Yes, Ukraine is costing Russia money and making it the target of Western anger, but that does not matter in the face of territorial gains.

Yes, the Russian Syrian campaign is expensive, but a small price to pay for Russia regaining control of the Middle East. In that vein, a nuclear North Korea, even one that causes Russia economic duress, is worth the cost as long as America doesn’t get the peace it desires on the Korean Peninsula.

I sometimes wonder if Russia would even mind if the North became more isolated and economically weak, as it would make the hermit kingdom even more dependent on the Russian czar. This would place the Kremlin in a stronger position with the West in the role of the white knight, a solver of geopolitical problems, a role Vladimir Putin enjoys for international and domestic consumption.

Many analysts have stated that the way to control North Korea is through China. I disagree. I think Russia is just as important in reining in North Korea’s nuclear behavior. The secret to stopping North Korea’s nuclear development and proliferation is to make that endgame favorable to the Russian czar’s interest. Only then will the riddle of North Korea be solved.

L. Todd Wood is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy, where he studied Russian as a strategic language. He is also a former USAF special operations helicopter pilot supporting SEAL Team 6 and Delta Force. He has contributed to The Moscow Times, Fox Business, National Review, Newsmax TV and many others. He travels extensively to the former Soviet Union and splits his time between the New York area and Moscow. His column, Behind the Curtain, runs Fridays in The Washington Times; his Web site is LToddWood.com.

Can South Korean-made TV dramas prepare the North for reunification?

By David S. Maxwell

The U.N. Security Council’s resolution 2270, adopted in March with the support of China and Russia, is arguably the toughest sanctions regime enacted against Korea since the war was suspended with the 1953 armistice.

It appears that the international community could be executing a strategic strangulation campaign: The sanctions can affect the nuclear and missile programs, the flow of hard currency, and support to the regime elite and military leadership, as access to luxury goods and military resources are cut off.

Such a campaign is likely to cause a number of problems for North Korea, as well as the international community, unless the mafia-like crime family cult known as the Kim Family Regime chooses to change its behavior and become a responsible member of the international community.

To do so would require not only the regime giving up its nuclear and missile programs, but also ceasing the crimes against humanity being perpetrated against the Korean people living in the North. I am not optimistic that we will see this kind of change in the regime.

South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Chinese scholars at the Communist Party School have recognized that one of the most severe challenges stemming from regime behavior could be North Korean collapse. This can be described as the loss of central governing effectiveness of the regime, combined with the loss of coherence and support of the military.

Robert Collins has written the seminal work on regime collapse and laid out the progression through seven phases. The regime is currently in the fourth phase (suppression of resistance), but should it begin to lose support of the elite and the military because of the strategic strangulation campaign, it can rapidly progress through the final three stages: fifth, active resistance against the regime; sixth, regime fracture; and seventh, formation or new national leadership. In lieu of the seventh phase, the situation could devolve into internal conflict or, in the worst case, Kim Jong-un could decide to execute his campaign plan to forcibly reunify the peninsula — since regime survival is the single vital national interest of North Korea.

If there is regime collapse, there can be only one outcome, and that must be the unification of the peninsula under a United Republic of Korea. Since 2009 and the signing of the ROK/US Joint Vision Statement, the end state sought has been the peaceful unification of the peninsula. Unfortunately, the deciding factor on whether it is peaceful or not will be Kim Jong-un’s decision-making, as well as how strong the resistance to unification is among the Korean people living in the North.

Regime collapse can cause myriad
U.N. sanctions on North Korea: Time is running out

By Larry Niksch

With his nuclear and missile tests this year, Kim Jong-un has signaled the United States that he is accelerating North Korea’s program to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a nuclear warhead that could strike the United States. Achieving this within the 2018-2020 period is a realistic prospect. North Korea then would have an arsenal of nuclear warheads mounted on long-range and intermediate-range missiles — and the status of a full-fledged nuclear weapons power.

Since 2006 the U.S. response to successive North Korean tests has been to go to the U.N. Security Council and repeatedly negotiate the imposition of multiple sanctions on Pyongyang. There is a consensus that these sanctions have been ineffective, as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile programs and the livelihoods of North Korea’s communist elite appear undamaged.

Security Council members amend, modify and add items, knowing that the new versions will have no more effect on North Korea than previous versions. Analysts agree that China has not enforced most of the sanctions to which it agreed.

The new sanctions approved by the Security Council in February 2016 will not change this situation. A careful read reveals limits and qualifications to key sanctions, opportunities for North Korean concealment of prohibited exports and imports and no restrictions on third-country banks that do business with North Korea. Implementation continues to rely on China’s willingness to enforce.

The challenge for the United States is to develop a strategy that opens up a better prospect of Security Council members enacting and implementing sanctions that put real pressure on North Korea to alter its nuclear and missile programs before it succeeds in developing an ICBM with a nuclear warhead. Time is running out.

A potent U.S. strategy would start by introducing a resolution in the Security Council mandating that U.N. member states cease providing oil and natural gas to North Korea and not assist other states that seek to provide North Korea with oil or natural gas. A cutoff of energy imports would quickly cause an economic crisis in North Korea. The problem is China, which supplies North Korea with most of its oil. A U.S. resolution would force the Chinese government to make a fundamental choice regarding sanctions on North Korea. Most experts appear to believe, probably correctly, that China would veto a U.S. resolution. However, the United States could employ explanations and incentives that would make a Chinese veto more difficult:

• Deal with China’s reputed fear of a North Korean collapse by asserting to the Chinese that North Korean leaders would make a rational decision to start making concessions rather than allow energy shortages to generate an internal crisis.
• Offer the Chinese acceptance of China’s long-standing proposal to resume Six Party Talks, and offer to work with China to develop common proposals in renewed talks.
• U.S. strategy also must involve similar proposals and offers to Russia. Don’t ignore Russia.

A U.S. resolution, even if vetoed by China, still could create gains for the United States, as it could:

• Bring the U.S.-China discussion-debate into the open to a growing segment of Chinese public opinion, which has turned critical of North Korea.
• Inform Chinese of China’s energy subsidies to North Korea.
• Inform Chinese of U.S. explanations and incentives to China.
• Produce a more robust debate within the Chinese government, sparked by voices urging tougher measures against North Korea, including a cutoff of oil.

In short, set the future for more intense Chinese debates.

The resolution would create a test for China in its relations with South Korea. China has wooed South Korea in recent years, but President Park Geun-hye has been angry over China’s lack of support for her penalties on North Korea in 2016. China would face a dilemma in its relations with South Korea in deciding whether or not to veto a U.S. resolution. South Koreans would gain a clearer perception of the possibilities and limits of security cooperation with China.

The United States would gain by introducing a resolution to cut off North Korea oil and natural gas imports. Realistically, it is unlikely that the Obama administration or its successor will introduce such a resolution. Time is running out for the current brand of U.N. sanctions, and North Korea probably will close the door on them by 2018-2020.

Larry Niksch was a specialist in Asian affairs at the Congressional Research Service until 2010. He is an ICAS fellow with the Institute for Korean-American Studies and a senior associate with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and teaches East Asian Security at George Washington University. The views expressed are his own.

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challenges for the Republic of Korea, the ROK/US alliance and the international community, including internal civil war, spillover of conflict outside of the North, refugee flows and massive human suffering, loss of control of weapons of mass destruction and the scientists who develop them and, most important, the complex and dangerous resistance by remnants of the military and a highly indoctrinated population.

Although the Korean people living in the North are suffering horrendously under the world’s most oppressive regime, it would be a fundamental mistake to assume (as the U.S. did in 2003 in Iraq), that the ROK/US alliance military forces would be welcomed as liberators and saviors. Of course, some will welcome outside help, but there could be enough resistance to make the insurgency in Iraq pale in comparison.

While the ROK/US alliance has conducted contingency planning for North Korean instability and regime collapse over the years, there are still numerous questions that require policy answers now — such as the disposition of the Korean People’s Army, what should happen to the regime’s scientific community, how to coerce and co-opt the second-tier leadership to prevent or mitigate conflict, and the future of landownership in the North, just to name a few.

However, resistance to unification will cause the greatest long-term problems for the ROK, the region and the international community.

There is only one way to prepare now to mitigate the effects of six decades of indoctrination and to help prepare the way for unification. The ROK must initiate a comprehensive information- and influence activities campaign. This must be done on multiple levels against target audiences of the remnants of the regime, the second-tier leadership and the Korean people. Although the regime has worked hard to prevent information from the outside world from reaching the people, defector organizations have been having success penetrating the North’s information defenses. From cellphone contacts through China to the proliferation of DVD players and DVDs, CDs and USB drives, the Korean people in the North are gaining access to various kinds of information. Studies have shown that some of the most sought-after forms of entertainment are South Korean serial dramas that show how people live in the South.

One major effort that could help ensure the continuation of Ms. Park’s Dresden Initiative would be to develop a series of dramas that are based on the story of unification. The ROK government should explore working with the Korean entertainment industry to take ROK policies and plans and turn them into dramas that are designed as entertainment, yet serve to illustrate how the unification process would unfold.

Stories can show how the Korean People’s Army would be integrated — if it maintains the chain of command and does not attack the South. They can show what happens to scientists who cooperate to dismantle the nuclear program. The Korean people can learn about landownership, the democratic political process and, most important, freedom. Serial dramas can educate people through the entertainment they crave.

There is much to do to plan and prepare for regime collapse, and the proposal above is just one small element of a necessary comprehensive strategy and campaign plan. But even the regime’s actions have driven the international community to execute this strategic strangulation campaign, there must be a renewed sense of urgency to plan and prepare for the possibility of regime collapse.

Yes, the regime has muddled through extreme hardship and may very well continue to do so, but there is always the possibility of regime collapse and the attendant dire consequences. Every action taken now, especially information and influence activities, has the potential to mitigate or reduce conflict and pave the way toward a political arrangement that is the only way to achieve denuclearization and end the horrendous human rights atrocities. Unification must result in a stable, secure, peaceful, economically vibrant, non-nuclear peninsula, reunified under a liberal constitutional form of government determined by the Korean people. The future is a United Republic of Korea.

Retired Col. David S. Maxwell is associate director of the Center for Security Studies in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. As a member of the U.S. Army Special Forces, he has nearly three decades of experience with Korean security issues.
Is Kim Jong-un a martyr?

By Alexandre Mansourov

Western experts believe North Korea will not attack South Korea militarily for three main reasons: The DPRK leadership is not suicidal; the North Korean regime is rational and, therefore, can be deterred by the U.S. conventional military presence and nuclear umbrella in the Republic of Korea; and the Korean People's Army will not attack South Korea in his mind, he must be willing to blow up our planet with nuclear force if his life and his regime's survival are physically threatened. When one of his cousins was denied her love, she chose to take her life in Paris in 2006. Suicidal genes or mindset, if Mr. Kim's grip on power is imperiled, he might decide to take away his life and those of his subjects with him in a nuclear inferno. Although the North Korean leadership appears to be rational and deter- The North Koreans have convinced themselves that the United States will attack them sooner or later. They like to say that Serbia did not have nuclear weapons, but came under the U.S.-led NATO attack under some pretext invented by its enemies. Iraq did not have nuclear weapons — although Saddam pretended he did to keep his enemies at bay. He failed in his strategic deception and dissuasion campaign — and Iraq became the target of U.S. attack. Libya disarmed unilaterally and gave up its weapons of mass destruction, but it did not help Moammar Gadhafi to stave off the NATO attack. The DPRK leaders also saw what happened in the Balkans, Iraq and Libya, and they said repeatedly that they would not let that happen to their country. It is obvious that China plays an enormous role in Korean security affairs, but I would speculate that Beijing's perceived abandonment and very real bullying of Pyongyang may actually push the North to attack the South earlier, rather than taking a “wait and see” attitude and hoping for a change of hearts in the enemies' capitals. Why? Because any hesitation and inaction in Pyongyang may allow the Chinese to use their economic clout and political influence to undermine the unity of the North Korean leadership and subvert the North Korean population from inside.

Mr. Kim does not want to allow the Chinese to slowly squeeze his regime out of power and replace it with a more pro-Beijing satellite, which will defer to Beijing's higher national security interests and more important strategic relations. Mr. Kim may be better off by presenting his Chinese patron with the fait accompli and then asking for help in negotiating a peaceful settlement, to the renewed inter-Korean civil war or defending his unified Korea against American reinvasion. Mr. Kim's nuclear threats are not just bluster and must be taken seri- ously. They reveal his penchant for coercive diplomacy and reflect his “hostile intentions” toward the United States and its allies. They are like cancer cells that tend to proliferate and eat all good cells around them. Mr. Kim is a bully who is used to getting what he wants. He is like a malignant tumor growing in the darkest corner of Northeast Asia: He is very good at evading the international immune system by various hidden and hider- eous means. He must be stopped and surgically removed from power so the people of North Korea can be free and happy, and the international community can live in peace, safe from Mr. Kim's nuclear threats.

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NK’s system of privilege, loyalty and ‘human rights denial’

By Robert M. Collins

Especially since the release of the report by the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (UNCOI) in February 2014, Kim Jong-un’s regime has come under increased scrutiny by the international community for its human rights abuses.

The UNCOI’s basic findings identify a systematic deliberate denial of human rights throughout North Korean society through practices that are draconian in nature and brutal in execution.

The Kim Jong-un regime stands as the bastion of the most centralized political system in the world. North Korea’s capital city of Pyongyang is the power center of that regime. Every resource that contributes to power, advantage or a better quality of life is centered in or managed from Pyongyang. Most importantly, the individuals who enable the Kim Family Regime to maintain political control are predominately located in Pyongyang, with supporting elements in the provinces.

The Korean Workers’ Party, the ruling party of North Korea, and all agencies of the government, security agencies and military are headquartered in the capital city. It is where the institutions involved in the suppression of human rights maintain their centers of administration, policy and decision-making. It is where the regime’s practice of “human rights denial” is formulated, and it is where political evaluations of key regime officials are conducted with focus on those officials leading and implementing the policies that support human rights denial. Because Pyongyang provides privilege and resources to those that serve the regime’s interests, North Koreans strive to live there. In doing so, they comply with the implementation of human rights denial in their personal performance and political participation.

Often referred to as the Pyongyang Republic, North Korea’s capital encompasses the nexus of ideology, centralization of power, resource prioritization and politically oriented privilege that enables the Pyongyang Republic to deny every North Korean every conceivable human right. Each of the regime’s three Supreme Leaders — Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un — contributed to the creation of the Pyongyang Republic through ideological and physical construction supported by highly effective regime internal security, an effort that begins with the sociopolitical classification of every North Korean. This classification system has been used to control the right to live in Pyongyang. Those allowed to reside in North Korea’s capital city are thus forced to implement the ideological values of the regime and contribute to the regime’s political consolidation process and its hereditary succession system.

The ideological foundation for maintaining the supremacy of the Supreme Leader (Suryong) is the doctrine of Suryong-juui, or Supreme Leader-ism. The Suryong leads the alignment of the political, social, economic and cultural sectors of North Korea to advance the socialist revolution. The Suryong leads the dictatorship of the proletariat and is the mind that brings the party together. An individual’s rights must not interfere with the Suryong’s guidance and directives because the Suryong is always correct in his wisdom, directions and decisions. The Supreme Leader’s guidance is where the Pyongyang Republic’s system of privilege, direct link between privilege, direct service to the conceptual precepts of the Pyongyang Republic and human rights denial.

As a result of these policies, the disparities between Pyongyang and the provinces are evidenced by the quality of life between the two populations. Those that live in Pyongyang receive the best and most food, health care, housing, education and professional opportunity. Those that live in the provinces overwhelmingly do not.

The role of the provinces is to provide manpower and resources without receiving the benefit of local economic development in return.

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North Korea’s motivations, capabilities and proliferation

By Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.

Recent rhetoric emanating from the North Korean regime has been quite threatening — and may signal a real “cold spell” for any outreach. The isolated regime will be willing to embrace. But even more troubling are the actions that have been taken since January 2016. A successful underground nuclear test in January and a successful launch of a three-stage ballistic missile with the range to hit the mainland United States (under the cover of a “satellite launch”) are only the beginning of the threatening behavior.

The North Koreans have now recently answered the pundits who have long claimed the DPRK could not get a long-range ballistic missile through all three of its stages (now accomplished), make a warhead small enough to fit on a missile (now apparently accomplished), build a mobile missile capable of evading U.S. early warning before launch (now also apparently accomplished) or build a re-entry vehicle for the missile that could successfully enter the earth’s atmosphere on the way to its target without burning up (now tested and pictures released to the public).

On March 9 the North Koreans revealed a nuclear warhead for their KN-08 — a road-mobile, long-range ballistic missile. In addition, they actually showed (in color pictures) where the warhead is mounted on the re-entry vehicle for the missile. Finally, on March 15, at a separate location, the North Koreans conducted an atmospheric re-entry test of the KN-08. Based on the pictures released, the test was both authentic and successful. Thus, as U.S. officials in both the Defense Department and the intelligence community have been assessing for almost two years now, North Korea appears to have a mobile, long-range, nuclear-equipped missile that can hit the United States. They have also shown (at least once publicly) that the missile has a re-entry vehicle that can probably withstand the heat of the earth’s atmosphere on the way to its target. While there is no information to confirm it, it is certainly possible that those with access to highly classified intelligence collection methods and sources already knew about these developments at least 18 months ago — institutions that support and protect the regime.

But there is more behind North Korean motivations than simply internal power credibility, regime legacy or even deterring outside attacks on the DPRK. North Korea has had a very long, very profitable relationship with Iran. How close is that relationship? As noted scholar Tal Inbar of the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Studies in Israel has stated, “If you see it in North Korea today, you will see it in Iran tomorrow.” This has held true for more than 30 years. Iran has every kind of liquid fuel missile that Pyongyang has built — a variety of Scuds, the No Dong, the Musudan and even Taepo Dong technology. In addition, there is now a long string of evidence since 2003 that North Korea has been assisting Iran with its nuclear program — including, at the very least, constructing underground facilities, providing raw materials and assisting with nuclear warhead technology. Thus, it is very likely that both the KN-08 and the nuclear warhead technology for the missile will go to Iran — for a very high price, of course (likely in the billions of dollars range). What does this mean for the United States? It means that if North Korea can target the west coast of the United States, Iran, once it gets the missile and the warhead, could target the east coast of the United States. Those who doubt that this is exactly what we should fear should keep in mind the complete lack of hesitation North Korea has shown in proliferating anything to anybody who will buy it — up to and including long-range ballistic missiles and nuclear technology.

North Korea’s motivations are not complicated. The regime has no intention of ever giving up its nuclear weapons or its long-range ballistic missiles. The reasons for this are clear: 1) Kim Jong-un needs these weapons in order to maintain the credibility of his regime and to consolidate his power from a position of military strength; and 2) these weapons, once proliferated, serve to bring in billions of dollars in badly needed revenue for the DPRK. As we look to the future, renewed focus on the Proliferation Security Initiative (to prevent these weapons, if at all possible, from getting to the Middle East) and sanctions enforcement that goes after front companies and banks handling the dirty money and resources vital for North Korea’s proliferation operations will be vital for pressing Kim Jong-un and his power elite. Given recent developments, this has become more compelling than ever.

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Kim Jong-un’s leadership style

As Kim Jong-un grows into his leadership role, it will likely become harder for his advisers to control him from behind the scenes. This could result in a very different leadership style than is evident today, which is firmly tied to Kim’s legitimacy building campaign. Once he is able to fully step into the shoes of the Supreme Leader, his decision-making process may change and the character and direction of his policies may become less opaque. Whether and how far he will depart from his father’s legacy remains to be seen.

No ruler governs exactly like his predecessor. Age, experience, legitimacy and relationships affect a leader’s characteristics and help determine the amount of power and authority he possesses. But these factors do not completely determine a leader’s position. In regimes like North Korea, political culture plays a fundamental role in how a leader comes to power and is treated by the wider leadership. The North Korean regime is subservient to a “Leader” (Suryong)-based doctrine that is not easily undone. One of the most peculiar features of the North Korean system is the supreme authority of the “Leader” (Suryong) in every domain, including ideology, law, administration and regulations. As was made clear by North Korean propaganda, “The Suryong is an impeccable brain of the living body, the masses can be endowed with their life in exchange for their loyalty to him, and the Party is the nerve center of that living body.”

Regardless of Kim Jong-un’s qualifications, he was chosen by his father, the Supreme Leader, and is of the Kim bloodline. Unlike his father, he went through the “proper” channels to receive his titles of power. In his early 30s, he is the legitimate ruler, the Supreme Leader.

What Kim Jong-un does not possess is the unquestioned, absolute and enduring loyalty of the leadership and the population. Although political culture may guide the succession, the new leader’s ability to deliver on his policy agenda affects his ability to consolidate his power. Kim Jong-un is two hereditary transitions away from Kim Il-sung’s revolutionary credentials. His claim to legitimacy is thus weaker, and his policy decisions will play a greater role in maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the country’s elite.

Once Kim Jong-un has consolidated his power, he will be able to make his own decisions. In the meantime, Kim will have to rely on his closest advisers, working with his Personal Secretariat to set the agenda, present policy options and ensure that his decisions are implemented. The Personal Secretariat and Royal Economy emerged in the 1970s with Kim Jong-il’s rise to power and have become institutionalized as part of the leadership apparatus dedicated to ensuring the authority of the Supreme Leader. Both of these parts of the leadership apparatus are tied to the internal security apparatus. Together, these three pieces of the apparatus provide the foundation of the Suryong system.

The Kim dynasty may be living on borrowed time. The regime has entered into its third generation, which is unheard of in the annals of recent political history. Totalitarian regimes may be ruthless and draconian, but they are built on weak foundations. They are the result of informal alliances that are forged at a moment in time. As time marches on, these alliances become weaker as they are replaced again and again. North Korea is no exception. The Kim regime lacks the same weight as it did for his grandfather and father, which puts Kim Jong-un in a very difficult situation.

If he attempts to continue along the same path as his grandfather and father as an unwavering tyrant, the system will eventually falter. If he chooses to pursue reform and tries to reinvent the regime by departing from totalitarianism, the regime could collapse into chaos. Whichever path Kim Jong-un follows, the rights of the majority of the North Korean people are likely to continue to suffer.

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Adapted from “North Korean House of Cards: Leadership Dynamics under Kim Jong-un” by Ken E. Gause

While he has only been in power for less than four years, some information, albeit highly speculative, is beginning to emerge about Kim Jong-un’s leadership style.

The most obvious departure from the way his father operated is Kim Jong-un’s open persona. He conveys an impression of an outgoing, people-friendly and ambitious leader, markedly different from Kim Jong-il’s isolationist, solitary and secretive image.

Kim Jong-un appears to be comfortable giving speeches and interacting with large groups of ordinary citizens, whereas his father only gave one publicly recorded speech that lasted 12 seconds. This aspect of Kim Jong-un’s leadership style harks back to his grandfather, Kim Il-sung.

Reports from defectors also paint a picture of a young and impetuous Supreme Leader who is sometimes quick to make decisions without seeking advice. He apparently understands the tremendous power of the position he holds, but also understands that there are constraints established by his father and grandfather that the system imposes.

Fully assuming the role of Supreme Leader requires more than just acting on one’s own initiative and making decisions. It also requires the leader to interact with the wider leadership. Recent defector reports suggest that Kim Jong-un is becoming increasingly comfortable in his role as Supreme Leader. He is dealing not only with his closest advisers but also with powerful institutions, such as the military high command.

Furthermore, he appears to be keenly aware of the protocols that need to be observed and seems to understand the boundaries within which he must operate to safeguard his position and maintain regime stability. However, his policies indicate a bolder approach to dealing with the issues facing the regime, both internal and external.
Crimes against humanity demand accountability

By The Hon. Michael Kirby

North Korea challenges international peace and security. Its proved human rights abuses demand accountability of those responsible. But are these two imperatives compatible?

Preserving peace and security and upholding universal human rights and justice were included in the preamble to the U.N. Charter of 1945. However, generally the U.N. tries to keep the subjects separate: Human rights tend to be very divisive and emotional.

The tricky business of securing international peace requires cool heads and quiet diplomacy. Human rights demand redress for wrongs that cannot be easily compromised. Peace and security necessitate delicate footwork to preserve safety and prevent conflict. Compromise and accommodation are usually the name of that game.

The U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (COI) was established in 2013. It delivered its report to the U.N. Human Rights Council in March 2014. The report disclosed “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations” that in many instances were found to constitute crimes against humanity. “The gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.”

The crimes carefully collected in the report included extermination and murder of political enemies; enslavement; torture; imprisonment; and rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence. The list goes on to persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds; forced transfer of populations; and the enforced disappearance of persons. Detention camps are proved by satellite images, but the details are filled in by the harrowing testimony of witnesses. They have come in large numbers to tell their stories and to demand action by the United Nations. We must respond to their pleas. Their testimonies are online. It will reproach the world until we act.

The Human Rights Council condemned North Korea and sent the COI report to the General Assembly. It recommended referral to the Security Council. By large votes of the General Assembly, the nations of the world responded. Attempts by the North Korea regime to frustrate or delay engagement of the Security Council failed. The Security Council, potentially, had a unique power. It held the keys to confer jurisdiction on the International Criminal Court to put on trial those in North Korea responsible for the crimes once proved. Under a principle of international law, leaders who, having the power, fail to prevent or punish crimes against humanity are themselves liable for those crimes. Potentially, that includes Kim Jong-un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea.

Within days, he was proved wrong.

In January 2016, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear weapons test. In February 2016, it conducted a long-range missile test. The action of North Korea was an affront to China. The connections between security and human rights were demonstrated for all to see. Unanimously the Security Council voted for tough new sanctions by the world community. Reliable reports suggest that China has taken strong steps of its own to uphold the new sanctions.

But what can we do to pick up the challenge of the COI report? What can we do to respond to the crimes against humanity described in the COI report? Just as patient dialogue in the Security Council ultimately achieved action on sanctions, so careful diplomacy behind closed doors should explore the ways of answering the cries of the victims. A quiet resolve of nations should be created to fulfill commitment voiced by the international community in 1945 when the U.N. was established. Crimes against humanity are not just human rights violations. They demand steps to ensure accountability. This was the resolve that put Nazi tyrants in the dock at Nuremberg. “Never again,” we said when confronted by their crimes. Yet now we face new crimes and new evidence. We must not turn away.

Human rights and peace and security are not divorced. Self-evidently, a country of violence, cruelty and danger is potentially unstable. Nuclear proliferation, missiles and submarine technology render North Korea a danger to itself and its neighbors. Responding to security concerns will never be adequate so long as grievous human rights violations remain to imperil the peace. This is why the recent unanimous vote of the Security Council on sanctions is a good step. It shows that unanimity can be built in the face of existential dangers. Isolation, secrecy and silence are no longer options for dealing with North Korea. All members of the U.N. now have the COI report on what goes on there. No longer can we say “We did not know.” Now we do know. And our knowledge demands our response.

Miseries of women, others at DPRK prison camps revealed

By Ann Buwalda and Nia Emerson

On March 18, four women defectors of North Korea gave a powerful reminder that as the world turns its attention to North Korea’s alarming nuclear activities, women and other North Korean citizens are silently suffering in the clutches of the brutal regime.

The women made history by speaking at the first event of the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women that focused specifically on the status of North Korean women. Ambassador Power of the United States, Ambassador Oh Joon of the Republic of Korea, Ambassador Motohide Yoshikawa of Japan and Ambassador Peter Wilson of the United Kingdom, hosted the event. Every day in North Korea, people suffer from an almost total lack of human rights. Families wither away due to starvation and thousands are thrown into political prison camps for anything that displeases the Kim Jong-un regime. Ambassador Power, quoting the Commission of Inquiry, expressed that within the most repressive country in the world, women are still the most vulnerable. These women’s testimonies are meant to give a voice to the millions in North Korea who are not allowed to have their own.

Kim Young-soon said she spent nine years in a political prison camp, along with her family. She found out after she was released that she had been imprisoned because of her friendship with a hidden mistress of Kim Jong-il. Of her entire family, only Ms. Kim and her son survived the camp, and her daughter still lives with crippling mental disabilities because of the scarring experiences and torture he faced in North Korea. Ms. Kim says, “If you really want to establish peace in the world, I think it’s as urgent as dealing with North Korea’s nuclear issue to resolve or get rid of all the political prison camps in North Korea.”

Lucia Jang’s first husband sold their son, without her knowing, to a wealthy North Korean family for a small amount of money and some bars of soap. She became pregnant a second time by a man she fell in love with in China, but she had to return to North Korea because the father’s family did not want the child. After returning, North Korean authorities in the prison camp where she was detained demanded that she abort the baby. Not wanting to lose a second child, she received help from her father and permanently escaped North Korea.

Lee Hyeonseo is a young woman who describes living in North Korea like living in another universe. She recalled the harsh abuses women face not only in North Korea but also in China, where they are commonly trafficked as slaves or sent back to North Korea.

Now a young mom, Kim Eun-ju lived most of her life never thinking she would become a mother because she lived in constant fear that she wouldn’t see the next day. Her family was struck hard by a famine in the 1990s. In 1997, her father died from starvation. One day, in desperation her mother and sister went to go find food, leaving Kim Eun-ju at home. Days later, thinking she would die of hunger before her family returned, Ms. Kim wrote her will as a mere 11-year-old.

Fortunately, her mother came back that day, though empty-handed. They were then forced to live homeless. In the winter, they fled to China to escape starvation only to have their struggles of hunger be replaced with struggles of human trafficking. Chinese authorities sent Ms. Kim back to North Korea where she experienced horrifying treatment upon return. Describing North Korea, Ms. Kim says, “to them, you are not human.”

As the Kim Jong-un regime continues to strip North Koreans of their dignity, it’s time for the rest of the world to step up with a united mission to preserve the value of humanity. It’s time to remind North Koreans that they are humans, extraordinary humans, and they are not alone.

As the United States and other governments consider their policy approach toward North Korea, they must prioritize the protection of human rights and ally themselves with the victims of the regime. China needs to stand by its commitment to protect refugees. Stop treating these victims as criminals. Stop sending them back to their misery. And as North Korean women continue to suffer as the most vulnerable of the vulnerable, their condition must be paid great attention.

Many women with stories like these defectors’ bravely fight the most oppressive government in the world, and now others must commit to stand and fight with them.

Ann Buwalda, an immigration attorney in Northern Virginia, founded the U.S. branch of the Jubilee Campaign in the early 1990s. She and Nia Emerson, a staff member of the Jubilee Campaign, prepared this article on behalf of the North Korea Freedom Coalition.
Loyal but exploited: North Korea’s overseas laborers

By Greg Scarlatoiu

North Korea’s exportation of laborers to foreign countries earns the Kim Jong-un regime part of the hard currency needed to develop its weapons and to keep its elites loyal. Recent studies indicate that at least 50,000 North Korean laborers are officially dispatched overseas, earning the Kim regime between $120 million to $230 million per year. However, recent data from China and Russia indicate that the number of North Korean workers officially dispatched to those countries may have increased dramatically in recent years, with an estimated 47,000 reportedly in Russia in 2015.

The program began with the exportation of North Korean labor to the Soviet Far East in the 1960s. To date, North Korean workers have been sent to 45 countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. Currently, at least 16 countries are hosting North Korean workers. Although North Korea is not a member of the International Labor Organization (ILO), all countries hosting North Korean workers are ILO members.

For the more difficult jobs in construction or logging, the regime selects male candidates of good Songbun — North Korea’s loyalty-based social discrimination system — who are married with at least one child. They are on the fringes of the “core” class, loyal but poor.

Young women sent overseas as restaurant workers come from privileged “core” class families. Women sent to China as textile workers must also come from a “loyal” background.

The overseas jobs are difficult, but coveted. To go overseas, workers have to give a bribe of $100 to $200, liquor, cigarettes or dining coupons at high-end restaurants to those making the selection. After they cross the border, their passports are confiscated by their minders and the workers find themselves entrapped and subjected to very harsh conditions of work. Up to 90 percent of their salary is confiscated by the North Korean authorities, but the very little money left can still make a significant difference for the families left behind.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the workers’ families received not money, but coupons to purchase food and electronics. In the 1990s, as North Korea’s economy failed, the coupon system collapsed, and the number of overseas North Korean workers declined. As the number began increasing again, the workers gained limited access to opportunities to earn cash. While overseas today, the workers continue to be under the strict supervision of agents of the North Korean regime. With the approval of the three site supervisors — the Workers’ Party secretary, the State Security Department (SSD) agent and the worksite manager — they may moonlight or be “subcontracted” by other foreign workers, if they bribe their bosses.

The North Korean worker ends up being exploited by his government, by the hosting country, by his supervisors and by other foreign workers. The loyal pauper is at the bottom of the heap, and the Kim regime knows it. Upon their return to North Korea, the SSD keeps the workers under strict surveillance for at least three years.

The workers abroad do not have any freedom of association or collective bargaining. Suspected dissent results in swift repatriation and harsh punishment. According to one of the former workers: “They put plaster casts on both of the worker’s legs and send him back. The casts are taken off after they cross the border. They let the workers go home if it’s a minor problem, but for bigger issues they are sent to a kwan-li-so (political prison camp).”

Social discrimination is rampant in the selection process. Only those of good Songbun are sent overseas. Health and safety violations are widespread. The scale of health and safety violations and the frequency of workplace accident-related injuries and fatalities may vary depending on location, industry and specialization. The fatality rate is high among loggers and construction workers. If loggers die on the job, the authorities wait for months to repatriate the bodies, until they have 10 coffins to put on the truck, to save on fuel cost.

Wage violations are rampant. Workers are not paid directly by the foreign employers. The workers do not even know what overtime work means. The laborers work between 14 and 16 hours a day, with no holidays, except perhaps one day a month. In most cases, the working conditions amount to forced labor. It is only the scale that may differ, depending on the hosting country, industry or specialization. Differences in the scale of forced labor are circumstantial, rather than the result of systematic efforts to uphold labor standards.

While continuing to claim it is a “workers’ paradise,” North Korea ruthlessly exploits its workers at home and abroad. The international community should urge North Korea to join the ILO. The international community must call on North Korea to abide by the obligations it assumed when it acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its own domestic legislation to protect the rights of its workers, at home and abroad. North Korea should cease restricting access to employers based on one’s Songbun classification. Further investigation of the situation of exported North Korean laborers should be conducted, and the cooperation of host countries must be sought. ILO members hosting North Korean laborers should abide by ILO conventions, and must be held accountable if egregious violations of the rights of North Korean workers are perpetrated within their territorial jurisdictions. Responsible members of the international community should also consider developing a set of standards inspired by the Global Sullivan Principles. Companies along the supply chain tainted by violations of the rights of exploited North Korean workers should abide by those standards.

The presence of tens of thousands of North Korean citizens overseas may offer opportunities for access and interaction, despite draconian control and surveillance. Hosting states and employers should be persuaded to seek direct access to those workers and distribute materials informing them of their rights. However, the exportation of North Korean labor should be terminated through concerted international action if the North Korean regime refuses to improve the working conditions and the overall human rights situation of these workers.

Greg Scarlatoiu is executive director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, located in Washington, D.C.
South Koreans handling ‘daily stress’ of North’s provocations

By Rep. John Doolittle

I was in South Korea in mid-February with a fact-finding delegation of experienced policy leaders on Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia issues sponsored by The Washington Times. Our visit was given a heightened immediacy by the fact that it happened to coincide with a flurry of strategic provocations from the North.

In the space of a month, North Korea tested another nuclear weapon, put a satellite into orbit and fired a long-range ICBM that demonstrated their capability to hit any part of the U.S.

The U.N. Command/U.S. Forces Korea was in the midst of preparations for its annual joint military exercises with the ROK military. Always taken as provocation by the North, this year’s eight weeks of maneuvers is called “the largest scale ever” by South Korea’s defense ministry and is a well-choreographed technological show of force.

North Korea’s military doctrine leans increasingly toward asymmetric warfare, according to Richard Chancell- lor, a senior analyst with U.S. Forces Korea, which means they would attempt to use conventional weaponry to offset their inability to match the U.S. and South Korea’s technological advances in cruise missiles or submarines. For example, the North can roll out an artillery piece, fire a shell into downtown Seoul and roll the gun back inside. Of the South’s 50 million people, about half live in and around the Seoul metropolitan area.

The timing of our delegation, which was co-chaired by Dan Burton, former chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Washington Times President and CEO Larry Beasley, could not have been better from the viewpoint of getting a firsthand immersion understanding of the stress of ongoing conflict that is the daily life of a South Korean.

U.S. Ambassador Mark Lippert, who received the delegation at the embassy’s historic landmark residence, remarked on the resilience of the South Korean people in the face of continual threats and hostility from the North, while also observing that the recent events had heightened tensions in the South to an unprecedented level.

Briefings by top government officials frequently had to be rearranged to accommodate new developments. This was particularly true on Feb. 11, when South Korea announced it had closed the Kaesong Industrial Complex. That project had employed more than 50,000 North Koreans and created a revenue stream to the North, with more than 50,000 North Koreans and created a revenue stream to the North, with about 70 people since taking power, including at least three of his four top generals. Some of the executions have been quite dramatic, such as the case of Defense Minister Hyon Yong-chol, who was executed with an anti-aircraft gun in front of hundreds of people at a military school in Pyongyang.

According to intelligence reports and accounts smuggled out of the North, Mr. Kim suffers the symptoms of someone clinically depressed. He is known to drink heavily and not sleep well at night. “If there is no North Korea, there is no world,” he has stated. As a source in the Korean government told us, “Killing your friends and relatives takes a toll on you.” A person like this is someone you consider putting under a 24-hour suicide watch.

Mr. Yun feels the global reaction to Mr. Kim’s provocations is appropriate, and that Mr. Kim may have underestimated the response. “The North Korean missile test was a harsh slap in the face to China,” Mr. Yun said, adding, “the U.S. Congressional resolution, coupled with the U.N. sanctions, is the toughest response ever and sends a very strong signal to North Korea and the international community.”
The Korean Peninsula has posed a seemingly intractable challenge for the United States for six and a half decades, and North Korea’s latest round of provocations has crystallized the danger of a nuclear-armed regime. Beijing and Washington may disagree about the future of Korea, but leaders on both sides of the Pacific agree that such weapons have no place in North Korea. Unfortunately, previous efforts to deter Pyongyang have failed. Successfully prohibiting North Korea from nuclear weaponization requires a new strategy that utilizes a strengthened trilateral alliance between the United States, Republic of Korea and Japan.

A robust trilateral alliance serves multiple purposes, the clearest of which is to strengthen the U.S. and Korean response to any hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. If hostilities ever broke out across the 38th Parallel, Japanese involvement would be required for a successful effort against North Korean forces. At a bare minimum, Japanese bases and ports would be vital logistical hubs. Following Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s recent defense reforms allowing collective self-defense, Japanese Self Defense Forces can now also take an active role in any future campaign. This means Japan could be a true force multiplier for allied action, providing valuable capabilities in anti-submarine warfare, ballistic missile defense, minesweeping and search and rescue.

Leaders in Seoul have long assumed that if conflict broke out, U.S. forces and bases in Japan would be available, but have seen little need for further Japanese assistance. Such support, however, should not be taken for granted. Instead, U.S. and Korea planners should begin incorporating the Japanese into planning and training so that in the event of a crisis, all three countries are prepared and have effective coordination mechanisms already in place. Such steps would also highlight the importance of Japanese involvement.

Beyond the wartime value of trilateral security, closer U.S.-South Korea-Japan cooperation would help maintain the peace and security the region has largely enjoyed over the past 60 years by creating a new form of leverage. Over the years, many have called on China to tame its boisterous ally, but Pyongyang’s recent nuclear and missile tests demonstrate China’s lack of control or lack of will to exercise control. Regardless, action from Beijing — or the U.N., for that matter — is unlikely to bring North Korea back to the negotiating table, much less achieve denuclearization.

A strong U.S.-South Korea-Japan partnership could provide the right incentive for starting this process. The Kim regime focuses almost solely on survival, and trilateral security efforts would demonstrate that the North’s nuclear ambitions are counterproductive to that end by consolidating regional actors against it. Similarly, closer ties between the United States and its Northeast Asia allies could motivate China to use whatever influence it wields in Pyongyang, since it too opposes a stronger alliance.

Japan and South Korea represent the United States’ closest allies in Asia, and the trilateral relationship will be the bedrock of the U.S. foreign policy in Asia for decades to come. The notion of three-way coordination between the allies has been discussed for years, but due to recent diplomatic breakthroughs and Pyongyang’s aggression, the environment has never been so favorable for establishing trilateral defense policies. Decisive leadership from Washington in taking practical steps toward creating institutionalized cooperation will be critical for creating this new alliance and deterring the North.

There are many hurdles to overcome. A poorly executed effort could destabilize the region if North Korea fears for its existence or if China feels encircled by the United States. Clear messaging and dialogue that reiterates the defensive nature of the trilateral cooperation and its focus on the Korean Peninsula can mitigate these risks.

More challenging, perhaps, are the historical tensions between Korea and Japan. U.S. government officials should therefore strive to separate the very real cultural and identity issues from defense matters.

A number of practical steps should be taken to this end. First, Washington needs to push Seoul and Tokyo to reengage on the information-sharing agreement abandoned in 2012. This agreement would allow a seamless flow of intelligence between all three countries and streamline communication and coordination. Second, the United States should advocate for recurring meetings between all three parties — from the national leadership level to the ministerial level and down to the operational levels. Finally, the U.S. military should begin trilateral planning and training with Japan and Korea. This will not only demonstrate the value of trilateralism but also exercise the actual elements of cooperation.

In its calls for closer trilateral ties over the years, the United States has done an excellent job of explaining why such an alliance is good for its own national interests. The challenge now is demonstrating to the Koreans and Japanese how trilateralism is key to their interests as well. A nuclear-armed North Korea poses a real danger to the United States and its partners in Northeast Asia, and Pyongyang can only be checked by a strong, united front. The United States must act now to create a new trilateral defense framework that will guide Asian security for decades to come.

By McDaniel D. Wicker

McDaniel Wicker is a fellow on Asia security at the Wilson Center. He previously served as an U.S. Air Force officer, largely in the Asia-Pacific region.
North Korea’s Feb. 7 launch of its Taepo Dong 3 revealed that the missile has an estimated range of 13,000 kilometers—meaning it can now reach any part of the United States. Previously, its range was estimated at 10,000 kilometers.

To face a common threat, the United States must work closely with critical allies South Korea and Japan. Trilateral diplomatic and security coordination is crucial. But while Washington’s relations with Seoul and Tokyo are perhaps the best they’ve ever been, bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea remain strained.

North Korea is a very real and growing threat to the United States and its allies. Pyongyang has likely already equipped its No Dong medium-range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead. That puts Japan and South Korea at nuclear risk today. Can North Korea hit the U.S. with a nuclear ICBM? The four-star commanders of U.S. Forces Korea, Pacific Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command all think so. And if not today, then certainly in the very near future.

Kim Jong-un is telegraphing that he will conduct more nuclear and long-range missile tests. Mr. Kim seems desperate to convince experts of his capabilities — by having his picture taken next to a nuclear warhead and while watching a test to prove North Korea has mastered ICBM warhead technology.

There is now near-unanimity of views that stronger sanctions must be imposed on North Korea for its serial violations of international agreements, U.N. resolutions and U.S. law. Even experts and pundits who once derided sanctions in favor of diplomatic engagement now grudgingly admit the necessity of imposing punitive measures on Pyongyang.

North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests this year. Standing up against Chinese pressure and economic blackmail, South Korean President Park Geun-hye moved forward on U.S. deployment of the THAAD missile defense system to South Korea. She also finally pulled the plug on the failed inter-Korean economic venture at Kaesong.

Meanwhile, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe imposed unilateral Japanese sanctions. And the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly and bipartisanly passed the North Korea Policy and Sanctions Enforcement Act to induce President Barack Obama to move beyond his policy of timid incrementalism by more fully enforcing U.S. law.

The collective U.S., South Korea, Japanese and U.N. punitive measures are welcome, if long overdue, to punish North Korea for its defiance of laws and resolutions. Hopefully they will eventually alter North Korean behavior, but in the meantime, they enforce laws and will constrain both the import and export of prohibited nuclear and missile materials.

With everyone adopting stronger sanctions, Kim Jong-un may perceive himself as being painted into a corner. As a result, he may feel compelled to take even more provocative and desperate steps. With no apparent off-ramp on the highway to a crisis, the danger of a military clash on the Korean Peninsula is again rising.

To face a common threat, the United States must work closely with critical allies South Korea and Japan. Trilateral diplomatic and security coordination is crucial. But while Washington’s relations with Seoul and Tokyo are perhaps the best they’ve ever been, bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea remain strained.

Last December South Korea and Japan reached an agreement to resolve the tragic “comfort women” issue. The accord was achieved through diplomatic perseverance as well as the courage by President Park and Prime Minister Abe. Fulfilling the agreement, however, will require both leaders to push back against nationalist elements in their countries.

The United States welcomed the breakthrough agreement, since it could enable its key Asian allies to refocus attention away from past differences and toward current security challenges. Washington’s hope is that progress on this difficult historic issue can lead to expanded military cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea for deterring the growing North Korean nuclear threat.

Last September the National Diet passed defense reform legislation that empowers Japan to play a more comprehensive role in responding to global security challenges. These changes, long overdue and promised by successive Japanese administrations, will allow Japan to augment allied deterrence and defense capabilities. Unfortunately, the changes were perceived by South Korea as dangerous and indicative of an innate Japanese desire to resume a 1930s-style militaristic imperialism.

The Japanese defense reforms pose no threat to South Korea. Indeed, they are critical to implementing the allied defense of South Korea. Japan would provide a critical base of support for U.S. forces involved in any conflict with Pyongyang, and Japanese combat support capabilities would be required during a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Quite simply, without Japan, the U.S. and South Korea cannot deter a North Korean attack nor successfully defend the Korean Peninsula from northern aggression.

The U.S. has critical national interests in Asia. It needs to remain fully and energetically engaged in the region. But Washington cannot protect these interests on its own. It must rely on its indispensable allies — Japan and South Korea — to achieve mutually beneficial goals. Washington should encourage even greater trilateral security cooperation, including integrated ballistic missile defense systems.

North Korea Extends Missile Range to Cover Continental U.S.

Bruce Klingner is a senior research fellow in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation. He previously served as the CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea.

Sources: Washington Post and Heritage Foundation research.
Discussions — with a halt on arms tests — could be ‘achievable,’ ‘desirable’ to all

By Ambassador Joseph R. DeTrani

The North Korean nuclear and missile programs are growing threats to the global community. To date, the international community’s response to these programs has been weak and ineffective.

The imposition of additional sanctions on North Korea has not prevented North Korea from building more nuclear weapons and more missile delivery systems. It has not prevented North Korea from threatening South Korea, Japan and the United States with a nuclear attack. And sanctions have not persuaded North Korea to return to negotiations. Clearly, a new strategy is necessary.

Since 2008, after the Six-Party Talks came to a halt when North Korea refused to sign a monitoring and verification regime it had orally agreed to, the North has had three successful nuclear tests (in 2009, 2012 and 2016) and numerous ballistic missile launches, putting two satellites into orbit. North Korea’s nuclear programs, plutonium and enriched uranium, continue to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, and their missile programs continue to move forward, with short-range Scuds, midrange No Dongs and long-range Taepodong ballistic missiles. North Korean media recently reported that the nation was working on miniaturization of its nuclear weapons and developing the capability to mate nuclear weapons with their ballistic missiles.

As the leaders of the international community come together for the fourth Nuclear Security Summit, in an effort to ensure that nuclear weapons and fissile material are never acquired by terrorists and rogue states, North Korea remains unhinged, building more nuclear weapons and producing more fissile material. Indeed, this is a North Korea that has sold missiles to Iran, Libya and Syria. It is a North Korea that has assisted Syria with the construction of a nuclear reactor in Al Kibar that, fortunately, was destroyed by Israel in September 2007.

I remember one of my first formal meetings in Beijing in 2003 with a North Korean negotiator, who informed me that if a nuclear agreement to Pyongyang’s liking was not possible, then North Korea could build more nuclear weapons, test these weapons and sell them. My response was clear: Selling nuclear weapons would cross a red line, with severe consequences.

Over the years, however, as North Korea conducted nuclear tests and declared its uranium enrichment program in 2010 — thus admitting to another path for nuclear weapons — the task of getting North Korea to agree to comprehensive and verifiable denuclearization, in return for security assurances and other deliverables, has become more difficult. It was during this period of nuclear and missile escalation that formal six-party and bilateral negotiations with North Korea ceased.

A nuclear North Korea can lead to a nuclear arms race in the region, as South Korea and Japan consider acquiring their own nuclear weapons despite the extended nuclear deterrence the United States provides to these two allies. A nuclear-armed North Korea, or faction within the government, eventually may decide to sell a nuclear weapon or fissile materials for a price because sanctions are biting and fewer customers are buying North Korean missiles and conventional weapons. Nuclear proliferation of this type could affect the security of all countries.

After 13 years of failed six-party nuclear negotiations, it’s time for a change.

The North Korea nuclear issue is international and requires an international solution. The P-5 plus 1 with the European Union was successful in its nuclear negotiations with Iran, culminating with the Joint Plan of Action. Similar senior attention should be applied to the North Korea nuclear issue, with the P-5 plus 2 (South Korea and Japan), at the secretary of state level, proposing meetings with counterparts in North Korea to discuss and negotiate a nuclear agreement that would provide North Korea with security assurances, a peace treaty, economic and energy developmental aid and the provision of light-water reactors in exchange for a comprehensive and verifiable denuclearization agreement.

Persuading North Korea to enter into these negotiations should not be difficult. This is where China can use its significant leverage with North Korea to get Pyongyang to agree to these talks. Previously, we relied on China to resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea. That didn’t happen, and China was clear in stating that its leverage with North Korea was limited, in that instability on the Korean Peninsula (if China pushed too hard) was something China could not accept.

However, getting North Korea to sit down with the P-5 plus 2 countries to discuss denuclearization and other issues should be achievable and desirable for all participating countries. Indeed, getting North Korea to immediately halt all nuclear tests and missile launches during these discussions should be the first order of business.

The participation of Britain and France, as part of the P-5, would broaden the scope of these discussions and help emphasize that the nuclear issue with North Korea is global, affecting all countries.

Ambassador Joseph R. DeTrani is president of the Daniel Morgan Academy, a new graduate school. He was the special envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea from 2003 to 2005. The views are the author’s and not the views of any government agency or department.
Sanctions can work, but new incentives are needed

By The Hon. David Clarke

On April 25, Australia will commemorate Anzac Day to pay tribute to those who have served the nation in wars and conflicts from World War I until the present-day “war on terrorism.”

In my home city of Sydney, a march of thousands of ex-service men and women and members of our Armed Forces will take place, watched by hundreds of thousands of Sydneysiders. Also marching will be, as there has been for decades, a contingent of American ex-service personnel, signifying that in every major international conflict from World War I onwards, Australia and the United States have been allies.

Since 1951, our two countries, together with New Zealand, have been joined as allies by the ANZUS Treaty; and now, 65 years later that military alliance is still solid and unshakable. It signifies that Australia and the United States are joined by shared values and traditions, such as support for religious liberty, the rule of law, human rights, democracy and the free enterprise system.

Historically and emotionally we have, and always will be, allies in times of war as well as, in times of peace.

Thinking Australians acknowledge that the United States holds a unique position that fate and providence have bestowed upon it as the leader of the free world and as a protector of good and decent values.

Without the leadership, commitment and righteousness of the United States, our freedoms would surely become eclipsed and extinguished, and the United States should not be left to bear this great responsibility alone. Australia’s previous Prime Minister Tony Abbott, put it fairly and squarely when he wrote, “It is wrong to expect America to be the world’s policeman with only token assistance from its allies.”

Thus, when on June 25, 1950, communist North Korea invaded South Korea, it was the United States that was the first nation to come to its military aid, and it was Australia that was the second nation to enter the conflict — with a contingent of 17,000 servicemen.

Now the situation on the Korean Peninsula, precarious at the best of times, is hurrying towards the precipice, making it the most dangerous time since a cease-fire ended hostilities in 1953.

North Korea’s game plan has always been to take one step backwards, then two steps forward so as to gain time to develop and perfect its nuclear capability. At times it acts with belligerence and bellicosity, initiating carefully crafted acts of hostility, aggression and breaches of international treaty obligations, followed by an illusory back down after material inducements, concessions and financial aid has been massaged from the West. Through this repetitive and contrived process of “induced conflict and tension,” North Korea has gained time to advance its nuclear capability to the point that it now possesses nuclear weapons and is well on a path to achieving a long-range missile system capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Whilst both North and South Korea have long called for a unified nation, it is apparent that the dynastic dictatorship in Pyongyang has no genuine desire for unification, in which a South Korea, with double the population and 40 times the GDP of the North, would enjoy dominance.

Recently there has been a hardening of resolve by South Korea, its allies and even the United Nations to no longer appease the Pyongyang regime in its decades-long “playing for time” strategy of obfuscation. As a consequence, there has been a series of increased sanctions against North Korea. This was demonstrated on Feb. 16, when Seoul withdrew from the North/South jointly run Kaesong Industrial Complex, with a loss to Pyongyang of $100 million per year of desperately needed foreign exchange.

As one looks back over recent decades of strategic policy aimed at blocking North Korea’s attainment of nuclear military capability, the truth is that the West has had little or no success. Despite the endless negotiations, on and off short-term sanctions, foreign aid inducements, and overall indulging of the Pyongyang regime, the West’s failure has been compounded, and time is running out.

New initiatives need to be deployed. Sanctions can and do work, but to succeed they need the power, prestige and will of the United States to lead the way. They need a strong and credible president to emerge from this year’s presidential election, and a determined Congress. They need leaders with the foresight of a Ronald Reagan and the courage of a Margaret Thatcher. In turn, the United States needs to be assured that the Free World stands behind it, not just in rhetoric but in action, not in a token way but in a total way. America’s allies need to take up their fair share of the burden.

The sponsorship by The Washington Times of Parliamentarians For Peace, an initiative launched recently in the Parliament of the Republic of Korea by a global coalition of parliamentarians from 60 nations, is to be enthusiastically applauded. Dedicated to a peaceful reunification of Korea and a lessening and removal of the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, it will further advance and enhance efforts by the Free World to obtain positive outcomes for the Korean people and world peace.

We are at the 11th hour, and unless we act decisively, the window of opportunity will close with grave consequences.

The Hon. David Clarke MLC, LLB, is a member of the New South Wales Legislative Council and Parliamentary Secretary for Justice in Australia.
Experts offer latest threat assessment, responses at TWT briefing

By Cheryl Wetzstein

The threats posed by North Korea are at their greatest level in two decades — and there isn’t clarity about what geopolitical responses should be planned, experts told a recent panel discussion held at The Washington Times.

One measure — leveraging American banks’ control over U.S. currency transactions, including the dollars used by North Korea to conduct its business — looked promising. But the mercurial nature of the nation’s supreme leader, Kim Jong-un, who is backed by one of the world’s largest military forces, makes the communist nation’s actions particularly difficult to predict — or prepare for, said panelists, including former California Rep. John Doolittle; Jenny Town, assistant director of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (USKI); Bruce Klingner, senior research fellow for northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation; and Bill Gertz, national security columnist at The Washington Times.

The March 16 briefing, hosted by The Washington Times Foundation, was moderated by Alexandre Mansourov, professor of security studies at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a visiting scholar at USKI.

The panelists gave the current threat assessment posed by North Korea — including its missiles, nuclear tests, satellite launches, miniaturization efforts for nuclear weapons, special operations, midget submarines and cyberwarfare.

They discussed current and potential responses for several kinds of worst-case scenarios as well as the desired outcomes. South Korean young adults, for instance, appear to be growing less interested in the kind of reunification that their elders have craved.

Of special note this year is the Workers’ Party Congress, which is being held in May. Such events are rare — the last one was held in 1980 — and typically used to announce major leadership or policy changes, said Ms. Town, who is part of a team that reports on North Korea activities at USKI’s web journal, 38north.org.

Cheryl Wetzstein is manager of special sections at The Washington Times.
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