

**Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data
Project**

Version 2.0
Campaign-Year Data

Codebook

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<http://www.navcodata.org/>

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Introduction to NAVCO v2.0

Recent studies indicate that strategic nonviolent campaigns have been more successful over time in achieving their political objectives than violent insurgencies. However, these studies have focused on the campaign as the main unit of analysis, which reduces our ability to determine how the conduct and course of the campaigns have influenced their outcomes. This project fills the gap by launching a systematic effort to disaggregate nonviolent and violent campaigns, most notably by focusing on the type, sequence, and outcomes of different tactics employed by armed and unarmed insurgents during their campaigns.

This dataset represents the next iteration of the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data project. NAVCO v2.0 goes beyond the initial research efforts by looking inside of the campaign and coding such variables and the number of participating organizations, the nature of their goals and leadership structure, and the ways opponent governments and third-party actors respond. Appropriate multivariate statistical analyses will be used to model the extent to which these different tactical choices impact the course of a campaign and its probability for success over time.

Unit of Analysis and Inclusion Criteria

Whereas the unit of analysis for NAVCO v1.0 was the campaign as a whole, NAVCO v2.0 focuses on the campaign-year. This project collects yearly data on 250 nonviolent and violent insurrections between 1945 and 2006. These campaigns constitute a consensus population of known cases since 1945 that at one time or another held “maximalist” goals of overthrowing the existing regime, expelling foreign occupations, or achieving self-determination. They are also “mature” campaigns, in the sense that they have at least 1,000 observed participants and a coherent organization linking tactics to one another over time.

Defining Campaigns

We define a campaign as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. Campaigns are observable, meaning that the tactics used are overt and documented. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events or revolts. Campaigns are also purposive, meaning that they are consciously acting with a specific objective in mind, such as expelling a foreign occupier or overthrowing a domestic regime. Campaigns have discernable leadership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts. Other scholars often use campaigns as their units of analysis, such as Robert Pape’s analysis of suicide bombing campaigns (2005), Horowitz and Reiter’s analysis of aerial bombing campaigns (2001), and Ackerman and Kruegler’s study of strategic nonviolent conflict (1995). In such studies, campaigns usually have distinguishable beginning and end points, as well as discernable events throughout the campaign. In the case of resistance campaigns, beginning and end points are very difficult to determine, as are the events throughout the campaign. In some cases, information on such events is readily available (i.e. Northern Ireland); however, in most cases, it is not. Therefore, our selection of campaigns and their beginning and end dates are based on consensus data produced by multiple sources. There are some difficulties with this method. First, it is difficult to gather the strength of the campaign and its activities over time (i.e. escalation or de-escalation). Second, without specific events data, it is theoretically difficult to compare all campaigns as equal when we know that some are much more disruptive than others. However, there are good reasons to analyze campaigns rather than events. First, events data are so difficult to gather—especially nonviolent events data—that making generalizations about nonviolent conflict is virtually impossible. By analyzing campaigns rather than individual events, we are able to make some general observations about campaigns that can be explored further through in-depth case studies. Moreover, resistance campaigns involve much more than just events; they involve planning, recruiting, training, intelligence, and other operations besides their most obvious disruptive activities.

Using events as the main unit of analysis ignores these other operations, whereas analyzing campaigns allows us to consider the broader spectrum of activities as a whole.

Distinguishing Nonviolent and Violent Methods of Resistance

Admittedly, there are difficulties with labeling one campaign as “violent” and another as “nonviolent” (see Ackerman and Kruegler 1994, p. 9). In many cases, both nonviolent and violent campaigns exist simultaneously among different competing campaigns, as with Palestinian campaigns. Alternatively, often some campaigns use both nonviolent and violent methods of resistance over the course of their existence, as with the ANC in South Africa. Characterizing a campaign as violent or nonviolent simplifies a very complex constellation of resistance methods.

The categories “violent” and “nonviolent” should not be dismissed out of hand, however. In order to address the difficulties mentioned above, scholars have addressed this dilemma by characterizing campaigns as “primarily nonviolent” or “primarily violent” based on the primacy of resistance methods employed. We have established some standards of inclusion in each of these categories. Nonviolent resistance does not directly threaten or harm the physical well-being of the opponent. Sharp (1973) has identified nearly 200 nonviolent resistance tactics, such as sit-ins, protests, boycotts, civil disobedience, and strikes, among many others. When a campaign relies primarily on nonviolent methods such as these as opposed to violent or armed tactics, the campaign can be characterized as nonviolent. The nonviolent campaigns were initially gathered from an extensive review of the literature on nonviolent conflict and social movements. The primary sources were Karatnacky and Ackerman (2005), Carter, Clark, and Randle (2007), and Schock (2005). Then these data were corroborated with multiple sources, including encyclopedias, case studies, and sources from a comprehensive bibliography on nonviolent civil resistance by Carter, Clarke, and Randle (2007). Finally, the cases were circulated among approximately a dozen experts in nonviolent conflict. These experts were asked to assess whether the cases were appropriately characterized as major nonviolent conflicts, whether their outcomes had been appropriately characterized, and whether any notable conflicts had been omitted. Where the experts suggested additional cases, the same corroboration method was used. The resultant dataset includes major nonviolent campaigns that are primarily or entirely nonviolent.

Campaigns where a significant amount of violence occurred are characterized as “violent.” Violent resistance involves the use of force to physically harm or threaten to harm the opponent. Violent campaign data are primarily derived from Kristian Gleditsch’s 2004 updates to the Correlates of War database on intra-state wars (COW), Clodfelter’s encyclopedia of armed conflict (2002), and Kalev Sepp’s list of major counterinsurgency operations (2005) for information on conflicts after 2002. The COW dataset requires 1,000 battle deaths to have occurred during the course of the conflict. We also added about a dozen cases to our sample based on data on insurgencies collected by Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson (2008). Lyall and Wilson used the COW dataset, the Uppsala Dataset on Armed Conflict, Fearon and Laitin’s dataset on civil wars (2003), and encyclopedic entries from Clodfelter (2002).

Crucial Caveats: What You Need to Know about NAVCO

1. **Changes from NAVCO v1.1 to NAVCO v2.0.** Please see the document “Changes between NAVCO v1.1 and NAVCO v2.0” for details about different name changes, combining and splitting of campaigns, and changes in campaign outcomes.
2. **Complexity regarding primary method of resistance.** The NAVCO v1.1 data set included a variable that identified the primary resistance method as either nonviolent or violent, as described above. That variable is included in the v2.0 data set but is static even though the primary resistance type may vary by campaign year. We therefore constructed a new variable, called “prim_method,” which can vary from year to year.

3. **Ambiguity on outcomes.** Researchers who coded the cases for NAVCO v2.0 often found it difficult to distinguish between values for the variable “progress.” Many would code campaigns as having achieved “significant concessions” (3) where NAVCO v1.1 coded such cases as a full success (4). Conversely, some cases that were coded as full successes (4’s) in NAVCO v2.0 were coded as partial successes in NAVCO v1.1. Inter-coder reliability on whether a campaign was a 3 or a 4 was also somewhat weak, whereas coders were much better able to distinguish the other outcomes from one another. As a consequence, researchers might consider creating a dichotomous “strategic success” variable in which values of 3 and 4 indicate a strategic success and values of 0, 1, & 2 indicating otherwise if the observation occurs in the final year of the campaign. In ongoing campaign years, however, researchers should not view a progress value of 3 as equivalent to full success, since the campaign has not yet concluded.
4. **A consensus data set.** The data do not include all nonviolent campaigns during the time period 1945-2006, because many unobserved campaigns were unknown to researchers prior to 2006-2007 (when the data collection occurred). Therefore, when researchers make claims based on the data, they should do so by arguing that those claims apply when drawn from a consensus list of mature, maximalist campaigns.
5. **Replicability of the data construction.** Because of the nature of the data collection process (where a vast literature review was combined with expert surveys) and the consensus nature of the NAVCO data list, it may be difficult for researchers to rebuild the data from scratch and produce an identical list of campaigns. For the release of NAVCO v2.1, we are seeking to create a more structured search for campaigns that will (a) add in campaigns that were missing in NAVCO v2.0 because information on these campaigns was not yet available; and (b) allow for more transparent procedures that improve the replicability of the data construction process.
6. **Known errors and omissions in NAVCO v2.0.**
 - a. One case from NAVCO v1.1 (Venezuela anti-coup 2002) was accidentally omitted from NAVCO v2.0. It will be included in subsequent versions.
7. **We welcome additions and corrections.** Please submit your feedback via the project website (<http://www.navcodata.org>).

A Note on Underreporting Bias

Especially among the nonviolent campaigns, there is real concern that the campaigns included are biased toward success, since it is the large, mature campaigns that are most commonly reported. Other would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed in their infancy (and therefore fail) will not be included in this dataset. This is the major limitation in this study, and it is difficult to avoid. However, we did attempt to mitigate the effects of underreporting bias in several ways. First, we chose to compare nonviolent campaigns with their comparable counterparts in violent campaigns rather than to view nonviolent campaigns in isolation. We did this because there are many “non-starters” among violent campaigns as well as nonviolent ones, and the same underreporting bias exists within the study of violent insurgencies as with nonviolent insurrections. Therefore, we only investigate the outcomes of *major* nonviolent and violent campaigns—those that are already “mature” in terms of objectives and membership. We only included cases where the objective was at some point maximalist (i.e. regime change, secession, or self-determination) as opposed to limited (i.e. greater civil liberties or economic rights). Such limited goals (greater autonomy and significant institutional reform) are coded only when campaigns’ goals were less than maximalist for certain campaign years. Additionally, we only include nonviolent and violent campaigns where we were certain that more than 1,000 people were actively participating in the struggle. For the nonviolent campaigns, we gleaned this information from the sources mentioned above. For violent campaigns, the information was implied from the 1,000 battle-death criteria for inclusion in the various datasets we accessed. Using this strict criteria or comparing major campaigns allows us to address questions of the relative effectiveness of resistance type among comparably developed mass movements. Critics may still be skeptical of the case selection, especially in the case of nonviolent conflict. Most

concerning is the potential omission of failed nonviolent campaigns, which may not be captured in the dataset due to extreme repression or poor news sources. To address this concern, we made certain that the dataset reflects a consensus sample, which was circulated among the world's leading authorities on nonviolent conflict to make sure we accounted for known failed campaigns. Unknown, failed, nonviolent campaigns are necessarily omitted from the dataset, just like unknown, failed, violent campaigns.

There are two additional selection issues that deserve to be addressed. First, in comparing the efficacy of violent vs. nonviolent resistance methods, we must be aware that states that spawn violent resistance may be significantly different than states that spawn nonviolent resistance, and that these differences may influence the probability of the campaign's success. Thus, we will compare states that experience violent campaign to states that experience nonviolent campaigns on variables such as state military strength, regime type, and economic development. Second, states that experience any major campaign (either violent or nonviolent) may be significantly different than the broader universe of cases that experience no campaign. In order to test for this possibility, a comparison will be made between states in the dataset and a random sample of states that did not experience resistance campaigns.

A Note on Missing Data

Following standard database practice, there are two categories of "missing" observations. A coding of "-99" (unknown) means that although the data are missing, a concerted effort was made to find the data to no avail. A code of -99 should therefore be interpreted as "missing and unlikely to be found in future iterations." A coding of "." (missing) means that the data are missing but may be filled in during later iterations of the data set.

Potential Research Uses

Researchers can use the NAVCO v2.0 database to evaluate questions such as:

- How does the choice of nonviolent or violent tactics impact the course of an opposition's campaign?
- How do campaign tactics interact with different forms of state repression or conciliation?
- Are there particular opposition strategies that are more likely to be successful?
- How do diverse groups maintain unity during the course of the conflict?
- Which organizational structures are most resilient in the face of repression;
- Under what conditions does backfire occur (whereby regime repression recoils against it)?
- How do different types of international actors time their assistance to resistance groups and/or sanctions against regime?
- Do campaign outcomes impact long-term political, economic, and social conditions within each case?

Variables

The following is a table listing the variables used in this project and their descriptions.

Table 1: List of Variables

Variable Name	Variable Description
campaign	Campaign name
id	Unique campaign ID
location	Country in which the campaign takes place
year	Calendar year
cyear	Denotes the status of the campaign in that year. 0=onset 1=ongoing 2=end year 3=post campaign
lccode	Location of country code (COW)
target	Target of the campaign
tccode	Target country code
navco1designation	Denotes the type of resistance method designated for the campaign in the NAVCO v1.1 dataset, based on an “ideal types” criterion. Note that this variable refers to the campaign’s coding from NAVCO v1.1. In NAVCO v2.0 this variable is static even though campaigns can change their primary resistance method. 0=primarily violent campaign 1=primarily nonviolent campaign
prim_method	Denotes the primary type of resistance method used in a campaign year. 0=primarily violent campaign 1=primarily nonviolent campaign
camp_orgs	Number of new named organizations involved in the campaign in that particular year. 0-10=number of new named campaign organizations in a particular year 11=more than 10 new named organizations -99=unknown
camp_size	Indicator of the general size of the campaign. 0=1-999 1=1000-9,999 2=10,000-99,999 3=100,000-499,999 4=500,000-1million 5=>1 million -99=unknown
camp_size_est	Estimated campaign size. 0=small (hundreds to thousands) 1=medium (tens of thousands) 2=large (above one hundred thousand) 3=extremely large (above one million) -99=unknown
camp_conf_intensity	Degree of unity amongst opposition groups. 0=seemingly united 1=cooperation with moderate disunity (i.e. ideological or policy disagreements) 2=verbal or active competition among discrete groups, short of physical violence 3=active competition among groups with violence -99=unknown
rad_flank	Whether a radical flank exists within the opposition movement. 0=primarily violent campaign 1=no radical flank 2=radical flank -99=unknown
resis_meth	Change in primary method of resistance 0=no change 1=change from nonviolent to violent 2=change from violent to nonviolent -99=unknown
cdivers_gender	Whether the campaign embraces gender diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
cdivers_age	Whether the campaign embraces age diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown

cdivers_class	Whether the campaign embraces class diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
cdivers_urbrural	Whether the campaign embraces urban-rural diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
cdivers_ideol	Whether the campaign embraces ideological diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
cdivers_party	Whether the campaign embraces party diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
cdivers_regional	Whether the campaign embraces regional diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
cdivers_ethnicity	Whether the campaign embraces ethnic diversity. 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
cdivers_religion	Whether the campaign embraces diverse religious identities (include distinctions such as protestant and catholic, sunni and shiite, etc.) 1=diversity is present 0=diversity is not present -99=unknown
camp_goals	Stated goals of the campaign. 0=regime change 1=significant institutional reform 2=policy change 3=territorial secession 4=greater autonomy 5=anti-occupation -99=unknown
goalschange	0=no change in goals 1=shift in stated goals -99=unknown
camp_structure	0=consensus-based participatory campaign structure 1=hierarchical command and control campaign structure -99=unknown
media_outreach	Whether there is evidence that the campaign spends resources on public relations, publicity and traditional media coverage. 0=none 1=information campaign -99=unknown
discrim	Whether state repression is discriminatory in targeting key actors or indiscriminant. 0=discriminate 1=indiscriminate -99=unknown
repression	The degree of state repression in response to campaign activity. 0=none; 1=mild repression; 2=moderate repression; 3=extreme repression -99=unknown
pi_educ	Campaign creates an educational system that runs parallel to official state institutions. 1=parallel institution is present 0 = parallel institution is not present -99 unknown
pi_socwel	Campaign creates social welfare system (health care, infrastructure, subsistence, employment) that runs parallel to official state institutions. 1=parallel institution is present 0 = parallel institution is not present -99 unknown
pi_tradmedia	Campaign creates an alternative media system that runs parallel to official state institutions. 1=parallel institution is present 0 = parallel institution is not present -99 unknown
pi_newmedia	Campaign creates alternative new media system (web, social media) that runs parallel to official state institutions. 1=parallel institution is present 0 = parallel institution is not present -99 unknown
pi_police	Campaign creates a police system that runs parallel to official state institutions. 1=parallel institution is present 0 = parallel institution is not present -99 unknown
pi_army	Campaign creates an army or militia that runs parallel to official state institutions. 1=parallel institution is present 0 = parallel institution is not present -99 unknown

pi_dispute	Campaign creates an alternative judiciary or dispute resolution system that runs parallel to official state institutions. 1=parallel institution is present 0 = parallel institution is not present -99 unknown
ab_domestic_con	State repression resulted in condemnation of government by domestic actors 1=condemnation 0=no condemnation -99=unknown or not applicable (no repression)
ab_inter_con	State repression resulted in condemnation of government by international actors 1=condemnation 0=no condemnation -99=unknown or not applicable (no repression)
ab_inter-reper	State repression resulted in international material repercussions (e.g. sanctions) against the government by international actors 1=material repercussions 0=no repercussions -99=unknown or not applicable (no repression)
camp_backlash	What was the effect of state repression on the campaign: 0=no repression 1=movement suppressed 2=decreased domestic mobilization 3=increased domestic mobilization -99=unknown
sec_defect	The regime loses support from the military and/or security forces through major defections or loyalty shifts 1=yes 0=no -99 unknown
state_defect	The regime loses support from the civilian bureaucrats and/or civilian public officials through major defections or loyalty shifts 1=yes 0=no -99 unknown
regime_support_	1= regime has formal support from other states 0=otherwise -99 unknown
wdrwl_support	1=other states have withdrawn support for regime 0=otherwise -99 unknown
camp_support_	1=campaign has formal overt support from other states 0=otherwise -99 unknown
ingo_support	1=campaign has formal support from international NGOs and societal actors 0=otherwise -99 unknown
dias_support	1=campaign has support from diasporas living in countries other than the target state 0=otherwise -99 unknown
sdirect	1=international sanctions imposed on the regime for cracking down on opposition 0=otherwise -99 unknown
slifted	1=international sanction are lifted 0=otherwise -99 unknown
in_media	Extent of international traditional media coverage of the campaign 0=little to none 1=moderate 2=high -99=unknown
dom_media	Extent of domestic traditional media coverage of the campaign 0=little to none 1=moderate 2=high -99=unknown
success	1=campaign outcome successful within one year of peak of activities, 0=otherwise
progress	0=status quo 1=visible gains short of concessions 2=limited concession achieved 3=significant concessions achieved 4=complete success -99=unknown
pub_opinion	Whether or not public opinion polling is available during the conflict in the country in which the campaign is taking place, or the country of the target regime. 0=no 1=yes -99=unknown
reliability	Measure of how reliable the source material was in terms of availability, scope and

	accuracy. 1=extremely low 2=some information 3=adequate information 4=significant resources 5=wealth of information
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Variable Descriptions, Inclusion Criteria and Coding Rules

Given that this dataset focuses on the campaign-year as the level of analysis, many of the variables outlined below represent an aggregation of events that transpired over the course of one year. In order to operationalize these variables, coders are instructed to base their estimates on “peak events,” which are the most prominent and important events in the campaign during a particular year. Instead of trying to aggregate all of the relevant events, news reports and analyses, peak events serve as focal points for understanding variables such as the maximum number of people participating in civil resistance and the degree of state repression. This technique is the best way to operationalize these variables in an accurate and timely manner.

Primary Resistance Method

prim_method

Description: Denotes the primary type of resistance method used in a campaign year.

Coding rules: Coding is based on a judgment of whether the campaign relied primarily on nonviolent or violent resistance in a given year.

Coding: 0=primarily violent campaign 1=primarily nonviolent campaign

New Named Campaign Organizations

camp_orgs

Description: Number of “new” (i.e. not previously accounted for in the dataset) named campaign organizations that join the opposition movement in a particular year.

Coding rules: This variable focuses only on those organizations that are named in news reports or research materials. RAs should seek out information about the structure of the campaigns and the number of organizations involved. Coding is based on an estimated count of the organizations that appeared in that particular year.

Coding: 0-10= number of “new” named organizations that appear in a given year; 11= new organizations greater than 10; -99=unknown

Campaign Size

camp_size

Description: Approximate number of people taking part in the opposition campaign.

Coding rules: The size of the campaign may be determined from scholarly estimates, histories or news reports. It is likely impossible to precisely gauge the size of the movement at any particular point in time, so this coding relies on “peak events” and secondary estimates. Peak events often indicate the maximum size of the movement. Estimates incorporate the total number of people that have taken part in any aspect of the campaign ranging from active organizing to popular participation in large-scale street protests.

Coding: 0=1-1000; 1=1000-10,000; 2=10,000-100,000 3=100,000-500,000 4=500,000-1million 5=>1 million -99=unknown

Campaign Size Estimate

camp_size_est

Description: A rougher estimate of the overall size of the opposition campaign.

Coding rules: Given that a precise accounting of the number of campaign participants may be difficult to determine, this variable captures a much more rough estimate of the overall size of the campaign. This is an indicator of the basic size of the campaign as derived from the secondary literature.

Coding: 0=small (hundreds to thousands) 1=medium (tens of thousands) 2=large (above one hundred thousand) 3=extremely large (above one million) -99=unknown

Intensity of Conflict Within the Campaign

camp_conf_intensity

Description: Looks not at just the existence of conflict within the campaign but also the nature and degree of conflict amongst groups, factions or leaders.

Coding rules: Identify the nature of disagreement and conflict within the campaign based on narratives and histories of the campaign and important events, such as attacks on other organizations, that clearly indicates the extent of conflict. While multiple codes may apply during each year, RAs should select the highest code that applies for that particular year of the campaign.

Coding: 0=seemingly united; 1=cooperation with moderate disunity (i.e. ideological or policy disagreements); 2=verbal or active competition among discrete groups, short of physical violence; 3=active competition among groups with violence; -99= unknown

Existence of Radical Flank

rad_flank

Description: Codes whether or not there is a “radical flank” in a movement that is otherwise nonviolent. A radical flank is defined as a group that adopts extremist rhetoric and violent strategies to pursue their goals. They represent a faction within the broader opposition movement. This concept excludes predominantly violent campaigns or other violent groups within the country that are pursuing different political objectives.

Coding rules: Identifies whether a radical flank exists within the campaign.

Coding: 0=primarily violent campaign; 1=no radical flank; 2=radical flank; -99=unknown

Change in Primary Resistance Method

resis_meth

Description: This variable codes whether there is a change in the campaign’s primary method of resistance (nonviolent vs. violent) in a given year.

Coding rules: A change in primary resistance method is coded when there is evidence that a campaign switched its strategy from one based primarily on nonviolence to one based on violence, or vice versa. Note that once a change has been made (from nonviolent to violent, indicated by a “1”, for example), researchers should consider that campaign violent until it changes back to nonviolent (indicated by a “2”) in a subsequent year.

Coding: 0=no change; 1=change from nonviolent to violent; 2=change from violent to nonviolent;

-99=unknown.

Campaign Diversity Variables

Description: This is a series of dummy variables that looks at whether a campaign contains “diversity” by spanning two or more sub-categories of the population.

Coding rules: Variables are coded as “diverse” when there is evidence that the campaign spans the socio-demographic categories outlined below. These are not mutually exclusive categories, so all categories that apply should be coded as diverse.

Coding: 0=not diverse 1=diverse -99=unknown

Variable Series:

Gender	Age	Class	Urban/ Rural
cdivers_gender	cdivers_age	cdivers_class	cdivers_urbrural
Ideology	Party	Regional	Ethnic
cdivers_ideal	cdivers_party	cdivers_regional	cdivers_ethnic

Religious
cdivers_religious

Campaign Goals

camp_goals

Description: This variable looks at the political goals of the campaign. Campaign goals are determined to be the stated political intentions of the primary group or groups in the campaign.

Coding rules: This variable captures the differences in campaign goals over time by allowing for variation amongst campaign depending on the type of conflict. “Regime change” indicates a goal of overthrowing the state or substantially altering state institutions to the point that it would cause a de facto shift in the regime’s hold on power. In contrast, “significant institutional reform” looks at the goal of changing fundamental political structures to alleviate injustices or grant additional rights. “Policy change” refers to a goal of changes in government policy that fall short of changes in the fundamental political structures, including changes in a state’s foreign policy. “Territorial secession” denotes the goal of agitating for complete independence from a state, while “greater autonomy” refers to campaign goal of achieving greater political independence short of complete legal independence. Finally, “anti-occupation” captures those conflicts waged against a foreign power. *Coding:* 0=regime change; 1=significant institutional reform; 2= policy change 3=territorial secession; 4=greater autonomy; 5=anti-occupation;

-99=unknown

Change in Campaign Goals

goalschange

Description: Denotes whether a campaign has changed its goals during a particular calendar year.

Coding rules: This is based on the stated goals of the leading groups of the non-state campaign. This does not include the goals of formal opposition parties within the state. Coders should focus on the movement as a whole or the organizations that represent the majority of the campaign (i.e. not those fringe organizations that do not speak for the movement as a whole). Coders should also employ a “high

threshold” for coding a shift, such that only clearly visible and public shifts in the campaign’s position. For example, if a campaign shifts its focus from an event-centered campaign to one seeking broader institutional change, or if the campaign transitions from advocating policy change to regime change, then it is coded as a shift.

Coding: 0=no change in goals; 1=shift in stated goals; -99=unknown

Campaign Leadership Structure

camp_structure

Description: This variable analyzes the structure of campaign organization and leadership, in particular the extent to which there is a clear hierarchical structure to campaign decision-making.

Coding rules: If there is a clear centralized leadership structure, hierarchically organized and with clear lines of authority—often but not necessarily focused on a single leader—then this variable is coded a one. If campaign leadership is spread across multiple groups or individuals, each of which has influence over tactics and strategy, then it is coded a zero.

Coding: 0=diffuse, consensus-based and participatory campaign structure; 1=centralized and hierarchical command and control campaign structure; -99=unknown

Media and Public Relations Campaign

media_outreach

Description: Whether there is evidence that the campaign spends *significant* resources on public relations, publicity and traditional media coverage.

Coding rules: Variable is coded as an “information campaign” when opposition campaigns employ a concerted strategy to garner traditional media attention. This can range from activities to publicize their efforts to the media to hiring a spokesperson to developing and disseminating their own media content.

Coding: 0=none; 1=information campaign; -99=unknown

Discriminatory State Targeting

discrim

Description: This variable focuses on the nature of state repression and how blunt or precise it is in its targeting the opposition.

Coding rules: First, one must determine whether the state responded with repression. If no repression was used, then it is coded a zero. If state repression narrowly targeted the opposition, for example, shutting down opposition organizations or arresting its leaders, then it is considered discriminatory. Indiscriminate repression is that which does not distinguish between opposition members and the general citizenry, such as widespread state violence against the population or actions that threaten force against all citizens.

Coding: 0=no repression; 1=discriminatory 2=indiscriminate -99=unknown

State Repression Episode(s)

repression

Description: This variable measures the most repressive episode or activity perpetrated by the state in response to campaign activity.

Coding rules: This variable looks at repression from the perspective of the opposition campaign, not the state. Focusing on peak events, coders should measure the extent to which the government uses the coercive apparatus of the state, including security agencies, economic fines and taxes and the justice system, to quell opposition. If the state does not respond, or responds in a conciliatory manner, this variable is coded as “none.”

Coding:

0=none

- few or no actions taken on the part of the state
- appeasing or surrendering to campaign
- making full concessions according to opponent’s demands
- making material concessions
- taking action that signals intention to cooperate or negotiate with opponent
- expressing intention to cooperate or showing support

1=mild repression

- verbal or threatening action short of physical action
- express intent to engage in conflict or threaten
- use of economic fees and levies to increase costs on opposition
- decline to cease ongoing conflict; maintain the status quo during conflict

2=moderate repression

- physical or violent action aimed at coercing opponent
- harassment and imprisonment of campaign members
- no apparent intention to kill

3=extreme repression

- physical action exhibiting intent to kill and violently silence opponents
- torture or severe violence (such as severe beatings), which could easily kill someone
- mass violence

-99=unknown

Parallel Institution (PI) Variables

Description: This is a series of dummy variables that looks at whether a campaign establishes institutions that provide alternatives to official state institutions.

Coding rules: Variables are coded as “parallel” when there is evidence that the campaign has established the relevant institutions listed below. These are defined as institutions that the campaign establishes itself—not those institutions that used to belong to the state but were taken over by the campaign (for this scenario see “regime defection”). Traditional media encompasses newspapers, television, and broadcast radio. New media is any publicly available internet source of information, including news websites, news blogs, and online radio/video feeds.

Coding: 0=none; 1=parallel institution present; -99=unknown

Variable Series:

Education	Social Welfare	Traditional Media	New Media
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pi_educ	pi_socwel	pi_tradmedia	pi_newmedia
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Police	Armed Wing	Courts
pi_police	pi_army	pi_courts

Domestic Audience Backlash Against State Repression

Description: Focuses on the domestic audience costs of state repression.

Coding rules: “Domestic condemnation” is coded if prominent individuals or organizations within the country not directly associated with the campaign publically express disapproval of repressive state tactics.

Coding: 0=none; 1=domestic condemnation; -99=unknown

International Audience Backlash Against State Repression

Description: Focuses on the international audience costs of state repression.

Coding Rules: “International condemnation” refers to the publicly stated disapproval of politically relevant states (defined as major allies of the target regime) or international organizations.

Coding: 0=none; 1=international condemnation; -99=unknown

International Material Backlash Against State Repression

Description: Focuses on real international costs sustained due to state repression.

Coding Rules: “International material repercussions” looks at a range of economic and military activities that raise the costs of repression for the state. This can range from the imposition of formal economic sanctions by IGOs such as the UN to more targeted constraints on material resources such as arms embargoes, withdrawal of international investors, or active military aid or intervention against the regime.

Coding: 0=none; 1=international material repercussions; -99=unknown

Campaign Backlash Against State Repression

camp_backlash

Description: Focuses on the impact of state repression on the campaign.

Coding rules: This ordinal variable gauges the impact of state repression on the degree of popular mobilization associated with the campaign. If there is no substantial campaign activity following repressive action, then the movement is considered suppressed. If there are still some opposition activities, but they are fewer and have smaller numbers of participants, then mobilization is considered decreased. For example, public protests do not have as many participants as prior to the repression. Conversely, if state repression is followed by larger, more prominent opposition activities, then backlash has occurred in the form of “increased domestic mobilization.”

Coding: 0=no repression; 1=movement suppressed; 2=decreased domestic mobilization; 3=increased domestic mobilization; -99=unknown

Security Defections

regime_defect

Description: A dummy variable that looks at whether security forces (internal security forces, police, or military) associated with the state break with it to publically announce their support for the opposition movement.

Coding rules: “Defectors” are defined as those people formerly associated with the state, who publically announce their support for the campaign. “Security officials” are those associated with the official police or military apparatus. Often they are generals or military leaders, but this could also be police that decide to not act on state directives to crackdown. The concept of “security defections” does not include other non-state actors that may have been previously loyal to the state. It only refers to those with formal affiliations with the government.

Coding: 0=none; 1=defection; -99=unknown

State Defections

state_defect

Description: A dummy variable that looks at whether leaders associated with the state break with it to publically announce their support for the opposition movement.

Coding rules: “Defectors” are defined as those people formerly associated with the state, who publically announce their support for the campaign. This means that former state officials formally or tacitly support the campaign. This does not include state officials that switch parties but remain committed to the current system. “State officials” refers primarily to the top non-military leadership of the state, such as prominent politicians or cabinet ministers. This can also include prominent officials in various labor, education and regulatory departments of the government that choose to no longer perform their official duties in order to support the campaign. The concept of “state defections” does not include prominent economic elites or other non-state actors. It only refers to those with formal affiliations with the government.

Coding: 0=none; 1=defection; -99=unknown

Regime Support

regime_support

Description: Whether or not the target regime has support from other states. The general focus on here is major powers and regional powers. RAs make note of the top three most important state supporters.

Coding rules: If other states have voiced their confidence in the target regime, defended it from criticism abroad, vetoed or opposed resolutions in the UN Security Council, then the regime is considered to have state “support.” If the regime has support, three text boxes will appear where the three primary state supporters should be listed.

Coding: 1= regime has formal support from other states; 0=otherwise

Withdrawal of State Support for the Regime

wdrwl_support

Description: Whether prominent allies of the target regime withdraw their support.

Coding rules: This is coded a one, only if a state is known to have previously been a close and prominent ally of the targeted regime but rescinds its public support for the government.

Coding: 1=other states have withdrawn support for regime; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

State Support for Campaign **camp_support**

Description: Whether or not the campaign has support from other states.

Coding rules: If other states have voiced their support for the opposition campaign, provided arms to insurgents or provided them with other material resources and support, then the campaign is deemed to have state support. If the campaign has support, three text boxes will appear where the three primary state supporters should be listed.

Coding: 1= campaign has support from other states; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

INGO Support for Campaign **ingo_support**

Description: Whether or not the campaign has support from prominent non-governmental organizations.

Coding rules: International non-governmental organizations (INGOs) are societal organizations that are not affiliated with any particular state or inter-governmental organization. Prominent examples include Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders. As coding of 1 indicates that the campaign has received substantial material support from prominent INGOs, include resources spent advocating on behalf of the campaign specifically, and material resources, training and personnel provided to the campaign.

Coding: 1= campaign has support from INGOs; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Diaspora Support **dias_support**

Description: Whether or not the campaign has support from an ethnic diaspora living in countries other than the target country.

Coding rules: A diaspora is defined as those that share the same ethnic, religious or national identity as those in the target country, but who live abroad (for example, Palestinian refugees living in places like Jordan). This variable only includes material support from a diaspora. It does not include other groups or organizations from other countries that support the domestic opposition campaign.

Coding: 1=campaign has support from diasporas living in countries other than the target state; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Direct Sanctions **sdirect**

Description: Dichotomous variable indicating whether international sanctions targeted the regime for its behavior vis-à-vis the resistance campaign.

Coding Rules: Any formal sanctions imposed against the regime as a consequence of its actions toward the campaign.

Coding: 1=yes; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Lifted Sanctions

slifted

Description: Dichotomous variable indicating whether the international sanctions that targeted the regime for its behavior vis-à-vis the resistance campaign were lifted.

Coding Rules: Lifting of any formal sanctions imposed against the regime as a consequence of its actions toward the campaign.

Coding: 1=yes; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Extent of International Media Coverage

in_media

Description: This variable measures the degree to which the international traditional media covered the campaign.

Coding Rules: If there is evidence that the international media did not cover or sparsely covered the campaign, this should be coded as zero. If the international media provided extensive coverage of the campaign, this variable should be coded as two. Middling amounts of coverage should be coded as one.

Coding: 0=little to none; 1=moderate; 2=high; -99=unknown

Extent of Domestic Media Coverage

dom_media

Description: This variable measures the degree to which domestic traditional media sources covered the campaign.

Coding Rules: The rules are the same as for the extent of international media coverage, but with respect to media sources in the country where the campaign is taking place.

Coding: 0=little to none; 1=moderate; 2=high; -99=unknown

Success

success

Description: Dichotomous variable identifying whether the campaign achieved 100% of its stated goals within a year of the peak of activities.

Coding Rules: In most cases, outcome was achieved within a year of the campaign's peak. Some campaigns' goals were achieved years after the "peak" of the struggle in terms of membership, but the success was a direct result of campaign activities. When such a direct link can be demonstrated, these campaigns are coded as successful. This variable will always be coded as a "1" when the "progress" variable is coded as a "4."

Coding: 1=yes; 0=otherwise; -99=unknown

Strategic Progress

progress

Description: Ordinal variable identifying whether the campaign achieved some or all of its stated overall political objectives. This refers solely to progress toward overthrowing or receiving political concessions from the regime, depending on the campaign's goal. It does not refer to "tactical or operational progress" which focuses on whether the campaign was successful in garnering broader support, conducting particular resistance actions, or immediate tactical effectiveness.

Coding Rules: This variable focuses on whether the campaign as effective in achieving political objectives in terms of changes in the policy position and actions of the target regime. If the state has not changed its position at all, then it is considered to be the status quo. If the state does not make formal or public concessions, but nonetheless changes its behavior to accommodate the opposition, for example by allowing greater protest or political openness than was allowed in the past, it should be coded as "visible gains short of concessions." Verbal statements of conciliation or changes in the stated position of the regime without additional action constitute limited concessions. Real actions short of ultimate capitulation, such as policy changes, the removal of state leaders or the instigation of negotiations with the opposition, constitute significant concessions. Coders should make judgments based on the most significant achievement of the campaign in a particular year.

Coding: 0=status quo; 1=visible gains short of concessions; 2=limited concession achieved; 3=significant concessions achieved; 4=complete success; -99=unknown

Note: our experience indicates that research assistants' judgments as to whether a campaign achieved a value of 3 or 4 in its final year were highly subjective. Therefore, when a campaign is in its final year, it may make sense for researchers to create a dichotomous variable indicating "strategic success" (3 & 4) or "otherwise" (0, 1, & 2). In ongoing campaign years, however, researchers should not view a progress value of 3 as equivalent to full success, since the campaign has not yet concluded.

Existence of Public Opinion Polling

pub_opinion

Description: This dummy variable indicates whether or not public opinion polling is available during the conflict in the country in which the campaign is taking place, or in the country of the target regime in the case of anti-occupation campaigns. This data is used for future reference and investigation into public views of the campaign.

Coding Rules: Public opinion polling refers to publically available survey data that measures the political views of average citizens in the country in which the campaign is taking place. This may including measures of their support for the government, the opposition campaign, their trust in state institutions or the course of the country.

Coding: 0=no public opinion polling; 1=public opinion polling exists; -99=unknown

Reliability

reliability

Description: In the most basic sense, this variable measures how confident coders are in the accuracy and reliability of the data they submitted.

Coding Rules: After having completed coding for a series of variables for each campaign-year, coders should record how reliable they believe the results are based on two factors: first, the general availability of information used to conduct the research and, second, the perceived credibility of the source material. Data from peer-reviewed journals and published materials are considered highly credible and reliable, while un-referenced web sites are of lower reliability.

Coding: 1=low confidence in the reliability of the data; 2=moderate confidence; 3=high confidence