Contending Interventions: Coming to Terms with the Practice and Process of Enforcing Compliance

By Emilian Kavalski


In recent years, the dynamics of justifying and legitimizing the policies and practice of international intervention has attracted the attention of mainstream media and has also cut across the subdivisions of the Liberal Arts college. Thus, by jumping on the bandwagon of this “trendy” topic both journalists and scholars have attempted to understand as well as explain the phenomenon of intervention (Chandler 2002; Fortna 2004; Lyons and Mastaduno 1995; Smith 1998). Yet, as I claim in this essay, owing to the limelight attracted by this topic in recent years, only few commentators have managed to elucidate the underlying dynamics of the exercise and process of international intervention. If anything, this attention to international intervention has tended to produce numerous (often polarized) opinions, yet little clarity on the issue.

In this context, the volumes by Finnemore and Davis et al. exhibit the complexity of synthesizing various views and perspectives on the topic of intervention. Both books share a common point of departure: their focus on one of the underlying characteristics attendant in the collapse of the East-West confrontation—the seeming predilection of international actors to get involved in the internal affairs of states, often under the pretext of righting the wrongs of domestic rule. Such willingness to intervene appears to debunk the dominant image of world politics: the contention that international relations take place in an environment dictated by the logic of anarchy, while the atmosphere of domestic affairs is one of order. In contrast, the instance of intervention puts forward that the
domestic relations of states are not only (frequently) marred by cleavages and fissures, but also that (in many instances) they can be at least as anarchical as the alleged inter-state pattern of interactions. In this respect, the volumes by Finnemore and Davis et al. suggest that intervention is often demanded to introduce stability and enforce compliance with prevalent norms. At the same time, the two books demonstrate awareness of the many controversies associated both with intervention as a strategy as well as the drawbacks accompanying each individual case. Such seeming shift from Cold War deterrence to post-Cold War enforcement is one of the ingredients of the current complexity of international life. As I will suggest in this essay, it is this discontinuity with the established pattern of global interactions that reflects the on-going transformations in world affairs.

The dominant research and popular fascination with the phenomenon of international intervention owes much to the seeming increase in its frequency in the post-Cold War period. This incidence has tended to be interlaced with the promulgation and consolidation of a policy-trend that there are intra-state conflicts whose solution requires the recourse to an external military force. It has to be reiterated that much of the conceptual confusion surrounding the practice and process of enforcing compliance is not least a result of the empirical focus on the experience of the 1990s. This essay, therefore, acquaints with the disparate claims on intervention in an attempt to construct a somewhat legible account of the logic of introducing compliance with externally promoted standards. The insistence is that the fog of intervention could be penetrated through a historical comparison with the development of its dynamics. At the same time, it is also claimed that the attention to intervention implicates the requirement to address the emergent complexity of international life.

These issues will be addressed in the following sections of this essay, which focus on the rationale (why), process (how) and practice (when) of international intervention. Although these three aspects imbricate intimately in intervention strategies, they are discussed separately here in order to countenance their motivational, historical and procedural (if not conjectural) facets. Such framework of analysis puts forth the suggestion of an analytical three-step for conceptualizing the dynamics of external enforcement. The essay concludes by synthesizing this model and making an inference on the pattern of socialization implicit in the notion of intervention.

Why Intervene?

The dominant focus in the current literature on international intervention seems to be its preoccupation with its occurrence in the post-Cold War period (Bellamy et al. 2004). The point of departure for most commentators has been the coincidence between the dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the (first) Gulf War, which aimed at the ousting of Iraqi forces from the territory of Kuwait. The latter incident seemed to set the standard for the 1990s. For all intents and purposes it sent a message that egregious violations of international standards of acceptable behavior would not be tolerated and swiftly punished. At the time, the U.N.-led intervention in Kuwait urged some commentators to declare the emergence of “a new international order through the U.N.” (Carlsson 1992: 7). Others pointed out that the notable feature of such “flurry of U.N. peace-keeping” efforts has been their “internal focus… to a domestic political scene” (James 1993: 359). In this context, the seemingly novel argument was put forward that in order to remedy the domestic problem of blatant
governmental disregard of basic human rights, the international community has to apply the cure of international intervention.

However, the subsequent developments, in particular the crises in the Balkans together with the deteriorating situation in Africa most blatantly exemplified by the Rwandan genocide, seemed to challenge the conviction that the U.N. is the most appropriate tool for enforcing compliance with international standards. For instance, in the context of former Yugoslavia, both regional and various external actors grew increasingly frustrated with the U.N.’s inability to have an impact on the evolving crises. The declaration of the representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the U.N., Muhamed Sacirbey, demonstrates this poignantly:

> Excuse us if we do not seem adequately grateful for the food that we are given, but after three years of sieges that the world powers could have confronted and lifted by now, we believe the members of the [U.N. Security] Council should be thankful to us for, while our physical existence resembles that of livestock held in pens, fed but none the less surrounded and waiting our fate, we in Sarajevo and elsewhere within our nation have continued to be true believers in and the practitioners of the principles that members here preach from the comfort of their unaffected lifestyles…. Hence, I say to the members of the Council that “your tolerance, even institutionalization, of this siege can no longer be justified…. The Serbians have to accomplish their crime by cutting down snippets of human life not noticeable to an increasingly disengaged international community until the entire tree of human life in places such as Srebrenica has been eradicated (Sacirbey 1995: 3-4).

The subsequent fulfillment of Mr. Sacirbey’s ominous portent turned Srebrenica into a glaring symbol of the U.N.’s failure as a coordinator for the enforcement of compliance in the region. As some commentators have insisted, such failure confirmed “the historical trend of virtual U.N. irrelevance in dealing with long-term threats to international peace and security” due to its “lack of long-term vision [and] ineffectiveness in stemming militarized conflicts” (Diehl et al. 1996: 698-99). It has to be noted that at least part of the reason for the alleged inability of the U.N. to coordinate “successful” interventions during the 1990s was the reticence of some states to participate (and/or support) enforcement operation and the willingness of others to favor the causes of one of the parties in the conflict and thus contribute to the further erosion of the authority (and legitimacy) of the U.N. (Diehl et al. 1996; Rathbun 2004). More significantly, however, this development also seemed to erode the conviction that it is multilateral arrangements that should be the appropriate environments for the deployment of intervening missions. It is in this context that the more vocal debates on this issue emerged.

Betts has perceptively remarked that part of the problem with the discussions on the strategies for introducing compliance in the immediate post-Cold War period was that the dominant reasoning on the use of force was “fuelled by confusion about which is the cause and which is the effect in the relation between collective security and peace, and by conflation of present security conditions (absence of threat) with future security functions (coping with threat)” (Betts 1992: 7). He has acknowledged, therefore, that it is reasonable to expect inconsistency both in the formulation of policy and in the theoretical debates on the issue of international intervention “if we do not yet know when and against whom we will once again need [to use it]… the idea that post-Cold War strategy must define itself against ‘uncertainty’ is becoming a tiresome and suspiciously facile cliche” (Betts 1992: 43).

In this respect, some commentators seem to suggest that the sense of uncertainty underwriting the practice of intervention reflects its problematic rationality (i.e., the tension between legal and moral obligation). Their claim is that the post-Cold War practices of humanitarian intervention
expose the clash of understandings between individual and collective human rights. Such inquiry into the cultural relativism of the application of international standards underwrites the “fundamental reflection about the definition of entities involved in political and legal reasoning and on the ways of reasoning that can take into account with equality the rights and needs of these entities” (D’Agostini in Davis et al: 146). This philosophical take has led a number of inquiries to insist that that the practice of intervention often spurs resistance, because in its essence it is an intrusion “on time and memory” (Karagiannis in Davis et al.: 174).

Although fascinating in its articulation, the claim here is that such style of exploration fails to produce convincing and intelligible renditions of the underlying rationale of international intervention (Hoffman 1984). The insistence is that this explanatory pattern results from the failure to put the study of enforcing compliance in historical perspective. The contention, therefore, is that the use of force for the enforcement of certain standards is not merely a conjectural event but it is also a historical occurrence intertwined with specific precedents and traditions for introducing compliance. Hence, coming to terms with the motivations of any intervention requires the development of good hypotheses about the changing purpose of force in international life. In this respect, the recourse to intervention should be understood as a practice that states have utilized for at least two centuries. Thus, instrumentally, intervention is defined as the deployment of “military force across borders for the purpose of protecting foreign nationals from manmade violence” (Finnemore: 53). The conceptualization that intervention is a historical process and not something that occurred with the end of the East–West confrontation, suggests its understanding in four moves.

The first one involves debunking the traditional interpretation of world politics (as advised by the dominant rationalist perspectives), because of its befuddlement of the process of forming state-interests. In this respect, it is not sufficient to claim as Peter Baehr has done that the term “‘humanitarian intervention’ is a misnomer. It would be far better to speak of the use of military force for (allegedly) humanitarian purposes” (Baehr in Davis et al.: 34). Such (only cursory) linguistic analysis fails to produce fresh insights both into the rationale of intervention as well as its post-Cold War impetus. Instead, what is needed is a serious consideration of the discursive claims that justify intervention and a thorough examination of the meaning and intentions underwriting their “humanitarian” articulations (Wæver 2002). Such elaboration entails a wider assessment of the alterations in the patterns of world affairs which are reflected in the practices of intervention.

Thereby, the second move in the explanation of international intervention involves a demonstration that the alterations in the process and practice of humanitarian intervention have indeed been accruing as indicated both by the actual military campaigns and the way state-leaders speak of them. It is this level of analysis that calls attention to historically-informed insights as it addresses the shifting rationale for intervention (Hui 2005: 23). In this respect, Finnemore has argued that during the nineteenth century “all instances” (Finnemore: 58) of military humanitarian intervention involved the protection of Christians from Ottoman Turks: the Greek War of Independence (1821-27); the agitation in Syria/Lebanon (1860-61); and the Bulgarian (1876) and Armenian (1894-1917) massacres. Such process tracing, in effect, points to the qualitative alteration in the identification of who is to be protected.

This understanding underwrites the third move in unpacking the motivations for the use of force (i.e., tracking the expansion of the concept of “humanity”) (Finnemore: 53). Initially, while
intervention involved the protection of rights only for the Christian and European subjects of the
Ottoman Empire, it gradually began to include non-European Christians. Then with the efforts to
abolish slavery, the slave trade, and colonization the notion of who is “human” gradually stretched
to its current meaning encompassing all races and creeds. It is noteworthy that such “enlargement”
of humanity was embedded in the rational-legal structure and codified in international law. The
overexposure of this pattern in the post-Cold War period has led some commentators to call for the
further legalization of humanitarian intervention through the stipulation of a universal set of criteria
specifying when the recourse to military force is justified (Voon in Davies et al.: 41).

Although admirable in its intent and attitude, the claim here is that such assertions seem
divorced not only from the reality of international interactions, but also from the domestic contexts
where intervention is applied. In this respect, several commentators have noted that while the global
norm-building process accelerated markedly with the end of the Cold War (thereby, allegedly
commanding a far more densely woven fabric of international norms and institutions), it is less clear
whether compliance is getting worse over time, whether the bar has been raised by this process of
legalization, or whether the cognizance of implementation challenges and failures has been
heightened (Luck and Doyle 2004: 305). For that reason, the international legal regimes on the use
of force in inter-state affairs, although important, seem to hold little explanatory potential for the
emergent patterns of global interactions.

The final, fourth move of an analysis attuned to the historical patterns of international
intervention exposes the altered perception of “success” (Finnemore: 53). Whereas in the nineteenth
century success was measured either by the installment of a new government or the granting of
significant concessions to the demands of the intervening party, in contemporary international
politics, the process of introducing regular free elections sets the standard. Such change has a
significant impact on both current and prospective patterns of intervention. Furthermore, the
awareness of historical context has even led some to propose tentative typologies for its
classification. For instance, some elaborate a five-tier categorization of intervention: (i) traditional;
(ii) managing transitions; (iii) wider; (iv) peace-enforcement; and, (v) peace-support (Bellamy et al.
2004). Others distinguish between three general patterns: (i) supportive enforcement; (ii) non-war
enforcement; and (iii) constraining enforcement (Kavalski 2005b).

In this respect, the analytical four-step understanding of intervention outlined above allows
approaching the rationale of international intervention as a complex dynamic of externally promoted
congruence that alters the domestic production of policy-interests and incentives. As suggested, the
recourse to force tends to be contingent on: the way enforcement is constructed; the capacity of
external agents to assist in adjusting the substantive beliefs of target-states and in bringing them in line
with prevalent principles. Intervention, therefore, emphasizes that norms (together with material
incentives) help in shaping the “beliefs about what set of policies will maximize short-term interests,
and they therefore serve to guide state-behavior and shape the agenda from which the elites choose
specific policies” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 285). As I explain later in this essay, it is this logic
that underwrites the practices of introducing domestic congruence with externally-promoted
standards.
How to Intervene

The process of international intervention (although intertwined with its motivations and its practice) reflects a distinct dynamic that requires individual attention. The conjecture is that one has to go beyond the mere discussion of intervention as the capacity and capability to interfere in the domestic affairs of another state and instead address the question of “how frameworks of international behavior might change” (Finnemore: 7). In other words, the insistence is that alterations in the patterns of military interventions are not the result of new weapons-technologies or shifts in power and resources; instead, more often than not what has changed over time is not the fact of intervention (i.e., it is still mostly strong states that use force against weaker ones) but its form and meaning—that is “state understandings about the purposes to which they can and should use force” (Finnemore: 3). Although this claim might sound like a truism, the argument is that what distinguishes such alterations in the meaning of intervention is that these changes are global and have affected state-behavior across the system.

Rosenau draws a similar conclusion even to the instances of U.N.-sanctioned humanitarian interventions (such as the ones in Haiti, Rwanda and Somalia) (Rosenau 2003: 323). Although a number of dynamics account for the surge in order-enforcement operations, he contends that it is the “bifurcation of global structures and the relative loss of capabilities that this has meant for states are surely a prime source of such interventions” (Rosenau 2003: 324). Rosenau, therefore, insists that even those states “that have long histories of assaulting the rights of their citizens are less able to hide behind the precedents of sovereignty to engage in such practices, while those states long committed to the protection of human rights experience the same pressures for ignoring the sovereignty of violating states and intervening in their affairs so as to bring violations to an end” (Rosenau 2003: 324). In spite of the simplification attendant in such generalizations they attest to the emergent complexity of international life, which toggles between the old propensities and the new patterns.

This inference hints at the relative character of state-sovereignty (Bartelson 1995; Weber 1995), which in turn points out that it is not so much the practice of intervention that has been altering but its meaning as a result of the shifting conceptualizations of the notion of sovereignty (Malmvig 2006). Hence, the process of intervention should be understood through the prism of its genealogy in relation to the concept of sovereignty and its malleability over time. In this respect, a historically-grounded analysis would indicate that “interventions have always been routine and sovereignty has been porous” (Tin-bor Hui in Davis et al.: 83). Such an assertion, therefore, points out that the changing purpose of force reflects not only changing perceptions about legitimate and effective uses of state-coercion, but also (and mostly) alterations in what a state is. The post-Cold War period, therefore, has simply brought back to mind the limited asset of sovereignty in that the dominant values and the general normative context of the international system render intervention legitimate when it can be shown that certain states are in clear violation of its principles (Webber 1997: 37).

For instance, Frederking has argued that NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is not just an act of (hegemonic) enforcement; instead, it needs to be perceived as an act of underlying prescriptive responsibility to uphold the prevalent rules of international behavior, because “human rights violations are not domestic matters, but legitimate concerns of the international community…. State sovereignty in the post-Cold War world is limited because ‘legitimate’ states ensure basic human
rights. States that perpetrate ethnic cleansing, thus, forfeit their right to territorial integrity” (Frederking 2003: 371). Moreover, the Kosovo campaign reinforced the inference that in “a world where the U.N. has repeatedly proven incapable of effectively supervising military operations or addressing civil conflict, regional security organizations must develop the capacity to keep order in their own backyards. NATO demonstrated that while the task is not easy, it is also not impossible” (Norris 2005: 293).

These assertions bring the operational process of intervention full circle by re-emphasizing the significance of the international pattern of order (Corrin in Davis et al.: 298-99). As Hodge explains, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo can be viewed from the perspective of a long history of interventions by strong states into the affairs of their weaker neighbors and any charge against the alliance for “reckless endangerment of the hallowed custom of sovereignty would be compelling least of all in the Balkan region, where compromised sovereignty has historically been closer to the norm than to the exception” (Hodge 2005: 69). The point of reference here is Bull’s insight that order involves regulation (marked by negotiation, coercion and restriction) of the extent to which interactions are worked out in the political domain, while at the same time promoting a “condition of justice and equality among states or nations” (Bull 1977: 93). Thereby, pragmatically, order is understood to be a framework of predictability. Predictability (in the sense of self-sustaining continuity) characterizes “both the process and the condition” of the “implementation” of “peaceful change” in international life (Van Wagenen 1965: 815).

In this context, the practice of intervention is analytically suggested as an attempt to introduce predictability by overcoming the uncertainty presented by states that fail to act in line with established norms and rules (Kavalski 2005a; Rotberg 2004). Therefore, the increase in the instances of enforcing compliance with prevailing norms in the post-Cold War period seems to reflect attempts to surmount the pervasive contradictions and ambiguities of international life. Instead of explaining these dynamics through the nascent discourse of globalization, Rosenau has suggested the possible complementarities in the opposing tendencies that seem to underwrite the complexity of current global system by coining the term “fragmegration.” He maintains that the concept of “fragmegration” sums up the ubiquitous “interaction between fragmentation and integration… capturing in a single word the large degree to which these rhythms consist of localizing, decentralizing, or fragmenting dynamics that are interactively and causally linked to globalizing, centralizing, and integrating dynamics” (Rosenau 2003: 11).

Procedurally, thereby, states (as well as inter-governmental organizations) often justify the recourse to intervention by constructing the target-state as a threat to the stability of “international order.” Such inference suggests that the process of intervention gives meaning to the “regularized patterns of behavior among states” (Finnemore: 85); in particular in a fragmegrative environment where “uncertainty is the norm and apprehension the mood” (Rosenau 2003: 208). The conjecture is that inter-state relations are shaped by a complex set of conceptual frameworks about desirable political goals and acceptable political means. It is claimed that these understandings have altered both in the way states perceive the mechanisms for maintaining international order as well as the manner in which patterns of domestic governance affect foreign-policy-behavior.

Such emphasis on the malleability of the process of intervention, demonstrates that the distribution of material capabilities does not determine the way in which force is utilized, in fact “similar distributions of material capabilities generate different understandings of order at different
This proposition drives home the argument that how intervention is conducted is socially constructed and related to the manner in which the patterns of interaction among states are depicted by the belief-systems that decision-makers hold about each other. In other words, the process of intervention is contingent upon the context and content of each individual case and the interpretations that they impel among state-elites.

When to Intervene

Any generalization of the practice of international intervention is bound to be inadequate, as every instance is conditioned by the particular context as well as by the specific motivations for enforcement. This understanding of practice reflects the suggestion that the rationale for intervening is underwritten by a complex dynamic of considerations distinctive to every individual case. By and large, however, the practice of enforcing certain standards of appropriate behavior tends to indicate the requirement to promote a “code of peace” (Adler 1998: 183). In this respect, the argument still holds that it is a framework of analysis attuned to historical analogies that seems to suggest the more convincing modes of building relevant patterns for understanding the recourse to force in international life.

The general thinking on intervention tends to outline its dependence on mutually supportive actions and collaborative efforts of multiple agents, each of which brings special expertise to its practice (Schnabel and Carment 2004). A historical process tracing the practice of enforcement would suggest that its pattern was altered at the beginning of the twentieth century when intervention began to be regulated by legal instruments (Finnemore: 55). Robert Cryer terms this “intervention by means of criminal prosecution” (Cryer in Davis et al.: 61). Such understanding forms the background of mainstream discussions on the establishment of international criminal courts, which characterize them as embodiments of the standards of appropriate behavior. Although, these assertions fail to address one of the main criticisms leveled at both permanent and ad hoc criminal tribunals—their seeming inability to enforce respect for international standards with those who either do not deem them acceptable or do not consider acceptable the very compliance with such international rules—it nevertheless reflects the general acceptance in contemporary politics of legalized solutions to both international and intra-national conflicts. In this respect, such a shift from military to legal solutions has resulted not only from “shared notions of law,” but also from the “rising influence of international law and lawyers” (Finnemore: 26). This was, in itself, a systemic alteration of world affairs that changed the behavior of states. Although such shift did not replace the recourse to militarized solutions of conflicts, increasingly these needed to be legitimized in terms of international norms and values (Kavalski 2005a).

The proposition, therefore, is that ideas affect decision-making primarily through the socialization of expert-groups (Yee 1996: 86-94). An expert-group (or an “epistemic community”) is a network of individuals, which has “an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge” (Haas 1992: 3). Socialization is the larger framework within which intervention operates. Curtis intuited the meaning of socialization through the “experience” and “exercise of political responsibility” that “operates to keep [decision-makers] in touch with the facts of life, to practice them in reading their meaning, and to make them responsible for giving effect to the lesson” (Curtis 1992: 168, 176). Formally, the dynamics of international socialization describe a “process that is directed toward a
state’s internalization of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its international environment” (Schimmelfennig 2000: 111) and “taught by the socialization agency” (Schimmelfennig 2001: 63). In other words, it refers to a process through which institutions, practices, and norms are transmitted between international actors. Being a complex and context-specific process, socialization is understood to comprise two complementary aspects: compliance and learning to comply (Kavalski 2003).

Ikenberry and Kupchan acknowledge that “the notion of socialization… elaborates the mechanisms, through which norms and beliefs become embedded in the elite communities of secondary states” (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990: 284). Socialization, therefore, occurs in terms of altering policy-making through compliance and learning, and in changing external behavior. This accepted thought on interventions, however, does not deny the autonomous agency of “socialized” actors; instead, it suggests templates, which they are most likely to follow in particular contexts (even if initially attracted primarily by rational motifs). Such contention facilitates the understanding of socialization as a process of “strategic social construction” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888).

In this respect, the claim that the professionalization of the diplomatic service—in particular its infusion by lawyers—helps explain the increasing predilection of states towards legal solutions of conflicts. This process was further institutionalized and became more widespread in the course of the twentieth century, but this assertion should not be taken to suggest that the world is becoming “a more peaceful place” (Finnemore: 50). Instead these developments simply point to the role of international legal regimes and the significant modes of global governance which they precondition. Hence, while legal traditions and practices have become staple fodder for the literature on international intervention, it has “often failed to appreciate the pull of politics in shaping these legal traditions” (Michael Davis in Davis et al.: 5). The practice of intervention in this context is implicated through the introduction of constraints (i.e., limitations on military maneuvers, concentrations, deployments, etc., as well as punishment in case of failure to comply with prescribed frameworks, particularly in an environment where the normative attraction of promoted standards is weak (or lacking).

It is these dynamics that intimate the debates on the practice of international intervention. The contention is that currently the decision when to intervene is dependent not so much on the constellation of power in the international arena at any given time, but on the domestic pressures on the government considering a policy of intervention. However, it has not always been the case that public debates (as well as the pattern of domestic governance of the intervener) would take precedence over the framework of global interactions in informing state-policies on intervention. For instance, the claim that during the Cold War norms of sovereignty (as defined by the post-1945 international environment) trumped humanitarian claims is almost becoming a truism (Finnemore: 54). Yet, the contention here is that the historical pattern of intervention confirms that its practice tends to set the agenda of non-compliant states (Talentino 2004: 321-22). Such contention, however, should not blight one to the fact that the practice of intervention intimately involves questions of the identity and interests of the intervener as blatantly indicated by NATO’s willingness to intervene both in Bosnia and Kosovo, but not in Rwanda or Sudan (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002: 602; Kavalski 2005a). Such qualification recognizes the pervasive ambiguity, contingency, and uncertainty of world politics. In this respect, although the volumes of both Finnemore and Davis et al. suggests intriguing heuristic devices that both challenge conventional wisdom and provoke
analytical imaginations, they seem to beckon further critical elaboration of the changing practices of international intervention.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to capture the dynamics of international intervention by focusing on its three dominant aspects – rationale, practice and process. Such analysis aims to consolidate the sundry (often dissimilar and contradictory) perspectives on the use of force in international life for the purposes of introducing compliance with a set of externally-promoted standards. The suggestion, therefore, is that the dynamics of enforcement could be conceptualized by making use of an analytical three-step:

▪ First, examining the motivations for enforcing compliance: such query elicits that the recourse to enforcement in world affairs aims at bringing the behavior of target-states in line with some international principles and tends to be dependent on the ability of agents to adjust the beliefs of policy formulation.

▪ Second, appraising the practice of international intervention: this investigation (hopefully) makes it clear that states tend to recourse to force in their international interactions when there is a need to reinforce the normative foundation of policy-making of target-states.

▪ Third, exploring the process of using force: the survey has indicated that the process of intervention reflects the context and content of each individual case and is premised on the particular interpretations that they impel among decision-makers.

When it comes to assessing the impact of international intervention it is often acknowledged that (at least) instrumentally it has the benefit of coercing immediate compliance. The claim that “decisive intervention ends wars” suggests that the recourse to force sets the agenda of decision-making, where there is no (or little) attraction to internationally accepted standards (Haine et al. 2004: 15). Therefore, as already suggested, the study of introducing compliance with prevalent rules and norms has become a central pre-occupation of the study of international life (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Checkel 2001; Slaughter 2004). Since the end of the Cold War the inquiry into the pattern of introducing acquiescence with international regulations has invariably been linked to the roles and identities of international organizations vis-à-vis nation-states (Ferguson and Mansbach 1996).

Consequently, such research on the practices and patterns of international intervention has also probed the habits and character of sovereign states in what is perceived to be an increasingly interdependent and globalizing world. The emphasis on “habits” and “character” of sovereignty is quite intentional here as it aims to distinguish from the hackneyed debates on the “functions” and “roles” of states in international life (Malmvig 2006). The intent is to draw attention to the changes in the routines of sovereignty—the diminished capacities of states to carry out domestic interaction independent of the scrutiny of other actors (regardless of whether they are sub-national, supranational or intergovernmental). Such shifts in the understanding of sovereignty backgrounds the resurgent interest in the practices of intervention. Some argue that this has become one of the most conspicuous indicators that the current complexity of international life has moved beyond the condition of being “post” its predecessor (Rosenau 2003: 14).

In this respect, the volumes by Finnemore and Davies et al. attest to the huge analytical problems confronting international relations scholars and analysts as a result of their attempts to conceptualize
the phenomenon of international intervention. Coming to terms with the recourse to violence in world affairs is an unfortunate but still extant fact of human interactions. The two books under review do a good job of bringing out the ethical and strategic dimensions underwriting the use of force in international life. Moreover, by undertaking an insightful engagement of the formal models for analyzing world politics, the analyses by Finnemore and Davies et al. use the recent rash of military interventions to draw attention to the changing patterns of global politics. In particular, they seem to indicate the complexity of the external coercion of compliance with prevalent norms not only because of the contradictions attendant in the use of force, but also because of the multitude of alternative choices—political, economic, and so forth—that are also available. It is this competition between contending options that complicate the current problematizations of the practices of international intervention.

Although the analytical three-step for studying intervention suggested in this essay is informed by the two volumes under review, it is distinct from their conceptual frameworks. Hence, I should reiterated that I am not attempting to provide a definitive account of the rationale, practice and process of international intervention. Instead, the objective here has been to heighten the awareness about the manner in which force has been used in international life. In this respect, I have tried to emphasize the point that it is the macro-historical mode of analysis (which traces the process of introducing compliance with externally-promoted standards and both surveys and compares the patterns of its deployment) that is more likely to uncover the conceptual fog surrounding the notion and practice of international intervention and sharpen its understanding and explanation. As already suggested, it is Finnemore’s study that seems to suggest a better approach premised on a detailed comparative analysis of the development of the notion and habits of intervention. Her examination provides a comprehensive framework for understanding the use of force in international life, which takes both students and practitioners beyond the polemics of pro- and anti-intervention debates. In contrast, owing to their lack of consideration for intervention as a historical process, the majority of contributions to Davis et al. seem to overemphasize the significance of the experience of the 1990s, which ultimately curtails the insights of their propositions. However, in terms of its account of the post-Cold War period, the volume by Davis et al. offers one of the more interesting combinations of both disciplinary and ideological perspectives. In this respect, it is deemed that both books would be of interest to neophytes as well as adepts in the field of international intervention. Furthermore, it is expected that these volumes would provoke others to further and elaborate the issues stirred up (or overlooked) by the authors; and perhaps, it is in this way that the contributions by Finnemore and Davis et al. suggest further avenues for exploration and research.

References


Dr. Emilian Kavalski is the Izaak Walton Killam Memorial Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Political Science, University of Alberta (Edmonton, Canada). His research and publications have focused on issues of European security governance, the EU and NATO enlargements, post-Cold War developments in the Balkans as well as conceptualizations of security community building and the applications of Complexity Theory to the study of international life. Dr. Kavalski has been the co-convener of the British International Studies Association Working Group on the Balkans and is the author of the forthcoming book Extending the European Security Community: Constructing Peace in the Balkans (London: I.B.Tauris).

© 2006, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.