ARE THE RELUCTANT WARRIORS OUT OF CONTROL?
WHY THE U.S. MILITARY IS AVERSE TO RESPONDING
TO POST–COLD WAR LOW-LEVEL THREATS

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The crumbling of the Soviet Union has precipitated a period of
military uncertainty in the United States that has reawakened con-
cern about civilian control over the military. With no single over-
arching threat, the United States does not have an easily identifiable focus
for military planning. Also, because what threatens American security is less
clear, there is considerable debate and disagreement about what the United
States should do to guarantee its security. Some argue that the international
system is now less dangerous (because of the growing numbers of democ-
racies, or the increasing scope of international institutions), while others
hold that the international system is more dangerous because of the
emerging multipolarity.1 Still others argue that what constitutes security will
change because issues not typically associated with security, such as envi-
ronmental problems, population pressures, and migration will pose the se-
curity threats of the future. Finally, some assert that threats to physical se-
curity will increasingly come from unconventional foes.2 In the midst of

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and Steven E. Miller (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). Martin Van Creveld argues that the
spread of nuclear weapons and norms about their non-use is leading to a revolution in the
way wars are fought that significantly elevates the importance of low level, irregular threats.
See Martin Van Creveld, Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict (New York: Free Press,
1993).

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this debate, the U.S. response to world events has nonetheless demonstrated two trends:

On the one hand, presidents have successively committed, or threatened to commit, U.S. forces in peripheral areas against dangers that do not pose a clear territorial threat to the United States. On the other hand, military leaders have often resisted such activism. Military leaders have occasionally even become vocal about the limits of the U.S. ability to use force effectively in peripheral areas.

In response to these trends, critics have charged that the increasingly cautious and public military opinions about the use of force pose a threat to civilian control of the military. At the very least, they argue, military leaders' public proclamations threaten the appropriate articulation of U.S. security goals. According to critics, political leaders should define goals and then look to the military for advice on the means to fulfill them. Military opinions should not play a role in defining goals. Those making this argument recommend that military leaders tone down their influence so as not to sway political decisions.

Are civilian decisions hamstrung by a reluctant military? Not quite. I rely on principal-agent theory to argue that there is a prior problem in the level of consensus among civilian institutions. The critics are right in noticing that many military leaders are reluctant to intervene in low-level conflicts, but


4. These arguments point to other concerns beyond the purely policy problems I examine in this article. Richard Kohn, for example, mentions the alienation of the military from its civilian leadership, citing jeers at President Bill Clinton and the open endorsement of the Republican party by some. There is undoubtedly data that demonstrates a change in the composition of the military forces, particularly since the advent of the All Volunteer Force (AVF). There also is a tradition of evaluating civil-military relations that would suggest that such changes would be detrimental to the civil-military relationship (see Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1971). As yet, there have been few empirical tests designed to examine whether or not the change in composition is, indeed, causing problems for the civil-military relationship—though there is a logic for expecting more problems—see n. 17. Regardless, these problems remain outside my purview. I am merely examining the issue of whether policy has been unduly effected by the quality of military advice.

5. There are a number of other recommendations having to do with instilling a diversity of opinion in the officer corps and teaching “proper” civil-military relations that, again, reflect the issues that have come about in the AVF and the disjunction between society and the military.
this is nothing new. The seeming intensification of the phenomenon, and publicity of military opinion, is a predictable reaction to disagreement within the civilian leadership. The design of American institutions encourages military caution when there is no clear civilian consensus over national-security goals.

The lack of consensus on American national-security strategy stems from issues at both the domestic and the international level. Domestically, each American political institution represents different interests. The U.S. system thus encourages disagreement. This has created challenges to reaching agreement even when the international system has presented the United States with clear rivals and threats to its interests (witness the debates over the importance of containment in different regions during the cold war).

The post–cold war international system, in which the threats to American interests are murkier and harder to interpret, make the obstacles more difficult. In addition, low-level threats can come from anywhere, are traditionally harder to anticipate and plan for, and rarely endanger the territorial viability of major powers.

Given these domestic and international challenges, civilians have yet to agree on the extent to which low-level threats are important for U.S. secu-


7. The founders noted the need for special provisions to create unified command of the army, navy and militia "when called into the actual service of the United States." They go on to state that the direction of the common strength forms a usual and essential part in the definition of executive authority. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, int. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 447 (emphasis in original). Hamilton, in Federalist 69, also argues that the power vested in the president as commander-in-chief is much inferior to that vested in the king of England. "It would amount to nothing more that the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first admiral and general of the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to declaring of war and to the raising and regulation of fleets and armies—all of which by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature." Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, 419.


9. For an argument that the crisis in civil-military relations is caused by the low level of external threat, see Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structure: Civil-Military Relations in a Changing Security Environment" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 29 August–3 September 1995).

American institutions were designed not only to encourage disagreement, but to make new action difficult in the absence of agreement. Thus, until there is civilian agreement on the principles under which low-level threats are important to U.S. security interests and goals, we should expect military leaders to advise hesitancy about committing forces.

While agreeing with the critics' statements about the quality and publicity of military advice, I argue that principal-agent theory explains this reluctance and suggests that it may not be so much a crisis in civilian control as a typical response to civilian disagreement. This approach also proposes that the reluctance can be ameliorated only in the event of civilian agreement about the importance of low-level conflicts to national security goals. Finally, by reminding us of the reasons for delegation in the first place, the principal-agent approach reminds us of the benefits (rather than looking only at the costs) of military advice. Extending American military force when the consensus for action is not high has presented the United States with security disasters in the past. Muffling military advice, particularly when there is not agreement about national security goals, could exacerbate the potential for this type of debacle. While we do not want military hesitancy to determine civilian goals, if it makes civilian leaders think twice about difficult commitments for which there is not domestic support before the United States is involved, it may be a good thing.

**Principal-Agent Theory and Civil-Military Relations**

My argument rests on a theory of delegation. The logic for delegating, or creating hierarchies, is based on a variety of observable stresses between individual and social rationality. In contrast to the invisible hand Adam Smith expected, economists have noticed many instances where uncoordinated individual action leads to market failures rather than to efficiency. For politics as well, the notion that individual rationality would lead to social efficiency has been challenged. Hobbes, for example, argued that perfect democracy brings extreme challenges to the civil peace. Social-choice theorists refer to the instances where individually rational decisions

lead to social irrationality as "collective dilemmas." Hierarchies are one solution to collective dilemmas. In democracies, for example, voters delegate authority over the provision of government to civilian leaders in elections. Civilian leaders, in turn, delegate authority over the provision of security to military organizations.13

Every time a principal delegates authority to an agent, however, he creates the problem of agency—the agent may not do what the principal wants. This may be true for two reasons. First, because the agent's interests may not be the same as the principal's. He can imagine a president, for example, because he has to balance many objectives, preferring to get the most bang for the buck from the military; an individual military leader, however, may prefer instead to get the most bucks for the organization.

Second, this divergence of interest can create problems of "hidden action" and "hidden information" because information asymmetry inherent in the principal-agent relationship advantages the agent. Hidden action problems make it hard for the employer to know if his employee is shirking and actions to overcome this problem can lead to moral hazard.14 Hidden information problems develop when the specialized subordinate knows more about their skills or the job than the principal. Hidden information problems can lead to adverse selection or can allow the agent to set the agenda so as to bias the results toward his preferences.15 Once civilians

13. I assume that individuals in government, whether elected officials or bureaucratic employees, are motivated by a desire to stay in power and maintain or increase their authority. This does not assume that they have no other goals, only that reaching other goals depends on maintaining their power and authority. This is a standard assumption made by students of American politics. See, Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). For a more extreme claim, see David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

14. Moral hazard refers to action by the agent to satisfy the indicator of his behavior that the principal monitors, rather than the behavior itself. Since the indicator can never be a true proxy for behavior, satisfying the indicator always produces less than optimal results. Sometimes, it leads to perverse results. Studies of the insurance industry, for instance, demonstrate how indicators of risk were no longer as useful once a party was insured. Just being insured, say for fire, made the party less inclined to be cautious. See Carol Anne Heimer, Reactive Risk and Rational Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

delegate responsibility over the provision of security to military organizations, military organizations can use the delegated authority and resources to pursue their own agenda.\textsuperscript{16} Thus principals must think hard about how to select appropriate agents and monitor them to ensure that they act as the principal prefers.\textsuperscript{17}

Principal’s choices about how to set up and monitor military organizations affect the type and degree of agency problems that are most likely to occur. Civilian principals are also agents of their voters, therefore political institutions are an important factor in predicting how civilians will decide to structure and monitor their military.\textsuperscript{18} When civilian institutions unify power over the control of the military in one branch of government, civilians can exercise \textit{ex post} checks to punish military indiscretions relatively free from electoral costs.\textsuperscript{19} This often biases organizations to anticipate civilian goals. When civilian institutions divide power over the control of the military between a president and a legislature—as in the United States—oversight becomes more complicated.\textsuperscript{20} There are two reasons for this.

First, the different electoral structures for the president and the Congress encourages disagreement between the institutions over policy goals.\textsuperscript{21} When


\textsuperscript{17} One mechanism commonly used to select appropriate agents is to find those who share a common culture with the principal. This suggests that some of the indicators and trends noticed by sociologists may be important to civilian control in the long term (see n. 4). It is important to note, however, that arguments about the changing composition of the services focus on lower ranks. It will be a while before these trends begin to affect the officer corps. To the degree that the officer corps follows the general trends, however, it could present problems for civilian control in the longer term.


\textsuperscript{19} This is because military leaders cannot appeal to another institutional branch and there are, thus, fewer mechanisms by which civilian choices are likely to be questioned, and fewer electoral incentives to question other institutional leaders’ decisions.

\textsuperscript{20} This logic can be extended to expect differences within the legislative branch (between the Senate and the House of Representatives), and at times, the judicial branch may be involved as well. The War Powers Act has prompted much legal attention of late. Representative Lowery sued President Reagan in 1983, Representative Dellums sued President Bush in 1990. See David Locke Hall, \textit{The Reagan Years: A Constitutional Perspective on War Powers and the Presidency} (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Harold H. Koh, “Presidential War and Congressional Consent: The Law Professor’s Memorandum on Dellum v. Bush,” \textit{Stanford Journal of International Law} 27 (spring, 1991): 247–64.

\textsuperscript{21} See Moe, “The Politics of Structural Choice.”
Congress wants the military to do one thing and the president another, the military is likely to align with the civilian preferences closest to its own. For example, after the Civil War, military leaders sided with Congress because both wanted a more activist reconstruction policy in the South.  

Second, and more often, disagreement between civilians can create distrust between the different branches of government over the mechanisms by which to control the military. Thus, even though the president and Congress may agree on what they are telling the military to do, they may disagree about how best to monitor and oversee the organizations. Mechanisms that work well for the president may frustrate Congress. For example, despite the general agreement with the goals of Kennedy’s “flexible response” doctrine, many members of Congress disapproved of McNamara’s methods of oversight.  

This disagreement allowed the Army greater discretion in interpreting Kennedy’s call for more preparation in counterinsurgency.  

Other institutional features may moderate discord between the branches of government by encouraging policy agreement. Some argue that there should be relatively less policy disagreement when one party controls both the Congress and the presidency than when party control is divided. This is true. Congress, however, does not always agree with a president of the same party on policy. Party influence is even less likely to have a moderating effect on decisions about how to oversee organizations.  

Aside from these broad outlines, theories about delegation tell us to expect several patterns to emerge when multiple principals compete for control over an agent. First, the compromise that results often makes policy

23. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 44.
less efficient. Not only does political uncertainty cause principals to choose structural designs that they would never choose on technical grounds alone, but the very nature of compromise means that opposing groups have a hand in the structure that is created. 27 So, while the principals may get what they want in general, they may have to pay too much, have to withstand delays, etc.; policy is likely to contain more slack.

Second, when principals disagree the agent has an incentive to act strategically and play the principals off one another in order to gain support for its own preferences. 28 Thus, when civilians disagree on policy, organizational leaders may ally with actors in one branch or the other to influence the policy outcome. All things being equal, agent opinions are more influential when principals disagree on policy.

Also, the political costs of using certain control mechanisms may rise (reducing the probability of their use). In the United States, for example, the potential for political backlash led presidents to be increasingly willing to fire military leaders or use other dramatic personnel measures to force changes in military doctrine. 29

Finally, regardless of the agent's preferences, McCubbins and Page offer a model of how delegation is structured that suggests policy will be conservative when principals disagree. 30 The upshot of their argument is that an increase in policy disagreement among principals should cause principals to delegate more authority over the scope of policy, but to require increasingly confining procedures (standards, hearings, restrictions, etc.) with which to


29. The checks that members of Congress have on presidential appointments (ranging from confirmation, to the ability to hold hearings to question presidential actions) cause the President to use care to anticipate congressional preferences or look for special circumstances before firing high-ranking military personnel. The dramatic lesson that demonstrated the potential political costs of removing military leaders in crises was Truman's removal of General McArthur from command during the Korean War. Though Truman enjoyed broad congressional (and military) support for his actions, he nonetheless paid high political costs when a small group of Republican members of Congress used the event to hold hearings and publicly embarrass the president. See Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969), 520–28; Weigley, History of the U.S. Army, 516–19. Under these conditions it is more likely that the president will use personnel to shape the overall tenor of military organizations rather than to direct change in a crisis. For instance, some have argued that President Bush and Secretary of Defense Cheney strategically appointed military leaders who were more likely to take action. Presidents have not used personnel to change doctrine.

ensure control over an organization’s behavior. Civilian authorities may ask military organizations to make plans for a particular contingency, but with many *ex ante* (or before the fact) stipulations as well as procedures for *ex post* (or after the fact) evaluations. These procedural controls tend to lessen the amount of substantive discretionary authority for the agent.

This situation generates incentives for organizations to be conservative in their advice and action. When civilians give military leaders competing signals about what is acceptable and require specific reporting, military leaders have reasons to take small, but well fortified steps. In the post-cold war, for example, American military organizations have been asked to formulate plans for action in high-risk areas, plans for action that do not risk casualties, and plans that can be undertaken in an era of reduced budgets. In specific instances there may be no plans that satisfy all of these criteria. Violating any one of them, however, will bring the wrath of some portion of Congress or the administration to the organization. In these cases, we should expect military organizations to draw conservative plans that specify their awareness of the various civilian concerns in order to avoid blame after the fact. When civilians disagree, therefore, they promote agency discretion over the scope of policy, but under such strict procedural controls that they insure more conservative military advice than would be the case if there were broad civilian agreement on goals.

We can expect the most effective oversight when civilian control is constitutionally unified. Military advice and policy outcomes should closely follow civilian preferences. In instances of divided civilian control, it is likely that policy outcomes will reflect civilian preferences most closely when civilians agree on policy goals. This will more often be the case when the same party controls Congress and the presidency. Still, however, military advice may reflect organizational preferences. When civilians disagree on objectives, military advice will be couched in such a way as to reinforce the preferences of the civilians closest to the military position. In this case, military advice will have relatively more influence on outcomes. The tendency for civilian leaders to rely on more confining procedures when they disagree should lead the military to be more cautious about spelling out the costs and benefits of policy options and having clear criteria for success.

31. McCubbins and Page, "A Theory of Congressional Delegation," 422. Although this model was created to examine disagreement within Congress, its principle should apply to disagreement among principals generally.
CONGRESS AND MILITARY POLICY

Though the Constitution gives Congress authority over defense and foreign policy, Congress has not always been active in this area. Congressional activity depends not only on the constitutional structure, but the importance of particular policy arenas for Congress members’ electoral aims. When defense policy is not important for congressional elections, we should expect Congress to cede more authority to the president. Indeed, this was the pattern for much of America’s first century. There was a gradual increase in Congress’s involvement in defense policy in this century, however, concomitant with the United States’ increasing role in international affairs and the rise of national (as opposed to local or state) parties.32 With the end of the Second World War and the acknowledgment that the United States would play an even greater role in international affairs, Congress solidified its access to information on defense policy in the National Security Act of 1947 (revised in 1949). This legislation gave Congress access to military dissent as a way of checking the president and making sure he took heed of the experts.33

Events surrounding the war in Vietnam convinced many in Congress that these checks were not enough and there has been an even greater upsurge in congressional activity in security affairs since the early 1970s. Congress sought to seize control over military policy by developing informational capacities to diminish the information asymmetry between it and the military and to insure that Congress had access to information untainted by either the president or the military.34 Congress no longer relies merely on military dissent to check the president. Members of Congress have their own expert staffs. Since the Vietnam war members of Congress have become increasingly active participants in war powers, defense budget-making, arms control, arms sales, and covert operations.35 The Defense

32. For a discussion of the historical cases, see Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, 24–36.


34. The growth of congressional staffs and activity were not confined to defense policy, but were a generalized phenomenon of the 1970s.

Reorganization Act of 1986 (known otherwise as the Goldwater-Nichols Act) and the creation of a commander in chief for special operations in the 1987 National Defense Authorization Bill are more examples of congressional activism.

MILITARY BIAS

Finally, the bias of military organizations is important for what military leaders will advise.36 Even though we should expect cautious plans when civilians disagree, the bearing of those plans depends on military preferences. U.S. military leaders tend to be more reluctant to use force than their civilian counterparts. In a classic study of the cold war, Richard Betts found what he called a general pattern of resistance to using force among the military leadership.37 This reluctance has been particularly strong with respect to peripheral wars.38

Some have argued that this conservatism results from Jomenian notions of the logic of force that are fundamental to the modern principles of war.39 Gacek points to the tension between the logic of force and Clausewitz's more political ideas about warfare which allow more room for limited war. He argues that the logic of force has generally dominated military thinking and increasingly, after Vietnam, it has dominated American thinking in general. He attributes this to the strength of the Jomenian ideas.

Principal-agent approaches would not necessarily disagree with Gacek's argument, but would focus on what kind of thinking leaders were rewarded for (with promotion) as being crucial for what ideas win out.40 Had military leaders espousing limited war ideas been rewarded, we would have been more likely to see what Gacek calls Clausewitzean notions become domi-

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36. Speaking of "military preferences" is a difficult thing; obviously, there is always variation among the preferences of individuals in each organization. The approach here suggests our general expectations about military preferences should be found in the pattern of perspectives that are rewarded by individual organizations and therefore tend to be represented in the leadership over time.

37. He also, however, found some differences between the branches, with the air force being somewhat more likely to recommend using force and the army being the most reluctant to use force. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises.

38. The reluctance to be involved in peripheral wars is partly due to resistance among some services to do the types of political-military tasks often required.


40. See Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change, chap. 2.
nant. Regardless, there is general agreement that U.S. military leaders as a whole tend to be cautious about using force in peripheral wars.

SUMMARY

If we are trying to explain military advice on the use of force, principal-agent theory would suggest that in instances of divided civilian control military preferences would be the key explanatory variable. In the U.S. case, military leaders have preferred not to intervene in low-intensity conflicts.41 We should therefore expect advice to reflect that preference. We should also expect the military’s influence on policy to be greater in instances of civilian disagreement. Finally, the historical reluctance should be reinforced by the dynamics of responding to bosses who disagree—which often encourages conservatism in the agent.42

MILITARY ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA, HAITI, AND BOSNIA

Principal-agent theory does not question the outcome of military reluctance but reinterprets its meaning and implications, so an examination of the following cases can not test the competing approaches. The cases can, however, demonstrate the plausibility of the principal-agent approach and offer support by tracing the process of civilian disagreement and military advice.

First, of course, I must chart the course of civilian disagreement. One way to operationalize this would be to call civilian control divided when each party controls at least one civilian institution (the House of Representatives, the Senate, or the presidency). This may, however, both under- and over-represent division. When a different party controls the Congress and the presidency, but congressional leaders agree with the president, civilian leadership is still acts in a unified way. Similarly, when there are splits within a party about foreign affairs, the president may act differently than his party

41. There is a principal-agent argument for why this is the case that space prevents me from going into here. See Avant, Political Instruments and Military Change.
42. By conservatism, I am referring to prudent, cautious advice with respect to intervention, not to any ideological tendencies. Others have argued that the composition of the military is growing more conservative in an ideological sense: see Kohn, “Out of Control”; see also Charles Coheran and Eloise Malone, “A Comparison of Naval Academy Plebes and College Freshman over 20 Years: 1974–1994” (paper presented at the Biennial International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, 20–22 October 1995).
in Congress. I thus define a policy as being under question when there are public arguments opposing the president in Congress, when statements by the relevant committee chairman, congressional or senate leadership take a publicly different stance from the administration, and when resolutions disputing the president's position are introduced or passed.\footnote{A policy is less disputed when there are public arguments opposing the president and most disputed when legislation opposing the president is passed. For another analysis that used public leadership positions to operationalize interbranch conflict, see Steven S. Smith, "Congressional Party Leaders," in The President, The Congress, and the Making of Foreign Policy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994).}

Also, while the crisis literature expects problems in general, the principal-agent approach is more explicit about when we should expect particular kinds of military reticence. For instance, it may generally be the case that the preferences of U.S. military organizations lead private military advice to be conservative with respect to interventions, but we should expect more public military statements when the level of civilian disagreement increases.

When there is conflict between Congress and the president over military policy goals, we should also expect more before-the-fact stipulations about military action which (all things being equal) should reinforce military conservatism. We should look for congressional and administration stipulations, but also military stipulations about what they can and cannot do; clear rules of engagement, markers for success, etc.

Those who argue that the military is out of control argue that we are heading down a slippery slope toward the point where the military will represent a political position in the United States.\footnote{As mentioned above, these arguments also point to a number of specific incidents between Clinton and the military—from the policy on gays in the military to derogatory statements about Clinton by some military personnel—as indications of diminished civilian control.} Much of this argument focuses on the Goldwater-Nichols Act which is said to have politicized the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in such a way as to allow someone like Colin Powell to take advantage of his military position to try publicly to influence foreign policy.\footnote{See Kohn, "Out of Control," 4; Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control," and Dunlap, "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012."} If these arguments are right, we should see relative unity in the opinions of military leaders (possibly emanating from the chairman of the JCS). Because the institutional approach pays attention to those perspectives that are rewarded by the service branches, it would be less surprised by a lack of military unity, and, indeed, would expect it in certain instances (for example, the air force generally believes air power alone is more effective than the army). I will use similar criterion for military division/unity as I did for civilian and call the military divided
when there are divergent public statements from members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders in Chief (CINCs), or the officers in charge in the field.\textsuperscript{46}

In effect, the principal-agent approach will be supported to the extent that the cases demonstrate (1) civilian disagreement in the case of public military reluctance; (2) civilian attempts to draw before-the-fact stipulations; (3) military responses to clarify how they will be successful that make clear references to civilian goals; (4) military options from which civilians can choose; and (5) policy that reflects civilian preferences. The crisis literature will be supported to the degree that (6) military opinion is so united as to limit civilian choices; (7) military opinion does not reflect civilian preferences; and (8) policy reflects military preferences.

THE CASES

Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia are often grouped together as representing the dilemmas of defending American interests against low-level disturbances after the cold war. They are, however, quite different conflicts; the justification of the American response to them (both domestic and international) has rested on distinct grounds, and there is a significant range in the relative difficulty of the military tasks involved. Furthermore, they are not separate events. The hunt for Aideed and its results had immediate effects on perceptions about intervention in Haiti and Bosnia. The specter of intervention in Bosnia was also raised in June, 1992 and thus provided a background issue for the other two interventions.\textsuperscript{47}

First, the missions had different purposes and the purposes had different relationships to American international goals. Somalia was clearly a case of humanitarian intervention. There were no purported security interests at stake and the crisis in Somalia had little impact on American domestic affairs. The intervention in Haiti was also justified on humanitarian grounds, but the crisis had greater international and domestic ramifications for American policymakers. Due to its geographical proximity, Haiti is well within what the United States has traditionally considered its “backyard.”

\textsuperscript{46} Again, it is received wisdom that there would be a difference between the military leadership in Washington and the commander in the field. I am not suggesting that this is anything new, just that the principal-agent approach would be less surprised by this continuation than the crisis literature.

\textsuperscript{47} Claiborne Pell (D-RI) called for the administration to consider military action and a naval blockade to stop ethnic fighting between the new Yugoslavia and its neighbors on 4 June. See “Pell Urges Action in Yugoslavia,” \textit{Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report}, 6 June 1992, 1619.
Additionally, there was a general belief that once the United States committed itself to restoring President Aristide to office, its credibility would be at stake if it did not take action.\(^{48}\) Haiti’s proximity to the United States also created domestic pressures when the Haitian population began exiting the country by boat.

Arguments for action in Bosnia also referred to humanitarian goals, but this crisis has a number of different international implications. First, although the crisis took place in an area arguably within the U.S. security umbrella, in the wake of arguments about the need for burden-sharing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), there were claims that the European powers should take a greater lead in resolving the crisis. The NATO issue arose again in the disagreement over continuing the arms embargo which effectively limited the ability of the Bosnian Muslims to protect themselves. There were also worries about the effect of any policy punishing the Serbs on relations with Russia. As in Somalia, however, the potential for direct domestic impact from the crisis has been slight.

Most importantly, we must say something about the military tasks involved. Haiti and Somalia were similar, and altogether different from Bosnia, because of the weakness of their military forces. Some claim that the Bosnian Serbs have been overrated, but they nonetheless pose a much more formidable threat than the Haitian military or the Somali warlords. In advising on the crisis in Bosnia, then, the difficulty of the task should make military leaders more concerned about specifying the dangers of intervention to civilians ahead of time so as not to be blamed for policy failure.

*Somalia*

The intervention in Somalia was based on humanitarian motives. The Bush administration has been faulted for ignoring the humanitarian debacle and not intervening earlier,\(^{49}\) but the rationale under which the action was instituted was the suffering in the country. Initially, then, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was more akin to a disaster relief operation than to an intervention, even though the absence of a central political structure in the country distinguished the operation from the other humanitarian efforts.

In the time leading up to the American operation in Somalia, congressional sentiment was in favor of action there. On 22 July 1992 Nancy

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Kassebaum (R-KA), senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged the establishment of a UN force to ensure that food shipments reached those in need. Then, in August, the Senate approved by voice vote a resolution urging President Bush to seek UN action.

In mid-September, the Bush administration announced plans to position four ships, with twenty-one hundred Marines, off the coast of Somalia to provide support for an airlift of UN peacekeeping forces into Mogadishu to enforce a cease-fire between the rival factions. The factions, however, were uncooperative and the force of UN peacekeepers too small to keep the peace. In response to this failure, Bush ordered a UN-authorized force of twenty eight thousand U.S. troops to Somalia in December.

The president was careful to take note of congressional concerns and the need for congressional support. Bush sent a letter to congressional leaders on 10 December 1992 saying that U.S. troops would stay in Somalia only as long as it took to establish a secure environment in which humanitarian relief operations could work. At the end of the 4 December briefing of Congress, Tom Foley said, "The president acted wisely, and in a circumstance where he had very little choice without grave humanitarian consequences resulting." Policy agreement among civilians over the humanitarian mission in Somalia combined with a relatively clear and attainable mission to cause little military resistance to U.S. involvement. Despite general agreement about this case, however, Congress members were concerned about how the response to the situation in Somalia would relate to other potential post–cold war interventions. In fact, as congressional leaders voiced support for Bush's actions, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) asked whether this action paved the way to similar deployments in other countries.

While there was little in the way of military resistance, there was serious thought among military leaders about setting the parameters for the mission in such a way that the U.S. military would be successful. First, alert to the potential problems involved with conducting humanitarian operations in a deteriorating security environment, the United States Central Com-

mand (USCENTCOM) gave careful thought to appropriate rules of engagement (ROE). The initial United Nations force in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was authorized in May 1992 and operated under the ROE outlined in chapter VI of the UN charter which allows the use of force only for purposes of self-defense. On 3 December 1992 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 794 which endorsed the secretary-general's call for the action in Somalia to operate under chapter VII (which allows all necessary actions to ensure a mission's accomplishment and leaves the ROE up to individual countries). This left USCENTCOM free to develop ROE that were restrictive enough to allow for the humanitarian mission, but permissive enough to allow U.S. forces to accomplish that mission and protect American lives as it put together a coalition (UNITAF or Unified Task Force) to secure lines of transportation through which food aid could be delivered.

USCENTCOM was also adamant in resisting "mission creep." CENTCOM developed a clear mission statement that outlined the bounds of U.S. participation in such a way that it was easy to resist new demands. The successful operation in southern Somalia, for example, led to a UN request that the United States establish control in the northern areas and begin to disarm the militia factions. Even though this request may have been sensible in light of a long-term transformation in Somalia, it represented a different mission than the one the leaders of CENTCOM had been delegated. The specificity of the mission statement of CENTCOM led such requests to be denied.

By the time the Clinton administration took office, approximately 18,000 U.S. troops were operating in Somalia, and UNITAF was largely successful. The Senate expressed support for the operation by passing a resolution (S.J. R. 45) on 4 February 1993 authorizing the president to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief.

Shortly thereafter, however, Congress expressed concern about the turnover of authority to the UN while U.S. troops were still deployed. Marking the first time that a sizable contingent of U.S. forces (five thousand) participated in a UN Operations without a U.S. officer in charge, the operational details were closely negotiated to convince lawmakers in Congress that the troops would remain under the overall direction, if not the formal com-

58. The House passed a similar resolution on 25 May.
mand, of the Pentagon. Some Republicans also expressed anger over President Bill Clinton’s reluctance to set a time table for withdrawal. Nunn urged Clinton to seek congressional authorization for continued participation in Somalia. He reasoned that because the operation could be a precedent for other U.S. actions, it was important to seek congressional support even if U.S. troops were not placed under foreign command. As the House debated S.J.R. 45, attempts were made both in committee and on the floor to attach conditions limiting the time American troops would remain in Somalia. These were defeated, narrowly in committee and more widely on the floor, but they served notice of the growing congressional concern over the limits of U.S. involvement in Somalia.

The UN again assumed responsibility for all military operations in Somalia under UNOSOM II at the beginning of May. There were a number of issues that changed in the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. The mission for UNOSOM II was more difficult and the chain of command was less clear. Tensions between the UN and the factions in Somalia arose in the immediate aftermath of the transfer, and as a result of this was a 5 June attack on Pakistani soldiers by Somali warlord, Mohammed Farah Aideed. The UN Security Council the passed a resolution (S. R. 837) authorizing UNOSOM II to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the battle, including the arrest of Aideed. U.S.-led strikes, including an attack on Aideed’s headquarters on 17 June that left many Somali citizens dead, drew fire from


64. The troubles between Aideed and UNOSOM II began in May when Aideed proposed a conference ostensibly to settle political issues, but actually to increase Aideed’s visibility. Disputes over the conference (which actually became two conferences—one sponsored by the UN and Aideed’s “rump” conference) led to the attack on UN peacekeepers just one day after it ended. See Clarke, “Testing the World’s Resolve in Somalia,” 52–53.
congressional critics. Democratic leaders still voiced support for the mission, but critics from both sides of the aisle cited the episode as proof that the UN mission was not likely to succeed.

As opposition began to rise in Congress, there was some disjuncture between military officers in the field and those in Washington. The U.S. officers in the field, Admiral Jonathon Howe (retired), the special UN envoy to Somalia and Major General Thomas Montgomery, the senior U.S. officer in Somalia, requested the Delta Force commando unit to hunt for Aideed. General Hoar, head of the USCENTCOM, had approved of the attack on Aideed’s headquarters (this was also widely supported in the administration), but strongly disapproved of a manhunt for Aideed. The administration initially denied the request from Howe and Montgomery, worrying that sending the Delta Force would direct too much attention toward the search for Aideed. Only as Aideed’s attacks mounted through the summer did the deputies committee (a panel of subcabinet officials) decide to send Rangers and a number of Delta commandos in late August. General Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was reportedly skeptical about the prospects for capturing Aideed, but approved the request for Rangers and Delta commandos in deference to his general in the field. While Powell seemed to agree with Hoar, he nonetheless deferred to his general in the field and the civilian decision to grant the requests.

The Rangers arrived in Somalia on 26 August, almost simultaneous with an administration decision to emphasize a broader political solution to the problems in Somalia. Admiral Howe and a senior U.S. diplomat in Mogadishu wanted even more troops so as to effectively disarm the Mogadishu population, but General Hoar criticized the UN approach to Somalia which he argued focused on “facile solutions like, get Aideed and all will be well.” After U.S. combat engineers and Pakistani forces were ambushed in Mogadishu on 9 September, General Montgomery sent a message requesting more fire power (four tanks, fourteen armored personnel carriers and a battalion of artillery). General Hoar supported the request (except for the

66. “After Supporting Hunt for Aideed, U.S. is Blaming UN for Losses,” New York Times, 10 October 1993, A1. The pattern of military leaders in the field supporting more aggressive action is also something Betts points to during the cold war. See Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crisis, chap. 8.
67. “After Supporting Hunt for Aidid, U.S. is Blaming UN for Loss.”
68. Ibid. The administration was worried about the prospects for the operation. Les Aspin was quoted on 28 August saying there would be no quick or easy way out of Somalia. “Aspin Sees No Quick Exit From Somalia,” Chicago Tribune, 28 August 1995, 1.
artillery) as did Powell, but Secretary of Defense Les Aspin rejected it because he feared it would emphasize diplomacy and speed up a withdrawal. 69

Congressional opposition to the action in Somalia that had been growing over the summer, came to a head in September. 70 Widespread senate support was voiced to cut off funds for the deployment by 31 October unless the administration’s policy was debated and voted on again by Congress. Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.VA) called for a cut off of funding within a month unless Congress explicitly authorized continued deployment in Somalia. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) complained that the U.S. had sent troops to Somalia to keep people from starving to death and now were killing women and children. Others, like Senators Nunn, Carl Levin (D-MI), and Strom Thurmond (R-SC), defended the deployment arguing that the success of Restore Hope would be empty if the country went back to shambles and that a premature pull out would harm U.S. credibility. 71 A compromise was worked out with the administration where the president agreed to notify Congress of the specific objectives behind the mission by 15 October, and seek a party vote by 15 November. 72 The measure passed the Senate on 9 September, publicly notifying the president of congressional concern about policy in Somalia. 73

Before Clinton had responded to the senate resolution, however, U.S. forces under UN direction, led a failed ambush of Aideed’s headquarters on 3 October which resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers. 74 Images of American dead being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu solidified congressional exasperation with the mission. One hundred and forty-two house Republicans sent a letter to Clinton on 6 October insisting that he pull out U.S. forces. Clinton promised in a 7 October address to Congress that he would withdraw all troops by 31 March, but key senators—including Bill Bradley (D-NJ) and John McCain (R-AZ)—rejected Clinton’s retooled policy. 75 The UN was blame for the ill-fated raid (the argument was that U.S. troops should not be under UN command) and at the administra-

69. Ibid.
73. The House adopted a similar nonbinding resolution on 28 September.
tion (the argument was that Aspin’s team did not have a clear plan). It was asserted that the military was angry over Clinton’s policies in Somalia.76

At this stage the policy was immediately and dramatically overhauled. Bargaining sessions coincided with Clinton’s official report to Congress (demanded in the senate amendment). Ultimately, a compromise was reached in which the administration agreed further to limit its goals, play down the capture of Aideed, and narrow the mission of U.S. forces in Somalia, in exchange for Congress agreeing to continue the operation through 31 March. The plan was solidly endorsed by civilian and military leaders.77

As the principal-agent approach would expect, public military resistance to administration plans did not surface until the transfer of authority to UNOSOM II, well after Congress had expressed worries about having American troops serve under UN authority.78 The concerns voiced by General Hoar—which constitute the clearest and most public military reluctance—seem to have been directed first at proposals from the field to hunt for Aideed. Congressional worries were expressed over just this issue. Then criticism was leveled at Aspin for not following through with enough force once the commitment was made—and again Congress members said the same.79 There was relative military unity among the JCS, but the administration received other options from Admiral Howe and General Montgomery. Regardless, more conservative military advice did not determine policy.

Haiti

In the Haitian case the military demonstrated considerably greater reticence, but less public resistance than we will see in Bosnia. The crisis was drawn out over a year from the time the Clinton administration sent forces to en-

76. “Many in Military Angry Over Clinton’s Policies,” Los Angeles Times, 19 October 1993, A1. In 1995, a report of the Senate Armed Service Committee faulted former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin for turning down the request for additional fire power before the 3 October raid. While it acknowledged that Congress was pressing for an end to the deployment when Aspin made his decision, “nevertheless, Aspin should have given more consideration to the requests from his military commanders...and approved the request for armor.” The report went on to say that had the troop carriers been available they would have been likely to have been used in the 3 October raid which may have resulted in fewer casualties. “Senate Report Faults Aspin For U.S. Deaths in 1993 Raid,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 16 October 1993, 2823.


79. Only in a secret meeting after the 3 October incident, did General Hoar complain to lawmakers that Pentagon civilian officials had dismissed his warnings against pursuing Aideed. “Many in Military Angry Over Clinton’s Policies.”
force the Governors Island accord to when U.S. forces actually intervened. Also, as the first crisis came right on the heels of the U.S. deaths in Somalia, the policy was influenced by those events.

Clinton came into office criticizing Bush for his handling of the Haitian problem. Particularly, he argued that the United States should do more to restore exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti and should not repatriate Haitian boat people. Once in office, however, Clinton was concerned that allowing boat people refuge in the United States would simply escalate the exodus, so he initially continued Bush’s policies. Black leaders in Congress began by giving Clinton the benefit of the doubt, but expressed impatience in March, shortly before a meeting between Clinton and Aristide.80

In June 1993 the administration and the UN begin to turn up the heat on the military government in Haiti by authorizing a worldwide oil and arms embargo against Haiti along with an assets freeze. Shortly thereafter, the UN brokered a deal—the Governors Island agreement—between Aristide and military leader Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras which set out the steps for the restoration of Haiti's democratically elected government and the lifting of international economic sanctions. A U.S. envoy expressed cautious optimism about the return to democracy in Haiti and the administration pledged to spend $37.5 million to rebuild Haiti.81

It was the enforcement of this agreement that led to the first iteration of the Haitian crisis. The United States pledged 1,800 troops to ease the return of exiled President Aristide. These troops, however, were to operate under the stricter guidelines of Chapter VI of the UN Charter which allows the use of force only for self-defense. The UN mission was to be deployed to Haiti only if the Haitian military created safe conditions and their mission was to train the Haitian forces and dissuade violence that might be spawned by anti-Aristide gunmen.82

The U.S. response to the problems in Haiti were complicated by the timing of the crisis, which occurred just after the Somalia debacle. Military leaders were already testifying in Congress about the incident in Somalia in October 1993, and at the same time they registered numerous concerns about the commitment in Haiti. They were worried, first and foremost, about the lessons rightist Haitian gangs might draw from the recent prob-

lems in Somalia. If they believed that killing American soldiers would heat a
domestic debate in the United States, these gangs would have an incentive
to work against U.S. troops. These concerns were heightened by the fact that
U.S. personnel would be operating as noncombatant personnel, making
them easy targets for Haitian gunmen.83 Finally, the Pentagon questioned
the mission’s potential for success, given concerns about Aristide’s stability
and whether he would be able to garner control over the Haitian military.84

Nonetheless, the administration sent 218 American and Canadian troops
aboard the troop ship Harlan County to Port-au-Prince. As the ship neared
Port-au-Prince, however, an armed mob attacked the cars of American
diplomats in Haiti. How to respond to the degenerating situation was hotly
debated. State department envoy to Haiti, Lawrence Pezzullo argued that
Washington should not give up, but should keep the ship off the coast
while a solution was brokered. Madeleine Albright, U.S. representative to the
UN, also wanted the U.S. to hold the line, arguing that U.S. prestige would be
hurt if they backed off. At the upper levels of the administration, however,
Aspin, Warren Christopher, and Anthony Lake all advised that the ship be
withdrawn. The recent experience in Somalia and the fact that the troops
were prepared for training, not for fighting, led advisors at the upper echelons
to recommend without dissent that the United States pull back.85

Concern in Congress, brewing since the Somalia problems, was made
formal on 23 October when Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole pressed
for restrictions on the president’s ability to intervene in Bosnia and Haiti.86
The deadline for Aristide’s return set out in the Governors Island agree-
ment passed at the end of October and Aristide remained in exile.

Through the winter, administration officials, Congress, the military gov-
ernment in Haiti, and President Aristide jostled back and forth attempting
to come to some sort of agreement. As in the Somali case, there was little
consensus over what should be done in Haiti. While the Clinton adminis-
tration supported Aristide’s return, they were sometimes at odds with him
(and his congressional supporters) over his refusal to accept the demands
of the new military government.87 Meanwhile, Democratic members of

84. “Failure Haiti Operation Backs Initial Pentagon Skepticism,” New York Times, 15 Oc-
tober 1993, A8:2, “Many in Military Angry Over Clinton’s Policies.”
85. Ibid.
86. “Clinton’s Policy is Battered, But His Powers are Intact,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report, 23 October 1993, 2896.
87. “Democrats Hit Administration Over Aristide’s Ongoing Exile,” Congressional Quarterly
Congress assailed Clinton over inaction in Haiti, while Republicans branded Aristide a leftist, unstable psychopath.\textsuperscript{88}

In April Democrats pressured Clinton to step up pressure on the Haitian military with legislation in both houses (S. 2027 and H. R. 4114).\textsuperscript{89} They proposed a new policy that would impose a complete embargo on Haiti except for humanitarian aid, ban all air traffic, prohibit visas for members of the Haitian military and their backers, freeze their assets in the United States, and end the practice of summarily returning Haitian refugees. In May Clinton followed suit. He supported, and the UN approved, an almost complete economic embargo of Haiti. Travel by the military and their families was banned and only food, medicine, cooking oil, and journalistic supplies were allowed to be imported into Haiti.\textsuperscript{90} Liberal Democrats urged more action, but congressional Republicans and other conservatives criticized any move toward military action for fear of another Somalia.\textsuperscript{91}

In June the administration increased the pressure further by cutting off U.S. commercial flights to Haiti and tightening other sanctions, and in July the president ordered U.S. Marines to conduct a mock evaluation of U.S. citizens in case the junta began to target Americans in Haiti.\textsuperscript{92} Senator Dole attempted to build on growing congressional concerns that the administration planned to use force in Haiti and create a bipartisan commission on Haiti as an amendment to the 1995 foreign operations bill (H. R. 4426), but the Senate voted to kill the amendment.\textsuperscript{93} Later, Clinton took his most serious step thus far by asking the UN to authorize a U.S. invasion and occupation of Haiti if sanctions failed to remove its military government. The UN voted to authorize the invasion on 31 July.

Meanwhile, conservatives in Congress initially warned of Somali-type problems in Haiti, then as the invasion drew nearer wondered what clear national interests the U.S. was protecting in Haiti, and questioned the wis-

\textsuperscript{88} Democrats included Christopher Dodd (Conn), Tom Harkin (Iowa), Charles Rangel (NY), Joseph Kennedy (MA), and Carrie Meek (FL). A particularly vocal Republican was Jesse Helms (NC). "Democrats Hit Administration Over Aristide's Ongoing Exile," \textit{Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report}, 12 March 1994, 613.


\textsuperscript{91} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{93} The vote was on 14 July. See "Senate Declines to Restrict Clinton's Options in Haiti," \textit{Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report}, 16 July 1994, 1943.
dom of endorsing Aristide. Nonetheless, the Senate defeated a Republican attempt to limit Clinton’s military plans by requiring him first to talk to Congress, and took no formal action to block the president as the invasion seemed imminent. Critics of the president seemed to grudgingly accept the importance of the invasion, if only to demonstrate U.S. credibility. According to former assistant secretary of state, Elliot Abrams, “To a great extent, Clinton has created a national interest for invading, credibility. If you say enough times, ‘We’re going to invade Haiti,’ you have to do it. Otherwise you have no credibility.”

As the United States moved closer to military action, there was little public military comment on the issue of whether the United States should intervene, although it was reported that military officials were very reluctant to begin planning the invasion, were concerned about an ill-drawn comparison with Grenada, and were especially worried about U.S. troops being drawn into policing activities. There was also an attempt to prepare the American public for casualties. General Shalikashvili warned that Americans should expect casualties if the president decided to intervene.

In the end, the last minute diplomatic efforts by former president Jimmy Carter, Nunn, and Powell created a solution that skirted the need for a U.S. invasion, and when American troops arrived, they were deployed as an occupying force rather than an invading force.

96. “Going In.”
99. The military devised a plan for Haiti relying heavily on new techniques designed by the Navy (and, particularly, Admiral Paul David Miller) designed to respond to the new conditions of the post–cold war. The invasion plan relied on a broader concept whereby different components of the military would be integrated to meet a challenge rather than relying, as the United States had in the past, on the deployment of set-piece units. The particular course for Haiti would have combined naval and army forces to conduct a night-time invasion. The plan, which would have used army helicopters on naval carriers, was not without risks and drew fire from more traditionally minded military leaders. Admiral Miller’s plan for an invasion was lauded, however, for its ability to adjust quickly, in mid-deployment, from an invading force to an occupying force. See “Unique Union of Soldiers and Sailors,” New York Times, 17 September 1994, A7; “Military Moves in New Directions,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 17 September 1994, 2583; Sean O’Keefe, “The Future of Warfare,” Roll Call, 6 February 1995, 25.
As in Somalia, Pentagon officials claimed to draw the mission statement clearly to prevent "mission creep," and as a lesson learned from the Somalia experience U.S. officers tried to incorporate the need for a sensitive and gradual approach to disarming Haitians. 100 There was also an effort on the part of the military to specify and limit its rules of engagement so as to prevent casualties. 101 American forces were authorized to shoot at any armed Haitian who threatened to use weapons against an American. They were also allowed to intervene against Haitian military or police forces to prevent "grave abuses" that threatened the life of the victim. Even in such cases, however, American forces were instructed that the first concern should be for their own safety. 102

These efforts to resist policing duties were taxed in the early days of the U.S. occupation when violent episodes exploded around U.S. troops. U.S. forces, however, continued to resist pressures to conduct basic law and order enforcement, 103 focusing instead on the daunting task of training and professionalizing the Haitian police. 104 U.S. forces secured Haitian Army garrisons, supervised Haitian police, and collected weapons.

As Jean-Bertrand Aristide was returned to power uneventfully and Colonel Cedras departed, despite what some called the timidity of the U.S. action in Haiti and some reported squabbles among Army, Special Forces, and police advisors, the results in Haiti looked like a measured success. 105 The turnover to the UN forces (most of which were American) was then crafted to avoid the pitfalls of Somalia, and also apparently successfully so.

For our purpose here, the incidents in Somalia made an invasion of Haiti even more suspect to members of Congress. Although they were not willing to prevent presidential action, Congress members were waiting in the wings to disclaim military mistakes. Military advice was pessimistic, but less public, than in Somalia. This makes sense given the grudging acceptance in Congress that something would be done. What is the most interesting

103. Ibid.
about the Haitian intervention, however, is that the initial military reluctance and grim forecasts about casualties did not hamstring U.S. policy. The Clinton administration opted to pull back from a confrontation in October 1993 because the forces were ill-prepared for confrontation and they did not want to suffer another incident on the heels of Somalia. The administration then directed preparations for an invasion of Haiti. These preparations were not widely supported, but were nonetheless carried out.\textsuperscript{106} As we might expect with the degree of congressional skepticism, military planners went to a great deal of effort carefully to specify their mission and craft ROE that reduced the possibility for American casualties. Finally, as in Somalia, it was not the military perspective that drove the policy decision.

\textit{Bosnia}

The most prominent display of military reticence occurred over the former Yugoslavia. In the debate over policy toward the Balkans, there were significantly more public military statements resisting military action. There was also, however, serious civilian disagreement about the best course to pursue. Furthermore, disagreement among NATO and concerns about the signal U.S. policy would send to other countries complicated action considerably. American policy toward Bosnia has been conflicting and ambiguous, partly because the United States has sought incompatible goals.\textsuperscript{107} One could argue that the degree of debate and ambiguity over foreign policy goals in Bosnia should be great enough to explain even unified military reluctance to intervention. Nonetheless, even in this arena civilian leaders were presented with some variety of plans for action.

In the summer of 1992 reports of brutal battles in Sarajevo caused the United States to consider military means to enforce a cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Calls for action from Congress in June were initially dis-

\textsuperscript{106} Indeed, carried out in an innovative way; with the Adaptive Joint Force Packaging concept, "U.S. Forces were positioned to either invade or facilitate." O'Keefe, "The Future of Warfare," 25.

\textsuperscript{107} For an analysis of the conflicting nature of U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia, see Michael Mandelbaum, "America's Self-Canceling Bosnia Policy," \textit{New York Times}, 18 June 1995, E15. He argues that the United States has three goals in Bosnia: supporting the Bosnian Muslims, ending the war, and keeping the United States out of the conflict. Unfortunately achieving any one of the goals requires abandoning another. He argues that U.S. policy has failed because it has not made a choice.

The United States had, however, made a de facto choice to place the goal of ending the war below the other two—a choice endorsed by some. See David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbs," \textit{Foreign Affairs} 73, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 30–47. More recent events demonstrate a new choice relinquishing the goal of keeping the United States out of the conflict.
counted by the Bush administration and the Pentagon. By the end of June, Bush announced additional diplomatic sanctions in retaliation for the shelling and bombing of Sarajevo and then sent C-130 transport planes to aid the UN airlift to Sarajevo. At this point Bush expressed willingness to provide air support but not combat troops.

In August, however, reported atrocities led to even louder cries by Congress. Bush then asked for, and received, UN Security Council approval of a resolution that requested the use of all measures possible to facilitate humanitarian relief to Bosnia. A nonbinding senate resolution also demanded a review of whether the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina had put the Bosnian government at a disadvantage. Lt. General Barry McCaffrey, representative of the JCS, supported the administration’s position, warning that, “To the extent that we employ military force where it may be called for, in the eyes of some we become the fourth belligerent.” He estimated that 60,000–120,000 troops would be needed to secure the airport at Sarajevo and a 200-mile overland path to the Adriatic sea.

In an interview with the New York Times in September 1992, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, went even further arguing that the United States should not intervene in Bosnia. Assailing the advocates of limited intervention, Powell argued that the U.S. armed forces are best used in a decisive fashion to achieve a well defined goal. From limited air strikes to protecting Muslims to limited force to try to deter fighting, Powell argued that plans for intervention were hopes aimed at ill-defined goals, rather than plans to achieve well defined goals. “As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result of not.” Furthermore, he stated, “I do not know how limited bombing will

113. Ibid., A1.
stop the Serbs from what they are doing.” Powell’s interview with the New York Times was followed by an editorial in October and a Foreign Affairs article after the election echoing his earlier arguments. Powell has claimed that his statements in print were made with the prior knowledge of his civilian leaders. Indeed, they seem to be consistent with the Bush administration’s position on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

Clinton had criticized Bush during the campaign for failure to act in the former Yugoslavia and his administration began a review of the policy when he took office. Warren Christopher had said at his confirmation hearing that the Western nations should enforce the flight ban, consider lifting the arms embargo to the Muslims, and examine the consequences of deploying ground troops. Top aides to Powell again claimed in testimony to Congress that “lifting the UN embargo on weapons shipments and enforcing the air exclusion zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina would do little to protect the Muslims from Serbian attacks.”

Once the administration had completed its review, however, Clinton’s plans for Bosnia, presented by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on 10 February, concentrated on diplomacy and bringing peace to the war-torn country. It pledged that the United States would join with a multinational contingent to enforce a peace plan only if such a plan was agreed upon by the warring parties. Plans to lift the arms embargo or use air strikes to neutralize Serbian artillery, Christopher claimed, had been ruled out after consulting with U.S. allies.

As the peace process went forward, Christopher testified on 25 March that the U.S. may be called upon to make good on its promise if Radovan Karadzic decided to sign the peace accord already agreed to by the Muslims and Croats. This caused expressions of congressional anguish over the possibility of U.S. troops in Bosnia. As it was, the question of intervention via air strikes arose anyway when the Serbs refused to accept the peace plan in early April. Powell argued once more that air strikes would not deter the

114. Ibid., A5.
Serbs. His argument, however, only reinforced administration concerns about the lack of public support for tougher U.S. action in Bosnia and a general belief that there was little congressional support for "military adventures in the Balkans." Continued Serbian attacks led Congress to express exasperation with Clinton's policies. Senate minority leader Bob Dole claimed, "No matter how you spin it, this policy has been a disaster." Dole claimed that the arms embargo should have been lifted months ago, and that he would support an air strike if isolated military targets could be identified. Members of the armed services committee, however, warned that U.S. air strikes might lead to the involvement of U.S. troops, an option that had no support in Congress or the executive branch. Shalikashvili (then commander of all American and alliance forces in Europe) also warned that outside forces would face difficult dilemmas if they were to intervene to stop Serb aggression, and that even with high-tech advantages, the U.S. forces would be plagued by the potential for causing civilian casualties.

Powell's statements have been taken as the clearest indicator of the military's reluctance to use force in anything but an all-out conflict. The all or nothing approach (reflecting the Vietnam syndrome) critics argue, has paralyzed the military's ability to deal with the post-cold war world where violent nationalism and ethnic conflict have supplanted superpower hostilities. Shalikashvili continued Powell's cautionary urges about the conditions under which the United States could effectively use force against the Serbs. This seeming unity among military officers is the best evidence for the argument that the U.S. military has a particular perspective on policy.

The level of civilian dispute over the potential for intervening in Bosnia would lead us to expect such conservatism; the Vietnam syndrome has affected civilian as well as military judgments. Even in this case, however, the military opinion about intervention in the former Yugoslavia has not been as unified as Powell's statements suggest. While generally concerned about intervention, some military leaders did float options for the use of force in

125. Kohn, "Out of Control," pp. 11-12; see also Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control."
Bosnia. For instance, as early as June 1992 when the Washington Post reported that defense planners were making the case against intervention, they also pointed out that General John Gavin (NATO supreme commander) offered the U.S. operations to support the Kurds in northern Iraq as an analogy of what might be done to support Sarajevo.\textsuperscript{127} Also, during the crisis of April 1992, senior military officials—including several who worked for Powell—argued that the deft use of air power could help silence Serbian artillery.\textsuperscript{128} General Merrill A. McPeak, the air force chief of staff, told a senate subcommittee that one option under consideration, bombing the Bosnian Serbs' gun positions, would be completely effective and pose "virtually no risk" to attacking U.S. warplanes.\textsuperscript{129} Admiral Frank Boorda, commander of NATO forces in southern Europe during 1991–94, was reportedly upbeat about the potential effectiveness of NATO air strikes.\textsuperscript{130}

As it was, NATO played cat and mouse with the Serbian forces over Sarajevo through the rest of 1993. On 5 February 1994, however, the Serbian shelling of a marketplace in Sarajevo followed by an intense artillery campaign led the United States and NATO to consider bombing Serbian targets. As in the previous discussions, there were references to military caution over the threatened air strikes, particularly those aimed at Serbian artillery.\textsuperscript{131} The NATO countries, however, agreed on an ultimatum requiring the Serbs to withdraw their heavy artillery to 12 miles from the center of Sarajevo by 21 February or face air strikes.\textsuperscript{132} After the Serbs complied, the United States and NATO continued with a toughening policy in their efforts to enforce the no-fly zone.\textsuperscript{133}

By March, though, statements by both military leaders and the secretary of defense urged caution in interpreting a new U.S. policy. According to Shalikashvili, "There were very specific conditions around Sarajevo that lent themselves to the application of air power, conditions that don't exist in other parts of Bosnia." Similarly, Secretary of Defense Perry argued that air raids could not be extended to protect other Muslim enclaves unless there

\textsuperscript{130} This was reported as he replaced Admiral Kelso as Chief of Naval Operations. "Commander of Bosnia Mission Named to Succeed Kelso," \textit{Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report}, 19 March 1994, 682.
were clear targets and the air strikes would aid diplomatic overtures. Still, NATO again made threats to Serbian forces surrounding Gorazde and then struck Bosnian Serb positions in August to halt Serb violations of unprotected zones.

The most significant NATO action, however, was taken in response to the ultimate failure of limited air power and to a second Serbian shelling of the marketplace in Sarajevo on 28 August 1995. After Serbs had effectively used UN hostages to defang NATO threats, and the West had failed to prevent the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa earlier in the summer, the allies had threatened that another attack on civilian targets would prompt a severe response from NATO. To prepare for this, the UN peacekeepers had been reduced and redeployed to less vulnerable positions. Then, a strong Croatian offensive, where the Croatian army retook Krajina, weakened the Serbs, and changed the strategic landscape of the former Yugoslavia. When the Bosnian Serbs shelled the Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August, the alliance kept its promise and on 30 August a NATO air attack, led by the United States, struck Bosnian Serb air defense systems, command and control centers, ammunition dumps, surface to air missile sights, and Serbian encampments around Sarajevo. After several days of punishment, the Serbs pulled back. In concomitant negotiations U.S. envoy Richard Holbrooke brokered a cease-fire and preliminary agreement which would promise 25,000 U.S. troops as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping mission in the event of a final agreement.

The final agreement was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, in the midst of almost daily threats by congressional leaders about the dangers of United States involvement in Bosnia and worries that American troops would be put in harm’s way. It has been charged that American negotiators antici-

134. “Pentagon is Wary of Role in Bosnia,” A6.
136. Worried that the UN mission in Bosnia was becoming untenable, the U.S. also planned for a NATO evacuation of remaining UN troops. “Pentagon Preps Plans for Bosnia Withdrawal,” Daily News, 15 July 1995, 2.
pated military concerns in the creation of the accord. The New York Times claimed that after reviewing the accord, even the most skeptical command-
ers agreed that the United States could achieve the limited goals with few casualties. "This is largely because the agreement meets virtually every condition the U.S. military insisted on for success: clear goals, a powerful force, NATO command and control, robust rules of engagement, a one-year time limit, and the expressed cooperation of the rival factions." 139 This is precisely what the principal-agent approach would suggest. The military advisors to the negotiators in Dayton had every reason to specify their mission as precisely as possible. The administration also had that incentive. Had the negotiation not been successful in making American plans as clear and risk free as possible, it is not apparent that Congress would have agreed to the deployment of U.S. troops.

The events in Bosnia are far from over, but in the policy choices thus far military hesitancy does not seem to have been a determining factor. At every step, policy choices have represented alliance politics, domestic politics, and the difficulties of creating policy for a complex situation as well as military considerations. 140 Furthermore, some of the military reticence can be attributed to the signals from civilians at the onset that ground troops to create peace were not an option. 141 During the April 1993 hearings, many argued that air power would not be effective without ground troops. 142 This is not to suggest that anyone in the military was advocating an armed intervention. The estimates were that it would take too many troops for too indefinite a period of time and that there was no political will to back up such a commitment. 143 The civilian statements refusing to even consider the use of troops, however, combined with public sentiment against sending Americans into Bosnia most certainly contributed to the military's conclusions about the quality of political will.


140. The Joint Chiefs had outlined several options ranging from lifting the embargo (which, if compelled to make a choice, the majority preferred) to an air strike aimed at sending a message (a close second because it minimized risk but with uncertain gains) to an opera-
tional air strike (which many believed was too risky) to inserting ground forces (which all believed was too risky). See "Pentagon Advice Gives Cold Comfort to Clinton: Bosnian Air Strikes Are Risky, Alternative Poor," Wall Street Journal, 28 April 1993. Clinton opted not to lift the embargo because of the international consequences for NATO.


143. "Pentagon Advice Gives Cold Comfort to Clinton."
Also, as in the case of Somalia, civilian opinion on Bosnia has not been unified. The one issue on which the most agreement could be found was that the United States should not inject ground troops into Bosnia. As part of enforcing the peace agreement, however, American troops are now deployed. Beyond this, there has been a broad range of opinion during both Bush and Clinton’s tenure in office about the relative costs of action in Bosnia. In Congress there has been both strong opposition to the use of force and strong support for it. Furthermore, the debate has not followed easily identifiable party or institutional lines: Republicans, Democrats, representatives, and senators have been found on both sides of the issue.

The character of the mission in Bosnia made the voices for caution stronger than in Somalia because it was harder to identify discrete tasks that did not risk either drawing the United States into the larger conflict and opening the possibility for American ground troops, or threatening the stability of NATO. Also, the quality of the Serbian forces made it easy to identify casualty risks in almost every contemplated action. So, while the United States supported humanitarian relief, the scope of the conflict in Bosnia made it more difficult to draw a mission statement within which even limited U.S. goals could be met without opening the prospect for greater participation in the conflict and greater risk of U.S. casualties. While those in CENTCOM felt reasonably certain that they could accomplish limited goals in Somalia without putting U.S. soldiers at undue risk, the situation in Bosnia did not inspire similar optimism. This simply reflected the military reality; the Serbs are a more formidable force than the war lords in Somalia. The Pentagon did draw up plans, but included a risk factor in all of the them. The extent to which these plans did not look like good options for Bosnia reflected the political reality, that the consensus in America pre-

144. For an argument that the U.S. should consider troops, see Jonathan Clarke, “Put Teeth Into Preparedness to Wage War,” Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1994, B7.
146. For example, Senator Charles Robb (D-VA) argued that the goal of military intervention in Bosnia should be to punish the Serbs, not to affect the outcome of the war. “It's symbolism, not gradualism,” he said. “It's a recognition of the limits of air power,” and the powerful domestic opposition to any introduction of ground troops. See “Vets Add Weight to Hill Debate on Use of Military Power,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 30 April 1994, 1077-79. In fact, analyses of air power demonstrate that it works when its aims at affecting the outcome of the war rather than on sending signals. See Robert Pape, “Coercive Air Power in the Vietnam War,” International Security 15, no. 2 (fall 1990). For the best defense of the use of air power in Bosnia which does focus on affecting the outcome of the war, see Albert Wohlstetter, “Why We’re in It—Still,” Wall Street Journal, 1 July 1993.
vented the consideration of military action that would put soldiers’ lives at risk in Bosnia for an uncertain outcome, rather than military intransigence. The policy chosen by the Clinton administration, beginning with limited NATO air strikes on the Serbs to end the stranglehold of Sarajevo, was approved by neither the Powell-led cautionaries nor the air power enthusiasts represented by McPeak, but represented the administration’s own judgement.148 Finally, after the Croatian offensive had weakened the Serbs and the warring parties agreed to a peace settlement, the circumstances for a more risk-averse intervention were obtained.

There has been a general dissatisfaction with military plans for Bosnia, particularly among those who were advocates for U.S. action. Some have even suggested that the degree of military cooperation the Clinton administration received in Somalia and Haiti was a trade off for avoiding action in Bosnia. It is undeniable that there has been an interactive effect between these crises. Congress members were talking about the parallels between the cases from the first commitment in Somalia when Nunn worried about whether this paved the way for similar deployments.149 Political and military lessons were learned and transferred from one intervention to the next.

It is not at all clear, however, that either administration was eager to intervene in Bosnia.150 Clinton did criticize Bush’s lack of action during the campaign but changed his mind after a review of the situation. His six-point plan introduced in February 1993 did not represent a serious departure from Bush’s policy. This probably reflects the fact that, given international and domestic worries, this was the best plan of action. U.S. decisions in Bosnia were clearly complicated by NATO concerns. Some lower-risk steps to help the Bosnians, such as lifting the arms embargo, were opposed by U.S. allies in NATO and threatened to inflame relations with Russia.151 The decision to use air strikes was allowed by a change of heart among the NATO powers after the Serbian capture of Srebrenica and Zepa. Only after the NATO perspective changed, the strategic situation improved with Croatian gains, and the UN mission was reduced, were other possibilities for American action less costly.

148. “NATO’s Plans for Limited Air Strikes on Serbs Fails to Satisfy Either Camp in U.S. Military,” Wall Street Journal, 13 August 1993, A8. The article notes that Pentagon dissent had been muted because officers did not believe that NATO threats would be carried out.
149. “Suffering Spurs Unprecedented Step,” 3761.
150. Though there were undoubtedly individuals who were in favor of intervention.
EVALUATION OF CASES

The civil-military interaction in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia suggests that the "out of control" claims are overstated. There simply does not seem to be a unified military perspective that is altogether different than the civilian one. While the centralization of the military engendered by the Goldwater-Nicholas Act may have made joint assignments more career enhancing, it does not appear in these cases to have generated overwhelming military unity. Furthermore, it does not appear to take much military disunity to provide civilian leaders with alternate plans. We also do not see military perspectives driving policy. Even with many reports of relatively united military opposition to intervention in Haiti and Bosnia, civilian leaders found military perspectives to support more interventionist plans.

The process suggested by the principal-agent approach provides an accurate interpretation of the pattern in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. In each case, public military reluctance was preceded by congressional concerns with the direction of policy. Congress members often articulated conditions for intervention—particularly low casualty risks and clear exit strategies.

Military leaders pushed for a number of conditions that would make their job clear and achievable. First, the military paid close attention to the potential for casualties. Military leaders sought not to involve themselves in a war, especially one that had the potential for serious casualties without the same strong public opinion support that Congress was looking for. In the cases examined here, most notably in Haiti, the army, navy, and air force have demonstrated an overwhelming concern with keeping casualties to an absolute minimum. We have also seen military leaders eager to make public their estimates of the number of casualties expected for different operations. In addition, military leaders called for clear goals, a clear chain of command, robust ROE, and, after Somalia, an exit strategy. This is something we should expect when an agent is attempting to satisfy principals who disagree. The move toward more detailed ROE is analogous to the


move toward well-documented small steps in domestic policy. The agent will want to get around being punished by one or another principal by agreeing ahead of time on rules or processes that can obtain agreement.

Even though there was general reluctance among military leaders during the Somali intervention and before those in Haiti and Bosnia, there were also leaders who spoke out for more aggressive plans. General Montgomery and Admiral Howe in the case of Somalia argued for a more aggressive policy and, for the most part, the administration followed their advice. General McPeak was a strong advocate of the worth of air power in Bosnia, and he had some support from Admiral Boorda. As it was, Clinton chose to follow a more intermediate route in Bosnia.

Most significantly, in all of these cases, military advice has not driven policy. Policy has reflected civilian preferences. Haiti is particularly notable here; Clinton chose to intervene and instituted a successful policy despite misgivings in the military and even greater misgivings in Congress. There is also much evidence that in their attempt to come to terms with the post–cold war security system, military leaders and military organizations are closely watching the civilian leadership—the president, the Congress, and the public—for guidance. As former secretary of navy Sean O'Keefe argues, “While it may be better to demur on such [peacekeeping and peace enforcement] assignments, operational tactics must be considered if we're truly headed in this direction.”

While the “out of control” claims may be overstated, it is clear that military advice in these crises has generally reflected a reluctance to intervene in low-level conflicts, and this reluctance has often frustrated at least a portion of the civilian leadership. The next obvious step is to examine the normative implications of this outcome and the solution to it.

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MILITARY HESITANCY

The crisis literature claims that military reluctance has constituted undue military influence on civilian decisions about the use of force. The assertion of undue influence is ultimately a normative claim. Principal-agent theory would agree that when civilian control is divided, and civilians disagree, policy outcomes are likely to be less efficient for any particular civilian preference, but the principal-agent approach makes no normative claims

about this outcome. Constitutional scholars do make arguments about the normative benefits of presidential (divided) versus parliamentary (unified) governments, but there is no consensus over which is best.

Presidential systems are held to create unwieldy arrangements that do not allow countries to respond effectively to the international system. Parliamentary systems allow governments to respond quickly and efficiently. At the same time, however, proponents of divided systems argue that they guard against civilian indiscretion. Parliamentary systems purchase efficiency at a cost—they increase the risk of civilian errors. Peter Feaver has pointed out that the crisis literature claims that civilians have a right to be wrong. In this claim, they may be reasoning in a similar way to proponents of parliamentary systems. The framers of the American constitution, though, had significantly different worries. Their concern in structuring American institutions was to guard against civilian indiscretion—to make it harder for mistaken policy to go forward.

In some sense, the claim of undue influence is also an argument that the level of military influence is unusual for the United States. By giving us some explicit suggestions about what is to be expected in U.S. policy, the principal-agent approach employed here can help us understand the degree to which what we have seen in the post–cold war is typical for this strategic setting. Principal-agent theory would expect military advice to have the most impact on policy when civilians disagree. When military leaders are being asked for advice by civilians with different preferences, they have an incentive to reinforce the civilian preferences closest to their own. They also have an incentive to speak publicly about their preferences—especially if they believe those with whom they disagree are ignoring important factors which may come back to haunt them. Furthermore, the design of delegation when civilian conflict is high leads organizations to take small, well fortified steps. Public statements are one way of fortifying the organization’s advice to insure that it will not be held accountable if something it


warned against comes to pass. The principal-agent approach would thus suggest that the behavior of the military is not so unusual.

Charting what is typical, allows the principal-agent approach to add some cautious advice to the competing normative claims. Divided systems instill a set of behaviors and enforce them with electoral risks. Indeed, the impact of the recent conservative military advice is enhanced by its reflection of public and congressional concerns about limited wars. Encouraging leaders to ignore electoral risks may lead the country into policies that are unlikely to be sustained. Certainly one of the most important lessons of the Vietnam War is that there are high costs to embarking on a policy that cannot be continued in the long term. In other words, it may be a good thing that the military is acting prudently before there is broad agreement between the president and Congress (or even between different congress members or the public at large) about what are U.S. national security goals. Until there is a general consensus that the United States should be intervening in Bosnia or Haiti or Cuba or any one of a number of similar contingencies that may arise, American interests (and the interests of our allies) may be served well by military wariness. Inaction may be frustrating, but action which only makes matters worse by its failure or lack of completion can lead to wasted resources, squandered lives, and institutional crises.

Just because the American system is working the way the framers intended does not make it right or best. The framers’ concerns, however, have shaped American institutions and should be the starting point for realistic expectations about what we can expect from civilian and military leaders in the United States. Barring Constitutional reform, there will always be more slack in the American polity than in a more unified system. If we want less slack, we need to focus our attention on the root cause—lack of consensus among civilian leaders. Trying to remedy an intermediary result—conservative advice from military leaders—is unlikely to work and could lead to even worse policy outcomes. While not making an explicitly normative argument, then, this approach would suggest that if we prefer military advice to be less public and more responsive to civilian preferences, we should focus on generating civilian consensus rather than on hushing military advice.

159. Russell Weigley has long argued that it is difficult for the American military to pursue limited wars. This phenomenon has less to do with whether civilian leaders are in control and more to do with the electoral context within which leaders operate.
ARE THE RELUCTANT warriors out of control? Not quite.160 Their conservatism makes sense as a response to the lack of consensus among the civilian leadership in the United States about the importance of low-level threats. The lack of consensus has been affected by the uncertainty of the international environment, and political institutions in the United States which encourage disagreement. When civilians disagree, the U.S. institutional structure was designed to slow change. The system is working as intended, and the way we should expect it to continue short of constitutional reform.

Conservative military advice has not led the military to be reluctant to act once civilian leaders have made a decision. In Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, civilian decisions have carried the day in policy outcomes. Furthermore, the generally conservative military advice has not removed civilian options. In the cases examined, the plans of even a few activist military leaders provided civilian leaders with a range of policy options. The conservatism of military advice has done more to cause civilians to give greater consideration to the use of force than to prevent it. To the degree that conservative military advice makes leaders think twice about using U.S. force, it reduces the potential that civilians will pursue a policy that cannot be sustained. Some, myself included, believe that is a positive outcome.

Nevertheless, to the extent that there is a problem with the U.S. willingness to use force, it is not a problem that will be solved by discouraging conservative military advice. The solution to the problem is to generate civilian consensus. Until there is a consensus about the conditions under which responding to low-level threats is important to American security, the military will not abandon its cautionary role.

160. Even Richard Kohn agrees that “out of control” did not accurately characterize his argument. See “An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations.”