Cooperating for Peace:
The Challenges and Promises of Partnerships in Peace Operations
Cooperating for Peace: The Challenges and Promises of Partnerships in Peace Operations*
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# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships in Peace Operations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Generation: Troops, Assets, and Training</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policing: Training, Deployment, and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Response and Reaction</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian Expertise</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion: Toward a Global Peacekeeping System</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Preface

This Geneva Report emanates from the research and deliberations of scholars and practitioners with extensive expertise in peace operations gathered in December 2009, to facilitate exchange, to share knowledge, and to distill critical lessons learned. Approximately thirty scholars and practitioners participated in the meeting. The seminar is part of an annual series of seminars on peace operations convened by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the International Peace Institute.

The seminar explored the question of partnerships in UN peacekeeping operations at a time when there is increasing interest in further developing the strategic, practical, and operational aspects of better understanding, resource-pooling and burden-sharing in peacekeeping operations. In particular, the seminar considered partnerships in four critical areas: troop and asset generation and training (finding adequate soldiers and equipment); rapid response and reaction (reducing the time for deployment during the critical early stage of a crisis); policing (improving the options for supplying the growing need for police trainers and formed police units), and civilian capacity (mapping the demand and possible mechanisms and sources of supply of widely-needed civilian expertise).
The questions on the table were these:
1. What is the state of the global peacekeeping system, and what are the opportunities and constraints for substantial, systemic improvements in the capacity of the international community to meet current and future demands?
2. What are the principal approaches to partnerships in this area, and what is the track record of their success?
3. What will be required, and of whom, for improvements in partnering in these areas in pursuit of enhancing the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations?

The work of GCSP conference professionals Katrin Kassebohm and Sandrine Gosselin are gratefully acknowledged, particularly for their invaluable assistance in organizing the event. Anne-Caroline Pissis managed the publication process within GCSP and brought the publication to fruition.

Thanks are expressed to Adam Smith for his skillful design of the event and for spearheading the work of the team in the substantive structure of the seminar, which is reflected in the content of this Report.
Executive Summary

In the over two decades since UN peacekeepers won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988, the mechanisms and means for providing peacekeeping “supply” where it is needed continue to bedevil policy makers and those on the ground tasked with the difficult job of international intervention. Today, the peacekeeping agenda is packed with concerns such as the protection of civilians, peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep, managing spoilers, balancing humanitarian, peacebuilding and development imperatives, and the realization that vulnerability to relapse into conflict means that peacekeepers may be required for years and indeed decades to come.

The challenge of creating a system of partnership to address the demand-side needs is evident. The seminar on which this Geneva Report is based emanates from the research and deliberations of scholars and practitioners with extensive expertise, in or knowledge of, peace operations who gathered in December 2009, to facilitate exchange, to share knowledge, and to distill critical lessons learned. Approximately thirty scholars and practitioners participated in the meeting. The seminar is part of an annual series of seminars convened jointly by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the International Peace Institute.
The seminar explored the question of partnerships in UN peace operations at a time when there is increasing interest in further developing the strategic, practical, and operational aspects of better understanding resource pooling and burden sharing in peace operations. In particular, the seminar considered partnerships in four critical areas: troop and asset generation and training (finding adequate soldiers and equipment); rapid response and reaction (reducing the time for deployment during the critical early stage of a crisis); policing (improving the options for supplying the growing need for police trainers and formed police units); and civilian capacity (mapping the demand and possible mechanisms and sources of supply of widely needed civilian expertise).

Partnerships
In considering the advantages and disadvantages, the strengths and weaknesses of these models, a common set of issues arises. First is the importance of understanding the institutional dimension: the need for organisations to seek partners to address legitimacy or efficiency deficits. The second is the concept of comparative advantage, how this term is used in this field, and the on-the-ground implications in peacekeeping theaters. The third is the importance of complementarity, subsidiarity, and cooperation; genuine partnership cannot mean paternalism or patronage, and dependency relationships must be mutual.

Troops
The principal challenge of force generation at the moment is that, in practice, one small group of countries makes a decision and pays the bills for global peace operations. In turn, member states with personnel capacity to spare, such as the South Asian militaries, provide the human resources. Many participants argued that this bargain is not sustainable over time, and that one of the key challenges to peacekeeping in the years to come is diversification in the distribution of troops. Donald
Daniel’s research and analysis reveals that, given a number of factors, the options for increasing the supply of well-trained, suitable troops for UN peace operations is highly constrained.

Policing
There has been the development of a standing police capacity in response, in part, to the need for rapid deployment. At the UN, a Standing Policy Capacity was established in 2007, and Formed Police Units (FPUs) have become increasingly relied upon. Second, there has been some halting evolution in the creation of global policing standards and the eventual adoption of a UN policing doctrine. While the process of creating global standards began in 2005, it is expected to come to fruition soon in a new doctrine and training guidelines. The challenges, however, remain acute.

Civilians
The principal challenge of civilian deployment is not availability or quality of personnel, but rather human resource management in recruitment, placement, and retention. Participants in the deliberations raised a number of issues in the possible expansion and enhancement of UN civilian capacities in peacekeeping. One concern is the concept of interoperability: experts at the headquarters level are not always appropriate in field settings, and vice versa. How can the incentives for professionalization and professional opportunity of civilian specialists be more fully addressed?

It does not necessarily follow that greater civilian staff involvement will mean greater progress on peacebuilding objectives. Capacity substitution, and not capacity development, often occurs with the deployment of technical assistants, for example. Participants cautioned that a civilian surge would not necessarily transfer into the peace-building and state-
building objectives that would allow for peacekeeping operations to begin withdrawal.

Looking Ahead
The need for rethinking and reinvigorating the global peacekeeping system is clear: as argued in the 2009 UN report "A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peackeeping", “Peacekeeping in its current form requires more predictable, professional, and adaptable capacities. It needs a global system to match the enterprise it has become.” The next task in the evolution of peacekeeping is to design and create a more integrated, predictable system on the supply side.

Changes in the global peacekeeping system will be a matter of further slow, incremental evolution. There is now a tradition of 60 years of peacekeeping practice-attempts to create a new global peacekeeping system that diffuses authority, responsibility, and function presents certain dangers. There will continue to be concerns about whether regionally- led interventions rather serve the national interests of neighbours than reflect the universal values that the UN through new principles such as the "Responsibility to Protect".
Introduction

The challenges of armed conflict in the last two decades have led to a burgeoning and diffuse system of peacekeeping measures. Beyond its very narrow and traditional definition of separating parties and monitoring cease-fires (which the United Nations (UN) still does, for example in southern Lebanon), peacekeeping has become a principal instrument in the complex set of responses made by the international community to provide the necessary security guarantees to the parties in these mostly internal conflicts to implement peace agreements after war.

Today, there are more than 200,000 peacekeepers deployed globally by the UN, the European Union (EU), the African Union (AU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and others operating within multinational, multidimensional mandates to ensure peace in war-torn countries. Indeed, armed conflict trends since the end of the Cold War have left in their wake numerous cases of lengthy post-war implementation of peace accords. In this context, building sustainable, resilient national-level institutions capable of addressing the root causes of conflict in the long term has been difficult at best. Peacekeeping is critical in such cases, especially where conflict is a result of recurrence of prior wars,
because external security guarantees are essential to sustaining incipient moves toward peace.¹

New global assessments of conflict trends and measures of the presumed root causes of conflict—scarcity, inequality, autocracy, and extreme-ideology motivation—signal a clear message: in the international system, a third of the states that are highly vulnerable to emergence of armed conflict, and in a subset of at least 34 states, are vulnerable to the recurrence of civil war.² Thus, it is quite reasonable to conclude that on the “demand side” of peacekeeping (when and where peacekeepers will be needed in present and future conflict arenas), there will be at least constant and possibly significantly increasing demand in the years to come.

The purpose of this paper and the seminar on which it is based, is to look at how the international community, and the UN in particular, can cope with the present and expected demand for peacekeeping. According to the most recent data, “the United Nations remains the largest institutional provider of peacekeepers, accounting for about 50 percent of global deployments—with nearly 80,000 military personnel, 12,000 police and thousands of civilian staff in the field. The UN’s forces grew at a rate of about 7 percent in 2008.”³

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More than two decades ago, in 1988, the United Nations Peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. On that occasion, the Nobel Prize Committee stated that “In situations of this kind, the UN forces represent the manifest will of the community of nations to achieve peace through negotiations, and the forces have, by their presence, made a decisive contribution towards the initiation of actual peace negotiations.”

The Prize that particular year was fortuitous: that year marked a shift in UN peacekeeping missions as the Cold War-driven conflicts of Angola, Cambodia, and Namibia began to wind down. This led to a new role for peacekeepers that - despite some similarities to the 1960-1964 mission in the Congo - had never been a part of the strict neutrality doctrine that was at the core of the peacekeeping system that had developed in the 1950s and beyond to monitor cease-fire agreements. The new tasks were immense, and “multi-dimensional”: to create security in the exit from mostly internal armed conflict; to provide policing and to coordinate the security of early-recovery humanitarian relief and development; and to oversee and to secure a political transition designed to clearly determine “success” in peacekeeping’s contribution to ending civil wars.

In the over two decades since the 1988 Prize, issues about how the international community organises itself to provide peacekeeping where it is needed continue to bedevil policy makers and those on the ground tasked with the difficult job of international intervention. Today, the agenda is packed with concerns such as the protection of civilians, peacekeeping when there is no peace to keep, managing spoilers, balancing humanitarian, peacebuilding and development imperatives, and the realization that vulnerability to relapse into conflict means that peacekeepers may be required for years and indeed decades to come. Clearly, there is a need to create a system of partnership capable of addressing the demand-side challenges.

To evaluate these questions and these issues, the report that follows presents the following sections.

1. First, what is meant by partnership and what are the present models of partnership? What lessons have been learned from key partnerships in “hybrid” operations such as the force deployed in African Union - UN Darfur (UNAMID)?

2. Second, how can improvements be made in the quantity and quality of peacekeeping troops? How can the recurrent problems of providing available and well-trained troops for peace operations be more effectively managed?

3. The third section does much of the same for the critical question of partnerships in policing. Arguably, one critical element in the ability of a peacekeeping operation is to provide for community-level security that can give societies a chance to recover and to build anew a local-level social contract. Policing is therefore essential to overall peacebuilding goals. What lessons have been learned in UN policing?

4. The fourth section looks at military cooperation and rapid reaction. Rapid response is critical if peacekeeping is to contribute to preventing crises from escalating, and becoming more serious challenges to international peace and security. Yet, still, the UN lacks a truly robust rapid response capacity. What can be done to improve rapid reaction and responses?

5. The fifth section addresses civilian expertise. There is widespread interest in being more effective on the “political” side of peacekeeping, and especially in the ways in which civil-affairs personnel can contribute, with other partner organisations, to building state capacities in the aftermath of war. Most analysts agree that national state capacity to manage conflicts through democratic institutions and processes is, strategically, the key to a successful drawing down of UN peacekeeping personnel.

6. International peacekeeping requires more predictable, professional and adaptable capabilities. In the final section, the report draws conclusions about the need for a global peacekeeping system. What would a
functional and effective system look like? What are the key issues in considering the further development of such a system? And, what are the risks and potential rewards?

A critical issue that arose in deliberations is the dilemma of achieving balance between flexibility in partnerships (that can meet the contextual needs of a particular crisis area) and the advantages that could be gained from institutionalising partnerships, particularly in the form of formalised agreements between the UN and other regional organisations. In some ways, this debate was between those who emphasised leadership in responding to crises – setting the agenda, building the coalition, providing the resources to make it work – and those who emphasized the need for deeper and more effective institutionalisation of peacekeeping arrangements among these critical organisations.
Partnerships in Peace Operations

The complexity and scope of current peace operations is characterised by the need for partnerships at virtually every level of engagement and in every operational environment. The need for rethinking peacekeeping in terms of partnership is reflected in the July 2009 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support (DPKO/DFS) report, “A New Partnership Agenda: Creating a New Horizon for Peacekeeping”, which reflects well the context for a new focus on partnerships:

Simply put, existing capabilities do not match the scale and complexity of peacekeeping needs today. The demands of the past decade have exposed the limitations of past reforms and the basic systems, structures and tools of an organisation not designed for the size, tempo and tasks of today’s missions. Political strains are also showing.

Divisions within the international community affect the ability of some missions to act effectively on the ground, and the attention of Member States is at times spread thin among competing peace and security priorities. Each new operation is built voluntarily and from scratch on the assumption that adequate resources can be found and is run on individual budget, support and administrative lines. Peacekeeping in
its current form requires more predictable, professional and adaptable capacities. It calls for a global system to match the global enterprise it has become.\(^5\)

**Key Questions**

1. What are the most serious dilemmas facing the UN and other actors in managing complex partnerships on the ground?
2. What are the most successful models – sequentially-deployed, co-deployed, “hybrid” operations – as we look to the future?
3. Under what conditions do the various models work best?
4. What should be done to leverage relative capabilities and comparative advantages of regional and subregional organisations in relation to the UN?
5. What kind of accountability challenges (for what and for whom) does partnership in peace operations raise? What issues of authority and legitimacy arise?

**The New Partnership Agenda**

As demand for this peacekeeping “system” has risen and complexity of the operating environment has increased in the last decade, so, too, has the need for direct and indirect partnership contributions to the widely-stretched UN capacity. The “New Horizon” report points to the critical role of partnerships within the UN (between the Security Council and Secretariat, between headquarters and field operations), and partnerships for the future that envisage expansion of participation in peacekeeping and a greater engagement by member states in support of specific missions. Likewise, partnership as a concept and operational imperative also refers to the ways in which missions partner with departments and agencies within the UN system, with other inter-

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\(^5\) The “New Horizon” report is available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/newhorizon.pdf; the quotation is from p. iii.
national organisations such as the World Bank, and beyond the system with hosting governments and local civil society, as well as international humanitarian organisations and non-governmental organisations through “global public policy networks”.

Given the complexities of the environment and of the tasks that peace operations entail, partnership becomes, prima facie, a natural strategy for an already overstretched UN to address the real-world need for more extensive, and more effective, responses. Partnerships seem especially beneficial in a wide range of issue areas requiring specialized engagement and comparative advantage, such as supporting political transitions, providing humanitarian response, security, and early economic recovery. In these and in other specific peacebuilding dimensions – such as responsiveness to gender, effectiveness in security sector reform, or progress in policing – partnerships appear to have inherent advantages in that resources can be pooled, comparative advantages realised, and risks can be shared.

However, it is also clear that there are sometimes costs to partnership approaches in strategic and operational coordination, in defining roles, responsibilities and accountabilities, and in field-level interoperability. Indeed, in crises such as Darfur or in missions such as Afghanistan and Kosovo, the mandate, structure, and terms of partnership are challenging dimensions of today’s more complex peace operations in comparison to past traditional operations. Do the coordination and efficiency costs outweigh the benefits of partnerships? There is a need for ongoing, careful evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of various forms of partnerships, of the effectiveness or dysfunction

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of different approaches, and of the potential – and pitfalls – of various forms and models.

Models of Partnership in UN Peace Operations

Wafula Okumu of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), drawing on the other typologies,\textsuperscript{7} has identified three principal types of peacekeeping partnerships, and, in turn, some of the challenges and dilemmas associated with them.

1. \textit{Sequentially Deployed Missions} involve the deployment of various forces in sequence, with hand-offs of responsibility in the aftermath of crisis and in various stages of the processes of recovery. For example, the 1999 intervention in East Timor by the Australian-led INTERFET force was subsequently followed by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Similar approaches have been seen in Haiti, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

2. \textit{Co-Deployed Missions}. In co-deployed missions, or “parallel operations,” the UN and other entities operate in the same country or theater of operations, usually under different commands but in the pursuit of similar broad goals. Parallel deployments have been seen in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Liberia, and Kosovo, for example. In Chad, the EU and UN are co-deployed and in neighboring Central African Republic the EU has provided troops whereas the UN has provided police and civilian personnel.

3. \textit{Hybrid Missions}. Deployments that involve two or more organisations sharing command or where one organisation subordinates its command to another are defined as hybrid, or sometimes “joint” operations. The case of UNAMID in Darfur looms large in the discussions of the hybrid approach, even though this model has also been seen at times in

Haiti and Kosovo. The litany of challenges seen by UNAMID since its deployment in 2007 is reflective of the difficulty of leadership in hybrid situations, and of the recurring problems of resources, interoperability, and accountability.

Issues in Partnerships

In considering the advantages and disadvantages, the strengths and weaknesses of these models, a common set of issues arise. First is the importance of understanding the institutional dimension: the need for organisations to seek partners to address legitimacy or efficiency deficits. The second is the concept of competitive or comparative advantage, how this term is used in this field and the on-the-ground implications in peacekeeping theaters.

The third is the importance of complementarity, subsidiarity, and cooperation; genuine partnership cannot mean paternalism or patronage, and dependency relationships must be mutual. Indeed, some have questioned the possibly elusive search for coordination and coherence in UN responses to civil wars, arguing that fully integrated coordination is not only virtually impossible to achieve, but that it may also be undesirable. It is important to keep in mind that partnerships, as a general rule, contain high transaction costs and that there are perhaps natural limits to how much can realistically be achieved through partnerships in peacekeeping operations.

1. Strategic Direction. The first question for peacekeeping concerns the conditions under which troops should be deployed. With the challenges of Darfur or Somalia, or earlier in Bosnia and Rwanda, where peacekeepers are deployed without peace to keep, peacekeeping itself is at risk of failure. One of the most vexing challenges to peacekeeping is the relationship of peacekeeping to the broader peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts to bring armed conflicts to an end. As one participant remarked, “In broad terms, those who are going to resolve the problem
are the people in the country where the operation is being undertaken. But is there a role for the international community? We need to be clear about what it is we’re trying to achieve collectively. We need to manage expectations of the nations that are providing resources and troops. Once you agree on objective, what functions need to be undertaken? Who is going to take responsibility for these functions? Who has the comparative advantage to do this? That is the basis of the “campaign plan” [that every peacekeeping mission should have]. There also need to be some basic measures of effectiveness and progress that indicate that you are progressing effectively. Thereafter it gets more complicated, because each of these functional areas needs a plan. Then there needs to be a meeting of the functional areas, to ensure that there is coordination. This all needs to be done before you even start. It needs to keep going once the mission is underway, but if it is not in place before you start, you are in trouble.”

Common political vision is paired with command and control. If partners share a political vision, working toward a common political framework, this consensus can have important ramifications throughout the entire mission. It gives confidence to mission personnel that there is unity of purpose and a specific higher goal that inspires their contribution to peace and the willingness to take risks toward that end.

2. Leadership and Coordination. Partnership coalitions need leadership in pursuit of a robust mandate. While there is a central understanding that the mandates emanating from the Security Council need to be further improved, especially in situations where a decisive response to local challenges to the peace are likely to arise, there is also an appreciation that, operationally, the robust nature of the response and the ability of peacekeepers to provide order and security is a function not of the Security Council alone, but also of the practical, operational aspects of partnership on the ground. There is broad support for the idea that partners must share a political vision, referring to the high level of missions,
both in the field and high representatives, and especially critical or “pivotal” member states. Success on the ground requires a leader – typically, a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who can seek to leverage the interests of different member states and build on those goal and objectives of reinforcing the incentives for national stakeholders to build peace. The vision for successful use of peacekeeping as an instrument is built around achieving political objectives; peacekeepers will find it hard to achieve a goal if UN member states are working against their aims to build peace in war-torn countries.

3. Management, Effectiveness, and Burden-Sharing. In addition to being military commanders, it is often said of leaders in multilateral peace operations that they must play roles similar to corporate CEOs. Indeed, the management of partnerships has proven to be challenging, perhaps even more so because in multi-dimensional peace operations the challenge is to manage many independent organisations, each with its own mandate, management, resources, and approach. Whose responsibility is it to respond to problems – the region or the international community? How does management of partnership affect its effectiveness in operational terms? How do partners characterise their sharing of the burden in terms of resources of funds, personnel, equipment, territorial responsibilities, or areas of expertise?

What makes for effective partnerships?
Okumu points to ten conditions required for effective partnerships in peace operations:
1. The deployment must be timely and cognizant of the realities and challenges on the ground, particularly the security situation.
2. While deployed, the partners must jointly plan their activities by putting in place mechanisms for advanced communication and strategic coordination.
3. In planning, all partners must be involved at all levels and stages, including UN Country Team members and external partners.

4. There must be adequate and consistent financial support to deliver mandates.

5. The success of partnerships depends on situations where political frameworks provide an environment that facilitates peacekeeping operations.

6. The partners must share a political vision that provides the basis for harmonized goals and complementary actions.

7. For co-deployed and hybrid operations to succeed, their command and control must be highly-integrated.

8. The terms and conditions of personnel in co-deployed operations must be more or less the same.

9. In order to build up the capacities of weaker partners, there should be a transfer of skills across organisations (e.g., from EU/NATO to AU).

10. In hybrid operations, proper planning and support for regional partner peacekeeping missions is critical.
Force Generation: Troops, Assets, and Training

Providing security on the ground is at the core of any peace operation mandate. However, a global shortage of troops, the inconsistent quality and preparedness of available troops, and the lack of critical equipment and logistical support compromise the ability of the UN and other actors to provide that security in a reliable and predictable manner. A successful military presence also depends on the precise alignment of many partners, ranging from Security Council members to the troop-contributing countries and the leadership in the field. In this seminar, Donald C.F. Daniel of Georgetown University reported on a snapshot look of where peacekeepers were recruited in 2008, how various troop-contributing countries compare in terms of the profiles of their militaries, where are the gaps in representation in UN peacekeeping participation, and the implications for partnering for force generation.

The Current State of Peacekeeping by Numbers

A 2008 snapshot of participation in UN peacekeeping operations reveals a number of trends and insights into one of the most essential challenges to peace operations, namely force generation. In 2008, there were real-
istically some 159 potential contributors to UN peace operations, 82 of which were designated contributors (states that contributed at least one unit to peace operations already). In all, in 2008 peacekeepers on the ground totalled about 170,000 (not counting, US troops in Iraq whose mission involves both stabilisation and counter-insurgency). In sum, the average contributing country pledged about 3% of its forces to peacekeeping operations. Over time, troop numbers have risen steadily, and the period 2001-2008 saw a sum total of 534,000 peacekeeping forces deployed in aggregate terms.

Gaps in the deployment of peacekeeping troops relative to demand (in this case, authorised amounts) are significant. Among these are geographic gaps, by which various world regions or groups of states are poorly represented in multilateral peace operations outside of their areas, e.g., Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or African troops. In sum, the research reveals that about 69 countries are willing to consider deployment of their forces out of area, thus contributing to a more universal and ostensibly more neutral approach to peacekeeping. South Asian troop contributors stand out in this regard. Analysis shows that without their engagement in peacekeeping in Africa, it would be very difficult to envisage generating authorised force levels given current patterns of troop contributions by other states that have more significant global deployment, particularly those from Western states. Critical points of analysis include the incentives which prompt states to make contributions, how their contributions relate to the specific specialised needs within a peacekeeping mission, and how to relate militarily the overall need for troops relative to contributions available.

Some of the summary findings of Daniel’s analysis:

1. In 2001-2008, increases in the numbers of troops deployed came mostly from already experienced contributors;
2. Second, one should not assume that peacekeepers provided are able to be deployed universally around the world; many are restricted to local-area deployments;

3. Thirty-one countries allied in the West (e.g., through NATO or in Partnership for Peace), particularly seem to be working together: jointly they have deployed 60-70,000 troops; and

4. Global capacity between the contributors to UN peacekeeping and Western group has not been highly interchangeable (have two separate sub-pools of contributors).

Key Questions

1. What is the current state – in quantity and quality – of the global supply of military troops and assets available for peacekeeping? What is the trend?
2. Where are the gaps, geographically and capability-wise?
3. What solutions are being considered by individual member states, the UN and regional organisations when it comes to partnering in military aspects of peace operations, including not only the adequate contribution of troops and assets, but also issues of planning, logistics, training, rules of engagement, and command and control? What other solutions should be considered?

The Capabilities Gap: Looking to Partnerships

The capabilities gaps in many peacekeeping operations are apparent: there are often not enough units in general, an insufficient number to sustain enforcement or civilian protection-type operations; ongoing interoperability issues; insufficient capacity to deploy in a timely way; and shortages in specialised and niche capabilities. How contributors partner to address these challenges is critical to understanding the capabilities gaps in force generation. Options include the following.
1. **Partnering between states directly.** In some instances, partners have formed battalions or brigades across national lines as a way to create a capability that they could not provide on their own. For example, a Chilean-Ecuadorian engineering company participated in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and an Italian-Norwegian Civil Military Integration Center company and a Belgian-Luxembourg headquarters battalion participated in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). SHIRBRIG (The Standing High-Readiness Brigade) was an example of this nature, an attempt to create a rapid deployment force for Chapter VII operations (critically, a headquarters and associated tactical support to rapidly create a UN presence on the ground). Beginning in 1994, the organisation grew to 17 participant countries and seven observers by 2007. In 2009, the effort was abandoned and some observers attribute the end of SHIRBRIG to the absence of political will to make such direct partnering work. Such expansive efforts of cooperation will likely be supplanted by direct support for partnering, such as U.S. support to Rwanda for its deployments in Darfur.

2. **Partnering among states within organisations.** This involves standing or earmarked forces, and many security organisations around the globe have such a feature. NATO has such partnership and cooperation programs, including the multi-division Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and a brigade-size NATO response force. The EU has 15 multilateral battle groups. The AU is forming five stand-by brigades associated with four of its sub-regional organisations (IGAD, SADC, ECOWAS, and ECCAS). In the CIS region, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation has replaced the CIS as an organizer of a standing peacekeeping force.

3. **Partnering between states and organisations.** States may provide direct contribution to an organisation’s operations, such as the deployment of 3,000 UK troops to support the UN in Sierra Leone in 200,
France's Operation Licome in support of the UN in the Ivory Coast, or the US support for the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1993-1994 with a naval deployment.

4. Partnering among organisations. Finally, organisations partner in sequential, parallel, or hybrid approaches. Such partnerships typically involve joint action between the UN, NATO, EU, and AU; such operations have been typically limited to the European and African contexts.

Challenges and Options in Force Generation

In addition to the challenge of rapid response, considered more fully in Section IV below, the principal challenge of force generation at the moment is that in practice, one small group of countries makes a decision and pays the bills for global peace operations. In turn member states with personnel capacity to spare, such as the South Asian militaries, provide the human resources. Many participants argued that this bargain is not sustainable over time, and that one of the key challenges to peacekeeping in the years to come is diversification in the distribution of troops. In looking for potential countries which could contribute additional troops, Daniel's research identifies those with large ground forces, high-quality militaries, high levels of development, countries that are already contributors, and with operational experience in peacekeeping and ground-force capabilities.

According to his analysis, however, this does not yield a long slate of potential additional contributors. For example, according to these criteria, the US emerges as a most promising potential contributor, but Realpolitik would indicate that it is unlikely to see new increases of U.S. troops under UN are unlikely. This leaves an additional set of countries identified as particularly promising, and Daniel cites Australia, Japan, South Korea, China, and Thailand as the most promising potential increased contributors which could potentially enhance the quality of peacekeeping operations. Among the group he identifies are also quite
a few African countries, including Benin, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa. From South Asia, he identifies Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. In North Africa and the Middle East, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia are promising. From the Americas, he argues for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. In the Far East, China and Indonesia are potential sources of higher-quality peacekeepers.

At the end of the day, Daniel concludes on a slightly pessimistic note: in his analysis, there are few options for a dramatic increase in the supply of high-quality troops for peacekeeping operations. Constraints arising from the internal politics of member states, international political considerations, and the length of rotation cycles makes additional troops from the prospective countries unlikely. While the cross-national comparison of prospective capabilities for peacekeeping is useful, participants found that additional criteria may be equally important. To be considered are which states can provide the most in terms of force mobility (a key gap), how various force contributions may interact between the political and military dimensions of the mission, how the blend affects the chain of command, and other desiderata such as internal mechanisms for oversight and accountability. There seems to still be a lack of institutionalisation in the processes of force generation: while an ad hoc approach allows for the greatest flexibility in designing each mission, institutionalised frameworks of contributions and integrated force development for peacekeeping may allow for more rapid responses, greater effectiveness, and a more forceful deterrent signal that the international community has the capacity in place when the political will crystallises to intervene in an armed conflict.
As law enforcement, police training, protection of public order and countering organised crime are increasingly central elements of peace operations, police forces assume an essential role in the implementation of mandates. What is the current state of available multilateral policing capacity? What is the assessment of the Standing Police Capacity so far? What are the political and operational challenges to enhancing standardised and improved policing capacity? How can partnerships between the UN, regional organisations and/or member states enhance this capacity? What lessons can be learned from inter-organisation partnerships in training and standardisation of police contributions?

Policing functions have increased in recent years as part of UN peace operations, even though the advent of UN police support dates to the 1960s. The close relationship today between the deployment of police, the establishment of community security, and the development of state capacity for security and conflict resilience in post-conflict countries cannot be over-emphasized. This linkage between policing and peace-
building aims is reflected in the dramatic growth in the numbers of UN Police (UNPOL) officers: in late 1995, 1,702 officers were deployed; by late 2009, the number had swelled to 12,222 in 15 peacekeeping missions. Eirin Mobekk of King's College finds that the UN Police Division is facing increasing demand for a “higher number of officers, expanded roles and mandates, and missions with a much higher degree of complexity than earlier peacekeeping missions.” She considers the principal challenges to policing to be cooperation and progress in UN planning. Participants deliberated on some of the key issues that affect the supply and effectiveness of UNPOL in the field.

The Challenges of Partnerships in Policing

Before listing the challenges, it is important to highlight that there has been significant progress in partnership approaches to enhancing policing capacities for peace operations. First, a standing police capacity has developed in response, in part, to the need for rapid deployment. In the UN, a Standing Policy Capacity was established in 2007, and Formed Police Units have become increasingly relied upon. Second, there has been some halting evolution in the creation of global policing standards and the eventual adoption of a UN policing doctrine. While the process of creating global standards began in 2005, it is expected to come to fruition soon in a new doctrine and training guidelines. The challenges, however, remain acute, and include:

1. An uneven quality of skills and lack of pre-deployment training. The quality of skills of officers is a challenge that continues to persist. It is the responsibility of each national contingent to provide pre-deployment training. In some instances, there has been progress in addressing this need. Prior to deployment of UNPOL personnel in Sudan, cooperation was sought between various national contributing law enforcement agencies with different law enforcement agencies, and 70% of all UNAMID police received pre-deployment training. Typically, across all
missions, only about 35% of UN police receive mission-specific pre-deployment training.

2. An absence of a unified doctrine and the number of variable guidelines in place; these guidelines are not well-linked to operational work or to pre-deployment training. The International Policing Advisory Council III (2007) endorsed a draft doctrine, and there has been recognition within the UN Police Division of the need for an operational doctrine. At present, with the help of INTERPOL, the draft doctrine is nearing finalisation.

3. Partnership in policing brings its own unique set of challenges. Who identifies the needs and priorities, and how are resources allocated? Who decides who the local stakeholders are, and what to do with them? Within the peacekeeping mission, there is often a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities – such as co-location with local police forces – and this has led to severe criticism of UN police in such settings as Timor-Leste or Haiti. The debate on co-location of forces reflects a lack of consensus among contributing personnel about how best to link up with local structures of police and how to approach the critical issues of skills transfer and capacity development.

4. The final challenge to partnership is getting the various entities within the UN system to work together. Policing is clearly and closely connected with early-recovery imperatives, such as establishing security and building the rule of law. This requires UNPOL to be closely involved in coordination mechanisms in country, although these vary. Particularly, with donor agencies such as UNDP mandated with police reform in some instances, and in common cause with development assistance to the building of rule of law, the need is paramount for close strategic coordination between UNPOL and other UN and non-UN entities working in the areas of judicial reform, security sector reform, and entities such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
UNPOL needs to focus more on actually participating in coordination mechanisms that are already in place in mission countries.

Mobekk remarked that “UNPOL has been notoriously poor at working with and consulting local stakeholders... too much is still dependent on individual police officers and their capabilities and willingness to bolster local ownership... Selecting partners based on the ability to communicate with them and accessibility will not lead to locally owned processes and would limit legitimacy”.

Cooperation and Progress in UN Policing

Participants concurred that much work needs to be done in improving UN police deployment and operational capacities, but that there is often a gap between the development of policy and the operational practice in complex mission environments. The following recommendations emerged from the deliberations. First, there is the need to support the creation of police institutions and services that make sense to the people. These institutions will not be sustainable unless they are fully supported by the society they serve. The example of Afghanistan illustrates that policing approaches must include Shari’a law and tribal law. This cultural context means that the most suitable partners need to be identified, and that deployment of western-oriented police contributes little to the extension of rule of law in far-flung villages.

Second, there is a need for further innovation. For example in Chad, the UN established an entirely new structure for partnership in policing involving coordination of three absolutely independent parties (UN, EU, Government of Chad). The international community helped Chad ensure that it could provide security in refugee camps, a secure environment for these organisations and established a Chadian police force, under the full command and control of the Chadian authorities, ensuring their responsibility for security. The force was trained by the UN, recruitment
done with UN personnel, and fully equipped and supported by the UN (via a trust fund).

Third, partnerships need to improve training. Training improvements can occur inside the community of member states, in the area of pre-deployment training. States that have the capability should help states that don’t. Training should be linked to international policing standards, the current absence of a universally-accepted policing standard undermines the development of a universal curriculum.

Finally, coordination needs to improve within the UN. Sometimes the police are overextended and in some cases they have been inappropriately deployed for paramilitary tasks. The Standing Policy Capacity is a very diverse unit that provides early leadership in mission deployment and provides assistance and advice to existing police missions around the world. In conclusion, the concept is quite good precisely because it reflects a team approach: the UN’s Specialised Police (SPU) deploys small teams with specific terms of reference. The colleagues selected for the training are highly motivated and highly competent.
Rapid Response and Reaction

Since the end of Cold War, expectations of the UN have been high in the global security environment, calling for a timely response to crises around the world. Yet, despite innovations in policy and years of experience, the UN and other actors are still unable to effectively respond to crises when most needed. What options are currently available, or are being developed, for rapid response (by the UN, the EU, NATO, and the AU)? What are the inherent challenges, both politically and operationally, to getting boots and suits on the ground in less than 90 days? What lessons can be learned from past and current efforts to create rapid response and reaction capacity? In what ways can partnerships between international, regional, and sub-regional organisations enhance the reaction capacity of the global peacekeeping system?

Despite the evolution of institutional arrangements designed to meet supply-side gaps, carefully developed institutional rules and procedures tend to fall apart in times of crisis. In such situations, it is important to look beyond the evolution of institutions and partnership frameworks and to the politics of the crisis in understanding those instances in which rapid reaction and response are forthcoming (or not).
The Case for Ad-Hoc Mechanisms

Rapid reaction and a decisive response in crisis situations require troops, air assets, headquarters facilities, and advance knowledge of the deployment area. Richard Gowan of New York University claims that while many organisational arrangements have been put into place for rapid reaction - some, mentioned above, include the NATO Response Force, SHIRBRIG, the EU Battlegroups, and the African Standby Force (the latter has a target completion date in 2010)-, he finds that “recent experience suggests that, far from facilitating rapid deployments, highly-developed multilateral rapid reaction mechanism are often less likely to move fast and effectively than ad hoc mechanisms.” Among the examples he cites in favor of ad hoc mechanism are the 1998 interventions in the DRC by SADC (led by Zimbabwe), which although controversial, were “undeniably fast”. Also cited was the 2003 deployment of Operation Artémis in DRC by the European Union (led by France).

In understanding the conditions that make possible a rapid response, it is critical – in Gowan’s view – to bring the states back in. That is, the institutional frameworks are often ignored in the heat of crisis and states tend to rely on their own mechanisms for providing rapid response. In the 2006 crisis in Lebanon, for example, Europeans used their own assets to backstop UNIFIL, bypassing normal UN deployment structures and processes. Thus, in mounting a quick and effective response, the emphasis is on the importance of member-state decision-making processes (reflected in the New Horizons Report) and on understanding coalitions of key states and their interests in a particular crisis.

Beyond Institutionalism

Thus, there is in Gowan's view a paradoxically inverse correlation between the degree of institutionalisation of rapid reaction and its effec-
tiveness (in other words, the more structured the rules, the less likely you are to get a reaction). Second, when crises actually occur, decision-making returns to state level (states make the actual choices). Policy-makers must therefore expect that in moments of crisis institutions are not coherent, and that decisions emerge through interactions between member states. The relationship between the EU and UN, which is extensively developed in this paper, argues that the formation of EU battlegroups is actually misleading in practice and that the ground-level interactions among European member states have “made it even harder for the EU to deliver.”

The case of the African Standby Force (ASF) is also illustrative of the problems of institutionalising rapid response. The ASF is in reality an amalgam of forces drawn from subregional organisation structures, and while SADC and ECOWAS are further along in joint force preparations, the entire ASF as a whole is fractured and patchworked, not a coherent institution. Furthermore, deployment of the ASF requires parliamentary approval, thus slowing down the ability to act quickly. The analysis comes down to evaluating the incentives that motivate states to contribute to rapid reaction. Among these are:

1. Risks and rewards: governments will weigh the financial and military risks of any peacekeeping endeavour against potential security or national-prestige rewards;
2. Range and regionalism: most countries (as Daniel’s data shows) tend to deploy peacekeepers close to home in the context of regional security arrangements; and
3. Responsibility: states will take more risk and provide greater commitment when they have political or operational control over a mission.

In sum, according to Gowan, it is fallacious to look toward institutionalisation as a remedy to the need for rapid reaction. Institutions can increase capabilities marginally, but at the end of the day state responses in crises will inevitably be unpredictable. The best one can hope for is
to structure the incentives in such a way as to encourage member states to take up responsibility in the moment of crisis.

Some participants demurred, however, arguing that the creation of institutions for partnering provides two important elements in responding to crisis. One is that frameworks reduce the uncertainty and provide a prior flow of information among the parties, easing cooperation and knowledge-sharing in times of crisis. The second is that institutional arrangements provide the critical agreement that ad hoc coalitions tend to lack: legitimacy. Although the deployment of a force such as the ASF may be more cumbersome initially, in this view, it will be ultimately more effective as a force if external legitimation for the force comes from existing multilateral agreements.
Civilian Expertise

Civilian expertise is needed in peace operations, both in supporting the work of missions and in boosting the capacity of the host country. Various member states and regional and multilateral organisations are seeking to enhance their rapidly deployable civilian capacity. However, challenges to effective and rapid civilian deployment exist on both the supply and demand sides. Questions remain on how to recruit, train, and retain skilled civilian experts; how to better understand the specific needs of countries emerging from conflict; and how to match this demand with the appropriate expertise. How can the demand for civilian capacity be measured? How can multilateral civilian expertise be harnessed to match this demand? How can partnerships between organisations or between member states create more reliable and more standardised rosters of civilian experts? What are the roadblocks – institutionally, politically or otherwise?

Current doctrine within the UN on peacekeeping and peacebuilding firmly supports the importance of civilian expertise and overall civilian direction of the mission as a critical political element contributing to
success. As one participant noted, “peacekeeping missions are 80% politics.” Moreover, there is a need to attract people who are knowledgeable about the specific case, with a clear understanding of conflict dynamics and a keen sense of how to move the process of peacebuilding forward. Cedric de Coning of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs finds that the common concern with civilian expertise—a shortage of qualified persons— is wrong; in his view, the principal challenge is the recruitment system itself—identifying, hiring, and deploying competent personnel. In deliberation, participants also identified a host of other problems with the concept of a “civilian surge” and cautioned that more consideration should be given to how increased civilian capacities could lead to more effective support for peacebuilding.

Civilian Functions in Peace Operations

### Substantive Functions

- Political Affairs
- Legal Advice
- Planning and Benchmarking
- Public Information
- Humanitarian Liaison
- Human Rights Monitors
- Gender Advisors
- Child Protection Advisors
- Conduct and Discipline Officers
- Rule of Law Advisors
- Electoral Affairs
- Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration
- Civil Affairs
- Security Sector Reform

### Administrative Functions

- Human Resources
- Financial Management
- Procurement
- Logistics
- Engineering
- Geographic Information Systems
- Information, Technology and Communications
- Transport
- Contingent Owned Equipment Management
- Security
- Integrated Training Services

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Civilians: Who, Where, and Why

The evolution of peacekeeping from a predominantly military enterprise to a more multidimensional approach incorporating civilians and police underlies the present concern with civilian capacities. Reflecting the growth in peacekeeping, almost 14,000 civilians are now deployed in areas such as security sector reform, gender, benchmarking, and electoral assistance. The debate over civilian components lacks clarity, in part because some entities such as the EU define police as civilians. The substantive roles and functions of civilians in peace operations are expansive, and include a wide range of tasks outlined in the box above.

De Coning claims that “The civilian component in the UN context is not one coherent component with one identity and management structure.... instead there are several civilian components that exist as specialised units of different sizes and composition, determined by the mandate or focus of the mission.” Three critical questions emerge in considering UN civilian capacities: first, what roles do civilians play in either substituting or enabling local capacity; second, how can the UN best make use of national staff and civilian capacities (especially substantive functions) to develop local capacity for the eventual transition to full national ownership.

Human Resources: Issues in Creating Rosters of Civilian Experts

On the supply side, one of the most difficult challenges facing the civilian experts side of peacekeeping is in recruitment, rostering, and deployment... essentially, the “HR” of managing civilian experts. The UN suffers from very high vacancy rates in its missions... UNAMID had a 56% rate in 2008, UNMIS had a 40% rate in 2005, and other missions often run at nearly 15-20% vacancy rates on average. The problems of filling these posts are numerous, including the time it takes to recruit
and deploy staff (typically, up to 170 days); the need to ensure balance and representation across member-state and gender considerations; the ability of missions to absorb more civilian staff; and practical issues such as securing insurance. The UN also finds it difficult to recruit for specific tasks, such as integrated planning, or in new areas such as protection of civilians. It is clear that the UN recruitment system is inadequate to respond to the complicated tasks involved, although incremental change to the system (called “Galaxy”) is presently underway to make it more responsive to the needs for civilian expertise in peacekeeping operations.

Among the areas of improvement are the civilian standby rosters through which pre-trained, pre-identified specialists are placed on a roster and can ostensibly be deployed when the need arises. The example of the Mediation Support Unit’s Standby Team of Mediation Experts is a good example of such standby capacity. Within DPKO, efforts have moved forward to building on the further development of the Rapid Deployment Team (formed in 2003). Third, is rostered capacity, or a database of potential candidates who may be called upon to meet specific deployment needs. In this light, the Department of Field Support (DFS) is developing rosters of specialists in political affairs and civil affairs. However, a truly integrated roster of civilian expertise to cover the broad range of needs and skills is elusive.

At present, in the follow up to the Secretary General’s 2009 report on peacebuilding, the Peacebuilding Support Office is reviewing how to improve the UN’s civilian rosters and methods for rapid reaction. Four questions arise in this regard: How to get the right people in the right places? How to get other institutions to do the same? How to stimulate and draw upon expertise available in the South and in countries of peace building? Finally, what mechanisms and systems are needed to enhance capacities for civilian peace-building?
Issues related to the Expansion of Civilian Expertise

Participants in deliberation raised a number of issues about the possible expansion and enhancement of UN civilian capacities in peacekeeping. One concern is the concept of interoperability: experts at the headquarters level are not always appropriate in field settings, and vice versa. How can incentives for professionalisation and professional opportunity of civilian specialists be more fully addressed? At present, there is concern that field-level appointments do not align well with professional development incentives within the UN.

Second, there is a deep concern about the substantive civilian affairs personnel, and the linkages between progress in national capacity development and peacekeeping exit strategy. It does not automatically follow that increased civilian staff will mean greater progress on peacebuilding objectives. Capacity substitution, and not capacity development, often occurs with the deployment of technical assistants, for example. Participants cautioned that a civilian surge would not necessarily transfer into the peacebuilding and statebuilding objectives that would allow for peacekeeping operations to begin withdrawal.

The third issue relates to the security of UN civilian personnel. Following the Canal Hotel Bombing in Iraq in 2003, and subsequent attacks on UN civilian personnel in Algeria, Afghanistan, and Somalia, there are concerns that a civilian surge would lead either to new vulnerabilities for UN personnel or to redeployment of peacekeeping assets away from critical military objectives to personnel protection. Thus, prior to enlarging the numbers of civilians in any given mission, it is critical to conduct detailed assessments of the impact that such civilians can have, the relationships between their roles and broader political objectives, and the practical incurred by the mission in providing security for more civilians to meet military objectives.
Finally, some are concerned that the deployment of civilians in peace operations may create a brain drain in those higher-capacity development countries that can supply quality South-South civilian assistance. While situations have gone well in this regards, such as in the case of the approximately 100 civil servants seconded by India in Afghanistan, there may be other instances in which work for the UN may well be more attractive to civil servants who are desperately needed to serve back home.
Conclusion: Toward a Global Peacekeeping System

The need to rethink and reinvigore the global peacekeeping system is clear. The next task in the evolution of peacekeeping, is to meet this need with adequate design and functioning mechanisms, especially in light of the fragile, post-conflict environments in which UN peacekeeping is striving to accompany toward democratisation and development.

The seminar revealed the principal cause of tension in the design of a new peacekeeping system. Advocates of institutionalisation of partnerships believe that putting the elements and structures in place will yield more predictable, professional, deployments. Others suggest that while the development of institutional linkages among peacekeeping organisations does not hurt, and may even marginally help, at the end of the day rapid reaction for peacekeeping – when it is needed most – is likely to occur only in cases where the interests of powerful member states happen to align. The critical question then, is: How can institutionalisation of peacekeeping help make rapid response more effective, recognising that in most crisis situations member-state political factors – and the formation of ad-hoc coalitions – typically will determine when peacekeepers are rapidly deployed?
Why a Global Peacekeeping “System”?  
Adam Smith of the International Peace Institute (IPI) argues that “Peacekeeping... the instrument that was not yet invented at the time of the drafting of the UN Charter, has become, in fits and starts, the world’s most expensive, most visible, and riskiest ongoing activity.” The UN peacekeeping budget has swelled from $1.4 billion in 200 to $8 billion in 2010. The UN itself deploys some 110,000 personnel in peace operations, and non-UN peace operations account for another nearly 100,000 personnel (in operations run by the AU, ECCAS, the EU, NATO, the CIS, and OSCE).

In practical terms, peacekeeping is already a global system. Formally, it is a set of interacting units or elements organised to perform a function, and thus the present state can be evaluated and improved systematically toward a better system featuring predictability, professionalism, adaptability, and more effective results in promoting international peace. The current shortcomings of the system are rooted in the way in which the UN, regional and subregional organisations, and member states sub-optimally supply in response to the demands for building peace in war-torn countries. Peacekeeping has become the most critical element in global responses, and is more likely to succeed when the security guarantees are provided for parties to successfully transform the waging of conflict from the battlefield into new forms of collective, inclusive governance.

The research findings on troops, police, rapid response, and civilians shows that the system itself has multiple inputs and that these are coordinated (more and less so) through cross-organisational partnerships. In the core critical areas – provision of basic security, protection of civilians, and support to peace processes – there is awareness that the system functions inadequately. While there is widespread appreciation in both scholarship and practice that “peacekeeping works,” there is also equal awareness that two principal deficits exist. First, the UN
does not show up on time; critical moments of intervention are lost because of the failure of collective action to muster sufficient forces, and to respond. Second, UN operations have in some cases been unable to protect civilians from mass violence. The widely-embraced but poorly-implemented norm of “Responsibility to Protect” is vitiated. This awareness of peacekeeping’s central challenges has animated the search for new partnership approaches in meeting these challenges.

Article 34 of the UN Charter confers upon the Security Council the legal authority to take action or to mandate others for action. The UN is at the locus of a global peacekeeping system: the combined effect of Articles 34 and 53 (“no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council”) puts the UN at the center of legal authority. Since the beginning of peacekeeping operations during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the UN has been at the forefront of implementing its legal authority via operational means.

The peacekeeping system faces normative and operational challenges, as the contributors to the seminar have shown. UN dependence on partnerships arises out of practical, political and normative imperatives. For Smith, this dependence is caused, in part, by a serious perception problem for the world body. “It has become clear over the past decade – and still clearer over the last two years – that the UN suffers from a dangerous perception problem among certain populations,” and the attacks on UN civilian staff mentioned in the last section underscore that the shield of legitimacy that the UN previously enjoyed has tarnished in the post-Cold War period. The reliance on partnerships stems from the need for the UN to augment its legitimacy in difficult climates such as Sudan (e.g., UNAMID) or Somalia (e.g., ANISOM). Thus, Adam Smith concludes that the gravity of peace operations has shifted somewhat to regional organisations and partnerships between organisations.
Changes in the global peacekeeping system will be a matter of further slow, incremental evolution. There is now a 60-year tradition of peacekeeping. Attempts to create a new global peacekeeping system that would diffuse authority, responsibility, and function is dangerous. There will continue to be concerns about whether regionally-led interventions serve the national interests of neighbours more than they reflect the universal values that the UN, through new normative instruments such as the Responsibility to Protect, brings to bear.

Improving Partnerships

Peacekeeping can be improved by forming and expanding upon partnerships that focus on the UN as a central normative and political coordinator, and often as a central command and control on the ground, with its partner organisations working in sequence, parallel, or hybrid/integrated modes. Peacekeeping can be improved for the peacekeeping system to:

1. Allow for more rapid responses, for example working together when a regional organisation or group of member states may be more likely to deploy quickly and where the UN may be called in a sequential partnership to take the reins over time. Individual member states or ad hoc coalitions may provide a more rapid and effective initial response, perhaps working directly with the UN. The joint operation in Haiti and the rules of command, burden-sharing, and practical issues such as control of air space in response to the humanitarian crisis following the January 2010 earthquake, offer insights into how the UN can more effectively interact with partners to provide immediate security and humanitarian relief in fragile states in the wake of natural disasters or other crises.

2. Allow for partnerships that feature a robust responder, when more force is required than the UN can or should bring to bear. The UN’s lack of critical force capabilities for offensive action has led its being mis-
matched against well-trained, resourced, and dedicated local fighters. Member states such as NATO or the EU are clearly positioned to respond more decisively in the short term, whereas the UN may be better-placed to build state capacity over the long term. Improving partnerships in this area requires a full understanding of the conditions under which powerful member states can and will intervene, and toward what end. One critical element of success in the system will be the continued universal oversight of peacekeeping by the Security Council.

3. Enable partners to be a sole responder when the Security Council is paralysed or refuses to authorise a force (in the case of Somalia, for example) and where partners such as the African Union may be willing to try to provide some security guarantees by protecting fledging governments that emerge from UN-mediated peace talks.

4. Create partnerships that contribute to UN legitimacy. While the case of UNAMID will continue to be debated, it is clear that the association with the AU contributed to UN capacity to have at least some presence in addressing the dire needs of war-torn Darfur. However, the severe logistical, managerial, and operational challenges illustrate that the “hybrid” approach has serious limitations and there is still insufficient understanding of the risks involved with these type of missions. Indeed, skepticism runs deep about the “hybrid” concept and consequently, the peacekeeping system will need to continue to find ways of allowing inter-organisational legitimacy to be mutually-reinforcing.

Looking Ahead
Several points emerged from the deliberations of the Geneva seminar pointing to future directions for peacekeeping in the 21st century.

First, when it comes to sustaining peace after civil war, peacekeeping is not always the right instrument, and certainly is not the only or even principal instrument to be considered. The UN and its partners must continue capacity-building in areas such as mediation, commu-
nity security, and governance processes, and to use peacekeeping cautiously. The over-extended reach and mandate of UN peacekeeping puts the entire system at risk losing of credibility.

Second, peacekeeping will continue to involve normative, mandatory, and operational risks for the UN. Partnerships do offer a way to expand participation and ownership, to share burdens, and to complement engagement in the interest of helping countries finding a new basis for living together.

Third, there are risks and rewards, advantages and disadvantages in partnering for peacekeeping. Developments in today's most difficult environments - Afghanistan, Sudan, or Somalia - will determine how partnerships are seen for years to come.

Fourth, in some ways, peacekeeping is a victim of its own ambitions in the last twenty years. Peacekeepers are today involved in virtually all aspects of global governance in war-torn countries: crime, democratisation, and, often, counter-insurgency. Indeed, there is nostalgia for the days when peacekeeping could be safely neutral, small and professional, and quietly humble. It is therefore important to think more forwardly about how peacekeeping contributes to international peace and security, and to reclaim and recast the role of the development of the system as a way to create international capacities not just for rapid response and post-conflict peacebuilding, but as a rejuvenated system able to contribute to conflict prevention. Some analysts point out that to avoid the conflicts of the future, which may be driven over climate change, scarcity and inequality, bad governance, UN peacekeeping system can help prevent escalation of conflict in critical moments of political, economic, or social turmoil.

Finally, it is important to be realistic about peacekeeping. As one participant noted with insight, “If the world doesn’t like what peacekeeping is doing, it should find a new world.” The next horizon will in fact be a period of intense intrastate, and international, competition. As
a result, the balance between demand for and supply of peacekeepers to meet the 21st century challenges to peace and security will likely require an even deeper and clearer understanding of the conditions under which peacekeeping partnerships can work.
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